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ABSTRACT
This dissertation discusses the backgrounds, mobility strategies, and business 
practices of the small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) proprietors in Taiwan, 
set specifically in Taiwan's history of the past fifty years. A main focus is on 
how Taiwan's SMEs balance off profit-seeking behaviour and social norms in 
their business practices.
It is shown in Chapters One and Two that whereas a popular belief is that there 
exists a culturally-based drive among Taiwanese to become independent 
proprietors, the prevalence of SMEs in Taiwan is instead largely induced by 
structural factors. Differential educational opportunities have set limitations to 
upward mobility through credentials, especially among ethnic Taiwanese, and 
the first chapters show how and why, starting in the 1960s-70s, running one's 
own small business became the most significant mobility path of the less 
educated in Taiwan. The following four chapters (Three through Six) are 
devoted to discussions of the SMEs' internal management, including financial, 
marketing, human resources management, and the new overseas investment 
ventures. Throughout, attention is directed toward the special interpersonal 
dilemmas faced by family firms, the predominant form of SME in Taiwan.
Ill
TABLE OF CONTENT
INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................................1
1. Literature Review.....................................................................................................................1
2. Theoretical Framework....................................................................................................... 25
3. Structure of the Dissertation............................................................................................31
4. Methodology...........................................................................................................................32
CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF TAIWAN’S SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED 
ENTERPRISES (1945-1960)........................................................................................................... 36
1.1 The Chaotic Take-over (1945-1949)................................................................................. 36
1.2 Class Structures in the 1950s .......................................................................................... 50
1.3 Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 68
CHAPTER 2: EDUCATION AND SOCIAL M OBILITY.......................................................... 70
2.1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................70
2.2 Education, Occupations and Ethnicity......................................................................... 71
2.3 Education After the War ...................................................................................................75
2.4 The Patterns of Mobility Paths in Taiw an................................................................... 89
2.5 Structural Constraints on Collective Action...........................................................94
2.6 Thesis on ‘the Boss Island’ .............................................................................................. 100
2.7 Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 104
CHAPTER 3: THE SMES’ FINANCES...................................................................................... 107
3.1 Initial Capital of SMEs ..................................................................................................  107
3.2 Working Capital of SMEs .................................................................................................114
3.3 Loans and Guanxi................................................................................   121
3.4 SMEs and Tax Evasion.....................................................................................................  125
3.5 The New Banks’ Competition and Deregulation of Financial Markets............127
3.6 Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 132
CHAPTER 4: MARKETING MANAGEMENT.........................................................................135
4.0 Introduction........................................................................................................................135
4.1 Outlets for SME Products...............................................................................................135
4.2 Types of Power Relationships..........................................................................................145
4.3 Price Competition in a Competitive World Market................................................... 149
4.4 Economic and Political Power Manoeuvres.............................................................  152
4.5 Long-term Relationships-H ow to Balance Cost and Benefit...............................155
4.6 State Regulations and Societal Power........................................................................164
4.7 ‘Guanxi’ and Long-Term Relationships.......................................................................  166
4.8 Conclusion............................................................................................................................169
IV
CHAPTER 5: HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 171
5.1 The Economic Structure and Family Firms................................................................ 171
5.2 Working for the Patriarchal Family.........................................................................  172
5.3 Labour-Capital Relationship in SMEs ........................................................................  175
5.4 Family Enterprises and Tax Evasion..........................................................................  181
5.5 Contradictions Between Strong Social Ties and Inefficient Management.....188
5.6 The New Market and Employment Situations........................................................... 198
5.7 Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 204
CHAPTER 6: SMES’ OVERSEAS INVESTMENT...................................................................206
6.1 The Trend to Invest Overseas......................................................................................... 206
6.2 Starting a New Business Overseas................................................................................212
6.3 Capital Sources for Overseas Investment................................................................. 219
6.4 Markets for Overseas Products................................................................................... 223
6.5 Human Resources Management......................................................................................232
6.6 The Asian Financial Crisis and Taishang...................................................................... 236
6.7 Conclusion...........................................................................................................................238
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................... 240
7.1 Summary of Findings.........................................................................................................240
7.2 Theoretical Reconsiderations.......................................................................................246
APPENDIX........................................................................................................................................ 256
REFERENCE (ENGLISH).............................................................................................................260
REFERENCE (CHINESE).............................................................................................................272
REFERENCE (JAPANESE).......................................................................................................... 284
V
Tables and Figures
Table 1. 1 Staff Distribution Between Japanese and Taiwanese in Japanese Enterprises
(1944-45).................................................................................................................................... 40
Table 1. 2 Staff Distribution Between Mainlanders and Taiwanese in Public
Enterprises (1946-50)............................................................................................................. 40
Table 1. 3 Distribution of Senior Positions Between Mainlanders and Taiwanese in the
Taiwan Administrative Governor’s Office, 1946..........................................................41
Table 1. 4 Composition of the Agricultural Population (Households) ...........................43
Table 1. 5 Average Rent Payments in Different Counties (1927, 1948)..........................  44
Table 1. 6 Interest Rates Per Month in Rural Taiwan (1948-49)......................................  46
Table 1. 7 Changes in the Taiwanese and Mainlander Population (1946-1957)............  53
Table 1. 8 Occupational Distribution Among Taiwanese and Mainlanders in the
1950s........................................................................................................................................ 54
Table 1. 9 The Labour Force in Different Industries in the 1950s (By Ethnicity) .........55
Table 1. 10 The Mainlanders’ Occupational Distribution in Urban Areas (1953).......  56
Table 1. 11 Employment in the Rural Taiwan (October-December, 1952)...................... 56
Table 1. 12 Annual Household Income, 1953............................................................................56
Table 1. 13 Lands of Different Ownership Types, 1952-1953 .............................................. 58
Table 1. 14 Number of Landlords Selling and Purchasing Land, 1946-49...................... 60
Table 1. 15 Employers and Self-Employed in Industry, 1951-60.........................................65
Table 2. 1 Newly Recruited Labour Force in Industry, by Ethnicity, 1960-1990..........72
Table 2. 2 Age of First Job, by Ethnicity (1960-1990)............................................................ 73
Table 2. 3 Years of Schooling of Those Who Had a Formal Job, by Ethnicity (1960-90)
..................................................................................................................................................... 73
Table 2. 4 Year of Schooling by Date of Birth and by Ethnicity.......................................73
Table 2. 5 Self-employed Ethnic Distribution in Secondary and Tertiary Industries
(1950-90)...................................................................................................................................  75
Table 2. 6 Development of Elementary Schools, 1944-1959................................................ 78
Table 2. 7 Education by Father’s Occupation and Date of Birth: 1946-75......................79
Table 2. 8 Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status, by Ethnicity........................ 80
Table 2. 9 Characteristics of Middle-School Sample, Taipei, April 1968.......................82
Table 2. 10 Regression Analysis of Different Variables on Educational Attainment
(1991-1992)..............................................................................................................................  84
Table 2. 11 Regression Analysis of Different Variables on Occupational Prestige
Scores (1991-1992).................................................................................................................  85
Table 2. 12 Occupational Prestige Scores by Education in Different Life Histories . 89 
Table 2. 13 Changes of Employment in One’s Working History .........................................90
VI
Table 2. 14 Education and Age of Self-Employment at Three Different Periods of Life
.....................................................................................................................................................91
Table 2. 15 Percentage of Self-employed and Employed in the Non-Agricultural
Sector, by Education............................................................................................................. 91
Table 2. 16 Small Business Owners’ Socio-Economic Background .............................. 101
Table 2. 17 Formal Education of Small and Medium-Sized Entrepreneurs ............. 104
Table 3. 1 Interest Rates in a Standard Rotating Credit Group...................................  114
Table 3. 2 Liability Structure of Big Enterprises, 1991-95 ............................    117
Table 3. 3 Liability Structure of SMEs, 1991-95.................................................................  118
Table 3. 4 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ Shares of Loans and Sa les ..............121
Table 3. 5 The Background of Newly Established Banks (1991)...................................... 128
Table 4. 1 Household Income Distribution, 1953.................................................................  141
Table 5. 1 Working Place Distribution, 1992 ......................................................................  173
Table 5. 2 Who Actually Got What in the Division of Parental Property...................175
Table 5. 3 Subjective Impression of the Integrity of Public Servants............................183
Table 6. 1 Reasons to Invest Overseas....................................................................................207
Table 6. 2 Areas and Annual Amount of Overseas Investment (1986-1997)................ 208
Table 6. 3 Source of Components and Semi-Products for Overseas Affiliates..........211
Table 6. 4 Types of Ownership in Host Countries  215
Table 6. 5 Capital Sources for Overseas Investment......................................................... 220
Table 6. 6 Markets for Overseas Taiwan Companies.......................................................... 222
Table 6. 7 Marketing Channels for Overseas Production.................................................224
Figure 4. 1 Share of SMEs and Big Firms in Export Markets, 1982-94 ........................... 136
Figure 4. 2 The Share of Exports in SMEs’ and Big Firms’ Total Sales, 1987-94 ......  137
Figure 4. 3 Export and Import Growth Rates, 1986-96......................................................  144
Figure 4. 4 Shares of Four Major Exporting Regions in Total Tra d e ........................... 145
Figure 5. 1 Structure of Employees by Industry.................................................................199
VII
Introduction
Introduction
Paradox reveals the truth 
—Friedrich Duerrenmatt1
This study is focused on the owners of small and medium-sized enterprises in 
Taiwan, upon their social origins after the second world war, and their strategies 
to be upwardly mobile through the establishment of independent businesses. The 
author seeks to de-mythologise some popular opinions about these people, and 
tries to expound the basic problems from the perspective of two contradictory 
forces— social and market forces.
1. Literature Review
Most scholarly writing tends to put Taiwan in either a Chinese or East Asian 
context. Two different discourses are expressed in the disciplines of 
anthropology/sociology and economics/political economy. Most of the research 
on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Taiwan is undertaken by the 
first pair of disciplines within the context of Chinese studies and by the second 
pair in line with an East Asian developmental model.
1.1. Anthropological and Sociological Works on Taiwanese Development
Those anthropologists and sociologists who perceive Taiwan as a frontier of 
Chinese culture2 tend to emphasise the unique characteristics of Chinese 
entrepreneurs, so their works mainly focus upon the traditional factors which 
propelled the dynamic development of Chinese business. Their main concerns 
involve three topics. Firstly, why do Chinese like to be proprietors? Secondly, 
why does the Chinese firm tend to be small? Lastly, how does the Chinese culture 
of guanxi influence Chinese economic behaviour, which in turn includes two 
questions: a) why is the family firm so common in Chinese society, and b) how do
1 Im Paradox erscheint die Wirklichkeit. See Friedrich Duerrenmatt, Die Physiker (The Physicists)
(Zuerich: Verlage der Arche, 1962), p.79.
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they utilise guanxi to run their businesses?
1.1.1 Why do the Chinese like to be their own bosses?
The bulk of research shows that Chinese seek to be proprietors," and the 
most common explanation has been a ‘Chinese mentality’. Chen Jiexuan 
wrote that diligence as a world view (Weltanschauung) would highly value those 
who worked hard to strive to become a boss: ‘Without moral support from this 
ideology, those who tried to be upwardly mobile would not have access to social 
prestige, and their pursuit of profit would lack legitimacy’.2 34 Wong Siu-lun found 
that the desire to be autonomous is the drive to be one’s own boss.5
Though the cultural explanation sometimes talks about history, its history is 
static and unchanged. The authors seem to believe that social institutions never 
influence culture, or at most just play a minor role. For example, when he 
compared Hong Kong and Singapore business communities, Wong Siu-lun said 
that if all Singaporean institutions were the same as those of Hong Kong, the 
drive to be businesspeople would be the same in Singapore. This is an argument 
which will never be proved, like the claim from neo-classical economics that if 
there were no government intervention in the market, we would be better off than 
what we have at the moment. From another way to read his empirical findings, it 
exactly shows that different social institutions will influence the possibility of 
social mobility.6 One obvious defect of these explanations is that they fail to
2Murray and Hong sharply criticise the claim that the essence of Taiwanese culture is Chinese culture. 
See Stephen O. Murray and Keelung Hong, Taiwanese Culture, Taiwanese Society: A Critical Review o f  
Social Science Research Done on Taiwan (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994).
3 See Victor Mok, ‘Small Factories in Kwun Tong: Problems and Strategies for Development’, in King 
Ambrose Y. C. and Ranee P. L. Lee (eds.), Social Life and Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press, 1981), pp.81-104. Wong, Thomas W. P., ‘Inequality, Stratification and 
Mobility’, in Lau, Siu-kai, Lee, Ming-kwan, Wan, Po-san and Wong, Siu-lun (eds), Indicators o f  Social 
Development: Hong Kong 1988, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, 1991). Other works, see notes below.
4See Chen, Jiexuan (Efc'/V^:), Xieli Wangluo yu Renji Wangluo—Taiwan Zhongxiao Oiye De Shehui 
Jingji Fenya (fa f t  - o &&&&'/&&#{■, Subcontracting and Personal
Networks—social economic analysis o f  Taiwan's small and medium-scale enterprises) (Taipei: Lianjing 
Chubanshe, 1994), p.292.
5 See Wong, Siu-lun, ‘Business networks, cultural values and the state in Hong Kong and Singapore’, in 
Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown (ed.), Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia, (London. New York: 
Routledge, 1995), pp.136-153.
6 See Wong, Siu-lun, 1995, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
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explain why certain groups are more likely to run their own businesses than others, 
e.g., Taiwanese A ) versus Mainlanders in Taiwan. However,
Susan Greenhalgh’s research on Taiwanese urban society found that ‘being 
Taiwanese’ means drawing on family, community and religious ties to climb 
through small-scale business and then larger-scale entrepreneurship into the 
commercial and industrial elite. “Being Mainlander” means eschewing ties of 
kinship and community, and using contacts with people in the bureaucracy and a 
higher education to obtain a white-collar job in government, and hence a secure 
position in the bureaucratic elite’.7 Marshall Johnson argued that the Taiwanese 
held a comparative advantage in the small business world where networks, 
familiarity and trust are required.8 Their research shows that there is a different 
probability of Taiwanese and Mainlanders running a business, even though they 
hold the same ‘Chinese cultural background’.
I will try to elaborate the reasons which underpin this difference. The factors 
that these authors suggest are not altogether convincing. If Taiwanese can use 
familial, communal ties to find a way in the business world, one cannot see any 
reason why the Mainlanders cannot do so, especially when they held relatively 
good opportunities to control the economy in the 1950s, and the public sector 
until the 1980s. For example, it would be easier for the Mainlanders to conduct 
business with the public enterprises than Taiwanese, if networks, familiarity and 
trust are required, as Marshall Johnson claimed. He and other authors hold to 
their claims because they did not analyse the initial conditions of the two groups 
in Taiwan in the 1950s, and the structural factors like family status or educational 
policies, which would largely determine one’s subsequent mobility paths. I will 
explore these in Chapters One and Two.
Other authors look for structural factors to explain why Chinese strive to be 
proprietors. Donald DeGlopper found in a study in Lukang ( j£ ,^ )  that almost all 
proprietors were working as craftsmen before they set up their own business. He
See Susan Greenhalgh, ‘Networks and Their Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan’, China Quarterly, no.99 
(September 1984), pp. 529-552.
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also found that those who desire to be ‘independent’ or ‘mobile’ were those who 
had been hired in small factories where employment was unstable.9 Another more 
comprehensive study done by Shieh Gwo-shyong (Xie Guoxiong, HI $ t) found 
three factors affecting the likelihood of a blue-collar worker becoming a boss: the 
features of dependent capitalism, the specific labour regime in Taiwan, and a 
worker’s age and marriage status.10 Though DeGlopper and Xie have noted the 
mobility paths of labourers, both of their studies are subject to criticism for not 
differentiating Taiwanese from Mainlander.
1.1.2. Why does the Chinese firm tend to be small?
There are three ways to explain the phenomenon: i.e., the traditional custom 
of family partition, state control, and the consequences of a particular path to 
economic development. Chinese family partition is most often cited as an 
explanatory factor. Equal partition of family property to each son makes it 
difficult for a family firm to grow large after the first generation.* 11 Wong Siu-lun 
presents a more elaborated family firm life cycle.12 He has argued that in different 
stages there are different possibilities to divide the family firm. The members of 
the third generation of the family are more likely to divide the family firm than the 
second generation. His model is similar to Shinichi Horie’s ), who
modeled the Chinese family partition into four stages: only communal property 
and familial ideology could bind the family (jia). together after the extended family
8 See Marshall Johnson, ‘Classification, Power, and Markets: Waning of the Ethnic Division of Labour’, 
in Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (Armonk, 
M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1992), p.81.
9See Donald DeGlopper, ‘Artisan Work and Life in Taiwan’, Modem China, vol. 5, no. 3 (July 1979), p. 
304.
10See Xie, Guoxiong (1& g  i&), ‘Heishou bian toujia—Taiwan zhizaoye zhong de jieji liudong
, Black-hands Becoming Their Own Bosses: Class Mobility in Taiwan’s 
Manufacturing Sectors)’, Taiwan Shehui Yanjiu Jikan Taiwan: A Radical
Quarterly in Social Studies), vol. 2, no.2 (summer 1989), pp. 11-54.
11 See Gary G. Hamilton and Nicole Woolsey Biggart, ‘Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative 
Analysis o f Management and Organisation in the Far East’, American Journal o f Sociology, vol. 94 
(1988) (Supplement), pp. 52-94.
12See Wong, Siu-lun, ‘The Chinese Family Firm: A Model’, The British Journal o f  Sociology, vol. 36, 
no.l (1985), pp. 58-72.
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stage (II) . 13
Though they have noticed how traditional factors can affect organisational 
behaviour in the family firm, they ignore the other forces that intervene into 
traditional customs. For example, the control of important production materials 
by the state inhibited companies that would have liked to step into industries like 
petrochemical, communication or electric power that are large-scale and capital 
intensive.
Some other scholars would attribute the prevalent phenomenon of small and 
medium-scale enterprises to state control, like Hill Gates. She uses the term ‘petty 
capitalism’ to describe the general phenomenon of small business which has 
existed since the Song dynasty. 14 The state policy to restrict family wealth 
confined such entrepreneurial activity to the construction of lineages which in 
turn created the social milieu for the prosperity of SMEs. In Taiwan, the 
Kuomintang state tried to create an ‘unspoken alliance’ with these petty 
bourgeoisie, the result being that the state left small business alone without 
interference. 15 Susan Greenhalgh and Alice Amsden both have a different 
viewpoint, believing the state’s control of credit, industrial raw materials and 
licenses hampered the growth of small enterprises. 16 A Taiwanese scholar, Wang 
Zuorong believes that the government’s fear of big business is the
reason why there is little big business in Taiwan. 17
These scholars have emphasised the importance of political force in shaping 
Taiwan’s industrial structures, but this is still not an adequate account, for small 
firms exist everywhere, in the industrialised countries and in the less developed
13 See Hone Shunichi, ‘Taiwan Kanzoku no Kazoku—y/a ideorogi to jia  shyutan’ (Family of Taiwan 
Chinese: jia -ideology and jia -group), Minzokugaku Kenkyu (Research on Ethnology), vol. 46, no. 3 
(1981), pp 311-313.
14 See Hill Gates, ‘Small Fortunes: Class and Society in Taiwan’, p. 178, in Denis Fred Simon and 
Michael Y. M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (Armonk, M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1992), 
pp. 169-185.
15 Ibid. : p. 178.
16 See Susan Greenhalgh, ‘De-Orientalizing the Chinese Family Firm’, American Ethnologist, vol. 21, 
no. 4 (1994), pp.766-767; Alice Amsden, ‘Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: the Origins of 
Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry’, World Development, vol. 19, no.9, (September 
1991), pp.1122, 1126.
17 See Wang, Zuorong, Wang Zuorong Kan Taiwan Jingji a M y Viewpoint on
Taiwan is Economy) (Taipei: Shibao Wenhua Chubanshe, 1988).
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third world. For example, 96.9% of Australian enterprises were small businesses, 
which employed fewer than one hundred workers in the manufacturing sector and 
fewer than twenty in the service sector in 1993-94.18 In Japan, 99.4% were small 
and medium-sized enterprises in the non-agricultural sector, hiring fewer than 
three hundred employees in the manufacturing sector, fewer than one hundred in 
wholesale, and fewer than fifty in the service sector in 1981.19 In short, small and 
medium-scale enterprises exist everywhere, and are not unique to Chinese 
industrial organisation.
In contrast to these arguments, Donald DeGlopper has written that the 
prevalence of SMEs is the consequence of economic development rather than an 
historical remnant.20 This explanation is consistent with the fact that in 1994 there 
were 55,700 newly set up companies,21 and these newly set-up firms had nothing 
to do with family partition. But on the other hand, we should not deny that this 
traditional custom influenced the closures of family firms. In Chapter Five, I will 
discuss the forces that inhibit a family firm from growing large.
1.1.3. How does guanxi influence Chinese economic behaviour?
As to this problematic, it would be very tempting to use ‘Chinese family’ as 
the basic unit to analyse ‘Chinese economic behaviour’, for in the Chinese studies 
of anthropology or sociology, the Chinese family system is a core discourse.22 
Following this academic tradition, the modern economic unit, which is individual 
in Western economic analysis, is transformed into family (jia, %), and family 
enterprise becomes equivalent to firm.
18 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Winning Enterprises—How Australia’s Small and 
Medium Enterprises Compete in Global Markets (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1995), p.8.
19 See Arita Tatsuwa ( #  Chusho Kigyo Montai no Kiso Riron ( 4* 4 ' jk #  TA :S§nO;2M£3!lfw ’ The
Basic Theory o f the Problems o f Small and Medium-Scale Enterprises) (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1982), 
p.5, Table 1.
20See DeGlopper, Donald R, op. cit., p. 286.
21 See Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (,*sL?S"Sß 4* 4 '£■ #!& ),
Zhonghuaminguo 84 Nian Zhongxiao Oiye Baipishu ^  V9 ^  'h , White
Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises) (Taipei: MOEA, 1996), p.64.
22 About the works on Chinese family and kinship, see Burton Pasternak’s review on the topic. See 
Pasternak, Burton, “Economics and Ecology,” in Emily Martin Ahem and Hill Gates (eds ), The 
Anthropology o f Taiwanese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 151-183.
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For example, in the Australian government’s research on Chinese business in 
Asia, it stresses that the economic unit is not the individual but the extended 
household. 23 This kind of definition will not be able to explain those companies 
which are owned by family members but run by ‘outsiders’. To resolve this 
problem, Gary G. Hamilton and Kao Cheng-Shu claim that the features of the 
family firm in Taiwan are diversification, duplication of hierarchies, personal 
relations and personal networks and the importance of an inner circle. They 
understand the family firm in terms of trust-bearing personal relationships.24 To 
define what a family enterprise entails, Chen Jiexuan uses the term ‘quasi-familial 
solidarity’, which means that a group of people, based on common interests, work 
together.25 Their explanations simply turn the family enterprise into a business 
administration. Following their definition, one is not able to distinguish a family 
firm from a non-family firm, e g., what is the difference between a partnership and 
a family enterprise. Wong Siu-lun’s explanation of ‘familism’, which focuses on 
ownership but not on the linkage in transactions, is more useful in clarifying what 
a family firm is . 26
Scholars like to incorporate guanxi and xinyong (trustworthiness, i t  ) in 
their analysis. Wong Siu-lun observes that family members have ‘familial 
solidarity’, which constitutes the core of a Chinese family enterprise. Because 
they are able to pull the outside world into the networks, the family firms work 
well. 27 In another paper, he argues that personal and particularistic business trust 
in late traditional China, including overseas Chinese communities, developed into 
a more systemic and universalistic trust which co-exists with traditional trust, 
providing a congenial environment for entrepreneurship to grow. In other words, 
he thinks personal trust/relationships are still very important in the modern 
Chinese world and he notes that systemic trust and personal trust are mutually
23 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia (Canberra: 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995), p. 126.
24See Gary G Hamilton and Kao Cheng-Shu, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business: The 
Family firm in Taiwan’, Comparative Social Research, vol. 12 (1990), pp. 135-151.
25 See Chen, Jiexuan, op. cit., pp. 59-67.
26 See Wong, Siu-lun, 1995, op. cit., pp. 139-40.
21 Ibid.: p. 139.
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reinforcing 28 Thomas Menkhoffs study argues that trust (xinyong) is the 
‘lubricant’ of Chinese international trade and that kinship networks are also 
networks of trust 29 Kao Cheng-Shu similarly writes that Taiwan’s business 
organisational behaviour is shaped by the traditional factor of ‘personal trust’ 
which is not arbitrary but instrumental-rational.30 Susan Greenhalgh observes that 
‘among the Chinese on Taiwan, as among the Chinese generally, there is a strong 
preference for economic relationships based on prior acquaintance and trust’ .31 In 
another work, she has similar viewpoints to Hamilton and Kao: that duplication of 
posts in family enterprises, packages of individual incentives and group risk 
insurance, networks, and diversification strategies make family firms competitive 
in the market. 32
These authors all emphasise the importance and positive effects of traditional 
factors. Guanxi or xinyong in their explanation of business development serve as 
a repertoire that people who live within this cultural context can hold access to 
indefinitely. Though Susan Greenhalgh talks about the negative consequences of 
utilising familism as the basic trust network, i.e., it produces an atomistic, 
competitive society/’ and a lack of market research, lack of scale of economy, 34 
she did not write anything about this dark side of a ‘network trust’ until 
recently .35
But as Ambrose Yeo-chi King writes, this is only a partial picture of the
28See Won,g Siu-lun, ‘Chinese Entrepreneurs and Business Trust’, in Gary G. Hamilton (ed), Business 
Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia (Centre of Asian Studies, University of 
Hong Kong, 1991), p. 15.
29See Thomas Menkhoff, Trade Routes, Trust and Trading Networks: Chinese Family-Based Trading 
Firms in Singapore and Their External Economic Dealings, unpublished Ph.D dissertation (1990), 
Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld.
30See Kao, Cheng-Shu, ‘Personal Trust in Taiwan Business’, in Gary G. Hamilton (ed ), op. cit., pp. 66- 
76.
31 See Susan Greenhalgh, 1984, op. cit., p. 535. Italics author adds.
32 See Susan Greenhalgh, ‘Families and Networks in Taiwan's Economic Development’, in Edwin A. 
Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy o f Taiwan 
(Armonk: M E. Sharpe, 1988), pp.231-236.
33 See Susan Greenhalgh. 1984, op. cit., p. 535.
34 See Susan Greenhalgh, 1988, op. cit., p. 236.
35 See Susan Greenhalgh. 1994, op. cit.
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Chinese cultural dynamic of network building. 36 The problem of these studies is 
that they treat the family firm as a coherent unit like an individual, so they cannot 
see any conflict and power relationships within the firms and between the family 
members. Some scholars have noted this kind of conflict, as in the works of 
Maurice Freedman'17 or Margery Wolf, 38 or recently Susan Greenhalgh.39 The 
economic conflict either between brothers or between fang  (households, is 
not unusual. It becomes necessary to study the dynamic development of xinyong 
or guanxi, and the nature of conflict within and between family enterprises, as I 
shall do in the thesis.
Some other studies show a different image. Donald DeGlopper finds that 
cooperation and help in Lukang’s businesses are not like the axiomatic obligations 
found among brothers. Such cooperation depends on pre-existing personal 
relations of ganqing (affection » ^ c f f ) . 40 In her study of the tanning industry in a 
community of Hakka Chinese in Calcutta, India, Ellen Oxfeld does not idealise the 
Chinese traditional relationships {ganqing or guanxi), but instead finds that a 
cultural ethos that has been carried from the country of origin and perpetuated in 
the overseas environment expresses a whole range of human relationships that 
have long been encompassed by monetary transactions in the Chinese context: ‘it 
should not be surprising to find such transactions serving as a focal point in Mr. 
Zhou ’s description and assessment o f fam ily relationships '.4l Another case is the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Bank controlled by the Tejaphaibul family, where ‘the 
second generation became embroiled in family conflicts which led to one part of 
the family in control of the Bank severing the short-term credit lines to another
36See Ambrose Yeo-chi King, ‘Kuan-hsi and Network Building: A Sociological Interpretation’, 
DAEDALUS, Journal o f  the American Academy o f  Arts and Science, vol. 120, no.2 (Spring 1991), pp. 
63-84.
3 See Maurice Freedman, Lineage Organization in Southeastern China (London: Athlone Press, 1958).
38 See Margery Wolf, Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1972).
39 See Susan Greenhalgh, 1994, op. cit.
'“ See Donald R DeGlopper, ‘Doing Business in Lukang’, in W. E. Willmott (ed ), Economic 
Organization in Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 297-326.
41 See Ellen Oxfeld, ‘Individualism, Holism, and the Market Mentality: Notes on the Recollections of a 
Chinese Entrepreneur’, Cultural Anthropology, vol. 7, no.3 (1992), pp. 267-300. I have added the 
Italics . Mr. Zhou is the interviewee in the article.
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part in control of the family’s Kloster Beer interests’ .42 Susan Greenhalgh has 
found that power dominance, especially gender dominance, exists within the 
family firm.4’
Besides the conflicts within the family firm, guanxi between the firms is also 
not as effective as some scholars have described. Hamilton and Kao wrote that 
such networks are very important when conducting business with other companies. 
When one has broader networks, one is more powerful. The relationships tend to 
be stable over the long term, and are based on reciprocal trust, loyalty and 
predictability.44 Eugene Cooper observed that ‘while the factors of price, quality 
and demonstrated reliability are important in the conduct of business in Hong 
Kong's free market, ascribed and affective bonds between businesspeople are 
perhaps more important than might be expected’ . 45 Wong Siu-lun argued that 
business trust is the essence of personal ties, and that universalistic trust is also 
established step by step, creating a congenial environment for entrepreneurship to 
grow .46 This kind of image is totally different from the competitive business world 
that neo-classical economics paints. So, too, Donald DeGlopper’s research among 
Lukang businesspeople shows that business is business, and guanxi does not help. 
He found that one can do business with anyone, of any background, though not 
with a total stranger.47 Victor Mok wrote that Hong Kong is a strong bastion of 
rugged individualism: an overwhelming proportion of the small enterprises in his 
study were interested neither in taking partners nor in being absorbed Cut-throat
42 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995b, op. cit., p. 138.
43 See Susan Greenhalgh, 1994, op. cit., p. 754.
44 See Gary G Hamilton and Kao, Cheng-shu, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
45 See Eugene Cooper, The Wood-Carvers o f  Hong Kong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980), pp. 97-98.
46 See Wong, Siu-lun, 1991, op. cit., p. 15. Their observations derive from their interview data, but it 
could be that an informant tells an interviewer socially approved things, and conflicts between themselves 
and other people get skipped in their discourse. In my interviews, most informants mentioned the 
importance of guanxi and xinyong, but when I touched the sensitive topic like the conflicts between 
partnership, they did not like to talk a lot about that, especially those informants who are not very good 
friends of my friends who introduced me to interview them.
4 See Donald DeGlopper, Lukang—Commerce and Community in a Chinese City (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1995), p.205.
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price competition is necessary to survive.48
Based on my own research, I would argue that there is always a tension 
between private interests and social relationships. The pursuit of private interests 
is based on capitalist market calculation, which is imperative for every enterprise 
in the market, or they will be cast out in the competition. On the other hand, 
social relationships are non-contractual relations, which means that the 
relationships between kinship, neighbours, associations and religious belief are 
not based on the ‘freedom of contract’ and self-interested calculations, that liberal 
economists tout . 49 This kind of tension runs through different spheres of social life, 
as in personnel management in the family firms, in their business networks, in 
their financial control, etc. Since this tension exists everywhere, how to resolve 
this tension will become one of my main concerns.
Another commonly discussed topic involves the industrial relations of 
enterprises. Though all writers on the topic agree that most people use guanxi to 
find their job, the interpretations of industrial relations are very different: one 
writer claims that the personnel management is paternalistic, but another says 
that the relationship between the workers and boss is only superficial. Gordon 
Redding claimed that the Chinese management pattern generally is paternal. 50 
Janet Salaff s comparison of family and non-family enterprises showed that this 
paternal management only exists in the family firm . 51 Ambrose Yeo-chi King 
found that Chinese like to hire kinsmen on the grounds that they are reliable, 
competent and responsible. 52 Xie Guoxiong found that firms hire people with
48 See Victor Mok, ‘Small Factories in Kwun Tong: Problems and Strategies for Development’, in King, 
Ambrose Y. C. and Ranee P. L. Lee (eds.), Social Life and Development in Hong Kong. (Hong Kong: 
The Chinese University Press, 1981), p.87, 89.
49 The concept is derived from Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation—Origins o f  Our Time.
(Chinese,Jubian: Dangdai Zhengzhi, Jingji de Oiyuan, •’ tr. by Huang
Shumin, Sh, Jiayin and Liao Wensheng, -^r$f » yM L if ’ $-3üL.) (Taipei: Yuanliu Chubanshe,
1989).
50 See Gordon S. Redding, The Spirit o f  Chinese Capitalism (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), p.215.
51 See Janet W. Salaff, ‘The Chinese Connection: Management Control Structures and the Search for 
Labour in Taiwan: Small Firms’, in E. K. Y. Chen, Jack F. Williams and Joseph Wong (eds.), Taiwan: 
Economy, Society and History. (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1991), 
p.199.
52 See Ambrose Y.C. King, and Peter J. L. Man, ‘Small Factory in Economic Development: the Case of 
Hong Kong’, in Tzong-biau Lin, Ranee P. L. Lee and Udo-Emst Simonis (eds.), Hong Kong-Economic, 
Social and Political Studies in Development. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1979), p.53.
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whom they have guanxi, mainly family members or workers whom the boss was 
acquainted with in the factory in which he used to work.5' Susan Greenhalgh also 
found that employment is mainly through personal networks. 54
On the other hand, Richard W. Stites found that ‘workers are aware that 
surface friendliness with the owner is just that’ . 55 Donald DeGlopper observed 
that the employer is not paternalistic, nor the employee dependent, and both sides 
like this kind of relationship. 56 If the worker is hired through personal networks, 
how come the relationships with the owner are on the surface only? But from the 
viewpoint of an employer, it is not hard to understand the contradictory findings, 
for the boss has to take care of social ties, and on the other hand has to calculate 
his own market interests, so how social ties and social distance can be maintained 
at the same time becomes important.
Another important research field involves the financial systems within 
Chinese society. Justin D. Niehoff s study of one village in Taizhong found all but 
one of the household factories there were financed by family savings, derived 
from the owners’ and younger unmarried members of those households, especially 
the unmarried daughters. 57 Bernard Gallin and Rita S. Gallin argued that the 
modified joint families provided their members with the necessary economic base 
and security to begin new entrepreneurial activities. 58 This finding contradicts 
Wong Siu-lun’s study in Hongkong, where he found the most general form in 
setting up a new enterprise was to cooperate with non-common descent, non­
lineage members to raise the initial capital. 59 Xie Guoxiong’s finding is congruent 
with Wong’s. He found that most of the initial capital could be raised from one of 
the following two types of partnership: partnership with a trade company, or 
partnership with the workers or owner of the putting-out company.60 All agree
53See Xie, Guoxiong op. cit., 1989, pp. 38-39.
54See Susan Greenhalgh, op. cit., 1984, p. 535.
55See Richard W. Stites, op. cit., 1985, p. 236.
56 See Donald DeGlopper, 1979, op. cit., p. 299.
57See Justin D. Niehoff, ‘The Villager as Industrialist: Ideologies of Household Manufacturing in Rural 
Taiwan’, Modern China, vol. 13, no.3 (July 1987), pp. 278-309.
58 See Bernard Gallin and Rita S. Gallin, ‘Socioeconomic Life in Rural Taiwan’, Modem China, vol. 8, 
no.2 (April 1982), pp. 205-246.
59See Wong, Siu-lun, 1985, op. cit..
60See X e , Guoxiong, op. cit., p. 38.
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that it is very hard to borrow funds from the banking system, and quite often one 
has to resort to the informal financial sector to secure money.
But to raise initial capital and to get a loan for working capital are two 
different things. Few works discuss the latter topic. Some like to infer from the 
difficulty to raise initial capital to the situation of getting working capital. For 
example, Zhou Tiancheng and Chen Jiexuan found that small and
medium-scale enterprises in Taiwan are not able to get financial support from the 
regulated banking system . 61 But in his research in Hong Kong, Victor Mok found 
that Hong Kong businesspeople did not lack working capital. 62 If so, why do the 
small and medium-sized enterprises always complain about capital shortages? I 
will discuss this puzzle in Chapter Three.
Business practices involve self-interested calculation, and at the same time 
businesspeople have to be careful not to infringe any of the core social rules 
expected by society. But the contradictions between the roles assigned to them— 
to be a greedy capitalist, or to be a popular philanthropist—is not easy to handle. 
Some scholars have touched upon this problem. For example, Ambrose Yeo-chi 
King notes that there are cultural mechanisms to neutralise or to freeze the 
practice of renqing (human relationships, A f f )  or guanxi in order to carve out 
room for instrumental rationality, which is necessary to maintain economic and 
bureaucratic life (in the Weberian sense).6'" But he does not tell us what sorts of 
mechanisms these are in the business world. Hwang Kwang-kuo (-^-7tiH) argues 
that there are four ways to evade unwanted renqing, which include a) internalising 
the modern attitude of individualism, b) setting up and enforcing clear-cut rules of 
social interaction, c) leaving the interpersonal network of mixed ties, and d) 
psychological compartmentalisation, 64 but all he discusses are the individual
61 See Zhou, Tiancheng , ‘Quanli Bianchui de Zhongxiao Qiye’ ( #  t} 17 'h , Small
and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Power Periphery), in Taiwan Yanjiu Jijinhui
Longduan yu Boxue—Weiquan Zhuyi de Zhengzhi Jingji Fenxi
# r , Monopoly and Exploitation—Political Economy Approach to Authoritarianism) (Taipei: Taiwan 
Yanjiu Jijinhui, 1989), pp. 111-112. Chen Jiexuan, 1994, op. cit., p. 108.
62 See Victor Mok, 1981, op. cit., p. 94.
6j See Ambrose Yeo-chi King, op. cit., p. 76.
64 See Hwang, Kwang-Kuo, ‘Face and Favour: The Chinese Power Game”, American Journal o f  
Sociology, vol. 92, no.4 (1987), pp. 963-967.
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psychological mechanisms. If so, it seems that there is no social mechanism to 
solve the renqing dilemma, which is a social instead of psychological phenomenon. 
Besides, Hwang’s explanation is ^-historical, and he ignores that this kind of 
contradiction only exists in certain social formations, and that the way to resolve 
it also depends on the specific social context. I will argue that the self-regulating 
market in Taiwan’s authoritarian political structure has a strong influence on 
business practices, which inserts tensions into one’s social relationships. I will 
also investigate the social mechanisms, e.g., the rotating credit club, family 
division, a high turnover rate of workers, etc, that are utilised to reduce the 
tension.
1.2. Economic and Political Economy Writings on Taiwan’s Development
After a period of long-term neglect toward research on East Asian 
development, Western scholars trained in economics and political economy in the 
1980s suddenly awoke to dramatic economic achievements in the region which 
puzzled them. Like the sociologists and anthropologists, they tried to unveil 
common factors underlying the region’s development.
There are three ways to talk about Taiwanese development in the East Asian 
context: in terms of Cultural Confucianism (CC), Strong States (SS) and a Magic 
Market (MM).
1.2.1 Cultural Confucianism
Following Weber’s discussion of the Protestant ethic, some scholars have 
tried to discover a ‘selective affinity’ between the Confucian ethic and 
entrepreneurial spirit in East Asia which might contribute to its outstanding 
economic performance in the past few decades. Tu Wei-Ming for
example, has argued that ‘the particular kind of modern [East Asian] capitalism 
emphasises the self, a transformative force, as a centre of relationships, duty 
consciousness, personal cultivation, consensus formation and cooperation,...[a] 
high premium on education and ritual, the fiduciary community and government
14
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leadership’ which could be summarised as ‘Confucian ethic’.65 Such an ethic 
encourages, in a secularised world, a willingness to devote oneself to pursuing 
interests that are rendered morally legitimate.66 The East Asian entrepreneurial 
spirit flourishes under such a drive.
Subject to many critiques that there is no concrete connection that can be 
shown to exist between the Confucian ethic and the East Asian entrepreneurial 
spirit, Tu has replied that ‘indeed there is no causal relationship’.67 If so, how do 
we know that the use of this explanation o f ‘Confucian ethic’ is not instead simply 
the result of long-term economic development? In other words, cause and effect 
are ambiguous in his explanation.
Another critique of the cultural Confucian explanation focuses on its failure 
to explain the economic results in China, North Korea and Vietnam, whose claim 
to a Confucian cultural heritage is no less than the Japanese claim.68 One way to 
respond to this critique is to explain East Asian development in terms of ‘political 
culture’. Roy Hofheinz, Jr. and Kent E. Calder, in their book The Eastasia Edge, 
attribute the economic success of the capitalist states of East Asia to political 
flexibility and predictability, which are based on a high degree of respect for 
hierarchy and for order from top to bottom.69 Such a close cooperation between 
the government and people gives government ‘a central rudder...to undertake 
long-term policies’, which in turn promotes economic development in an 
uncertain world. This kind of ‘oriental’ discourse also could be found in the 
reports of the Hong Kong colonial government when these describe the Hong 
Kong business community. In a report of the Hong Kong Government in 1966, 
‘the traditional Chinese view of the ideal relationship between government and 
people...is analogous to that which should exist between parents and children or
65 See Tu, Wei-Ming, Confucian Ethics Today—The Singapore Challenge, (Singapore:Curriculum 
Department Institute of Singapore, Federal Publications, 1984), p. 84.
66 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
67 Ibid., p. 88. Here what Tu means is the so-called ‘mechanic causality’ which is distinguished from 
what Louis Althusser calls ‘structural causality’ or ‘expressive causality’. See Louis Althusser, Reading 
Capital, 1970, Verso Edition.
68 See Ruth McVey, ‘The Materialisation of the Southeast Asian Entrepreneur’, in Ruth McVey (ed.), 
Southeast Asian Capitalists (New York, Ithaca: Cornell University, 1992), p. 11.
69See Roy Jr.Hofheinz and Kent E. Calder, The Eastasia Edge, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982), 
p.249.
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between a shepherd and his flock’ . 70 Similarly Zhang Jiaming used the
term ‘paternalistic leadership and management’ to describe the relationship 
between the government and business community in Taiwan. This kind of 
relationship is based on a cultural conviction o f ‘trust and loyalty’ . 71
One problem with this kind of explanation is that the types of political 
regimes are so diverse that we cannot find the same relationships between the 
state and civil society across all the countries. For example, Hong Kong is 
basically a laissez faire  state where no specific industrial policy is pursued by the 
government, while in Singapore the government forward-plans almost everything. 
How come these two totally different states have both succeeded economically?
Even when the government works closely with businesspeople, this does not 
tell us what the types of cooperation are. Does the authoritarian state command 
and the businesspeople follow, as in Singapore and Korea? Or do the 
businesspeople just mind their own business and never care what the policies are, 
as in Taiwan or Hong Kong? 72 Or what of the strong power of the Keidanren (.#  
ffl i|L ’ Association of Business Federations) to influence Japanese industrial policy? 
Flattening different political situations to a one-dimensional level cannot alert us 
to the important differences existing between the different locales. Throughout 
the thesis, I will focus on this problem of how the government and business 
community in Taiwan interact.
Another difficulty arising from this approach is that it fails to explain the 
different industrial structures in different countries. Why do Taiwan’s small and 
medium-sized enterprises specialise in exports, while it is the enormous Zaibatsu 
and Chaebol which do so in Japan and Korea?
70 Cited in Lau, Siu-kai, ‘Utilitarianistic Familism: The Basis of Political Stability’, in Ambrose Y. C. 
King and Ranee P. L. Lee (eds.), Social Life and Development in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1981), p.197, note 8.
71 See Zhang, Jiaming Jingji Ouanli yu Zhipei—Taiwan Daxing Oiye Zuzhi de Zhidu Fenxi.(M
d] a LLl i t  M  &J P Jft f f 4 d , Economic Power and Domination—Institutional
Analysis o f  Taiwan’s Large Enterprises) (Unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Donghai University, 1989), 
p.328.
72 For the Hong Kong case, see Victor Mok, 1981, op. cit., p. 85; K. Y. Yeung, ‘The Role of the Hong 
Kong Government in Industrial Development’, in Edward K. Y. Chen, Mee-Kau Nyaw and Teresa Y. C. 
Wong (eds.), Industrial and Trade Development in Hong Kong (Centre of Asian Studies, University of 
Hong Kong, 1992), p.56.
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Since the Cultural Confucian approach cannot explain a lot of the variants in 
the individual countries in the region, a better way to resolve the problem is to 
differentiate between different levels of analysis. Ruediger Machetzki tries to 
identify six basic traditional socio-cultural characteristics in East Asia: i.e., a) a 
relatively low resistance from the traditional human and social viewpoints to the 
transfer of technology, b) a society highly pressed by a so-called ‘particularistic’ 
or ‘situational’ ethics, c) the nature of elite political and social teachings, d) an 
elite education that cultivates a high motivation to learn, e) group-oriented 
thinking, and f) a strong savings and investment consciousness, which contribute 
to a nation’s modernisation success.7"’ Margot Schueller notes that the Taiwan 
government fulfills five political conditions: i.e., a) the elites are capable of 
implementing ‘collective’ economic interests as against individual interests, and 
by doing so, they legitimate their rule, b) the state extends its role, intervening 
into the market to initiate and coordinate industrial development, c) it adopts the 
experience of industrialised countries according to precise evaluations of one’s 
own country’s capability and world market situation, d) a willingness to learn and 
an emphasis on the value of knowledge, e) the use of private savings and state 
investment to raise capital formation, plus f) a Confucian cultural background, to 
explain industrialisation.74 Such an explanation hints that one must have the 
‘right’ culture and ‘good’ government to be successful in economic development. 
But what is a ‘right’ culture? Most Confucian cultural explanations suffer from 
the fact that they only cite the traditional merits to strengthen their arguments, 
while neglecting those darker traits in the culture which can be easily picked up 
from many other writings. When they try to account for the failure of 
development, they do the reverse, i.e., look for the negative cultural factors, as 
Weber did.
Another question is that they do not say clearly how a strong developmental
'3 See Ruediger Machetzki, ‘Kulturspezifische Basis der Wirtschaftspraxis’ (Specific cultural basis of 
economic practices), in Werner Draguhn (ed.), Neue Industriekulturen im pazifischen Asien— 
Eigenstaendigkeiten und Vergleichbarkeit mit dem Westen (New Industrial Cultures in Pacific Asia— 
Autonomy and Comparability with the West) (Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Institutes fixer Asienkunde 
Hamburger, 1993), pp. 24-32.
/4See Margot Schueller, ‘Die Rolle des Staates im Industrialisierungsprozess’, (The State’s Role in the 
Industrialisation Process), in Werner Draguhn (ed.), Ibid., p. 139.
17
I n t r o d u c t io n
state could appear in Taiwan. What kinds of cultures can deliver a ‘good’ political 
regime? What are the articulation mechanisms of these different levels? It is a 
riddle in such writings. The ‘strong state’ approach tells us more about these 
unanswered questions.
1.2.2 The Strong State
In the 1980s a mainstream explanation of East Asian development was the 
‘statist approach’, which was best exemplified in Gordon White and Robert 
Wade’s words, that ‘the phenomenon of successful “late development“...should 
be understood primarily...as a process in which states have played a strategic role 
in taming domestic and international market forces and harnessing them to a 
national economic interest’.75
Robert Wade says that what makes East Asia an economic success is ‘a 
consistent and coordinated attentiveness to the problems and opportunities of 
particular industries, in the context of a long-term perspective or the economy’s 
evolution, and a state which is hard enough not only to produce sizable effects on 
the economy but also to control the direction of the effects’.76 He uses the term 
‘governed market’ to describe the Taiwan government ‘getting prices right’ and 
‘selecting certain industries’ to promote economic development. He does not 
deny that getting prices right matters, as neo-classical economics always 
emphasises, but he says it is an inadequate explanation. More important is that the 
Taiwan government implemented a discriminatory industrial policy to help to 
establish some key industries which later became competitive in the world 
market.77 Thomas Gold similarly argues that ‘any explanation of Taiwan’s growth 
with stability must start with the Nationalist party-state, ...which, with a great 
deal of autonomy from particular social interests, effectively led sustained
75 See Gordon White and Robert Wade, ‘Developmental States and Markets in East Asia: An 
Introduction”, in Gordon White (ed.), Developmental States in East Asia (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1988), pp. 1-29.
76 See Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role o f  Government in East Asian 
Industrialisation (N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 343.
See Robert Wade, ‘State Intervention in “Outward-looking” Development: Neo-classical Theory and 
Taiwanese Practice’, in Gordon White (ed.), Development States in East Asia (N ew  York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1988) , pp.30-67.
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economic development. . . . ’ 78 M. Shahid Alam also attributes the economic success 
to the high level of the government’s commitment to economic development, 
which manifested itself directly in a subordination of political to economic 
objectives.79
Ruth McVey observes that ‘the essential ingredient of the strong, 
developmental state has been seen as its possession of autonomy from sectoral 
and societal interests, and hence its ability not only to reconcile differences and 
maintain order but to map out a strategy for improving the country’s place in the 
world capitalist system’ . 80 In other words, a relatively autonomous state and 
foresightful bureaucrats are two fundamental factors accounting for a country’s 
success. In this story, culture gets no role on the stage.
The problems lie in the links between political regimes, economic strategies 
and the outcomes. One argument is to associate an ‘authoritarian regime’ with 
effective industrial strategies. The bureaucracy knows what is good for long-term 
development, and it adopts certain policies to initiate economic growth. This 
argument can be easily refuted, for even if they had the will to adopt 
developmental strategies, it is still hard for them to evaluate which policies would 
be positive or negative for development. Keynesian and Neo-classical economics 
develop different policy suggestions, and how did these Asian economic planners 
know which one was suitable for them? Since there are major disputes among 
economists, how could these bureaucrats be so confident of their policies? 81
Stephan Haggard notes that ‘the causal connection between growth strategy 
and political regime may be made in either strong or weak form. The strong 
argument holds that there are political prerequisites for the pursuit of a particular
78 See Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, New York/London: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1986), p.122.
9 See M. Shahid Alam, Governments and Markets in Economic Development Strategies—lessons from 
Korea, Taiwan and Japan (New York: Praeger, 1989), pp. 86-87.
80 See Ruth McVey, op. cit., p. 13.
81 There was a debate among Taiwanese economists to define what policies the KMT government
implemented. See Tsiang, Sho-chieh ( # * ! .# ) ,  ‘Taiwan’s Economic Miracle: Lessons in Economic 
Development’, in Arnold C. Harberger (ed.), World Economic Growth (San Francisco: Institute for 
Contemporary Studies, 1984), pp.301-325. Tsiang is a monetarist. Another representative scholar is 
Wang, Zuorong, whose view is Keynesian. See Wang, Zuorong, Women Ruhe Chuangzao le Jingji Oiji 
(4k i°I&JiJt 7 ,  How do we create the economic miracle?) (Taipei: Shibao Chubanshe,
1978).
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growth strategy. Political elites and their coalition partners are aware of these 
institutional requirements and restructure or maintain the political system to attain 
their economic policy goals. The weak form of the argument holds that 
authoritarian politics are ‘“functional” for a particular strategy, even if economic 
objectives are not sufficient in themselves to explain changes of regime’. He 
adopts the weak argument and argues that an authoritarian regime mainly wants to 
restore order, but later on pursues economic objectives which can be successfully 
achieved under authoritarian rule.82 Edwin A. Winckler shares the same view. He 
writes that ‘East Asia’s strong states emerge from global competition...in response 
to pressures from the world system that are geopolitical before they are 
developmental’.83
This argument is more moderate, but still insufficient. When one says an 
‘authoritarian regime is functional to development’, one says nothing more than 
the statement ‘politics intervenes in social life’. It is a tautology. If East Asia had 
failed, they would say an ‘authoritarian regime is dysfunctional’. If we look back 
carefully at Taiwan’s development in the past century, we can find that its 
economy kept on growing throughout the Qing dynasty, colonial times and the 
postwar era.84 Can we say that each of these different regimes in Taiwan was 
beneficial to growth?
Even if the political institutions are functional to economic performance 
after 1945, this approach still ignores social institutions, e.g., families, schools, 
factories, associations, and industrial organisations, which constitute one’s whole 
social milieu. When the regime tried to enforce its policies through political 
institutions, either by means of coercion or moral persuasion,83 it had to face 
resistance from the bottom. As a Chinese saying expresses it, ‘the higher level has
82 See Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery—the Politics o f Growth in the Newly 
Industrialising Countries (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press: 1990), chapter 10, pp. 254-270.
83 See Edwin A. Winckler, ‘Globalist, Statist, and Network Paradigms in East Asia’, in Edwin A. 
Winckler and Susan Greenhalgh (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1988), p.278.
84 See Liu Jinqing, ( I 1] i£ .^ ), ‘Cong Lishi Guandian Tantao Taiwan Jingji Chengzhang Wenti’ (t&H.
,J£ t f  £  M A  , On the Problems of Taiwan Economic Growth—from Historical
Perspective), Taiwan Xueshu Yanjiu Huizhhi ( o #4 #1 i t  i t  , Journal o f Taiwan Studies 
Association), 1987, no. 2, pp.84-89.
85 See Stephan Haggard, op. cit., p. 262.
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a policy, the lower level has a counter-strategy’ .86 Power is not centred on one 
dictator, and every bureaucrat has some leverage to defend his own interests. In 
her findings on Wenzhou’s economic development in the PRC, Liu Yia-ling 
exposes different strategies used by local leaders to fight against central policies 
for their own interests.87 In Taiwan, corruption was widespread in different 
institutions before political democratisation. These bureaucrats were not powerful, 
but had enough power to impede any policy implementation from the top. The 
Chinese use the slang saying ‘ Yamen Bazikai, Meiqian BiejinlaV H ^  »
&;£%#] U l^ ) 88 to describe how to deal with bureaucracy. A statist approach does 
not explain that under such corrupt, inefficient circumstances, Taiwan’s 
businesspeople still make money.
The strong state approach became obsolete after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, which hit one of the most praised ‘strong state model’ South Korea. Now 
everyone blames the state’s policy of “distorted incentives, lax regulatory 
standards, poorly managed financial liberalisation and inadequate disclosure and 
supervision [that] encouraged excessive risk-taking” .89 Insufficient disclosure of 
information, inadequate transparency in decision-making, improper economic 
policies which allowed capital to pour into the real estate market, crony 
capitalism, etc, all contributed to the failure of the economic system. The once 
admired strong state becomes the destabilising factor in economic development.
Long before the outbreak of the financial crisis in East Asia, many Taiwanese 
political scientists had tried to understand the ‘relatively autonomous state’ from 
the perspective of a patron-client relationship between central and local power 
elites, and between the government and businesspeople, which is in contrast to the 
statist approach. This perspective sheds light on the local institutions which are 
most relevant to most businesspeople, especially to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which operate within a local area and have nothing to do with the
86
8 See Liu, Yia-ling, ‘Reform from Below: The Private Economy and Local Politics in the Rural 
Industrialisation of Wenzhou”, China Quarterly, no. 130 (June 1992), pp. 293-316.
88 It means that a government office welcomes everyone, but don’t come here without bringing any 
money.
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central government. For example, Chen Mingtong’s (P^.B$IÜ ) study on local 
factions shows the strong ties between local politics and local monopoly 
economic activities. 90 Chen Dongsheng unveiled the mechanisms of
land speculation by local factions and private monoploy capital in Taipei 
County . 91 Wang Hong-zen (Wang Hongren, Wang Zhenhuan
and Liu Jinqing(f'J ) all wrote about the close relationship between the 
bourgeoisie and the state in shaping economic policies. 92
Their research is subject to one criticism: they do not incorporate the market 
forces in their analysis, and assumed that if one had good connections with the 
government, one would reap huge profits from the benefits. But from the 
viewpoint of a national economy, such firms could not reap profits endlessly, for 
their profits cannot exceed the capacity of the total economy. For example, some 
reaped money from speculating in the stock market and land market, but after the 
collapse of the bubble economy, most of these entrepreneurs were trapped in the 
economic recession, and had to find a way out.9'' Market forces will limit the reach 
of political power.
Based on my own research, I will try to explain the role of the ‘relatively 
autonomous state’ in the economy, and to understand how local power could 
counter the central state’s policy and cause ‘inefficiency’ from the viewpoint of 
rationality in the economic system. In addition, I will discuss the limits of political
89 See “World Bank Accepts a Share of Blame for Asia Crisis”, International Herald Tribune. 25 March 
1998, p. 20. Original report is the World Bank’s Global Development Finance 1998.
90 See Chen, Mingtong (P&0^  ii|), Ouyuxing Lianhe Duzhan Jingji, Difang Paixi yu Shengyiyuan Xuanju:
Yixiang shengyiyuan houxuanren beijing ziliao de fenxi ((& LA M iB.
: — M M iB X  f t  $  , Regional Oligopoly, Local Factions and Provincial Assembly
Elections: an analysis o f the background o f candidates) (Taipei: unpublished paper, 1989), p. 12.
91 See Chen, Dongsheng (P ^ ^ ff) , Jin Ouan Chengshi—Difang Paixi, Caituan yu Taibei Duhui Fazhan
de Shehuixue Fenxi (d tM tä  ' F— • ßfJSFl £  J b 0  ItJfM. Money+Power
City—Sociological Analysis o f Local Factions, Zaibatsu and Taipei Metropolitan Development) (Taipei: 
Juliu Chubanshe, 1995).
92 See Wang, Hongzen ( i  ), Zhanhou Taiwan Siren Duzhan Ziben zhi Fazhan (£%& £  $  fa  LA
, The Development o f Private Monopoly Capital in Postwar Taiwan) (Unpublished Masters 
thesis, National Taiwan University, 1988); Wang, Zhenhuan ( i # . 2 f ), Taiwan Xin Zhengshang Guanxi 
de Xingcheng yu Zhengzhi Zhuanxing The State, Capital, and
Taiwan Political Transition) Taiwan Shehui Yanjiu Jikan ( Taiwan: A Radical 
Quarterly in Social Studies), no. 14 (1993) pp. 123-163; Liu, Jinqing, 1975/1992, op. cit.
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power constrained by market forces.
1.2.3 The Magic Market
Neo-classical economics is based on three assumptions: maximising
behaviour, market equilibrium and stable preferences.94 When doing an empirical 
study on economic development, unfortunately the neo-classical economists 
always direct their attention to market dis-equilibrium and leave the other two 
assumptions as self-evident. No wonder the free market is perceived as 
determining economic success or failure.
When they explore the economic development of East Asia, based on their 
ideology, they largely want to know how the government deregulates the market, 
gets prices right and induces people to invest in ‘comparative advantage’ 
industries. Samuel P. S. Ho claims that the lessons from Taiwan can be ‘viewed as 
a series of gradual adjustments to changes in its comparative advantages....The 
Taiwan experience once again confirms that administrative controls and other 
forms of interference with the market can seriously distort the economy’.95 
Because the Taiwan government has taken a ‘fairly sensible, practicable approach 
to development’, the high quality of the human resources in Taiwan exploit the 
opportunities provided by the market and Taiwan attains significant growth.96 
Jiang Shuojie has argued that Taiwan adopted the ‘right’ interest rates
and exchange rate policy in the 1950s, which made the Taiwan economy efficient 
and, therefore, produced good economic results.97 Hou Jiming believes that the 
neo-classical economic policy adopted by the government, i.e., conforming to
93 For example, the famous stock speculators Lei Bolong (HN&fi), Yu Huaiyin(iJ|>££g.), and the 
business group Hemei(fcr f . )  in Tainan area.
94 See Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1976), p. 5.
95 See Samuel P. S. Ho, Economic Development o f Taiwan, 1860-1970 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1978), pp. 248-251.
96 See Samuel P. S. Ho, op. cit., pp. 251-252.
9 See Jiang, Shuojie (& * $ # ) ,  ‘Taiwan Jingji Fazhan de Qishi’ (& üf , The
Implications of Taiwan Economic Development), in Ma, Kai (,S> S/t) (ed.), Taiwan Jingji Yanjiu 
Luncong—d iy i ji, Jingji Fazhan yu Zhengce ( £ f t t mJfj — Essays 
on the Economy o f  Taiwan, vol.l, Economic Development and Policy) (Taipei: Zhonghua Jingji 
Yanjiuyuan, 1991), p.22.
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market mechanisms, is the secret of Taiwan’s success.98 This same scholar would 
also attribute the success to increased human capital, 99 while others praise the 
functioning of a ‘free labour market’ . 100 Such rhetoric is repeated over and over 
again in neo-classical economics writings. 101 But the important contribution of 
this approach is that it points to a fact: where there is control over the market, 
there is underground economic activity. For example, the work of Chen Shimeng 
et al., exposed the inefficient aspects of government control over the 
financial and manufacturing sectors. 102
Many sociologists or anthropologists lose their sense of market forces when 
they try to dismiss the functioning of the market in modern society, as we have 
pointed out in the preceding literature review. Based on this perspective, I will 
discuss the problems arising from the government’s control over certain industries, 
and shall observe how people under this political control could gain undue 
benefits from it.
But the assumptions of neo-classical economics are «-historical, and most 
Taiwanese economists tend to forget the history of Taiwan of the past fifty years. 
They talk about Taiwan’s economic history so far as the history fits into their 
doctrines. Sometimes they forget that their assumptions are not found in reality.10'" 
Let me briefly note three of these assumptions. Firstly, maximising behaviour is a
98 See Hou, Jiming ‘Jiegou Xuepai, Xingudian Xuepai yu Taiwan Gongye Shengji’ (£##§:
3k ' Structuralist, Neo-classical Economics and Upgrade of Taiwan’s
Industry), in Ma Kai (ed.)., Ibid: p .32.
99 See Hou Jiming, ‘Jiaoyu, Renli yu Gongping de Jingji Fazhan: Taiwan de Shili’ (#t If ’ K t}
• £ * * & * « ,  Education, Human Resources and Economic Development with Equality: the 
Case of Taiwan), in Ma Kai(ed.), Ibid.: ppA \-6\.
100 See Wu, Huilin ‘Taiwan de Laodong Shichangyu Jingji Fazhan’ 7%
tftfik., Taiwan’s Labour Market and Economic Development), in Ma Kai (ed.), Ibid.: pp. 83-113.
101 See W. Galenson (ed.), Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan: The Postwar Experience 
o f the Republic o f China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979); Lin C-Y, Industrialisation in Taiwan, 
1946-72: Trade and Import-Substitution Policies for Developing Countries (New York: Praeger, 1979); 
Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Gustav Ranis and John C. H. Fei, The Taiwan Success Story: Rapid Growth with 
Improved Distribution in the Republic o f China, 1952-79 (Boulder: Westview, 1981); Bela Balassa, The 
Newly Industrialised Countries in the World Economy (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1981).
102 See Chen, Shimeng (P^ ^ül) et al., Jiegou Dangguo Ziben Zhuyi I f
Disintegrating KMT-State Capitalism) (Taipei: Chengshe Baogao 1, 1991).
103 See Wang, Hongzen, ‘Jingji Qiji? or Jingjixue de Shenji?’ (,£sL$}--^-5t ?
Economic Miracle? or Miracle of Economics?), Zhongguo Luntan g f& JS , China Tribune), vol.25, 
no.3 (1987) pp.45-48.
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product of historical capitalism and does not exist in other types of economies. 104 
In search of East Asian development we have to know how traditional behavioural 
patterns fit into the capitalist market. Secondly, if there were ‘stable’ preferences, 
there would be no fashions, no new products to stimulate new markets. 105 Lastly, 
a self-regulating market is always accompanied by government controls; in fact, a 
capitalist market is an artificial product, which could not exist if there were no 
political intervention. 106 This argument can be seen from the ambivalent feeling 
toward government activity in neo-classical economics. The neo-classical 
economists are not anarchists, so they reluctantly support the concept of a 
‘minimum state’, which no one can satisfactorily define. 107 The strong state 
approach provides an extreme critique of this assumption, but ironically both 
approaches generally ignore the role of tradition and social institutions, which is 
the setting of political and economic forces.
2. Theoretical Framework
Based on these observations and critiques of the work done by other scholars, 
I will use the two concepts of market relations and social relations, which are 
derived from the two concepts of a ‘self-regulating market’ and ‘protective social 
forces’ developed by Karl Polanyi, to analyse the forces acting on individuals in a 
family firm.
In the self-regulating market, in the depiction of neo-classical economics, 
human beings are self-interested, trying to maximise profits or utility, and to 
minimise costs, subject to the constraints set by the market. This depiction 
assumes an atomised self-interested person conforming to market competition.
104 See Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Marx-Englels Werke vol. 23 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1867/1977), pp. 85- 
98. Maurice Godelier, ‘The Rationality of Economic System’, in Rationality and Irrationality in 
Economics (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1966/1972), pp. 243-319. Marcel Mauss, 
The Gift: forms and functions o f  exchange in archaic societies (London: Cohen Press, 1954).
105 See Herbert Marcuse/ tr. by Douglas Keller, One Dimensional Man: studies in the ideology of 
advanced industrial soceity (London: Routledge, 1991).
106 See Karl Polanyi /  tr. by Huang Shumin, Shi Jiayin and Liao Liwen, The Great Transformation-
Origins o f  Our Time (Chinese, Jubian: Dangdai Zhengzhi, Jingji de Oiyuan, I t f tü t& M fö t f j fö
(Taipei: Yuanliu Chubanshe. 1957/1989).
10 See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press), p.34.
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atomised, because man is self-sufficient; 108 self-interested, because the pursuit of 
interests is in the nature of being human; conforming to market competition, 
because the market is self-regulating and conforming to market regulation is the 
only principle to survive. The relationships between a person and others are based 
on ‘self-interest’, on contracts, and on instrumental rationality. This kind of 
market relations is generally accepted in our capitalist world, which generates the 
market forces that bear upon individuals.
The concept of social relations is defined as the relationships between kin, 
friends, neighbours, associations, and religious belief. These are not based on the 
‘freedom of contract’, or self-interested calculation, or a newly arisen political 
order, which violates the goal of a free market, i.e., the pursuit of maximised 
self-interest. People are socially embedded and conform to social norms: socially, 
because man is a social being, who cannot survive and develop one’s capacity 
without support from society as a whole; 109 embedded, because social action is 
‘embedded in ongoing networks of personal relationships rather than being 
carried out by atomised actors’ ; 110 conforming to social norms, because these act 
on individuals as if they objectively exist, as Emile Dürkheim observed. The 
relationships between a person and others are based on norms, on power, and on 
values. This kind of social relations produces pressures on individuals.
Everyone in a capitalist society is embedded in market and social relations. I 
will use ‘market principle’ to denote the rules that economic man follows in 
market relations, while ‘social principle’ means the rules accepted by people in 
their social relations. The two principles influence individuals’ behaviour 
simultaneously. The rules set by the market principle may be consistent with 
social rules. However, often the social rules contradict the market principle. For 
example, it is not accepted behaviour for a shopkeeper to make money from sales 
made to his parents in Taiwan. Yet if the parents keep on taking away goods from 
the store to re-sell to their friends, what can the shopkeeper do? Can he charge his
108 See Charles Taylor, ‘Atomism’, in his Philosophy and the Human Sciences—Philosophical Papers 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.189.
109 Ibid. : pp. 204-206.
110 See Richard Swedberg and Mark Granovetter, ‘Introduction’, in Mark Granovetter and Richard 
Swedberg (eds.), The Sociology o f  Economic Life (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 9.
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parents or must he behave filially until he goes broke? In the following pages, we 
will be able to see the contradictions arising from the working of the two 
principles. No one principle can be flattened to the other, and every business 
person has to face the two forces. ‘Family enterprises’ show the two forces acting 
on an organisation: the family belongs to social relations, while the enterprise is 
the basic unit in market relations. The strategies used by the head of the family 
firm entail both principles, and when there are contradictions, s/he has to find a 
way out.
I will observe the development and business practices of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises in Taiwan, which are mostly family firms, when they try 
both to make profits in the market and at the same time conform to the social 
norms imposed on them. My arguments are: if social relations and market 
relations do not conflict with each other, they can pursue profit with social 
approval. However, when the two elements are mutually exclusive, the proprietor 
has to choose either to follow social relations or market relations. Normally the 
market relations will prevail over social relations. When so, we would like to 
know what the social consequences will be. My logic can be seen in the following 
diagram.
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With this framework, I distinguish myself from the neo-classical economics 
and cultural approaches to family firms. Even though the tools and main 
assumptions are the same as in neo-classical economics, Oliver Williamson adds 
‘transaction costs’ in his cost-benefit analysis of organisations. His claim is that 
any organisational form we observe in any situation is that which can reduce the 
transaction costs efficiently. 111 In mathematical expression, it is:
y = f (X/)
subject to g(Xz) < C
y: organisational form
Xz: variable z (one of the variables is transaction cost 
variable)
C: total cost
In this formula, a certain organisational form will appear if and only if a certain 
combination of all variables, which affect the emergence of an organisational form, 
is less than the total cost. Since the formula developed by Williamson is the same 
as in neo-classical economics, what I criticised in the former section also applies 
here. This approach ignores the values and loci of power within society. Too, it is 
tautological, for what we observe at the moment is deemed the most efficient with 
the minimum transaction costs. It also excludes any possibility of social change 
given that the status quo is deemed the most rational and efficient. In Chapters 
Three to Six, I will explore the tenets of neo-classical economics, and will argue 
that under certain conditions, social relations are more important.
My approach also distinguishes me from the ‘social embeddedness theory’ 
developed by Mark Granovetter and his colleagues. 112 Granovetter observes that 
‘many economic problems that by tradition belong to the economists’ camp can be 
fruitfully analysed with the help of sociology’ . 113 He notes that ‘most behaviour is 
closely embedded in networks of interpersonal relations’ 114 and stresses ‘the role 
of concrete personal relations and structures (or “networks”) of such relations’ in
111 Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierachies (New York: Free Press).
112 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’, in Mark 
Granovetter and Richard Swedberg (eds.), The Sociology o f  Economic Life (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1992), pp.53-81.
113 Richard Swedberg and Mark Granovetter, op.cit., 2.
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economic behaviour. 115 He criticises the under- and oversocialised views of human 
action. Transaction cost theory is undersocialised, and functionalsim or other 
sociological works are oversocialised. He claims that ‘the embeddedness 
approach to the problem of trust and order in economic life, then, threads its way 
between the oversocialised approach of generalised morality and the 
undersocialised one of impersonal, institutional arrangements by following and 
analysing concrete patterns of social relations’ . 116 In this way, economic life is 
embedded in social relations, 117 and the self-regulating market disappears in his 
theory. For example, when he takes the example of the persistence of large 
numbers of small firms, he ‘suggests here that small firms in a market setting may 
persist instead because a dense network of social relations is overlaid on the 
business relations connecting such firms and reduces pressures for integration’ . 118 
In other words, he does not believe that market forces will sweep away small 
firms because ‘there are social relations’ which make these small firms efficient 
enough to survive. If we put at one end of a pole the assumptions of neo-classical 
economics, which believes market relations will win in the long run, Granovetter’s 
New Economic Sociology should be placed at the other end of the pole, believing 
that social relations will win.
Yet the New Economic Sociology analysis is similar to neo-classical 
economics, in that it assumes rational action, subject to certain constraints. 
Granovetter says that ‘the assumption of rational action...is a good working 
hypothesis’, and ‘when situational constraints are fully appreciated’, all rational 
and non-rational behaviour can be analysed. 119 Granovetter’s analytical method is 
similar in this respect to Gary Becker’s, who analysed discrimination, wage 
differential, etc, based on a rationality assumptions subject to social constraints. 120
Following this line of thinking allows us to escape the difficulties faced by
114 See Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddednes’, 1992, 
p.73.
115 Ibid.: p. 60.
U6 Ibid.: p. 63.
117 Ibid.: p. 75.
118 Ibid: p. 76.
119 Ibid: p. 75.
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neo-classical economics, which prophecies that the market will win in the future. 
Nor will I be trapped in the ‘oriental discourse’ whose description of economic 
actions in China is based on xinyong and guanxi. Rather, through the dialectical 
development of the two forces, I hope to explain the dynamic development and 
strategies of the family enterprises in Taiwan.
3. Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organised in line with businesspeople’s life histories. First 
I will discuss the origins of the small business class before 1960, showing the 
social and political setting of these businesspeople. Then I will discuss their 
educational backgrounds and their social mobility after they leave school. From 
Chapters Three to Five, I will analyse the business practices that prevail in Taiwan, 
including finances, marketing, and human resource management. The 
circumstances in which businesspeople make money, and how they run their 
business, will also be probed. Step by step, I will unravel the effects of different 
forces on businesspeople’s behaviour. In Chapter Six, I will move the setting 
overseas, in order to observe how they manage and profit in a different socio­
political context, which can be used as a contrast to practices at home in Taiwan.
Chapter One is a historical analysis, which tries to probe the different 
opportunities of people from different classes and ethnicities at the outset of the 
reorganisation of Taiwan society from 1945 to 1960. The socio-political setting 
influenced the mobility structures of each socio-economic constituency.
We will see in Chapter Two that educational achievement in Taiwan is not 
simply a result of ‘perfect competition’ based on merit. I will argue that the 
inequality of socio-economic status in the 1950s and 1960s reproduced inequality 
in education, which was worsened by the intervention of political power. I will 
examine the effect of education on occupational attainment, and the mobility 
strategies adopted by people with different educational levels. I will also explore 
the generally held belief that ‘the Chinese mentality promotes efforts to become 
an independent proprietor’.
120 See Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour (Chicago: The University of
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In Chapter Three, it will be seen how the political setting, which strongly 
distorts the functioning of the ‘free financial market’, carves out a space for those 
businesspeople who are able to benefit from the political regulations. But it shall 
also be seen how businesspeople without political power have to resort to pure 
economic means to promote their status and incomes. The situation after financial 
de-regulation will also be probed to understand how family firms accommodated 
to the new situation.
Marketing management and long-term relationships, which are often depicted 
in the ‘embeddedness theory’ or cultural approach, will be discussed in Chapter 
Four. It will be observed how price competition and the market influence long­
term relationships among small and medium-sized business proprietors. Another 
important factor in the economy, power, will be introduced to analyse the 
manoeuvres of economic actors in the market. I will argue that only in certain of 
Taiwan’s social structures will utilisation of guanxi be prevalent and that this 
mechanism alters when the social structure changes.
In Chapter Five I will extend my analysis of the contradictions of social and 
market relations into the family, which has always been regarded as a coherent 
unit. I will observe the contradictions in the human resources management of 
family firms, and also will see how they resolve these dilemmas. I will incorporate 
the traditional practice offen-jia  (division of families) to observe new trends.
Chapter Six will focus on overseas investments by SMEs in recent years. 
Business management in finance, marketing and human resources will be explored 
in comparison with these SMEs’ practices in Taiwan. In a different foreign 
political context, how do they adapt themselves to the new environment in light of 
their goal of maximising profits?
4. Methodology
A common definition of small and medium-sized enterprises is that ‘a small 
business in the manufacturing sector has less than 100 employees and in the 
service sector less than 20 employees. A medium-sized enterprise has between
Chicago Press, 1976).
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100 and 500 employees in manufacturing and 20 and 500 employees in 
services.’121 This definition has been adopted widely in Europe and North America, 
even though some companies employ few workers but have substantial sales. The 
Taiwan government’s definition is more strict, that ‘a small- and medium-sized 
enterprise in the manufacturing sector employs fewer than 200 workers, and 
realised capital is less than NT$60 million (about US$2 million at the exchange 
rate of 1:30), and in the service sector fewer than 50 workers and n o t than 
NT$80 million in business sales’.122 The circumstances of my informants’ 
enterprises is shown in Appendix 1.
The data for my study are based, overall, on three sources: interview 
fieldwork conducted in Taiwan from March 1993 to January 1994 and from 
September 1997 to March 1998; the General Survey of Social Change in Taiwan, 
whose raw data I have analysed using a computer; and secondary sources 
containing the findings and analyses of other researchers.
The fieldwork entailed repeated in-depth interviewing with forty-two 
businesspeople and three officials, including two females and forty-three males. 
Because they regarded their own financial situation as secret, I had to develop my 
own personal networks (guanxi) to reach these businesspeople. All of these 
interviewees were either friends or relatives, or their friends and relatives, or their 
friends and relatives in turn. Due to these personal connections I could deal with 
their responses as basically trustworthy. Even so, I found that they tended to 
avoid answering questions on profits and political attitudes. To gather more in- 
depth and reliable information, it became important to reach ‘key’ interviewees 
who were willing to talk entirely openly, either based on religious belief or 
personal trust. I interviewed such people on repeated occasions. The backgrounds 
of the interviewees are listed in Appendix One.
Each interview lasted approximately two hours and was held either in the 
interviewee’s factory or in a restaurant. I used a semi-structured questionnaire to
121 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995a, op. cit., p. 8.
122 The definition of SME has changed seven times, and the latest revision was announced in 1995. This 
is the one I am citing here. See Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, White Paper on Small and 
Medium Enterprises (  J &  # )  , 1996, p.354.
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guide me, which included questions about their individual life history, production, 
marketing, finances, and external social and political relationships. The interview 
usually proceeded as follows: in the beginning I asked her/him to talk about 
her/his life since s/he was born. From her/his self-description, I gained 
background data on education, ethnicity, parents’ occupations, and what sorts of 
jobs s/he did before s/he ran her/his own business. Whenever s/he mentioned a key 
question, e.g., her/his relationships with her/his siblings, I would dig into the 
relationships, which in the context of Taiwanese cultural values might often be 
considered shameful to talk about.
During October 1997, in the final stage of thesis-writing, I used a structured 
questionnaire pertinent to my dissertation’s main themes, to obtain relevant 
information from another forty people. This enables me to make more generalised 
conclusions that build upon what I earlier had derived from the face-to-face 
interviews.
For the above reason that personal connections were necessary to attain 
access to respondents who are small and medium-sized businesspeople, the 
second sample was also not randomly selected, and it is not large enough to be 
representative. But I have sought to complement the interview and questionnaire 
data with a general survey. This survey was conducted by the Institute of 
Ethnology at the Academia Sinica The respondents
were randomly selected across the whole island.12' I have obtained the raw 
computerised data for 1986 and for 1990 to 1993. Each survey contained 
information on more than two thousand respondents. In different years there were 
different survey topics, but each year’s survey contained similar basic personal 
background data on occupational distributions, values, social stratification, and 
economic and political attitudes, which I have been able to utilise to study 
business activities in the 1980s and early 1990s. I have used a computer to do 
statistical analyses of the raw data.
In addition, to look back at the business history of the 1950s and 1960s, I
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have had to depend in part on writings from that time, because most of my 
interviewees did not start their businesses until the 1970s. A wide literature 
review became essential to study this period. I have been to the Academia 
Historica in Taipei to find historical documentation, including official documents. 
The latter documents largely portray official viewpoints, which did not normally 
prove helpful to understand the businesspeople’s viewpoint, but some of this 
material nonetheless proved valuable. Surveys conducted by the Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction in the 1950s will be used to analyse the 
class structure at that time.
123 About the sampling methods, implementation and preliminary results, see Qu, Haiyuan (H $M$)(ed.), 
Taiwan Diqu Shehui Bianqian Jiben Diaocha Jihua (£ ? ?  f'j, The Plan of the
General Survey of Social Change in Taiwan) (Taipei: the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1991).
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Chapter 1: Historical Origins of Taiwan’s Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (1945-1960)
In Taiwan numerous proprietors of small and medium-sized enterprises emerged in 
the 1960s. But what were their activities in the 1950s? What types of people, from what 
backgrounds, were engaged in industrial and commercial activities before 1960? How 
did they run their business? To understand the more recent decades, as I suggested in the 
Introduction, we need a historical perspective. The failure to probe into these earlier 
historical circumstances is, I would submit, a shortcoming of all those sociologists, 
anthropologists and political scientists who hold to an ahistorical approach, which I 
believe adversely affects their analyses. In this chapter, therefore, I will put on the hat of 
an historian.
I will briefly discuss the situation of small and medium-sized enterprises in the 
reorganisation of Taiwanese society after it was taken over by the Chinese Nationalist 
government. I will use historical data to delineate the class structures in this chaotic 
transition period from 1945 to 1949
In the third part of the chapter I will discuss the class structure and mobility in the 
1950s. This featured land reform implemented from above, ethnic differences, the state’s 
strong economic control, and market fluctuations. However, let us start with the 
immediate post-war industrialisation and its influence.
1.1 The Chaotic Take-over (1945-19491
Even though Japan surrendered in 1945, its influence on the later development of 
Taiwan cannot be neglected. Firstly, it created a reservoir of well-disciplined labourers 
for capitalist production. It also provided basic literacy, which enabled people to become 
small entrepreneurs in later decades when opportunities arose. Japanese Colonialism 
especially created a large number of businesspeople who could speak Japanese and who 
subsequently could develop close business connections with Japanese companies after 
the war.
Secondly, most of the industries during the colonial period were owned by Japanese, 
and these were subsequently 'nationalised' by the Nationalist government after 1945.
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Most of the higher positions in these new public enterprises were occupied by the in­
coming Mainlanders (see Table 1.1 and 1.2), so the native Taiwanese had no chance to 
develop their careers in the public sector. Doing business in the private sector became 
one of the remaining paths to upward mobility.
Thirdly, the regulated economy established by the colonial government during the 
war was retained by the Nationalist government in the 1950s, and the private sector was 
dominated by the public sector throughout these years, until the boom of the 1960s when 
there arose an outlet for the private sector on the international market124.
As noted, most large enterprises were Japanese-owned during the colonial period, 
and all of the Japanese companies were nationalised when the Nationalist government 
took Taiwan. The Nationalist army arrived in Taiwan on 25 October 1945. The colonial 
bureaucracy and Japanese enterprises initially continued to be operated by the Japanese 
according to new regulations set by the Taiwan Xingzheng Zhangguan Gongshu 
(Taiwan Administrative Governor’s Office, to avoid interruption
to administration and production. Step by step, the personnel in these higher positions 
were replaced by newcomers and within a few years the old Japanese monopoly capital 
was replaced by Chinese party-state monopoly capital.125 The production of the public 
sector in 1952 comprised 57.3% of total industrial production.126 However, some of the 
'enemy' property was sold to the private sector, and the sold enterprises bolstered the 
small business class.127 In the following I will discuss how Taiwan society was 
reorganised in different groups. Some raked in exorbitant profits, but more lost out in the 
transition period.
124 Relevant studies about the influence of Japanese colonisation on Taiwan include Tu Jaw-yan ( ,B£  i f  ),
Nihon Teikoku Shugi ha no Taiwan ( 9 Tno £2%* ’ Taiwan under Japanese Imperialism) 
(Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1975); George W. Barclay, Colonial Development and Population 
in Taiwan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); Liu Jinqing (£'jsgj£), Sengo Taiwan Keizai 
Bunshiki a  fP$T ’Analysis o f  Postwar Taiwan Economy) (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo
Press, 1975); Zhou Xianwen ( ^ , | X ) ,  ‘Riju Shidai Taiwan Jingjishi’ ( 9  • Taiwan
Economic History during Japanese Colonial Times) Taiwan Research Paper series no. 59. (Taipei: 
Economic Research Centre of Bank of Taiwan, 1958); Lin Jiwen ( # $&X),RibenJutaiMoqi (1930-1945) 
Zhanzheng Zongdongyuan Tixi zhi Yanju ( 9  9 3 0 - 1 9 4 5 M%£% ’ Research
on War Mobilisation System for in the Late Japanese Colonial Times) unpublished Masters dissertation 
(1989), Graduate School of Political Science, National Taiwan University.
125 Up to 1950, 860 Japanese enterprises were confiscated, but 19 of them were taken over by the KMT 
provincial party without any legal process. See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., pp. 27-29.
126 See Liu Jinqing, op. cit, 117.
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1.1.1. The Taiwanese Capitalists
Before the arrival of the Nationalist army, a lot o f Japanese-owned land and factories 
were sold to Taiwanese at very cheap prices because the Japanese owners were afraid of 
Nationalist confiscation. According to a new law, such transactions with the Japanese 
before 15 August were recognised as legal. The problem was how to recognise the 
contracts made between Taiwanese and Japanese from the 16th of August to the 25th of 
October. Some speculative businesspeople forged contracts with wealthy Japanese to 
secure estates, and these contracts were forged with a date before 15 August. The head 
of Tatung Steel Company Lin Tizao collaborated with the
Japanese and bought more than fifty houses, land, and machinery. In one night he became 
one of the most wealthy people in Taiwan. His son Lin Tingsheng (#>#£.£ ) later became 
a member o f the Central Standing Committee of the KMT in 196*1, which means that his 
economic power was recognised by the party. The transferred value of the estates was 
more than 30 billion, while the confiscated property put up for sale by Taiwan Province 
was valued at only 12 billion.128 In short, some of the Taiwanese people reaped a lot of 
money in collusion with the Japanese during this chaotic transition period.
Another kind of speculative business was underground usury. The nominal interest 
rate set by the government was far below the inflation rate, so most o f the money in the 
period flew into commercial or financial speculation. In the first half year of 1949, there 
were more than five hundred underground usurers, and the interest rate was as high as 
80%, while the official interest rate was only 20%. The biggest moneylender had 250 
billion dollars in deposits, while at that time the issue of Taiwan dollar banknote was only 
470 billion. 129 In 1950, only 7% of farmers’ loans derived from commercial banks 
(including the Land Bank), and 19% from the Farmers’ Association, while 73% derived 
from private borrowing,^0 largely meaning rampant underground usury. A famous case 
involved Hou Yuli who later became an important member of the Tainan
Business Group in the 1950s. Though he had a textile factory and made a lot of profits
127 Ibid.: pp. 26-27.
128 See Huang Bing ( et al, Petition to the National Resources Committee to Invalidate Those 
Transactions with the Japanese after the 15 th o f August.
129 See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 67.
130 See Li Denghui (Lee Teng-hui, ^  &%£), Taiwan Nonggong Bumenjian zhi ZibenLiutong ( £  7% JLai-lß 
H Pal 4L If 4^ /Til ii .  ’ translated from his English work ‘Intersectoral Capital Flows in the Economic
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from selling cloth, his capital profits derived mainly from usury in the transition period. 
The amount of loans he provided was more than any co-operative credit union, and as 
much as a branch of the First Commercial Bank (one of the three commercial banks at 
that time).ljl
1.1.2 The Corrupt Mainlander Bureaucrats
After the uprising o f February 1947, the National Resources Commission, which was 
in charge of all Chinese public enterprises, asked every Taiwan public enterprise to write 
a report on the ethnic distribution of the posts in each enterprise. The Nationalists knew 
very well that economic inequality was one cause of the uprising. From Table 1.1, 1.2 
and 1.3 we can see that more Taiwanese worked as staff in the same given enterprises 
compared to Japanese times. But the problem was that the Mainlanders occupied almost 
every key position and they outnumbered the Taiwanese, The education of most of the 
Mainlander staff admittedly was high, and in terms of education they might have 
deserved their positions. But at that time 2,508 Taiwanese had been educated at 
Taiwan-based universities or colleges, more than 50,000 Taiwanese had graduated from 
Japan’s tertiary educational institutions, and about a hundred Taiwanese had graduated 
from other overseas tertiary schools.lj2 Scarcely any had been assigned to important 
posts. So it was not education but ethnicity which determined economic opportunities at 
the time. Without a ‘good background’ a person could not be promoted in position, even 
if highly educated.
The public enterprises taken over by Mainlanders were trapped in corruption. During 
this period it was widely reported that public property was stolen, especially machinery. 
For example, the Taiwan Copper Mining Company reported that
before the arrival of the Nationalist army, ‘thieves and bandits rose in swarms, and most 
of the equipment and small machinery sustained heavy losses. Even after the take-over,
Development of Taiwan, 1895-1960”) Taiwan Research Paper series no. 106. (Taipei: Economic Research 
Centre of Bank of Taiwan, 1972), p. 119, Table 89.
131 See Xie Guoxing ( 3Ü I! # ) ,  ‘You Shang Er Gong: Guangfu Chuqi Tainan Bang De Tuibian’ (& i§i 
X .: o »From Commerce to Industry: the Transformation of Tainan Business Group
in the Early Post-War Period), in Lai, Jeh-Han ( M hS )(ed.), Taiwan Guangfu Chuqi Lishi (& &4JL 
’ Taiwan History During the Early Post-war Period) (Taipei, Taiwan: Sun Yat-sen Institute for 
Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 1993), pp. 335-364.
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thieves and bandits were still audacious in robbing the property. Up to the end of March
1946 the loss reached 358,504.7 Taiwan dollars. From the first o f April 1946 the 
company was restored to work, but it never stopped the burglars. By the end of May
1947 another 308,397.83 Taiwan dollars in equipment had been taken’. N o  one knows 
whether it was stolen by cunning Taiwanese or by sly Mainlander managers. These 
machines presumably were subsequently bought and operated by the private sector.
Table 1. 1 Staff Distribution Between Japanese and Taiwanese in Japanese 
Enterprises (1944-45)
Japanese T aiw anese T otal Y ear
T aiw an  C opper M ining Co (& ift) 260 3 (?) 1944
T aiw an  E ngineering  and 
S h ipyard  Co ( £ f & # i£ & L)
223 22 245 1944
T aiw an  A lum inum  Co (& £S) 286 13 299 1945.3
T aiw an  F ertilise r Co ( £  Jfc) 231 492 723 1945. ?
Y anshuigang Sugar Co 356 44 400 1945.12
Source: Documents from the reports of different companies submitted to the National
Resources Commission.
Table 1. 2 Staff Distribution Between Mainlanders and Taiwanese in Public 
Enterprises (1946-50)
M ain lander T aiw anese Total Y ear
Taiwan Copper Mining Co 117 72 169 1947.5
Taiwan Engineering and 
Shipyard Co ( £ $ fc^ -i£ # DL)
22 146 168 1946.5
130 187 317 1947.5
Taiwan Aluminum Co 
(£ * S )
82 39 121 1947.3
153 47 200 1948.9
Taiwan Cement Co (&  >£) 257 259 516 1950.6
Taiwan Steel Co ( & ^ f £ ^ )
oo 8 66 1950.6
Source: the same as Table 1.1.
13" See Wu Wenxing ( & X. JL), Riju Shiqi Taiwan Shehui Lingdao Jieceng Zhi Yanjiu ( 3
Z-tff % ’ Research on Taiwan Leading Strata in Japanese Times) (Taipei: »
Zhengzhong Publishing Co., 1992), pp. 114-124.
133 At that time one Taiwan dollar could buy 12 kilograms of rice. See The Preliminary Work Team of 
Taiwan Copper and Mining Company of the National Resources Commission, Ziyuan Weiyuanhui Taiwan 
Tongkuang Choubeichu Zai Tai Xiufu Shiye Ji Taibao Jiuye Oingxing Baogao ( jtffi-Jr M i t  it
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Table 1. 3 Distribution of Senior Positions Between Mainlanders and Taiwanese in the 
Taiwan Administrative Governor’s Office, 1946
Total Chuzhang Vice
C h u zh a n g
Zhuan-
yuan
Kezhang Guzhang Zhuren
wll "Hi * *
MLD 251 8 2 76 37 90 38
91.90% 100% 66.70% 87.40% 100% 93.80% 90.50%
TW N 22 0 1 11 0 6 4
8.10% 0% 33.30% 12.60% 0% 6.20% 9.50%
Source: See Xu Bangnan (% #  f j ), ‘Dare ga Kimeru no ka—Kokumindo Seiken no Seisaku Kitei Kiko to 
Jinji Haichi” (Who makes decisions?—Policy decision making mechanism and personnel 
allotment in KMT regime), in Wakabayashi Masahiro (ed.), Taiwan—Tenkanki no Seizi to Keizai 
(Taiwan—Politics and Economy in Transition) (Tokyo:Tahada Shoten, 1987), p. 134.
Another problem in the public enterprises was factional struggle within the KMT 
party. The Governor General, Chen Yi, assigned every Taiwan Provincial ministry 
post to members of his faction, which caused violent friction among different factions in 
the central KMT party. To counterbalance Chen’s economic domination, the other 
factions occupied party and military positions. For example, the CC Clique controlled the 
KMT’s provincial party, the Military statistical burea Clique controlled police
organisations, and the Song Family Clique assigned the members of its
controlled National Resources Commission to take over the Japanese enterprises.135 
Such a factional struggle made it impossible for the public enterprises to function 
normally. Every faction member in the enterprises just wanted to appropriate higher 
profits for the faction and himself; no one cared about ‘national’ or common interests. 
Corruption became epidemic. One case is enough to illustrate the situation. Li Zhuozhi 
a member of Chen Yi’s faction, was general manager in the public enterprise 
Taiwan Paper and Printing Company. He sold some machines valued at more than ten 
million Taiwan dollars1"6 at a very cheap price, and later bought these machines back for
134 In the party there were five main factions: the CC , Military statistical burea, Song Family, Zhengxue
and Tuan Cliques. The following paragraph is mainly from information in Chen Mingtong’s article ‘Paixi 
Zhengzhi yu Chen Yi Zhitailun’ atm, Factional Politics and Chen Y i’s Policy to
Taiwan), in Lai Jeh-Hang (ed), Ibid.: pp. 223-302.
135 Ibid. : pp. 264-271.
136 Unless noted, Taiwan dollar is used to designate old Taiwan dollar in this paragraph, which is different 
from the New Taiwan dollar used after June 1949.
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his private company at 400,000 Taiwan dollars.lj7 It is not hard to imagine, too, that 
because one public enterprise was the fortress for a faction, it was impossible for 
different companies to cooperate. In other words, there was little economic integration 
between different public firms. No wonder that in his General Report on Taiwan 
submitted to the National Resources Commission, S. Trone found ‘the general tenor in 
Taiwan is: each factory for itself, each manager by himself; if inflated big profits are made, 
then the industry is in order’.138
1.1.3 The Speculative Mainlander Bureaucratic Capitalists
It was also a good time for Shanghai commercial capitalists and other Mainlanders to 
exploit the chaos to make money. The main export products from Taiwan were sugar and 
rice, while the main imported product was clothes from Shanghai. At that time the 
Chinese economy was under the Song Family Clique’s control. Its National Resources 
Commission was in charge of almost every public enterprise. From the manipulation of 
trade between Taiwan and Mainland China, it also reaped enormous profits. In 1946, the 
Commission, without paying a penny, shipped 150,000 tons of sugar from Taiwan to 
China, and purchased 400 million tons of coal at a very cheap price. In 1947 it ordered 
Taiwan to ship another 150,000 tons of sugar, 300 to 400 million tons of coals and 
500,000 tons of rice to China without reimbursing any costs.
At the same time, it exported clothes from its controlled textile factories to Taiwan. 
The Song Family Clique’s textile capital derived from the taken-over o f Japanese textile 
companies left in China. It reorganised all o f these companies into the China Textile 
Construction Company (.Zhongguo Fangzhi Jicmshe Gongsi, ^  Ü3 *]),
mainly based in Shanghai. In 1947 the company produced 37% of China’s silk and cotton 
materials, and 40% of Chinese cotton clothes.140 Clothes were sold to Taiwan at a 
relatively high price. From January 1946 to September 1948, the clothes price index in 
Taiwan rose to 194.4 from 100, while the sugar price index was only 92.9 as compared
137 Ibid.: p. 272.
138 See S. Trone, General Report on Taiwan, unpublished manuscript submitted to the National Resources 
Commission, Nanking, China, January 21 1948, p.7.
139 See Chen Mingtong, op.cit., p. 264.
140 See Watanabe Nagao, Chugoku Shihonshugi to Sengo Keizai (Chinese Capitalism and Postwar 
Economy) (Tokyo: Taga Keizai Shunbunsha, 1950), p. 59. This is cited in Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 231, note 
9.
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to the weighted total price index (=100).141 Why was the clothing price so high? One 
reason is that its import was monopolised by the Song Family Clique. Another reason 
was that the Taiwan dollar was undervalued as compared to the Chinese Fabi currency 
(legal currency, ^ r ^ ) . 142 If the Taiwan dollar was undervalued, it meant Taiwanese had 
to pay more to get the same quantity of products from China. Such an undervaluation 
was caused by hyperinflation in China and the fixed exchange rate system between the 
Taiwan dollar and Fabi, which did not change until January 1948. The Song Family 
Clique used its political and economic power to exploit the abnormal situation and 
grasped huge profits.
1.1.4 Taiwanese Landlords
Before 1960, Taiwan was still predominantly an agricultural country in the sense that 
farmers composed most of the population. In 1946, 57.8% of the total population was 
engaged in agriculture. About 40% of this agricultural population were tenants, and 
one-third semi-tenants, as can be seen from Table 1.4. The category of landowner 
included landlords and self-farming landowners. In 1944 the landlords owned about 32% 
of Taiwan’s total arable land, while constituting only 3.5% of the total agricultural 
population.143
Table 1. 4 Composition of the Agricultural Population (Households)
Year Total Agricultural Population (1946)
landowner semi-tenant tenant farm labour
1946 527,016 172,314 148,580 206,122 -
100.00% 32.70% 28.19% 39.11% -
1948 645,941 216,736 154,460 231,224 43,521
100.00% 33.50% 23.90% 35.80% 6.70%
Source: Wu Tianquan, Taiwan de Tudi Wenti (& ^6-] ’ Land Problem in Taiwan) (Taipei:
unknown publisher, 1949), Table 10, appendix p. 5. Zhongguo Dizheng Yanjiusuo ( ^ f§ ithifr 
Taiwan Nongdi Jianzu Baogao ( o ^  ’ Report on Rent Reduction in
Taiwan) (Taipei: Zhongguo Dizheng Yanjiusuo, 1951), pp. 13-14.
Note: Semi-tenant means those farmers who owned some lands but not enough and had to rent more land 
to plough. Landowner includes farm-owners and landlords. Farm-labour means those who did not 
have any land and had to work for others.
141 Ibid.: p. 56, Table 13.
142 The Taiwan dollar’s real purchasing power was about 30% undervalued in exchange for Fabi. See Liu 
Jinqing, Ibid.: p. 49.
143 There were about 114,000 landlords, and the agricultural population was 3,318,235 in 1944. See Wu
Tianquan j l ) ,  Taiwan de Tudi Wenti( a ^ M ,  Land Problem in Taiwan) (Taipei:
unknown publisher) , p.30; Zhou Xianwen, op.cit., p. 14.
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Table 1. 5 Average Rent Payments in Different Counties (1927, 1948), %
Year ARJEA
Taipei Xinzhu Taizhong Tainan Gaoxiong Hualian
1927 54.0 51.2 49.5 45.7 45.3 —
1948 56.0 58.0 56.0 51.0 53.0 50.0
Source:. See Hou K’un-hung (fä IL % ) (ed.), Tudi Gaige Shiliao ’ Land Reform Data o f
Modern China) (Taipei: Academia Historica, 1988), p. 404. Wu Tianquan, op. cit., appendix 
p.6, Table 12.
The land tenure system in the transition period was left untouched. The colonial 
system in which tenants paid rent in kind was simply inherited. The rent could be as high 
as over 70% of the whole year’s crop, or as low as under 10%, depending on the 
relationship between landlords and tenants or the fertility of the land.144 Table 1.5 shows 
how much the rent was in 1927 and 1948.
The rents were raised after the war. The reason is that the government raised taxes 
and landlords transferred the burden to their tenants. In that period, the Nationalist 
government was fighting against the Communist Party in the Mainland, so it needed to 
secure a grain supply. It adopted three different measures to collect more grain and at the 
same time to prevent inflation. In 1946 it asked all farmers to pay their land tax in kind. 
The second measure was to force landlords to sell their grain to the government 
according to the amount of land tax they paid. The third method was aimed at the grain of 
medium-to-big landlords. The more rice they had, the more they had to sell it to the 
government at a compulsory purchasing price.143 This caused the landlords heavy losses, 
so one way to compensate was to raise rents. In Tainan, the share of the crops between 
landlords and tenants was raised from 5:5 in 1946 to 6:5 in 1947 and 6:4 in 1948.146
144 A survey done in 1952 on rural Taiwan shows the rent paid in 1948 as follows:
Rent % of Tenants (N=351)
0-10% 5%
11-30% 8%
31-37.5% 3%
37.6-50% 21%
51-60% 16%
61-70% 8%
70-+% 8%
No answer 31%
See Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, Rural Survey o f Taiwan, October - December, 1952 
(Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1953), Tabular Materials Compiled From 1,176 
Detailed Household Schedules, p. 9.
145 For details of the process of forced grains-selling, see Liu Jinqing, op.cit., pp. 60-65.
146 See Hou K ’un-hung ( e d . ) ,  op.cit., p. 366.
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O f course, not every landlord relied on rent to survive. There were three different 
kinds of landlords. The big landlords usually had inherited their lands from the Qing 
Dynasty, and most of them had diversified their wealth into commercial and industrial 
activities in colonial times. The biggest landlord at that time, Gu Zhenfu (-$-#. ), and
the second, Lin Xiantang already owned a lot of factories and banks in
colonial times.147 Their main activity was commercial and financial capital investment.
Another kind of landlord was less powerful nationwide, but locally influential. Most 
of them owned rice mills in the rural areas. The rice mills were often underground 
financial intermediaries where poor farmers and tenants borrowed at usurious rates. 
Because they owned a big granary and most peasants deposited grain in their granary, 
they could pool the unsold rice as a kind of deposit, and used this capital to invest in other 
commercial or financial activities.148 But most of the ‘capital’ was used as usury. One 
sort was ‘MaiqingX M #  ), which means to lend farmers consumption funds or 
productive capital before planting, and after the harvest the loan had to be paid in kind: 
‘the normal interest rate in Pingdong was 25% in 1952, while in an emergency, it could 
reach 40%, and in eastern Taiwan, the interest rate was even higher”.149 Besides these 
local financial landlords, another sort of landlord were not wholly dependent on the rent 
income. They had jobs in co-operatives, farmers’ or fishermen’s associations in the local 
areas, and their incomes were mainly from the profits of these organisations.150 They 
were managers or professionals, and were rural leaders. In the transition period, they 
were not greatly affected by the chaotic political and economic change.
Small landlords were more adversely affected.'Natural disasters in 1946 and 1947, 
the hyperinflation, and the tax policy all increased their burden. Though they could 
transfer some of the burden to tenants, usually their lands were too small to cover all o f 
the costs. But the fatal blow to these small landlords was yet to come.
14 See Tu Zhaoyan, op.cit., pp. 412-464. Also Zhao Wenshan ( ) ,  Taiwan ‘Sanqiwu’ Dizu Yundong 
de Toushi ( £  2%3L ' Thorough Understanding o f Taiwan ’s ‘Three-Seven-Five 'Rent
Reduction Movement) (Taipei: Ziyou Chubanshe, 1949/12), pp. 131-132.
148 Ibid.: p. 132.
149 See Deng Xuebing ( Tai wan Nongcun Fangwen Ji ( £ M. YftfrFVjtiL » Visit in Taiwan Peasant 
Village) (Taipei: unknown publisher, 1954), p. 96.
150 See Zhao Wenshan, op.cit., p. 132.
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1.1.5 Taiwanese Peasants and Tenants
The average farm household, including landlords, owned only 1.4 hectares in 1948. 
Farm-owners had to pay higher taxes to the government, and had to deal with natural 
disasters and to cope with hyperinflation. Yet it was, of course, harder for tenants. They 
had to pay more rent to landlords as compared to colonial times, as we saw in Table 1.5. 
The survey done in October 1949 of 3,967 tenants, 1,032 farm-owners and 493 landlords 
gives a rough sketch o f their living conditions .151
The expenditures of farm-owners were 63.2% of the landlords, while tenants’ 
expenditures were only 37.7% of landlords in 1948. In the expenditures of tenants, 
58.5% was spent on basic food and drink, a percentage that increased to 61% in 1949, 
reflecting a lower living standard. The survey shows that the smaller the land a tenant 
farmed, the higher percentage of his income he spent on food and drink.152
Another figure shows that 18.7% of tenants were in debt, while the figure among 
farm-owners was only 9.3%. But the figures may be underestimates. No one wanted to 
expose her/his debt because usury was illegal under the law.15’ The interest rate in rural 
areas is shown in Table 1.6. The interest rate on private loans was almost 5 times more 
than the public interest rate, and the annual interest rate could reach as high as 432%.
Table 1. 6 Interest Rates Per Month in Rural Taiwan (1948-49)
Year
1948 (1-6)
1948 (7-12) 
1949(1-6)
1949 17-121
Public Banks 
3.6% 
6 .0%  
10% 
10%
Private Loans 
20% 
30% 
36%
____ 36%+
Source: See Zhongguo Dizheng Yanjiusuo, Ibid.: p. 9.
151 See Zhongguo Dizheng Yanjiusuo ( @ ), Taiwan Nongdi Jianzu Baogao ( olfJzItbM
Report on Rent Reduction in Taiwan) (Taipei: Zhongguo Dizheng Yanjiusuo, 1951), p. 2.
152 See Ibid.: pp. 6-7.
153 See Guomindang Zhongyang Gaizao Weiyuanhui Diliuzu ( t  Z tÜ :#  I  #  ^  ^  i&) ’ Taiwan
Nongjia Jingji—Dang de Shehui Diaocha, Nongcun Dianxing Diaocha Baogao ( —.It 
i tM f l  ’ Ä  Peasant Economy in Taiwan—Social Survey o f the Party, Report on Typical
Village) (Taipei: KMT, 1952), p. 17. It reports that ‘farmers were afraid that usury is illegal so that they did 
not like to report. Every interviewer had similar report. Their disguised reasons could be “only short-term 
turnover”, “not feel easy to report”, or obviously said “I am afraid it might aflFect my loan in the future”....’.
46
Chapter 1 Historical Origins
1.1.6 Taiwanese Workers
There were some 260,000 industrial labourers at the end of the war, when mass 
unemployment began to emerge.154 This entailed three kinds of unemployment. The first 
involved Taiwanese soldiers dispatched back to Taiwan who could not find any job, a 
figure estimated at about 100,000.155 Another was ‘bureaucratic unemployment’. In 
1945 there were 46,944 Taiwanese bureaucrats in the colonial bureaucracy, and the 
figure was reduced to 39,711 in December 1946. The figure for 1946 includes Taiwanese 
working in public enterprises, which had mostly been privately Japanese owned in 
colonial times. If we deduct this number, the figure comes to only 31,193. In other words, 
about one-third of the Taiwanese bureaucrats were laid off.156 It was the same with the 
take-over o f public enterprises, which laid off a lot o f workers due to insufficient capital. 
The third kind o f unemployment arose from the bankruptcy of small private enterprises. 
Because they were now cut off from Japanese supplies of material, many of these 
factories could not go on with their business. Another reason for bankruptcy were new 
regulations. For example, the government ordered that all reading materials for all 
schools should be ordered from the public enterprise Taiwan Printing Company, which 
drove many printing companies out of business. The situation was the same for private 
tobacco and wine manufacturers and import-export companies.157
Life was hard for these unemployed. Most o f them returned to rural villages and were 
responsible for the hidden unemployment seen in the successive increases of the 
agricultural population in these few years. From 1946 to 1948, the number of farmers 
increased by almost 23% (see Table 1.4). Even skilled professionals suffered. In 1946 the 
doctors of National Taiwan University Medical School went on strike because they did
154 It was recognised by the secretary of Taiwan Zhangguan Gongshu Ge Jingen ( % ) in his address to
Provincial Assembly in June 1946. See Chen Xingtang ( (ed.),  Taiwan “2.28” Shijian Dangan 
Shi liao—Nanjing Dier Lishi Dangan Guancang (
M  ’ Documents o f  Taiwan “Uprising February 28 ’’—From Nanjing Second Academia Historica) (Taipei: 
Renjian Chubanshe, 1992), pp. 78-88.
155 See Xiao Shengtie ( üf Ü48.), ‘Taiwan 228 Shijian de Jingji yu Wenhua Beijing—Shehui Oiwang Lilun
zhi Yingyong’ ( *Economic and Cultural
Background o f the Uprising February 28 in Taiwan—Application o f Social Expectation Theory), in 228 
Minjian Yanjiu Xiaozu ’ Folk research Team on the Uprising of February 28), 228
Xueshu Yantaohui Lunwenji (jz.jz.s\  iftm X  #  ’Essays on the Uprising o f February 28) (Taipei:
228 Minjian Yanjiu Xiaozu, Taimei Wenhua Jiaoliu Jijinhui, Xiandai Xueshu Yanjiu Jijinhu, 1992), p. 90.
156 See Ibid.: p. 93 and Chen Xingtang (ed.), op.cit., p. 664.
15 See Zhang Qin ( 5 k $ r ) ,  ‘Taiwan Zhenxiang’ ( a  » ‘The Real Facts in Taiwan’), in Chen
Xingtang, op.cit., pp. 135-162.
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not get enough in wages to cope with inflation.158 The government did not have enough 
money to pay ordinary teachers, either. Their pay was delayed for three months in Taipei 
county from May to August 1946.159 Such arrears were also reported in the ‘normal 
year’ of 1952.160
1.1.7 Summary
From 1945 to 1949, Taiwan society experienced a chaotic take-over period. Real 
incomes in 1946 stood at only 10.64% of 1936, the year of highest incomes in colonial 
times.161 The average price index from January 1946 to September 1948 was 33,133 
(1937=100), and the index worsened to 2,642,400 (1937=100) from October 1948 to 
June 1949, the month of the Taiwan Dollar Reform. In other words, the inflation rate was 
7,975% in nine months. Wages and the income that farmers received for their rice lagged 
far behind the inflation rate. The wage index was only 33%, 29% of the total price index, 
while rice increased in price by only 90% and 74% in the two periods.162 Most native 
Taiwanese farmers, small landlords, tenants and workers were trapped in poverty.
Another segment of the native Taiwanese was little affected. They were the 
economic and political elites in colonial times, who still held influence in the new regime. 
They had been big landlords and capitalists under Japanese rule, and so long as their lands 
and enterprises were untouched by the new regime, they could use their power to 
appropriate profits and held onto their prestige through political participation. In this 
period big landlords transferred the burden of higher tax to their tenants. Besides, they 
had already diversified their wealth into commercial and financial activities, and were 
able to accumulate additional capital. Many of them later became leaders of business 
groups. After the uprising of February 28, 1947, some did not take part in politics any
158 See Chen Xingtang, op.cit., p. 68.
159 See Xiao Shengtie, op.cit., p. 93.
160 In 1952, a report said that the mining companies owed labourers up to three months wages. They gave
the workers the so-called ‘wage card’ which could be reimbursed in future. Most workers could not wait so 
long, so usually they discounted the ‘wage card’ up to 30% to get cash. See Guomindang Zhongyang 
Weiyuanhui Sheji Kaohe Weiyuanhui ( il Hit + # » Scrutiny Committee in
Central Committee, KMT), Taiwansheng Changkuang Laogong Zhuangkuang Kaocha Baogao (
#  ’ Reports on Labourers ’ Conditions in Mining and Manufacturing Industries o f  
Taiwan Province) (Taipei: KMT, 1954).
161 See Xia Shengtie, op. cit., p. 109, Table 1.
162 See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 56, Table 13.
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longer,16'1 but their economic power was still influential, insofar as they did not defy the 
new regime.
The new rulers from mainland China benefited the most from this power reshuffle. 
This privileged ‘carpetbagger’ group superseded the Japanese colonisers without 
changing the fundamental social and economic structures. As seen, too, different power 
blocks from China extended their battlefield to Taiwan, which contributed to economic 
and political underdevelopment in the period. Because they controlled most of the 
confiscated Japanese ‘enemy property’, which could not be properly operated under their 
management, economic performance in turn was interrupted.164 The newcomers did not 
emphasise production, preferring sometimes to plunder the enterprises. They occupied 
every high post in the government bureaucracy, were granted privileges in doing business, 
and could rely on the armed forces to suppress dissent. The social cleavage between 
Taiwanese and Mainlander emerged in this period, especially with the violent 
suppression o f the February 28 uprising.165
Basically the colonial social class structures were left untouched, though they 
became more polarised in this period. The living standards o f the small landlords, farm- 
owners, semi-tenants, tenants and workers worsened. As rulers, Japanese bureaucrats 
were simply replaced by Chinese bureaucrats, and the new antagonisms copied those of 
Japanese times. This would not change until the Nationalist government was defeated by 
the Communists in China and retreated to Taiwan. In trying to defend their last fighting 
base, they began to create new alliances. Land reform became a tool in this, which altered
163 In their paper, Chen Mintong and Wu Naide find that there was ‘political disruption’ after the uprising
of February 1947. In Gaoxiong county, the turnover rate in 1945, the year of the first county representative 
election after take-over, was only 20%, the same as in colonial time. But it increased to 80% in 1950, the 
first election after the uprising. They attribute the high turnout rate to ‘white-terror’. But this contradicts to 
Chen’s own finding in another article which says that most Taiwanese local factions owns local monopoly 
business, e.g., a local credit union. Almost every credit union was reorganised from Japanese cooperative 
union, which means that they were already influential in colonial times and kept their power in Nationalist 
times. See Chen Mintong (P$.afj ii|), Wu Naide ‘Zhengquan Zhuanyi he Jingying Liudong’ (jst
' Regime Transfer and Elites Mobility), in Lai Jeh-hang, op.cit., pp. 303-334.
164 A popular joke at that time could express the Taiwanese feelings. The Taiwanese complained that the 
Americans treated the Japanese better than the Taiwanese because the American dropped only two atom 
bombs in Japan, but threw a whole Chinese army at Taiwan. This was reported by American journalist 
William Newton in March 1946. See Chen Xingtang, op.cit., p. 65.
16~ See Yang Feng Taiwan Guilai ( ^ R e t u r n  from Taiwan) (Shanghai: Wenhui
Newspaper, 4 March 1947), in Chen Xingtang (ed.), op.cit., p. 113. It reports that the Taiwanese called 
those people from the mainland ‘people the from fatherland’ in 1945, but one year later, called them 
‘Chinese’. They used a more discriminatory word ‘Waisheng Zhu’ ( tbf i  I# ’ Mainlander pig) after the 
military repression to express their resentment.
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the social structure thoroughly.
1.2 Class Structures in the 1950s
No sooner had Chen Cheng (ßfctäO been appointed as Taiwan’s governor in 1949 
than he announced an enforcement of the 375 Rent Reduction Act, a law from the 
mainland which was supposed to limit farm rent to a maximum of 37.5% of the total 
annual main crop yield. When the Nationalists took over Taiwan in 1945, a lot of naive 
tenants believed that they could ask landlords to reduce the rent according to the new 
Chinese law, which caused a lot of conflict between tenants and landlords at that time.166 
After the defeat in China, enforcement of the law became politically advantageous to the 
government, so as to create a new alliance with the rural population, composing more 
than 50% of the total labour force.
Rent reduction was the first step to reform the tenure system. The second step was 
the sale of public lands. The government owned more than 20% of total arable land in 
1947. Most of these lands were confiscated property, especially the lands owned by the 
Taiwan Sugar Company, which had been a conglomerate of all colonial Japanese sugar 
companies. Though there had been a suggestion to sell public lands to tenants, it was not 
taken seriously into consideration until 1949. From 1948 to 1953, 35% of public lands 
were sold. Among the sold lands in the period, only 5% of the land was sold in 1948.167 
One can note that the Taiwan Sugar Company’s better land was left almost untouched 
because its income was the main source for the government’s foreign exchange reserves 
in the 1950s. It sold only about 14% of its secondary land to tenants.168 On the one hand 
the Nationalists wanted to win tenants’ support, but on the other it did not like to lose 
any revenue from its milk cow.
The third step was a Land to the Tiller Program whose main goal was to help to 
establish owner-farmers. It was implemented by the compulsory purchase of private 
tenanted farmland by the government and resale to the actual tiller. The political
166 The rent reduction law was published in 1927, and was tried out in some provinces, but never much 
enforced. The conflict arising from tenants’ requests and landlords’ resistance was widely reported in the 
transition period. See Hou K ’un-hung, op.cit., pp. 352-353.
16' See Tang Hui-sun ( I f  ), Land Reform in Free China (Taipei: Chinese-American Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1954), pp. 80-81.
168 Ibid.: pp. 69, 84. Taiwan’s land is classified into different levels according to different fertility of the 
land. Government taxes the farmer according to the classification. ‘Secondary’ land means the ‘second 
best’ land.
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motivation for this large-scale land reform was threefold: (i) the KMT wanted to create a 
new alliance, similar to the Rent Reduction Program, (ii) it wanted to eliminate the 
powerful influence of the landlord class in the rural areas, and (iii) it wanted to satisfy the 
expectations of the USA, which was pushing East Asian countries to reform their land 
tenure systems to prevent Communist infiltration.169 The success of this land reform 
rested strongly on violent threats, and that the land reformers were reforming other 
people’s land.170
Through these reforms, the traditional social structures were deeply changed. 
Politically the landlord class was replaced by newly arising owner-farmers and local 
KMT branch cadres in the rural areas171; economically it diverted land-speculative capital 
into other spheres, and produced income redistribution effects to some extent.172 In the 
following pages I will limit my discussion to the impact of the reforms on class structures, 
the economic effects and the new possibilities that emerged to become businesspeople. 
But let us first examine the impact on Taiwanese local society of the influx after 1949 of 
Chinese immigrants, who started the land reform engine.
169 See Theodore Reynolds Smith, East Asian Agrarian Reform: Japan, Republic ofKorea, Taiwan and the 
Philippines (Connecticut: John C. Lincoln Institute, unknown publishing year, likely between 1967 and 
1970), pp. 14-17. Taiwan’s land reform was a ring of American planned agrarian reform in East Asia. 
Japan, Korea and Philippines had similar reform under American pressure.
170 A lot of scholars have pointed out that the success of land reform in Taiwan was based on the military
threat, especially after the massacre of February 28,1947. The speaker of Pingdong’s local parliament said 
that ‘a driver in Taipei was sentenced to death because he caused a traffic accident. If a driver could be 
killed just because he violated a traffic law, we can imagine what the result would be if the landlords do not 
obey the law. Because landlords have the idea of the driver case in mind, the Rent Reduction Program was 
implemented easier.’ See Zhao Wenshan ( ) , San Qi Wu Dizu Yundong de Toushi (_£ -tJUtL
)  (Taipei: Ziyou Chubanshe, 1949) , p. 71.
171 The details of consolidating KMT’s control in local politics, see Cheng Mingtong, Paixizhengzhi yu
Taiwan Zhengzhi Bianqian (ifk& »Faction Politics and the Development o f Taiwan
Politics) (Taipei: Yuedan Chubanshe, 1995), pp. 152-166.
1 2 Only a few academic papers discuss the social effects of land reform. The best materials are from the 
research reports of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. See Arthur F. Raper, Taiwan zhi 
Chengshi yu Gongye ( TfTfltLX. #  ’ Urban and Industrial Taiwan-Crowded and Resourceful)
(Taipei: U.S. Mutual Security Mission to China and National Taiwan University, 1954); E. Stuart Kirby, 
Jinbuzhong de Taiwan Nongcun ( i £ #  fl a A? M. f t  ’ Rural Progress in Taiwan) (Taipei: Joint 
Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1960); Arthur F. Raper, Taiwan Muqian zhi Nongcun Wenti yu qi 
Jianglai zhi Zhanwang ( n 8  M f t  M M M  ’ Rural Taiwan-Problems and Promises)
(Taipei: Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, 1953); Martin M. C. Yang, Socio-Economic Results 
o f Land Reform in Taiwan (Honolulu: East-West Centre Press, 1970); Chang Yen-tien, ‘Land Reform and 
its Impact on Economic and Social Progress in Taiwan’, Industry o f  Free China, vol. 23 No. 4 (April 
1965); Cai Hongjin ( # :£ i£ .) , Taiwan Nongdi Gaige dui Shehui Jingji Yingxiang de Yanjiu ( täßt 
j t f f t  ’ Research on the Influence ofLand Reform on the Social Economy in Taiwan)
(Taipei: Jiaxin Cement Cultural Foundation, 1967).
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1.2.1 Bureaucratic Mainlanders
From 1946 to 1957 the population of civilian Mainlanders increased by more than 
one million, as Table 1.7 shows. Most arrived between 1949 and 1956. The large 
increase in Mainlanders from 1950-1957 included demobilised Mainlander soldiers. The 
figures in the table do not include soldiers, who comprised about 2% o f Taiwan’s total 
population. Such a big influx of new immigrants in such a short period had a strong 
impact on the indigenous society.
Besides soldiers, the non-soldier Mainlanders comprised 8% of the total population, 
and their occupations centred on tertiary industry. Almost 68% of the Mainlanders were 
in tertiary industry, as shown in Table 1.9. The Mainlanders’ occupations in tertiary 
industry mainly centred on professional, clerical and sales work. A report observed that 
most o f them were civil servants, staff in the communications sector and professionals 
(see Table 1.10).17^  Because they were loyal personnel of the Nationalist government, 
most o f them having worked for the Nationalists on the mainland, the government felt a 
political obligation to take care of them. The result was that the public offices and 
enterprises became refugee shelters for these immigrants. Raper noted that ‘the 
government’s policy is to arrange for as many Mainlanders as possible to work in 
government’,174 and ‘those who were from the mainland want to go back, but at the 
moment they have to get a job to survive, so it is almost impossible to lay off the 
redundant s ta ff175.
More than one-fourth o f Mainlanders were soldiers if we exclude those whose 
occupations are not categorised (see Table 1.8). Such a huge army was supposed to 
defend against Communist invasion with the help of the American seventh fleet. The 
government had to spend the lion’s share of its fiscal budget to maintain this army. From 
1952 to 1956 national defence expenditures in the central government budget averaged 
80.9%. Even in the late 1980s, it still composed more than 50% of total central 
government expenditures. This caused budget deficits in the 1950s, which were financed 
by US aid, which comprised between 5.3% to 20.1% of the budget.176 Without this aid,
173 See Arthur F. Raper, translated by Quan Hansheng, Chen Shaoxin, Taiwan zhi Chengshi yu Gongye, 
op.cit., p. 221.
174 See Ibid.: p. 121.
175 See Ibid. : p. 52.
176 See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 189, Table 57; p.175, Table 49.
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hyperinflation would have arisen similar to the postwar period.177
Though there was universal compulsory military service after 1951, the standing 
army was mainly formed by Mainlanders. They were totally under the state’s control. 
They were not allowed to marry until the ‘successful recovery of the Mainland’, a policy 
which was eased in the late 1950s; and they were not counted as a segment of the 
‘normal’ population in official statistics unless they married and registered as a 
household.178
Table 1. 7 Changes in the Taiwanese and Mainlander Population (1946-1957)
Year Total
(A)
TWN
(B)
MLD
(C)
C/A(%)
1946 6,090,860 6,059,139 31,721 0.52
1947 6,495,099 6,436,444 58,655 0.90
1948 6,806,136 6,678,969 127,167 1.87
1949 7,396,931 6,980,234 416,697 5.63
1950 7,554,399 7,029,459 524,940 6.95
1951 7,869,247 7,268,557 600,690 7.63
1952 8,123,374 7,473,544 649,830 8.00
1953 8,438,016 7,724,000 714,016 8.46
1954 8,749,151 7,983,087 766,064 8.76
1955 9,077,643 8,224,955 852,688 9.39
1956 9,390,381 8,435,965 . 954,416 10.16
1957 9,690,250 8,676,022 1,014,228 10.47
Source: Ryozaburo Minami ( ^  )(ed.), Taiwan no Jinko to Keizai
(Population and Economy in Taiwan) (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, 
1971), p.30, Table 10.
Note: TWN means Taiwanese, and MLD means Mainlander.
The official unemployment rate was between 2.4% and 2.9% in the 1950s, but this 
must be an underestimate. A survey o f rural areas in 1952 shows that the unemployment 
rate was 13% (see Table 1.11), while in urban areas in 1953 it was about 12.5%.179 The 
figures did not include any underemployed. For example, about half of the working class
1 ' As we know, the most convenient way for a government to finance its budget is to increase money supply 
from the central bank. The Nationalists did this in Taiwan through reform of the New Taiwan Dollar from 
15 June 1949 to 1952. It caused inflation, which rose 57% in 1951 and 17% on 1952. The arrival of US aid 
in 1952 relieved the pressure to issue more banknotes. See Wu Congmin ( ‘Mei yuan yu Taiwan 
de Jingji Fazhan’ & )&&&  » US Aid and Taiwan’s Economic Development), in Taiwan:
A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (Taipei: Spring 1988), pp. 145-158. The developmental 
state theory should take into account such an ‘irrational developmental budget’ if such authors think the 
Taiwan government had a developmental mentality.
1 8 They were not counted as a part of the population and labour force until 1969.
179 See Ib id : p. 218.
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had only temporary jobs, which was counted as employment.180
These workers in public offices or enterprises received wages in cash and in kind, 
including free housing or a housing allowance, rice, coal, oil, salt, etc. In June 1953, a 
civil servant’s annual income was NT$9,174, and half of the income was paid in kind. 
This wage was about 18.8% higher than the average income of NT$7,722 (see Table 
1.12). Because the pay was good and the job was stable, it attracted more educated 
people. The young men whose first formal job in the 1950s was in this sector averaged 
seven years of education compared to 5.8 years o f education for young men in Taiwan as 
a whole.181 Mainlander bureaucrats had relatively stable jobs. They also thought they 
would be returning ‘home’ at any time, and thus had no incentive to leave the public 
service in order to establish a business.
Table 1. 8 Occupational Distribution Among Taiwanese and Mainlanders in the 1950s
ETHNICITY
OCCUPATIONS TWN % MLD %
Soldiers 2 0.08 28 17.95
Professional, technical and related workers 110 4.60 17 10.90
Representatives and officers 8 0.33 3 1.92
Managers in public and private enterprises 29 1.21 5 3.21
Clerical and related workers 122 5.11 15 9.62
Sales workers 209 8.75 14 8.97
Service workers 85 3.56 4 2.56
Agricultural, animal, forestry workers, 
fishermen and hunters 1084 45.37 20 12.82
Production and related workers, 
transport equip, operators and labourers 428 17.91 20 12.82
Occupations not categorised 312 13.06 30 19.23
Subtotal 2389 100 156 100
Source: I devised this table by putting raw survey data through a computer. The raw data derives from 
The General Survey o f Social Change in Taiwan, 1992.
180 See Ibid. :p. 215.
181 I have calculated this using a computer program from the raw data of ‘A General Survey of Social 
Change in Taiwan, 1992’. Education differences among groups is statistically significant at the level of 
1%. The mean of the educational years of different groups is shown as follows:
Self-employed 5.29 N=31
Employee 7.03 N=T06
Work for Own Family 4.64 N=53
Housewife 4.50 N=2
Others________________311 N=17
TOTAL 5.82 (N=209)
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Table 1. 9 The Labour Force in Different Industries in the 1950s (By Ethnicity)
Industry U nknow n Primary Secondary Tertiary
Surveys Father Interviewee Father Interviewee Father Interview ee Father Interviewee
1989-90-1 T W N 59 46 183 121 28 56 46 93
M L D 4 4 4 0 0 2 12 14
1989-90-2 T W N 52 49 199 126 27 71 62 94
M LD 7 7 7 0 0 2 9 14
1991-92-1 T W N 42 33 253 95 36 96 86 193
M LD 4 4 6 3 4 10 13 10
1991-92-2 T W N 34 157 17 36
M LD 0 1 1 14
Subtotal T W N 187 128 792 342 108 223 230 380
M LD 15 15 18 3 5 14 48 38
T O T A L 202 143 810 345 113 237 278 418
2546 (2201) (345) 1155 350 696
% (1) 13.6 45.4 13.7 27.3
%(2) 52.5 15.9 31.6
%(3) TWN (54.7) (15.9) (29.4)
MLD (16.7) (15.1) (68.2)
1953 TW N (69.3) (9.6) (21.1)
S u rv ey M L D (16.6) (17.6) (65.8)
1955 T W N (29) (20) (51)
Survey M L D (4) (22) (74)
1952(% ) (4) 56.1 16.9 27 .0
1955(% ) 5 3 .6 18.0 78  4
1958(% ) I L L 19.7 7 9 7
Source:
1. Derived by the author. Same as Table 1.8.
2. The 1953 survey was done by the Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction. See Arthur F. Raper, (tr. by
Quan Hansheng, Chen Shaoxin, Taiwan zhi Chengshi yu Gongye ( g  > Urban and
Industrial Taiwan-Crowded and Resourceful) (Taipei: U.S. Mutual Security Mission to China and 
National Taiwan University, 1954), p. 221.
3. The 1955 survey is from Li Dongming Study on Social Increase ofPopulation in Taiwan (  £
Mb Fk A  o  4£ f t )  (Taiwan: Taiwan Population Studies Centre, Taiwan Provincial
Department of Health, 1968), p.71, Table 41. Original data is from Taiwan Provincial Government, 
Department of Civil Affairs, Taiwan Provincial Household Statistics Summary, 1955 (Taipei: Taiwan 
Provincial Government, 1956).
4. The data is from A. Hermalin, P. K. C. Liu, and D. Freedman, ‘The Social and Economic Transformation 
of Taiwan”, in Arland Thornton & Hui-sheng Lin (eds.), Social Change & the Family in Taiwan (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 72, Table 3.7. Original data is from Directorate- 
General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1984.
Notes:
1. Total number of different categories including unknown category is divided by 2,546.
2. Excluding the number of unknown category, divide the number of the three industry with 2201.
3. Ethnic occupation distribution in different industries, excluding the number of unknown category.
4. The figures here are labour force distribution in different industries. See source 4.
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Table 1. 10 The Mainlanders’ Occupational Distribution in Urban Areas (1953)
Occupations interviewees (%)
civil servan ts 71 2 0 .0 6
com m unication  workers 26 7 .3 0
p rofession a ls 37 1 0 .45
b u sin essp eo p le 36 10 .17
ven d ors 37 1 0 .45
industrial workers 27 7 .63
workers in other
com m ercial activ ities 36 1 0 .17
married so ld iers 19 5 .37
serv a n ts  and others 24 6 .7 8
u nem ployed 41 11 .58
TOTAL 354 10 0 .0 0
Source: See Arthur F. Raper, Quan Han-sheng, Chen Shao-xin, 
Taiwan zhi Chengshi yu Gongye, op. cit., 218.
Table 1.11 Employment in the Rural Taiwan (October-December, 1952)
(N=l,176)
1952 Rural Survey Farm-
owners
Part-
Tenants
Full-
Tenants
Farm
Workers
Non-farm
People
All Others
Taiwanese 315 190 350 174 89
Mainlanders 1 1 6 28 22
(%) (Full and Part Owners)
On own farm 67% 66% 0 0 0
Maintenance 2% 3% 2% 1% 12%
Farm wages 4% 3% 19% 1% 1%
Non-farm wages 5% 6% 37% 54% 10%
Handicrafts, etc 8% 6% 13% 34% 15%
Unemployed 13% 12% 29% 11% 62%
Source: See Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, Tabular Materials Compiled From 1,176 
Detailed Household Schedules (Taipei: unpublished manuscript, 1953), p.4, Table 1; p.6. 
Note: The question asked by the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction is ‘Use made of working 
time in last calendar year of husband’. The meaning of ‘Maintenance’ is not clear here.
Table 1. 12 Annual Household Income, 1953
Total A verage 7 ,7 2 2
E m ployers 27 ,271
S e lf-em p loyed 9 ,2 0 6
W orkers 5 ,1 4 8
P rofession a ls 11 ,708
Civil S ervan ts 9 ,1 7 4
O thers 7 ,1 2 8
Source: Arthur F. Raper, Ibid. : p. 124, Table 4.
1.2.2 Capitalist Mainlanders
A lot o f rich political refugees brought gold bullion and US banknotes to Taiwan
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after the Communist Party took over China. They used their money in three ways: 
industrial investment, underground speculation and hoarding.182
Those who invested their capital in industry mostly had political connections with the 
Nationalist government, especially those in textiles. They shipped their dismantled 
machines from China, mainly from Shanghai, and went into operation under the 
government’s protection. In 1953, seven out of the twelve big cotton textile factories 
were owned by Mainlanders, while four were public enterprises which were firmly 
controlled by Mainlander bureaucrats.18^  For example, the head of the Taiyuan ( a  7t )  
Textile Company was Yan Qingling who was the late president Yan Jiagan’s
(Ü  brother. The company belonged to the Yu-long (^ H r , Yue-loong) business 
group, in which Madam Chiang Kai-shek held investment interests.184 The other 
Mainlander capitalists who became big business groups all benefited from the 
government’s protection policy in the 1950s.185 One such important industry was the 
printing and publishing industry, which also benefited from the government’s regulation 
of freedom of speech.
This kind o f industrial investment, though it was a kind of bureaucratic capital, 
contributed to Taiwan’s economy at that time, and to later development. Many future 
Taiwanese small businesspeople worked for a while in these companies, learned skills 
from their operation, and came out to run their own businesses when business 
opportunities emerged in the 1960s.
Another type of Mainlander capitalist were ‘financial capitalists’, who specialised in 
financial activities after they came to Taiwan. Some o f the experienced Shanghai dealers 
dealt with the shares o f privatised public enterprises released from the Land-to-the-Tiller 
reform. They set up businesses in Taipei, and connected up with small brokers in rural 
areas to purchase small landlords’ shares, which were used to compensate their sale of
182 See Ziyou Zhongguoshe (£  & 17 @ ^ L), ‘Women de Jingji’ (‘ »‘Our Economic Situation’),
in Jinri de Wenti 9  ’ Problems Nowadays) (Taipei: Ziyou Zhongguoshe, 1958), pp. 48-49.
18j See Wang, Hong-zen, Zhanhou Taiwan Siren Duzhan Ziben zhi Fazhan a
M, The Development o f Private Monopoly Capital in Postwar Taiwan) (Taipei: unpublished Masters
thesis, 1988), p. 27.
184 See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 219.
185 It included the Zhongxing Textile Business Group, Yuandong Business Group, Hualong Business 
Group, Jiaxing Business Group, Guofeng Business Group and Pacific Business Group. See Wang Hong- 
zen, op.cit., p. 23. Hsiao Hsin-Huang Michael, ‘The Entrepreneurial Process of Taiwan’s Small-Medium 
and Big Business’, Zhongguo Shehui Xuekan (Chinese Sociology Journal), no. 16 (1992), pp. 139-168.
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land to the tenants.186 The circulated shares o f the four privatised companies became 
their speculative targets. The price rose five times in one year, and dropped to one-fifth in 
the successive year thanks to Shanghai speculative capitalists.187
1.2.3. Taiwanese Landlords
Table 1.13 shows that in June 1952, landlords or part lessors composed 29.3% of 
total farm households. Strictly speaking, the ‘real’ landlords were ‘full’ lessors, which 
comprised 12.6% of total farm households.188 Among these landlords, 87.3% were small 
landlords who owned paddy fields of less than two Jia (1 Jia is about 1 hectare), 9.3% 
owned between two and four Jia, while only 3.35% of these landlords owned more than 
four Jia.189
Table 1. 13 Lands of Different Ownership Types, 1952-1953 (Unit: Jia)
O W N E R SH IP TYPES Individual Joint Corporate Subtotal
Area of Owner-Cultivated Land 189,874 222,318 15,005 427,197
Area of Tenanted Land (1) 113,849 121,989 18,119 253,957
Subtotal 303,723 344,307 33,124 681,154
Number of Lessors 38,005 34,772 4,073 76,850
Number of Part Lessors, 
Part Owners 40,869 57,315 3,867 102,051
Subtotal(2) 78,874 92,087 7,940 178,901
Compulsorily Purchased Land (3) 32,063 99,796 11,709 143,568
% of Appropriated Tenanted 
Land = (3/1)* 100% 28.16 81.81 64.46 56.53
Affected Landlord 
Households (4) 15,146 87,149 3,754 106,049
(% )=4/2 19.2 94.64 47.28 59.28
Purchased Land 
per H ousehold (3/4) 2.12 1.15 3.12 1.35
Source: TangHui-sun, op. cit., pp. 101, 105, 140.
186 See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., pp. 236-237.
18 As the economic planner Yin Zhongrong ( f - t y g . )  noted, to establish a legal stock market had an effect 
like the Shanghai stock market before 1949 where transactors were limited to small groups, and which had 
no positive effect on savings and industrial capital. See Yin Zhongrong, ‘Dui Taiwan Sheli Zhengjuan 
Jiaoyisuo zhi Yijian’ (4&ff ft &  » Comments on the Establishment of Taiwan
Stock Market’), in his Wo dui Taiwan Jingji de Kanfa ’M y Opinions to Taiwan
Economy) (Taipei: Economic Planning Board, Executive Yuan, 1961), Second Part, p. 25.
188 Another statistics shows that there were 142,175 landlord households, but it does not say what year it is. 
Let us assume that it was the statistics of 1951. In 1952 there were 679,750 farm households, so about 20% 
of farmer households were landlords. It is not greatly different from the figure Table 2.14 shows. See 
Guomindang Zhongyang Gaizao Weiyuanhui Diliuzu, op.cit., p. 2, Table 1-3.
189 See Tang Hui-sun, op.cit., p. 103.
58
Chapter 1 Historical Origins
Another feature of land ownership in Taiwan was the high proportion of joint-owner 
households, which comprised 49.3% of total farm households and owned 50.5% of the 
total land. This was the product of traditional fen-jia , i.e., land is distributed equally to 
sons, and after a few generations, a small plot of land is owned by many people, but 
ploughed by one.
1.2.3. a The Influence of the Rent Reduction Program
For landlords, the first effect of rent reduction was a decrease in income. Rent 
payments decreased 29.3% in 1949. According to a survey, 73% of landlords’ living 
standards were adversary affected. Among those landlords who held another job, only 
56% were notably affected, while 98% of the other landlords were affected.190 It was 
reported that the big and medium-size landlords were little affected because they usually 
had non-farm jobs in cities or towns. But for the small landlords who had only several 
hectares of land, this rent reduction program reduced their income to less than those of 
big tenants. They needed to terminate leases and to plough the land by themselves or by 
hired workers.191 From the beginning of 1950 to the end of June 1951, there had been 
16,349 cases of lease termination and tenancy disputes, which increased to 35,313 one 
year later.192 Another way to cope with their reduced rental income was to find another 
job. But since they did not have any non-agricultural skills, and there were not a lot of 
industrial jobs available, they hardly could change their occupation.
The second effect of the rent reduction reform was a fall in farm prices and an 
increase in farms sold. When landlords heard that, the Nationalist government would 
enforce the rent reduction program, they began to sell their land in 1948 (see Table 1.14). 
In 1949, the year the rent reduction program was implemented, the supply of land for sale 
increased abruptly to 10,791 hectares from 4,935 hectares in 1948. Under this situation, 
the land’s price plummeted from 18,600 kilograms of unhulled rice per Jia in 1948 to 
9,000 kilograms in 1950; the leased farm land could only be sold for half the price of 
owner-cultivated land.193 O f the farms sold, 60.9% had been owned by landlords who 
owned more than 5 Jia. Where did the money go when they sold the land? For large
190 See Zhongguo Dizheng Yanjiusuo, op.cit., p. 7.
191 See Zhao Wenshan, op.cit., pp. 72-73.
192 See Tang Hui-sun, op.cit., pp. 50-56.
193 See Tang Hui-sun, Ibid.: pp. 62-63.
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landlords, 84.5% of the funds were invested in industry or commerce, while only 16.5% 
of the small landlords did likewise. 26.2% of the small landlords used the money to clear 
their debts.194 It is obvious that the small landlords did not have a substantial chance to 
become businesspeople.
Table 1. 14 Number of Landlords Selling and Purchasing Land, 1946-49
Year Number of landlords Number of landlords Land Sold Land Purchased
who sold land who bought land (hectares) (hectares)
1946 17,023 16,629 7,320 6,818
1947 14.017 16,234 4,205 4,545
1948 12,654 5,587 4,935 2,067
1949 22,960 16,412 10,791 6,893
Source: See Mao Yugang IfS'J), ‘Taiwan Tudi Gaige zhi Jingji Yanjiu’ (‘
’ ‘Economic Research on Taiwan Land Reform’), in Yu Yuxian ff)(ed.), Taiwan 
Nongye Fazhan Lunwenji ( £  M S  &  X  #  » Essays on Taiwan Agricultural 
Development) (Taipei: Lianjing Publishing Co., 1975), p. 163, Table 12.
Note: Calculation is based on land transactions in Xinzhu, Taizhong, Gaoxiong, Taidong, Hualian and 
Tainan.
1.2.3. b The Influence of the Land-to-the-Tiller Program
The Land to the Tiller Act o f 1953 transferred 56.5% of the tenanted farms from the 
hands o f landlords to tenants. Table 1.13 shows that 70% of the appropriated lands were 
jointly-owned. The number of appropriated joint landlords was 87,149. If we divide the 
size o f the appropriated land with the affected landlords, the average size of the 
compulsorily purchased land of one landlord was 1.15 Jia for joint landlord owners, and 
2.12 Jia for an individual owner. The reason why most of the appropriated lands were 
jointly-owned was because the jointly-owned landlords were smaller than individually- 
owned, and the government faced less resistance from these small landlords than from 
medium to large landlords. This table shows that only 19.2% of the individually owned 
lands were purchased, while almost all of the jointly-owned lands were appropriated.195
There were many ways to evade appropriation. The first was to divide one’s property 
and distribute it to sons. A second method, as noted, was to cancel the contracts with 
tenants and plough it themselves. Another method was to change the tenure contract to 
make the tenants wage-labourers, as ‘wage-labourers’ were not entitled to buy the lands 
that they were ploughing.
Landlords were compensated 30% through the shares of four public enterprises and
194 Calculated from Zhongguo Dizheng Yanjiusuo, op.cit., pp. 81-82, Table 15.
195 See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 82.
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70% through land commodity bonds in kind. At that time no one believed that the 
Nationalist government could pay the land commodity bonds for ten years, so some of 
them sold the bonds for a very low price in a very short period.196 But research conducted 
in 1969 revealed that 85% of the interviewed landlords kept the land bonds to meet their 
living expenses. Commodity bonds were the major source of funds for consumption 
immediately after land reform, so the small landlords had to keep them.197
How did these landlords dispose o f their corporate stock? In a survey in 1966 of five 
hundred ordinary landlords and seventy-five big landlords, Martin M. C. Yang found that 
98.4% of the ordinary landlords and 90.6% of the big landlords sold their stocks early, 
and that the prices they received, except for the Taiwan Cement Company, were 35% to 
65% less than par value.198 The small landlords were too small to control any company, 
and saw no benefits to keep stocks that did not provide immediate dividends, so they sold 
their shares to obtain cash. Their shares were mostly purchased by Shanghai capitalists 
who dealt on the stock exchange, and later on became concentrated in big landlords’ 
hands, who had already been capitalists before the reform. The four privatised companies 
were under the control of these big landlords, who had already invested during colonial 
times. For example, the Taiwan Cement Company, the most profitable company among 
the four, was controlled by the Lin family of Banqiao (fe-fö), the Gu family of L ugang(^
^ ) ,  the Lin family o f W u fe n g (ll^ )  and the Chen family of Gaoxiong( it} ,££) after the 
election of an executive board in October 1954.199 An interviewee who worked as 
financial manager for the Jilong(^fl£) Yan family confirmed that the four companies 
were controlled by the big landlords—including the Taiwan Mining Company and the 
Taiwan Agriculture and Forestry Company, which were agglomerations of Japanese 
small and medium-sized enterprises.
How did the landlords employ their capital when they sold their commodity bonds or 
stocks? Theodore Reynolds Smith found that all o f the small landlords who sold 
commodity bonds used the money for their living expenses, and even among big
196 It was reported that some landlords wanted the government can buy the commodity bonds so that the 
landlords can liquidate their capital. They would sell the commodity bonds as low as 25% of the value of 
the rice’s market price. See Deng Xuebing, op.cit., pp. 200, 223.
197 See Theodore Reynolds Smith, op.cit., pp. 93, 96.
198 See Martin M. C. Yang, op.cit., p. 238.
199 See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 239.
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landlords, only one-fourth invested in industry or commerce.200 In Martin M. C. Yang’s 
survey, only 9.2% o f small landlords and 17.6% of big landlords used it as capital for 
another investment, or to change occupation. In Smith’s survey, their numbers came to 
12.9% and 26.1% respectively. Obviously most o f the capital was not invested in 
industry or commerce, contrary to the claims of the government and some scholars.201
Yang’s survey also shows that 20% of the ordinary landlords and 30% of the big 
landlords did change their occupation. He notes that ‘big landlords had, in general, been 
able to enter comparatively large and modem businesses or industries, whereas the small 
and ordinary landlords had to pick up many kinds of non-farming jobs’.202 In other words, 
to compensate for the loss o f income, small and ordinary landlords had to work as wage 
labourers, while big landlords, as we mentioned, had already been businesspeople. 
Among those landlords who transferred their money into industrial and commercial 
activity, the investments were mostly operated by their children.2(b
Even when landlords invested in non-farming activities, it does not mean that the 
capital was put into productive industry. In 1957-58, there were many reports of land 
transfers.204 It was a kind o f land speculation which should not be taken seriously as 
‘investment’. Such funds also became the source of the financial ‘black’ market in the 
countryside.
Thus a preliminary conclusion would be that after the reform, not a lot o f landlords 
used the compensated money in industry or commerce. Some small and ordinary 
landlords entered business, but they did not compose the main part of the business class. 
The business class drew its recruits mainly from among the large landlords, and the small 
landlords' children.
200 See Theodore Reynolds Smith, op.cit., p. 96.
201 See Mao Yugang ( -€, Tf $ ’] ) , op.cit., pp. 146, 162; Wolf Ladejinsky, ‘Agrarian Reform in Asia”, 
Foreign Affair, April, 1964.
202 See Martin M. C. Yang, op.cit., pp. 244-245.
203 See In Huang Dazhou’s ( y? ) survey, 53% of the investment was done by their children, 12% by 
brothers. See Huang Dazhou, ‘Taiwan Nongdi Gaige du Nongcun Dizhu zhi Yingxiang’
M ü. The Influence of Land Reform on Landlords), in Lee Denghui ( £  3L^)(ed.), Taiwan
Nongdi Gaige dui Xiangcun shehui zhi gongxiang (  a  #-£ . f t  iff ’ Contribution of
Land Reform to Taiwan ’s Rural Areas), pp. 70-119.
204 A document of the Ministry of Economic Affairs reports that ‘rich people feel depressed because they do 
not know how to use their capital. Depositing it in a bank will get little interest; loaning as usury is too 
risky; stocking speculative commodities is illegal; running a business has to pay high taxes....So the surplus
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1.2.4 Farm Tenants
After the Rent Reduction Program, the standard of living of tenant farmers did not 
improve much. A survey conducted after the Program showed that the liability of the 
tenant farmers rose from 18.7% to 20.2%. Those tenants who did benefit from the policy 
spent most o f their increased income on consumption (51.9%) due to poverty. Only 
0.1% of the tenants invested in commerce.205 But the plummeting land price made it 
more affordable for them to buy their own land. Without the help o f the Land-to-the- 
Tiller Program, 28,960 tenant families purchased 15,646 Jia of farm directly from 
landlords in 1953, which composed 6.2% of the tenanted land.206 The Land-to-the-Tiller 
Program helped 194,823 farming families to purchase 143,568 Jia of farm land offered by 
the government for resale in 1953.207 The percentage of tenant households was reduced 
from 36% in 1948 to 15% of the agricultural population in 1959. Tenanted land was 
reduced from 44% to 14% in the same period. It was a dramatic change in tenancy 
structures.
Though tenants were helped to become farm owners, their market situation in the first 
five years did not improve a lot. First o f all, they had to pay a mortgage for the land for ten 
years. This meant that they were tied to the land for those ten years and did not have any 
surplus to invest in the land. They were like tenant-owners who paid the rent to the 
government instead of landlords. In fact, both Bernard Gallin’s research in Hsin Hsing 
village and the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction survey in 1954 showed that the 
financial burden of the tenants who bought land increased because they had to pay a land 
tax and house tax, and the tax could not be reduced even if there were a natural disaster.208 
Though the sources of income of tenant farmers and landlords were redistributed after 
land reform, it did not necessarily mean that tenant farmers obtained what the landlords 
lost. The government used a lot of methods to collect taxes, in order to secure the surplus 
from agriculture to finance its budget. According to Li Denghui’s ( ^  ’ Lee Teng-hui)
estimation, the landlords’ share of agricultural income decreased from 25.19% in 1936-40 
to 9.76% in 1950-55 to 6.26% in 1956-60, while the figures for non-landlords were
capital in rural areas begins to be used to buy land ...whose after-tax income is better than interest, and 
without any risk. The transfer of land becomes more frequent.” See Hou K’un-hung, op.cit., p. 744.
205 See Zhongguo Dizheng Yanjiusuo, op.cit., p. 160.
206 See Tang Hui-sun, op.cit., pp. 105, 137.
20' See Tang Hui-sun, Ibid.: p. 137.
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67.08%, 77.18% and 81.43%, and for government and other public groups were 7.73%, 
13.06% and 12.31% respectively.209 Apparently the government appropriated 41.0% of 
the income released from the landlords after land reform in 1950-55 and 24.2% in 1955- 
60.
After six years of the Land-to-the-Tiller Program, E. Stuart Kirby conducted a 
survey in 1959 on rural development which reported that ‘according to local leaders’ 
opinions, more and more farmers had to find non-farming jobs because of insufficient 
arable land and population pressure.’210 One trend was diminishing arable land per farm 
household.211 Official data showed that the households owning less than 0.5 hectare 
increased from 34% to 36%, while those owning more than 2 hectares decreased from 
10.7% to 9.5% between 1956 and 1961.212 The size ofthe farm families was increasing in 
the 1950s and early 1960s because sets of rural sibling bom a that time tended to be large: 
six or more were common.21“ The average persons in a farm household increased from 
6.26 members in 1952 to 6.75 in 1962.214
The result o f insufficient land was either disguised unemployment in rural areas, or 
the creation of a large number of propertyless workers. Liu Jinqing estimated that in 
1961 there were about a million potential surplus population in the agricultural sector, 
which was 44% of the total agricultural population.215 But there were not a lot of 
industrial jobs at that time, so all the surplus population could do was to find part-time 
agricultural or industrial work, or to be a wage farmer. Yet part-time farming households 
decreased from 60% to 52% in the period, which implied there were few industrial work 
opportunities for the surplus population and that farmers had to put even more intensive 
labour into their own farm. At the same time, the number of wage farmers increased from
"08 See Bernard Gallin, Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1966).
209 See Lee Teng-hui, op.cit., p. 83, Table 49.
210 See Stuart E. Kirby, op.cit., p. 75.
211 Ibid.: p. 70.
~12 Original from Taiwansheng Nongye Xuanyang Pucha Baogao (Report on Farming Survey in Taiwan 
Province), 1956, Table 1, 3-2, 3-3; Taiwansheng Nongye Pucha Zongbaogao {Summary o f General 
Agricultural Survey in Taiwan Province), 1961, Table 1, 2. Cited From Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 350, Table 
89.
213 This data is from a personal communication from David Schak. The data was collected through his 
personal research.
214 Ryozaburo Minami (i£j £p)(ed.), Taiwan no Jinko to Keizai (Population and Economy in Taiwan) 
(Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyusho, 1971), p.92, Table 6.
215 See Liu Jinqing, Ibid.: p. 353.
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0.7% to 4% of the total agricultural population from 1956 to 1961.216
In summary, the newly arisen farm owners did not have much of a chance to be 
businesspeople in this period because, firstly, they had to pay a mortgage for ten years for 
the land they had just acquired; because, secondly, the increased income released from 
landlords was not totally transferred into their hands; and because, lastly, the increase of 
population exacerbated their burden, which required them to find supplementary jobs. 
With few opportunities, the most likely mobility path for them was to be a wage labourer 
in agricultural sector.
1.2.5 Employers and Self-Employed Workers
According to the 1956 Census, there were 86,650 employers, whose distribution in 
the primary, secondary and tertiary industry was 23,766 (27.42%), 29,353 (33.88%) and 
33,531 (38.70%) respectively. The number of self-employed workers was 952,728, and 
the distribution among the three sectors was 720,673 (75.64%), 56,156 (5.89%) and 
175,899 (18.46%) respectively. The employers composed 3.23% of the total labour 
force, while the self-employed were 35.5% in 1956.217 Table 1.15 shows the number of 
employers and self-employed in the 1950s. The number increased gradually over the ten 
years.
Table 1.15 Employers and Self-Employed in Industry, 1951-60 (per 1,000 Persons)
Industry
Y ea r
Prim ary Secondary T ertiarv T ota l
1951 581 64 161 806
1952 617 68 170 855
1953 648 71 179 898
1954 683 75 189 947
1955 717 79 199 995
1956 755 83 209 1047
1957 794 87 221 1102
1958 836 93 233 1162
1959 879 97 245 1221
1960 924 103 259 1286
1961 972 108 273 1353
Source: original data is from ILO, Year Book o f Labour Statistics, 1967. Cited 
from Kato Hisanobu, Taiwan no Rodoryoku Jinko” (Labour Force in 
Taiwan”), in Minami Ryozaburo -T b ^ ^ X ed .), op. cit., p. 78.
216 See Liu Jinqing, op.cit., p. 350, Table 89.
217 See The Taiwan Provincial Government, A Summary Report on the 1956 Census.
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The employers’ income in 1953 in the urban areas averaged NT$27,271, about four 
times more than the average urban resident’s income, and they belonged to the top 6% of 
total households (See Table 4.1).
Table 1.15 also shows that most of the non-farming self-employed were concentrated 
in tertiary industry. Usually a tertiary sector can absorb a huge number of disguised 
unemployed or marginally employed. It can accommodate landless farmers who had left 
their villages to find a job in an urban area. According to a survey conducted in urban 
Taiwan in 1952, 31.8% of the sampled families were self-employed. Though their annual 
income was 20% higher than the average income and close to a public servant’s income, 
we have to take into account the diverse occupations in this category, which produced 
great income differences. For example, shopkeepers, drivers owning three-wheeled bikes 
or a wooden trailer, and a lot of marginal labourers were all counted as being in the same 
category. As Arthur F. Raper wrote, ‘the self-employed is the result of surplus 
population. They cannot find any wage job, so they create these marginal jobs to survive. 
Most marginal labourers will be happy to accept any possible constant jobs’.218 We can 
conclude that the self-employed category contained two income groups, one of which 
had some capital and ran a small shop or factory; the others were the marginal labourers 
who worked for themselves, but their incomes were unstable and meagre, and their status 
no more than that of a wage worker, and perhaps worse.
1.2.6 The Working Class
The number of employees increased steadily from 737,000 in 1951 to 1,222,000 in 
1960. The percentage of wage labourers in the total labour force increased by only about 
0.1% of the total labour force every year, from 35.8% to 36.8%. The work force’s 
distribution among industries remained relatively stable, i.e., 20% in primary, 30% in 
secondary and 50% in tertiary industry.219
The employees in primary industry were mainly tenants before land reform, farmers 
who did not own enough land to make a living after the reform, or cane-workers who had 
worked for the Taiwan Sugar Company. In 1952, half of the interviewed tenants had to
218 See Arthur F. Raper, op.cit., p. 145.
219 Calculated from Kadoo Hisanobu, op. cit., Table 7, 13.
66
Chapter 1 Historical Origins
work for others, while the percentage for landlords was only 25%.220 These hired farm 
labourers were not entitled to purchase landlords’ land in the Land-to-the-Tiller Program, 
and their living conditions had deteriorated. The survey by Martin M. C. Yang noted that 
72% out o f 250 interviewed labourer households complained of this.221 One reason why 
their living conditions deteriorated was that many landlords had had to sell their land and 
leave the farming business, and therefore no longer needed farm labourers. Their 
numbers increased from 0.4% of the agricultural labour force to 4% between 1956 and 
1961, mainly due to insufficient land and increasing population.
The industrial workers’ income was one third below the average income in urban 
areas (see Table 1.12). Mining, textiles and the metal machinery industry employed half 
of the workers, and so their conditions can be used to illustrate workers’ situation in the 
period.
The monthly average wages in these three industries in 1953 were NT$455, NT$450 
and NT$439 respectively.222 A KMT report observed that some mining companies could 
not pay wages on schedule, which meant many workers had to discount their ‘wage card’ 
up to 40% to borrow money for living expenses. The wages owed to workers amounted 
to four million five hundred thousand dollars.22^  The accidental death rate in the coal 
mining industry in 1951 was 61 deaths per hundred million tons, while the figure in Japan 
was 24, and in the UK was only 2.3. Raper reported that only half of the workers had 
constant jobs, while the other half had to find any kind of temporary job .224
Almost 50% of the employees were in tertiary industry, and mostly in the service 
sector, which included street vendors, hairdressers, entertainers, housemaids, cleaners, 
etc. Most people in the sector were marginal labourers, and their jobs were only a means 
to survive in an urban area until they could find a job in manufacturing industry. This 
surplus population step by step was absorbed by the expanding manufacturing sector 
after Taiwan’s economic take-off.
Since the income o f the working class was so low, it was almost impossible for them
220 See Gaomindang Zhongyang Gaizao Weiyuanhui, op.cit., p. 24, Table 4-8.
221 See Martin M. C. Yang, op.cit., p. 347.
222 See Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Sheji Kaohe Weiyuanhui, op.cit., pp. 17, 73-74, 137-138. 
For the textile and metal machinery industries, I take the median as the average income because different 
factories had different average wages. Converted to annual average incomes, these figures were close to 
what Arthur F. Raper reported.
223 See Ibid: pp. 17-18.
224 See Arthur F. Raper, op.cit., p. 215.
67
Chapter 1 Historical Origins
to accumulate a lump sum of initial capital. But even though their market situation was 
very disadvantageous, this class provided a 'reserve army' of small businesspeople after 
the economic take-off. They utilised the skills they had learned in the factories to provide 
products through trade agencies to the world market.
1.3 Conclusion
We have observed some of the features of the postwar period which characterised 
the changed and unchanged parts of Taiwan society.
With the replacement of Japanese colonial government with mainlander Chinese, 
political power was strongly held in the hands of the newly arrived regime. The KMT 
enforced land reform policies after it fled to Taiwan, aiming to consolidate the party’s 
legitimacy among peasants and to weaken the local elite’s power. The landlord class 
vanished, and only large landlords were able successfully to transfer their capital into 
industry and to benefit from the reform.
The party state also benefited from the reform, politically and economically. The 
surplus it secured from the agricultural sector was directed toward financing its fiscal 
deficit, mainly in national defense. The small landlords, though they obtained a certain 
amount of compensation, did not enter business activity because o f lack of a business 
skills, or because the compensation was too little to invest. Labourers and peasants 
obviously were too poor to go into any business requiring even a small amount of capital.
State power controlled the economic institutions, and thus good connections were a 
key to making any substantial profits in the 1950s, as we have seen from the development 
of the textile industry. International trade was mainly controlled through the foreign 
exchange rate system which favoured importers, who wanted to import as much as they 
could. Too much demand for foreign currency led to rationing, and this provided another 
method for the state to control businesspeople- and provided chances to participate in 
corruption at the same time.225
Under the regulated economy, there was not much chance for private capital to 
pursue maximum profits through market mechanisms alone. Either they made money 
under the protection o f state power, or earned marginal profits by running a small shop. 
But after the reform of the foreign exchange rate system, plus many advantageous
22~ See Liu Jinqing, Ibid.: p. 283, and my interview data.
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international factors, Taiwan’s businesspeople in both large and small firms rushed into 
trade. With the state's strong control of the international sector no longer possible, exports 
created a channel for those who had not had any chance for success in the 1950s.226 The 
flow of international capital in the 1960s from the United States and Japan created 
opportunities for assembly firms in Taiwan, which in turn produced backward linkage 
effects on local industries. But although there were good business opportunities to be 
grasped in the 1960s, the social structures formed in the 1950s would have certain effects 
on the life chances of the people occupying different economic positions. In the coming 
chapter we will see how different family backgrounds constrained educational 
opportunities, which in turn constrained one’s occupational opportunities. We shall 
observe, too, who became the new small and medium-sized entrepreneurs.
226 See Zhou Tiancheng (j§| ^3$,), Quanli Bianchui de Zhongxiao Qiye ( SMEs in Peripheral, #  f} i t  f£ 
^  'J' ) , in Taiwan Yanjiu Jijinhui (ed.), Longduan yu Boxue—Weixuan Zuyi de Zhengzhi Jingji
Fenxi (Monopoly and Exploitation- Political Economy o f Authoritarian Rule, #  fj'Zjj 
&]&>a )  ( Taipei: Taiwan Yanjiu Jijinhui, 1989 ) pp.97-118.
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Chapter 2: Education and Social Mobility
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between a family’s socio-economic status, the parents’ education, 
and the child’s education and occupational attainment is often probed in sociological 
studies. An obvious pattern is that the parents’ social-economic status and education 
have a significant influence on their children’s education which in turn affects their 
occupational attainment. Following this line of research, we can easily trace the mobility 
patterns of different classes.227
Oddly, the research on Taiwan businesspeople is normally divided into two fields: 
social stratification scholars tell us the general mobility patterns, but they do not explain 
why Taiwanese businesspeople adopt certain strategies instead o f others to climb up the 
social ladder; and in particular, no-one previously has discussed the mobility patterns of 
small and medium-sized businesspeople in Taiwan. 228 On the other hand, those who
22 Social Stratification is one of the biggest branches in sociology. The International Sociological 
Association has established a research committee for this theme. In this branch of sociology, one tradition 
is to probe the relationship between education, social origins and occupational attainment. See Donald J. 
Treiman, ‘Industrialization and Social Stratification’, in Edward O. Laumann (ed.), Social Stratification: 
Research and Theory for the 1970s (Indianapolis :Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. 207-234; Hans-Peter Blossfeld 
and Yossi Shavit, ‘Persisting Barriers: Changes in Educational Stratification in 13 Countries’, in Yossi 
Shavit and Hans-Peter Blossfeld (eds.), Persistent Inequality—Changing Educational Attainment in 
Thirteen Countries (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 1-23; Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, The 
American Occupational Structure. (New York: Wiley, 1967); Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, 
Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977); Samuel Bowles and Herbert 
Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
228 See Kuanjeng Chen and Hsiu-Jen Jennifer Yeh, ‘Social Structure at Work: The Effects of Educational 
Development on Educational Mobility in Taiwan’. Paper presented at Conference on Social Stratification 
and Mobility: Newly Industrializing Economies Compared (Taipei: International Sociological Association 
Research Committee 28, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica), pp. 123-150; Shu-ling Tsai and Hei- 
yuan Chiu, ‘Changes in Educational Stratification in Taiwan’, in Yossi Shavit and Hans-Peter Blossfeld 
(eds.), Persistent Inequality—Changing Educational Attainment in Thirteen Countries (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1993), pp. 193-227; Shu-ling Tsai, “Social Change and Status Attainment in Taiwan: Comparisons 
of Ethnic Groups”, International Perspectives on Education and Society, vol. 2, pp. 225-256; Huang Yizhi 
( ^  8 . &), ‘Taiwan Diqu Jiaoyu Jihui Bupingdengxing zhi Bianqian’ ( £ ^ h b l* 8 1 f
The Change oflnequality in Educational Opportunity), Chinese Journal ofSociology ( P HJft 
vol. 18 (1995), pp. 243-73; Tsai Shilling and Haiyuan Chu (Ijs-;fo5?,H $MJ?>), “Bijiao Taiwan Ge Zuqun zhi 
Jiaoyu Qude’ (&$$.£ Educational Attainment in Taiwan: Comparisons ofEthnic
Groups), Proceedings for Humanities and Social Sciences ( A . J vol. 3, no.2 (1993): pp. 
188-202; Yang Ying (f§^|), Taiwan Diqu Jiaoyu Kuozhan Guochenzhong Butong Jiating Beijing Zinyu 
Shoujiaoyu Jihui Chayizhi Yanjiu ( P ^F M ^M  f t  I t  £  ßr ft,
Effects o f Educational Development on the Education Opportunities for Children o f Different Sauce-
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conduct research on small and medium-sized businesspeople based on interviews or 
fieldwork almost never touch this topic of the relationship between parents’ socio­
economic background, education and occupation. They never analyse in detail who is 
more likely to become self-employed or an employer, though some of them have vague 
ideas about mobility paths.229 This chapter aims to make clear these mobility paths, and 
to offer some explanations as to why different types o f people in Taiwan have opted for 
particular mobility paths.
In the first part of the chapter I will describe the general pattern of educational and 
occupational development in Taiwan, and will pay attention to the difference between 
Taiwanese and Mainlanders. In the second part, I will discuss educational development 
in postwar times, to discern some of the characteristics o f the Taiwan education system 
in Taiwan, the role o f the state and the ways in which a family's socio-economic 
background strongly influenced education. I will use path analysis to see these effects. 
Afterwards I will discuss why those who were who were less educated did not adopt 
collective strategies to improve their market situation. In the last section, I will review 
some hypotheses developed by other scholars on the phenomenon o f ‘opening one’s own 
shop’ in Taiwan.
2.2 Education. Occupations and Ethnicity
In the previous chapter we noted that most Mainlanders worked in tertiary industry, 
with Taiwanese in primary industry. Did the situation change after Taiwan’s economic 
take-off in the 1960s? Let us see the distribution of these two groups in different 
industries.
economic Background) (Taipei: Taiwan Normal University, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department 
of Education, 1988).
229 See Xie Guoxiong (Mt §  Shieh Gwo-shyong)»’’Heshou bian Toujia—Taiwan Zhizaoye zhong de Jieji 
Liudong” (Black-hands Becoming Their Own Bosses: Class Mobility in Taiwan’s Manufacturing 
Sectors ’ —  ft ^  Taiwan Shehui Yanjiu Jikan ( ft
-pj > Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies), vol. 2, no.2 (summer 1989), pp. 11-54; Chen Jie-xuan 
(H^ -fi'~£),Xieli Wangluo yu Renji Wangluo—Taiwan Zhongxiao Oiye De Shehui Jingji Fenxi (J& f t  &U& 
— n%£ ’Subcontracting and Personal Networks—social economic
analysis o f  Taiwan’s small and medium-scale enterprises) (Taipei: Lianjing Chubanshe, 1994); Donald 
DeGlopper, “Artisan Work and Life in Taiwan”, Modern China, vol. 5, no. 3 (July 1979), pp. 283-316; 
Alice Amsden, “Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: the Origins of Small Enterprise and 
Regionally Decentralized Industry”, World Development, 1991 (Sep.), vol. 19, no.9, pp. 1122-35; Hill 
Gates, “Ethnicity and Social Class”, in E. M. Ahem and Hill Gates (eds.), The Anthropology o f Taiwanese
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To exclude the effects of the older generation on occupational distribution, I will 
examine the occupations of those people who entered the formal labour market after 
1960. Table 2.1, which I have devised through a computer analysis o f raw survey data, 
shows people who had their first formal jobs in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. 50%, 51% 
and 54% of these people entered secondary industry, and 38%, 27% and 45% tertiary 
industry in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s respectively. Such a trend reflects the fast 
industrialisation in the period from 1952 to 1992: the share of agricultural output in 
National Domestic Product was reduced from 32.2% to 3.5%, while industrial output 
increased from 19.7% to 41.4% and tertiary output increased from 48.1% to 55.1%.2^ 0 
The fast growing industrial sector, especially the manufacturing sector, absorbed most of 
the new labourers.
Table 2. 1 Newly Recruited Labour Force in Industry, by Ethnicity, 1960-1990
Primary Secondary Tertiary Total
1960-69
Taiwanese 40 154 115 309
(%) 12.9 49.8 37.2 100.0
Mainlander 1 12 14 27
(%) 3.7 44.4 51.9 100.0
Total(%) 12.2 49.4 38.4 100.0
1970-79
Taiwanese 15 341 151 507
(%) 3.0 67.3 29.7 100.0
Mainlander 0 30 43 73
(%) 0.0 41.1 58.9 100.0
Total(%) 2.1 51.1 26.7 100.0
1980-89
Taiwanese 9 245 176 430
(%) 2.1 57.0 40.9 100.0
Mainlander 0 42 62 104
(%) 0.0 40.4 59.6 100.0
Total(%) 1.7 53.7 44.6 100.0
Source: I have calculated this using a computer, upon the computerized Raw 
data of the General Survey o f Social Change in Taiwan, 1992. The 
research was conducted by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica 
under the directorship of Professor Kuo-shu Yang and Hei-yuan Chiu. 
About the survey, see appendix 2.
Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press), pp. 241-281. 
230 See Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1993, Taipei, p.42.
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From this table it can be seen that more Mainlanders went into tertiary than secondary 
industry as their first formal job, and the first formal job for Taiwanese centred in 
secondary industry. Table 2.2, which I have also devised from raw interview survey data, 
shows at what age they obtained their first formal jobs. The Taiwanese working age was 
3.4 years younger than the Mainlanders’. Two possibilities might explain why 
Mainlanders entered the formal labour market later than Taiwanese: one is that many of 
them could not find a formal job after they graduated from school, so they either 
remained unemployed or at best found informal jobs which made them late to enter the 
formal labour market; a second possibility is that they stayed in school longer than 
Taiwanese. Table 2.3 shows how many years of schooling the two groups received.
Table 2. 2 Age of First Job, by Ethnicity (1960-1990)
1960-69 Male Female A verage Cases
Taiwanese 18.6(314) 16.9(158) 17.7 314
Mainlander 24.5 (13) 18.0 (14) 21.1 27
1970-79
Taiwanese 20.2(210) 18.6(303) 19.2 513
Mainlander 22.0 (31) 19.9(42) 20 .8 73
1980-89
Taiwanese 21.4(197) 20.8(243) 21.1 440
Mainlander 22.4 (52) 21.1 (53) 21.7 105
Source: As Table 2.1.
Table 2. 3 Years of Schooling o f Those Who Had a Formal Job, by Ethnicity (1960-90)
1960-69 P rim ary S econ d ary T ertiary A verage
T a iw an ese 6.16(40) 7.16(154) 8.84(115) 7 .77(309)
M a in la n d er 0.00 (1) 7.29 (12) 11.54 (13) 9 .13  (26)
1970-79
T a iw an ese 7.80(15) 9.08(341) 11.52(151) 9 .77 (507 )
M a in la n d er 0.00(0) 11.32 (30) 12.70 (43) 12.13(73)
1980-89
T a iw an ese 11.06(9) 11.03(245) 12.41(176) 11.60(430)
M a in la n d er 0(0) 11.62 (42) 13.31 (32) 12.63(104)
Source: As Table 2.1.
Table 2 .4  Year of Schooling by Date o f Birth and by Ethnicity
Y ea r  o f  B irth 1926-1935 1936-1945 1946-1955 1956-1965 1966-1975 A verage
Taiwanese 4.32(222) 5.73(379) 8.53(529) 10.80(645) 11.73(253) 9.05(2028)
Mainlander 8.08 (66) 7.27 (22) 12.70(361) 12.89(112) 12.52 (62) 11.42 (323)
D ifferen ce 3.76 1.54 4 .20 2.09 0 .79 2 .37(2351)
Source: As Table 2.1.
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Obviously the Mainlanders were consistently more highly educated than the 
Taiwanese throughout the postwar period, though the difference narrowed over time. 
Their higher education also explains why most of them had a job in tertiary industry. 
Though a supervisor in secondary industry requires more education than a stock clerk in 
tertiary industry, and hawkers and pedicab drivers in the tertiary industry are not much 
educated, tertiary industry usually requires a higher education. After controlling for 
ethnic background, I found that years of education largely account for the different rate 
at which they entered the different economic sectors.231 When this educational difference 
is taken into account, the difference in the chance of the two ethnic groups entering 
tertiary industry narrows considerably (compare Table 2.1 and 2.3). Even for those 
Taiwanese entering secondary or tertiary industry, their education was lower than 
MainJanders, as Table 2.3 shows.
Table 2.5 shows us the ethnic distribution in the category of self-employed (including 
employers) at different times. The Mainlanders’ percentage is continuously lower than 
their sample distribution over the past forty years. In other words, they tended to work as 
an employee instead o f running a shop or factory . If the more highly educated are more 
likely to be successful in business because o f their knowledge, why did the more 
educated Mainlanders not have a higher probability to become self-employed or an 
employer? I will explain this later.
From the survey data, we can see three features. Firstly, the Mainlanders’ education is 
consistently higher than the Taiwanese. Secondly, the proportion of Taiwanese in the 
self-employed or employer category is much higher than Mainlanders. Thirdly, the 
Mainlanders’ occupations centred on white-collar jobs. Why did the socio-economic 
patterns not change over the past half century? In the following sections, I will discuss 
how the occupational distribution was affected by political, economic and social forces 
and the effects of education.
231 The Pearson chi-square probability is less than 0.000 for both ethnic groups, which means that people 
with different education years have different possibility to enter different industries.
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Table 2.5 Self-employed Ethnic Distribution in Secondary and Tertiary Industries 
(1950-90)
Sample’s Ethnic Ratio 
(Taiwanese: Mainlander)
Ethnic ratio in 
non-primary Industry
Self-employed
1950s 92.3:7.7 (980:82) 85.4:14.6 (205:35) 92.2:7.8 (71:6)
1960s 89.3:10.7 (1296:156) 83.5:16.5 (444:88) 91.6:8.4 (142:13)
1970s 90.3:9.7 (1772:190) 87.8:12.2 (870:121) 91.9:8.1 (227:20)
1980s 84.7:15.3 (2040:368) 83.1:16.6 (1230:245) 93.3:6.7 (278:19)
Source: see Table 2.1. 
Notes:
1. The sample here is pooled from four sources: when respondents married, what were the occupation of 
her/himself, his/her father, spouse and spouse’s father. Therefore I got two generations’ occupational 
distribution. One problem of this pooling is that the sex ratio in the sample is 3:1, which means 
females are under-represented. But if we consider that the female labour-force participation rate was 
always lower than males, it is not a big problem to use the data.
2. Numbers in parentheses show the numbers of sampled informants: Taiwanese/Mainlanders.
2.3 Education After the W ar
According to human capital theory, education is a kind of capital that one can 
accumulate to facilitate finding a job in the labour market.2^ 2 What one spends in 
education will be rewarded through a higher income or prestige in a future job. One 
question with this approach is the question of who pays the cost. But obviously it is not 
the educated individual who pays the cost, but instead, her/his family and the government. 
Educational inequality can be reproduced through the effects of socio-economic 
inequality, as many findings show.2^
In other words, we have to distinguish between three different kinds of educational 
costs: one is the opportunity cost o f getting an education, another is the tuition fee paid 
by the family, and the third is the cost covered by the government. Meritocracy is not the 
only principle in the education market. Social and political forces intervene in the market, 
which might reduce or reinforce the effects of personal merit. In this section I will discuss 
three features that characterised postwar education in Taiwan: firstly, the schools were 
hierarchically ranked; secondly, educational opportunity was unevenly distributed 
between Taiwanese and Mainlanders because of unequal socio-economic status; thirdly, 
education was tightly under the government’s control.
232 See Gary Becker, 1975, Human Capital. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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2.3.1 The Hierarchically Ranked School System
Among the hierarchically ranked schools at the tertiary education level, National 
Taiwan University has always been regarded as the best university, then Qinghua or 
Zhengda, then other public and private universities. High schools’ reputations are based 
on their ‘examination passing rate’ to university. Such a hierarchically ranked school 
system resembles the Japanese system, but is more monocentric because of the selection 
method and the state’s education policy.2^ 4
In the entrance exam, those students from the few ‘superstar’ schools235 have a higher 
probability to enter the next educational level. For example, the overall pass rate to 
tertiary education in 1981 is about one-third of applicants, but the pass rate of the elite 
Jianguo senior high school is over 95%. In 1971, only two thirds of the graduating junior 
high school students could enter senior high school or junior college. The other third had 
to enter the labour market. It is more difficult to enter a tertiary institution. In 1981, 
thirty-four out of one hundred and eighty-seven academic senior high schools (18.2%) 
did not have any student successfully pass the university examination. Under 10% of the 
graduating students in seventy-six schools passed the exam. In other words, 58.8% of 
total academic high schools do not function as preparatory university training schools, 
despite the claimed goal for academic senior high schools set by the government.236
Because of the stratified school system, a vocational education becomes the ‘least’ 
prestigious in the educational system.237 For those who could enter high school, their first
23'3 See note 228.
234 See Ronald Dore, The Diploma Disease (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1976), pp. 46-50. In Japan, 
different universities individually test students on the same day, so sometimes the ‘second-best’ university 
could get ‘higher marked’ high school students. But in Taiwan, all universities jointly test high school 
students on the same days with the same questions. After the publication of the results, students can choose 
their university according to their results on the test.
235 It is so called ‘Mingxing Xuexiao\ afi JL ^  ), which is defined as the passing rate to the next 
educational level.
236 See Zhang Chunxing ( 5MM&), ‘Minguo Sanshijiunian Yilai Xuexiao Jiaoyu de Fazhan yu Jiantao’
(R ®  ’ Evaluation of the Development of Schooling Education
after 1950), in Zhongguo Luntan Bianji Weiyuanhui (17 #)(ed .), Taiwan Diqu Shehui
Bianqianyu Wenhua Fazhan ( ’Social Change and Cultural Development
in Taiwan Area) (Taipei: Zhongguo Luntan Zazhi, 1985), pp. 407-408.
23 David Schak suggests that children from poor families generally prefer a vocational education as it 
provides them with occupational skills. This point exactly conforms to what I say here that poor socio­
economic origins produce poor educational performance, and then the poor student correctly chooses to 
enter a less prestigious vocational school. Poor children might prefer a vocational education subjectively, 
but objectively they are not able to enter more the prestigious academic school.
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choice was normally an academic school. Junior vocational school was the last resort of 
those who could afford further study. A survey conducted by the Ministry of Education 
in 1971, the first year of graduates from a nine-year compulsory education, showed that 
85.21% of the graduating junior high school students in Taiwan wished to study further. 
Most of them would have liked to study in an academic senior high school, and few 
preferred a vocational junior college or high school.2'’8 In 1984, the two ‘best’ vocational 
senior high schools in the Taipei area could recruit only 40% of their planned students. 
The situation in private vocational senior high schools was worse. There were over seven 
thousand vacancies in these private vocational schools.239
This hierarchy o f schools reflects occupational prestige. A student graduating from a 
more prestigious school could get a more prestigious job. From this perspective, 
education becomes a pre-selection mechanism for the business community to determine 
who could enter which jobs and positions. Thus, young people spend all their energy in 
trying to enter a higher and ‘better’ school.240
To compete with others in the ‘educational industry’, students have to start their 
‘preparation’ as soon as possible.241 Family socio-economic background becomes 
important from the start. In colonial times, education was a privileged mobility path for 
upper-class Taiwanese. After the war, more and more children could go to primary and 
junior high school, as Table 2.6 shows. Elementary education was no longer a 'luxury', 
but it was still hard for students to enter junior high school before the nine years of 
compulsory education was promulgated in 1968, partly because of insufficient school 
capacity and partly because of the family's economic difficulties.
In 1955 and 1956, Xinzhu county and Gaoxiong city experimented in accepting every 
student who wanted to study in junior high school without taking any entrance exam. 
The survey reported that only 55% of the graduating students in Xinzhu and 62% in 
Gaoxiong continued their studies.242 The report did not say why 40% of the pupils did
238 See SunBangzheng (•& # _ £ ), Liushinian Lai de Zhongguo Jiaoyu 7 Chinese
Education in Last Sixty Years) (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1971), p. 300.
239 See Zhang Chunxing, op. cit., p. 410.
240 The situation is the same in Japan. It is criticised by Japanese scholars as ‘School/sm” (gakkore,
Ek.) but not ‘credential/^” (gakure, #>§.).
241 A famous commercial advertisement is: (Don’t let your children lose
from the starting line).
242 See Wang Yaquan ( I $ | ) ,  ‘Fazhan Chuji Zhongdeng Xuexiao Fangan zhi Shishi—Xinzhu
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not want to study further, but from my interview data, every interviewee from that 
generation who today owns a SME emphasised that his family was too poor to afford for 
them to go to junior high school. Some of them had to work as an apprentice and at the 
same time went to a supplementary junior high school at night. Table 2.7, which I have 
devised from raw survey interview data, shows the average years of education by date of 
birth. Obviously the relationship between father’s occupation and years of education is 
the same as in colonial times. It shows that in the 1950s and 1960s it was still not so easy 
for a poor family to provide their children with a higher education. The official data of the 
entrance rate into junior high school in 1955 was only 39%.24j As can be seen, a farmer’s 
and manual worker’s children lost out from the start. After prolonging compulsory 
education from six to nine years, the difference narrows, though they are still less 
educated.244
Table 2. 6 Development of Elementary Schools, 1944-1959
Number of Schools Number of Students Enrollment Rate
1944 1,097 898,424 71.31
1945 1,053 850,097 80.01
1947 1,160 855,821 79.02
1949 1,199 892,758 79.07
1950 1,231 906,950 79.98
1953 1,300 1,060,324 87.75
1955 1,446 1,244,029 92.33
1957 1,597 1,480,557 94.61
1959 1,757 1,777,118 95.44
Source: From Yu Shu-lin, ‘Jin Wushi Nian Lai Guomin Jiaoyu zhi Yanjin’ (‘The Evolution of National 
Education in Last Fifty Years’), pp. 343-344; 348-349. In Zhongguo Jiaoyu Xuehui (ed.), Jin 
Wushi Nian Lai zhi Zhongguo Jiaoyu (Chinese Education in the Last Fifty Years) (Taipei: Fuxing 
Shuju, 1977), pp. 322-359.
Gaoxiong Liang Xian Ziyuan Shengxue Shiyan Qingxing--’ {ftM.W&L'P '
f  ’ ‘The Implementation Plan of Developing Junior High School--the
Experimental Situation of Voluntary Further Study in Xinzhu and Gaoxiong Counties’), in Shi Jiansheng 
et al. (^LS^^^Xeds.), Zhongguo Jiaoyu Xiankuang, ( f  M f i f f  {Chinese Education Updated, 2) 
(Taipei: Zhonghua Wenliua Chuban Shiye Weiyuanhui, 1958), p. 350.
243 See Yu Shulin ( ) ,  ‘Jin Wushi Nian Lai Guomin Jiaoyu zhi Yanjin’ (‘The Evolution of National 
Education in Last Fifty Years’), in Zhongguo Jiaoyu Xuehui (ed.), Jin Wushi Nian Lai zhi Zhongguo 
Jiaoyu {Chinese Education in Last Fifty Years) (Taipei: Fuxing Shuju, 1977), p. 350.
244 In Japan, over 75% of Tokyo University students’ fathers are from professional and managerial 
background, while among those who could not go to university, the main obstacle is the high tuition fee. A 
private university might charge as much as 1.5 million yen a semester.
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Table 2. 7 Education by Father’s Occupation and Date o f Birth: 1946-75
Years o f  Birth 1946-55 1956-65 1966-75
Professional, technica l and 
related workers; Adm in istra tive  and 
m anagerial workers;
C lerical and related workers 13.36(81) 13.08(124) 12.63(67)
Sales workers; Service workers 10.02(100) 11.68(142) 12.54(69)
Agricultural, anim al husbandry 
and forestry workers, 
fisherm en and hunters 7.29(262) 9.83(240) 10.94(69)
Production and related workers 
transport equipm ent operators 
and labourers 7.86(99) 10.80(181) 11.57(74)
Average 8.81(542) 11.06(687) 11.91(279)
Source: See Table 2.1. 
Notes:
1. Based on informant’s father’s occupation when s/he was fifteen years old.
2. The informants include Taiwanese and Mainlanders.
3. Marginal workers, e.g., first-time job seekers are housewives, are excluded from the 
table.
4. Figures in parentheses show numbers of informants.
The combination effect of the hierarchical schooling system and socio-economic 
status was the emergence of ‘after school lessons’.245 A rich or above average income 
family could send their children to private elementary and junior high schools famous for 
their ‘examism’. They only teach the subjects that will be tested and ignore all other 
activities.246 Another way was to hire a private tutor after school. In Taiwan in 1995, the 
private tutoring wage per month, four hours a week, was about US$230. In 1994 the 
official minimum wage was only US$558 a month, and the per capita income per month 
was US$936. An average family could not afford this extra education fee. Another cheaper 
way is sending children to cram schools247, which is more common for middle-income 
families, but the Teaming’ effect will be less evident.
2.3.2 Educational Differences Between Taiwanese and Mainlanders
Was the difference in educational achievements between Taiwanese and Mainlanders 
over the past forty years institutionalised discrimination, or just the results of differences
24:1 It is called ‘buxi’ (41 ^  ’ lessons after school) or ‘ebu’ (S 4 S  ’ evil lessons after school).
246 See Sun Bangzheng, op. cit., p. 203.
247 In Taipei, the most famous cram school area centres on Nanyang street near the Taipei railway station. 
One can see numerous students in uniforms coming here after school.
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in socio-economic family background? I will review the evidence and then discuss the 
causes of the persistent differences.
Table 2.8 shows the changes of occupational prestige scores by ethnicity. A 
Taiwanese father’s occupational prestige increased steadily from 29.96 in the 1950s to 
39.76 in the 1980s. The Mainlanders’ stayed close to a level close to 50. In short, 
Mainlanders’ fathers enjoyed higher social prestige than Taiwanese, but the difference 
was progressively reduced over time. In the following section, I will confine myself to 
examining the effects of the educational standing of persons bom in the 1940s to the 
1960s, who comprised the major part of the labour force after the 1960s.
Table 2. 8 Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status, by Ethnicity
Date o f Birth 1936-45 1946-55 1956-65 1966-75
Taiwanese 29.96
(325)
32.62
(479)
35.51
(599)
39.76
(237)
M ainlander 46.05
(19)
57.19
(53)
50.24
(100)
50.46
(54)
Source: see Table 2.1. 
Notes:
1. This index is coded according to the international socio-economic index of occupational status 
developed by Harry B. G. Ganzeboom, Paul M. De Graaf and Donald J. Treiman. See their work 
“Standard International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status”, Social Science Research 
(Academic Press, Inc), vol. 21, 1992, pp. 1-56.
2 .1 use father’s occupation when the informant was fifteen years old. Usually the occupation was steady 
over the life-span.
3. The index used here is ‘minor group’ scores instead of unit group scores because some occupations 
coded in the survey are not shown in Ganzeboom’s index table. The score range is from lowest 17 
(agricultural and animal husbandry workers) to 85 (jurists).
4. Figure in parentheses is number of informants.
From the winter o f 1965 through the spring of 1966, Richard W. Wilson conducted 
research at some elementary schools in Taiwan. He evaluated the socio-economic status 
of the children at three schools: a city public school, an urban private school and a rural 
public school. Fathers o f the children at the urban public school generally held medium- 
to-low occupational positions with corresponding incomes, while at the private school 
they enjoyed medium-to-high incomes and at the rural public school low-to-medium 
incomes.248 The status classification, though based on children's vague responses and the
248 See Richard W. Wilson, Learning to be Chinese: The Political Socialization o f Children in Taiwan 
(Massachusetts: theM.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 149-152.
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author's own subjective estimates, did reflect the status difference o f different schools. 
Normally the educational facilities in urban areas are better than in the countryside, and 
those in the private elementary schools better than in the public schools. The private 
elementary schools are usually the so-called 'superstar schools'.
The ethnic ratio (Mainlander to Taiwanese) in the three schools was 47:53, 92:8, and 
40:60 respectively. The private schools mainly enrolled Mainlanders and their fathers' 
occupational status was 'medium-to-high'. Wilson's description is in agreement with the 
class structure we observed in the second chapter, where I argued that the Mainlanders 
(except for the soldiers or veterans) held better positions in the state bureaucracy and 
state enterprises or ran a business in the 1950s.
The most 'competent' students, as was earlier noted, could enter the academic high 
schools. A survey by Stephen M Olson in 1968 showed that the numbers of Mainland 
students in one municipal academic senior high school was much higher than at a private 
academic and commercial-vocational school (see Table 2.9). The Jianguo ( ^ Ü I ) school 
is the 'superstar school' in the Taipei urban area because only those who get the highest 
scores in the entrance exam could enroll. Those who failed to enter the municipal senior 
high schools would attend private academic schools, and the Yanping ($£ ■*{*■) school is 
ranked in the middle of the hierarchy. The Yuda ( I f i t . )  private commercial-vocational 
school is ranked as ‘not a good school’ compared to the other two schools if we use the 
criterion o f examination marks. If we look at the student’s father's education, it was 
highest in respect to the municipal academic, then the private academic and private 
commercial-vocational.249 A correlation between ethnicity and father’s education in the 
table is easy to see. In the Jianguo academic senior high school, 60% of the students were 
Mainlanders, and in Yuda commercial-vocational senior high school 86% were 
Taiwanese. Fathers’ education in Jianguo was 50% tertiary educated, while the figure for 
Yuda was only 5.4%. The private academic senior high school Yanping was in the middle. 
Obviously the effect o f ethnic socio-economic differences could be seen in junior high 
school.
249 See Stephen M. Olson, ‘The Inculcation of Economic Values in Taipei Business Families’, in W. E. 
Willmott (ed.), Economic Organisation in Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp.
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Table 2.9 Characteristics of Middle-School Sample, Taipei, April 1968
Native Place and
Educational Background
Name and Type o f School
Yanping Jianguo Yuda Total
private m unicipal private or Average
academ ic academ ic vocational
Total Num ber in Sam ple 
(grades 10 and 11 only) 192 227 224 643
Native Place
Taiwan 77.10% 39.20% 86.20% 66.90%
Mainland 21.90% 60.80% 13.40% 32.70%
No inform ation 1.00% 100% 100% 100%
Father's Education
College or above 21.90% 49.30% 5.40% 25.80%
Higher Secondary 33.90% 27.80% 17.00% 25.80%
Lower Secondary 13.50% 7.50% 23.20% 14.80%
Prim ary or less 23.20% 11.50% 46.40% 27.20%
No Information 7.30% 3.90% 8.00% 6.40%
Source: See Stephen M. Olson, The Inculcation of Economic Values in Taipei Business Families’, 
in W. E. Willmott (ed.), Economic Organisation in Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1972), p.267. Table 1.
Entering a ‘better5 academic senior high school meant a better chance to enter 
university. A survey conducted by the Stanford Institute in 1961 showed 37% of the 
students graduating during 1957 and 1959 from universities were bom in Mainland 
China (N=850), while the graduating students from senior vocational high school were 
only 6% Mainlander (N= 1994).250
The statistical survey o f education of Taiwan Province revealed the same situation. In 
1967, 'when Mainlanders constituted about 14% of the total population and probably a 
somewhat lower proportion o f school-aged youth, almost a quarter of the island's non- 
vocational high school students, 30% of its college students, and almost 40% of those 
enrolled in the top-ranking national universities were Mainlanders'.251
Tables 2.10 and 2.11, which I again derived from raw national survey material, show 
the effects of ethnic, demographic and stratification factors on education and
261- 295.1 have changed his Wade-Giles into Pinyin.
250 See Meiguo Jiazhou Shidanfo Yanjiusuo (Stanford Research Centre, California, USA), Jiaoyu yu 
Fazhan—Zhonghuaminguo Jingji Fazhan Guocheng zhong Jiaoyu Jihua zhi Renwu (Education and 
Development—the Role o f Educational Planning in Republic o f China ’s Economic Development Process) 
(Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1962), p. 128.
251 See Sheldon Appleton, The Social and Political Impact of Education in Taiwan’, Asian Survey, vol. 16, 
no. 8 (1976) p. 706.
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occupational attainment. Table 2.10 suggests that ethnicity, at least at first glance, seems 
to be an important factor affecting one’s educational achievement, even after including in 
demographic variables, i.e., gender and date of birth. But after I put in the stratification 
variables, i.e., fathers’ and mothers’ education, its effect was reduced sharply from 2.24 
years to 0.79. This means that the total effect o f ethnicity on education is that the 
Mainlander on average was 2.61 years more educated than Taiwanese, but the indirect 
effect, i.e., from the demographic effect (0.37) and parents’ educational background 
(1.45), contributes most to the total effect.252 If we include the variable of father’s 
occupation, which contributes 0.36 to educational attainment, then the ethnicity variable 
becomes insignificant. In other words, the ‘obvious’ ethnic cleavage phenomenon in 
educational attainment is in fact caused by stratification variables. From Table 2.4 we see 
that the educational difference between Taiwanese and Mainlander was narrowing, and 
Table 2.8 also shows the occupational prestige difference narrowing. We can expect that 
accompanying the improvement of the Taiwanese populace’s socio-economic status, the 
ethnic educational difference would be gradually eliminated. This finding is contrary to 
Lin Zhongzheng (#>,&-£-) and Lin Heling’s (# £ ^* 4 0  finding in 1991, both of whom 
claimed that there is no sign to show the educational achievement difference had 
diminished.250
People without higher educational credentials have to enter lower prestige 
occupations. Table 2.11 shows the effect of different variables on occupational 
attainment. As in Table 2.10, ethnicity seems, at first sight important to one’s 
occupational prestige. The prestige score difference is 8.76, which is the total effect of 
ethnicity on occupational prestige. After putting in demographic variables, its effect is 
reduced only a little. But after I add the variables of parents’ education and father’s 
occupation, the ethnic variable and demographic variables both become insignificant. Yet 
all these variables together can explain only 24% of the total variations. If I include one’s 
own education in the regression equation, R square increases from .24 to .42, i.e., almost
252 About the decomposition of effects, see Duane F. Alwin and Robert M. Hauser, ‘The Decomposition of 
Effects in Path Analysis’, American Sociological Review, vol. 40 (Feb 1975), pp. 37-47.
253 See Lin Zhongzheng and Lin Holin, ‘Taiwan Diqu Gezucun de Jingji Chayi’ (Economic Difference 
Among Different Ethnic Groups in Taiwan Area), in Zhang Maogui ( 5k%L$k) et al, Zucun Guanxi yu 
GuojiaRentong {Ethnic Relationships and National Identification) (Taipei: Yeqiang Chubanshe, 1993), p. 
132.
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doubles, and parents’ education becomes insignificant. This means that one’s occupation 
status is very highly correlated with education. With each additional year o f education, 
her/his occupational prestige score increases 2.11 points. The direct effect of parents’ 
education diminishes to insignificance because its effect on an informant’s occupational 
attainment is transmitted through one’s own education. So we can say that the 
occupational difference between Taiwanese and Mainlanders would be eliminated if the 
gap in the educational difference between the two groups diminishes in future.
Table 2.10 Regression Analysis of Different Variables on Educational 
Attainment (1991-1992)
Education A ttainm ent
Ethnicity 2.61 2 .2 4 0 .79 0 .4 3 (n .s)
S e x — -1 .7 2 -1 .7 6 -1.71
Dob1 — 1 .27 0 .89 0 .8 8
D ob2 ~ 4 .1 3 3 .24 3 .09
D ob3 — 6.1 4.81 4 .6 4
D ob4 - 6 .8 5 5 .03 4 .8 5
Father's education ___ ___ 0 .3 0 0.21
Mother's education — — 0 .2 2 0 .18
Father's occupation — — — 0 .04
R square 0 .0 4 0 .3 3 0 .50 0 .5
Source: see Table 2.1, notes.
Notes: 1. n.s means not significant at 1% level.
2. Father’s occupation is his occupation when informant was fifteen years 
old. The occupational status score is calculated from Ganzeboom et. al.
3 . 1 have excluded the Aborigines in the samples. Ethnicity is coded into 
Taiwanese and Mainlander.
4. DOB means date of birth. DOBlare those people bom between 1936 and 
1945. Dob 2 are those people bom between 1946 and 1955. Dob 3 are 
those people bom between 1956 and 1965. Dob 4 are those bom after 
1965.
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Table 2. 11 Regression Analysis of Different Variables on Occupational Prestige Scores 
(1991-1992)
Occupation Prestige Scores
Ethnicity 8.76 8.6 2.33(n.s) 1.62(n.s)
Sex - -1.53(n.s) -1.91 (n.s) 1.11 (n.s)
Dob1 - 2.19(n.s) 0.03(n.s) -1.69(n.s)
Dob2 - 8.1 3.62(n.s) -2.67(n.s)
Dob3 - 9.67 4.01 -5.15
Dob4 -- 10.24 2.75(n.s) -6.78
Father's education -- -- 0.32 -0.09(n.s)
Mother’s education - -- 0.61 0.23(n.s)
Father's — — 0.26 0.15
occupation
Own Education — — — 2.11
R square 0.04 0.08 0.24 0.42
Source: See Table 2.1, notes. 
Notes: See footnotes in Table 2.10.
Then why does father’s occupation have a significant influence on children’s 
occupations? My analysis of the survey of 1992 shows that 61.8% of the respondents got 
their first jobs through personal networks, e.g., were introduced by family, friends or 
relatives, while only 38.2% found their jobs through an official employment office, 
newspaper advertisements or by passing a state examination.254 If so, father’s social 
network could be an important source to find one’s first job, and there is a tendency that 
the social network is based on similar social background. If one’s child is incorporated 
into her/his network, s/he might find a similar job to her/his father. This question will be 
probed in detail in Chapter Five.
2.3.3 The State’s Educational Policy
The ethnic, demographic and stratification factors explain 50% of the variation in 
one’s education, as Table 2.10 shows. In other words, another 50% of the variation is not 
explained by these factors. These can be attributed to one’s own efforts or talent, or the 
pre-existent state education policy, etc. In modem society, the state plays an important 
role in educational planning, which sets the constraints of the educational opportunities
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of its people. Education is incorporated into the modem political system to achieve 
certain ‘national goals’ set by the state, e.g., language policy or economic policy, which 
will affect the development of education.
The KMT-controlled educational system after the second world war has had two 
notable features: (i) the government has used education as a means to control people’s 
thinking; and (ii) educational expansion has been based on economic planning.
Education is the easiest and cheapest means to control ideology. The KMT regime 
tried to legitimise its rule as the sole ‘representative’ of China,255 and it felt it had to 
tightly control any ‘heretical’ discourse challenging its claims.256 Private education was 
seen as a potential ‘challenger’, so the establishment of new schools was put under strict 
control. This policy meant that although there was a high social demand for higher 
education throughout the postwar period, only a few private schools were allowed to be 
set up. The government argued that there was not sufficient finances to expand higher 
education, but at the same time did not allow the private sector to do so. It was not a 
problem of any lack of private capital. For example, after an ‘open door’ policy was 
proclaimed to set up private junior colleges in 1964, forty-one new private colleges were 
set up in five years, increasing the numbers in Taiwan from eight to forty-nine.257
This earlier policy o f limiting higher education was aimed at political and ideological 
control, but its side-effect was to intensify the competition between students. Though the 
enrolment rate of graduating elementary school students in junior high school increased
254 The figure excludes those unknown, others, self-employed or home-workers which constitutes 18.4% of 
the sample. Calculated from Qu, Hai-yuan, op.cit., 1992.
255 See Masahiro Wakabayashi ‘Yoyu suru Naisen’ (>&&?-suruJ*3 »Dissolving Civil War), in
Masahiro Wakabayashi (ed.), Taiwan—Tenkanki no Seiji to Keizai ( fr —# - l i t n o  3f /'□ to•&§. ’ T;aiwan:
Politics and Economy in Transition) (Tokyo: Tahata Shoten, 1987), p.368.
256 The 1950s was called ‘white terror decade’, for all leftist intellectuals were either put in jail or purged.
One famous anti-KMT magazine in the 1950s was shut down due to its proposal to have a new party. In the 
1960s, two famous writers Li Ao ( #  I f ) and Bo Y a n g (fä ^ )  were also put in jail in the name o f‘ intention 
of subvert the government’. See Dai Guohui ( 111 ), Taiwan Zongti xiang ( »General Image
o f Taiwan) (Taipei :Yuanliu Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 171-173.
25 See Jiaoyubu Jiaoyu Nianjian Bianzhuan Weiyuanhui ( I f  "f £ ß |f  ft i t  ’ Education
Annual Editorial Committee, Education Ministry), Zhonghuaminguo Jiaoyu Nianjian ( P 0  ßi US f t  f f  f -  
M  ’ Education Annual—Republic o f China) (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1976), p. 677. Also see Chen 
Shufen ( ) ,  ‘Guangfuhou Taiwan Diqu Gaodeng Jiaoyu Shexiao Zhengce zhi Tantao’ (ßUfeJfc. a 
JtbUk #  I f  If ’ Research on School Set-up Policy for Higher Education in Postwar
Taiwan Area), in Lai Jeh-hang and Huang Chun-chien (Ü  »^ T £ # )  (eds.), Guangfuhou Taiwan Diqu 
Fazhan Jingyan {zfcjJLM a I f  täEk ffM. M4&•The Development Experience o f Taiwan in the Post-war Era) 
(Taipei: Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, Academia Sinica, 1991), p. 231,
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from 33% in 1953 to 62% in 1967, the year before the introduction of nine years’ 
compulsory education, the absolute number o f ‘failed’ students in the junior high school 
exams increased steadily from 89,367 to 134,076.258 ‘After-school lessons’ became 
pervasive, which the education ministry in 1976 admitted was ‘one of the most serious 
problems in recent educational development’.259 A rich family in this competition was 
more ‘competitive’ because it could better afford the after-school lessons. Mainlanders 
generally held better occupations, so they could better afford their children’s ‘extra 
education cost’. But the Mainlanders’ children not only were helped by their higher 
socio-economic family status; they were also heavily subsidised by the government. All 
children of state employees received exemptions from tuition fees and were in line for 
scholarships at all educational levels,260 while other students had to pay tuition fees above 
the junior high school level. Civil servants, mainly Mainlanders, benefited the most from 
the subsidy. From 1950 to 1974, only 59% of the newly recruited civil servants who 
passed the state examination were Taiwanese, while 41% were Mainlanders.261 The 
Mainlanders received a disproportionate educational subsidy from the government 
compared to its 15% of the total population warranted. At the same time, a special tax, 
which was based on agricultural income, was levied to finance educational 
expenditure.262 In other words, through the government’s financing policy, educational 
resources flowed from a disadvantaged class, the peasants, to a privileged class, public 
servants. No wonder Shu-ling Tsai and Hei-yuan Chiu found that a ‘farming background 
exerts a negative impact on educational attainment at all [school-level] transitions’.263
Another important educational influence was related to economic-oriented planning.
appendix 2.
258 See Jiaoyubu Jiaoyu Nianjian Bianzhuan Weiyuanhui, Ibid.: pp. 227-228.
259 Ibid: p. 227.
260 See Tsai Shu-ling and Chiu Hei-yuan, ‘Changes in Educational Stratification in Taiwan’, in Yossi 
Shavit and Hans-Peter Blossfeld (eds.), Persistent Inequality—Changing Educational Attainment in 
Thirteen Countries (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), p. 218.
26‘ These are the statistics for the ‘advanced level exam’ (ifj » Gaodeng Kaoshi). The ratio for the
‘general level exam’ ( #  ’ Putong Kaoshi) for civil servants is 79:21. The ratio of Mainlanders was
considerably higher than its population ratio. See Kaoxuanbu » Examination Department),
Zhonghuaminguo Liushisannian Kaoxuan Tongji ( i 7 i f  ’ Examination Statistics,
1974) (Taipei: Kaoxuanbu, 1974), pp. 32-33; 52-53.
26~ See Wang Zhiting ( Ü ^ o ^ ) y Taiwan Jiaoyushi ( £7%?#:j f  £  • Taiwan Education History) (Taipei: 
Taiwan Shudian, 1959), p. 176. As we have seen in Chapter One, the KMT government used ‘extraction’ 
policy' to squeeze agricultural surplus for industrial development in the 1950s and 1960s.
263 See Tsai Shu-ling and Chiu Hei-yuan, op. cit., p. 218.
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In the 1950s and 1960s, vocational education was the mainstream education philosophy 
all over the world, which emphasised its function in promoting economic development. 
Taiwan was not exceptional.264 The decisive factor for the government to develop 
vocational education was the report of the Stanford Research Institute in 1962, which 
proposed that Taiwan increase its skilled labour supply to promote rapid economic 
development.265 Since then, entrance to academic schools was strictly controlled. On the 
one hand, the government encouraged the private sector to establish vocational schools 
to relieve the demand for higher education, and on the other the government set a target 
that adjusted the academic and vocational senior high student ratio from 80:20 to 
30:70.266 This former ratio was successfully reversed to 32: 68 in 1988.267 It was a 
dramatic change. The effect of this economic-oriented policy is not hard to imagine: 
fewer and fewer students could study at academic senior high schools, which in turn 
intensified the competition among the students and among junior high schools to succeed 
in the students’ race to climb into academic senior high schools. Table 2.9 shows that 
more o f the Mainlander students studied in academic senior high schools, while 
Taiwanese students ‘fell’ into vocational senior high schools. Using a computer to 
analyse the raw statistics of ‘A General Survey Data of Social Change in Taiwan, 
1992-93’, I have derived the ethnic ratio at different educational levels showing the 
highest degree earned (Taiwanese: Mainlanders): at academic senior high school, 76:24; 
junior college, 79:21; vocational senior high school, 87:13. The figure deflates the 
number o f Mainlanders in academic senior high school because those who entered 
university or senior college are not counted in. The ethnic ratio in university is 74:26. The 
overall demographic ratio is 86.2: 13.8.
Education itself was sufficient to function as the main mechanism to reproduce 
socio-economic inequality in a competitive education market.268 The state’s policy could
264See Yang Yirong ( 1£),  Jiaoyu yu Guojia Fazhan: “Taiwan Jingyan” de Fanxing’ ( I f  If J%§3 
A  : a A  ’ Education and National Development: Reflections on ‘Taiwan Experience’), in Lai
Jeh-hang and Huang Chun-chieh (eds.), op. cit., p. 136.
265 See Jiaoyubu Jiaoyu Nianjian Bianzhuan Weiyuanhui (ü lf -ä ß t f lF  M i t ), op. cit., p. 628.
266 The ratio of academic and vocational school students in 1962 was 8:2. See Gai Zhesheng (jk'M lk), 
Taiwan Renli Ziyuanyu Jiaoyu Fazhan zhi Guanxi Yanjiu (Research on the Relationships Between Human 
Resources and Educational Development in Taiwan) (Taipei: Jiaxin Cement Cultural Foundation, 1969), 
p. 135, Table 55.
26/ See Yang Yirong, op. cit., p. 149.
268 See Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist American: Educational Reform and the
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have reduced the negative effects o f socio-economic differences, but in Taiwan, 
educational policy, on the contrary, reinforced the inequality.
2.4 The Patterns of Mobility Paths in Taiwan
Workers o f low prestige occupations have to ‘help themselves’ to become upwardly 
mobile. In different countries labourers adopt different strategies to improve their market 
conditions. As seen, Taiwanese in the past forty years were less educated than 
Mainlanders. Under this condition, how did they use different strategies to improve their 
market situations? In the following pages, I will concentrate on the self-employed in 
non-primary industry. I will sketch a general employment history, and then discuss the 
occupational category of self-employed, which contains employers who hire workers, as 
well as petty bourgeoisie such as small shop-keepers or taxi-drivers, who do not hire 
workers. Section 2.5 will discuss the structural influences on mobility patterns.
Education often determines one’s life-time occupation. Table 2.12 shows the change 
in occupational prestige scores in one’s work life. We can see that the scores remained 
relatively stable, though most of the people were ‘upwardly’ mobile a little. This suggests 
that social stratification in Taiwan was largely determined in school, with students 
classified through the examination system. Their future occupations were largely 
determined when they attained different levels of schooling.
Table 2.12 Occupational Prestige Scores by Education in Different Life Histories
O ccupation  
P restig iou s S c o r e s
First Job Job  w hen  
Married
Job when
Interviewed
No Schooling 2 5 .9 6 2 2 .8 5 27.61
Self-learn ing/ dropout 3 1 .25 2 9 .8 4 32 .64
Primary 3 3 .73 3 3 .0 8 35 .39
Junior High S ch oo l 3 7 .69 3 8 .4 3 39 .86
S en ior  High S ch oo l 4 4 .7 9 4 6 .7 6 4 8 .0 4
Junior C o llege 5 2 .78 5 4 .2 56 .15
University 6 0 .0 6 6 1 .1 9 6 1 .0 8
P ostgraduate 6 9 .6 8 6 7 .6 3 6 9 .66
C a se s 1794 1448 1740
Source: see Table 2.1.
Note: Regarding the occupational prestige scores, see Table 2.8, note 1.
Contradictions o f Economic Life (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
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Table 2.13 provides a general sketch of employment history. The most distinguishing 
feature is that the percentage of self-employed increased over time. The typical 
employment history o f the self-employed is: find a job in the labour market, and when 
you marry, become a housewife (for females) or set up a small shop (for males). This 
tendency occurs across generations.
Table 2.13 Changes o f Employment in One’s Working History
%  o f d iffe re n t k inds o f 
e m p lo ym e n t
F irs t Job Jo b  w hen 
M arried
Job  w hen
In te rv iew ed
S e lf-e m p lo ye d 5.8 (7.0) 12.4 (15.5) 21.5
W o rk  fo r  O thers 64 .6 (78 .3 ) 40 .8 (50 .9 ) 45.2
W o rk  fo r  F a m ily 8 .6 (10.5) 9 .5 (11.8) 6.7
H ousew ife 1.3 (1.5) 15.7(19.6 ) 19.8
No Job -- 1.4 (1.8) 3.3
R etired - - 2 .7
S tuden t - 0 .4 (0 .5 ) -
U nknow n o r unm arried 19.7 ( - - ) 19.7 ( - - ) 0.7
C a ses 2377 2377 2377
Source: see Table 2.1, notes.
Notes: The figure in parenthesis is the percentage excluding unknown or unmarried.
Table 2.14 shows the education and age background of the self-employed category. 
The number of self-employed in the non-agricultural sectors increases as time passes , 
but the self-employed in primary industry does not change much after marriage. 
Regarding the relationship between education and self-employed in the non-agricultural 
sectors, the higher the education the lower the percentage o f that educational level who 
work as self-employed, as Table 2.15 shows. The effects of education on different kinds 
o f employment do not differ for different dates of birth.269 Regarding the ethnic 
distribution, 23.2% of the Taiwanese (excluding those self-employed in primary industry) 
are self-employed, while only 11.1% of the Mainlanders are self-employed. In other 
words, those Taiwanese with less education are more likely to be self-employed over 
time.
269 I used the log-linear model to check the effects, and the effects of different educational levels on 
employment do not differ for different dates of birth.
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Table 2.14 Education and Age of Self-Employment at Three Different Periods of Life
P rim arv Junior H S
First Job M arried In terv iew ed First Job M arried In terv iew ed
-1 9 4 5 59(31) 116(78) 144(77) 6(3) 11(6) 18(4)
1946-55 19(9) 54(19) 76(22) 7(5) 14(3) 24(3)
1956-65 1(1) 9(4) 17(5) 8(4) 16(7) 37(10)
1966-75 1(0) 1(0) 1(0) 1(1) 5(0) 7(0)
Total 80(41) 180(101) 238(104) 22(13) 46(16) 86(17)
S en io r H S Junior C o lleg e
First Job M arried In terv iew ed First Job M arried In terv iew ed
-1 9 4 5 1(0) 5(1) 16(4) 0 0 0
1946-55 6(1) 11(1) 32(3) 2(0) 7(1) 10(1)
1956-65 10(3) 23(3) 65(7) 3(1) 4(0) 17(0)
1966-75 7(1) 4(1) 19(1) 1(1) 0 3(1)
Total 24(5) 43(6) 132(15) 6(2) 11(1) 30(2)
T e rtia w S ubtotal
First Job M arried In terv iew ed First Job M arried In terv iew ed
-1 9 4 5 1(0) 4(1) 6(2) 67(34) 136(86) 184(87)
1946-55 3(0) 5(0) 9(0) 37(15) 91(24) 151(29)
1956-65 0 5(1) 7(0) 22(9) 57(15) 143(22)
1966-75 2(0) 1(0) 3(0) 12(3) 11(1) 33(2)
Total 6(0) 15(2) 25(2) 138(61) 295(126) 511(140)
Source. As in Table 2.1.
Notes: The figure in parenthesis is the number in primary industry.
Table 2.15 Percentage of Self-employed and Employed in the Non- 
Agricultural Sector, by Education
Self-em ployed Employed
Prim ary and less 32.3 52 .9 .
Jun ior High School 28.6 61.4
Senior High School 23.0 69.3
Jun ior College 14.0 81.0
Tertiary and more 12.6 83.6
Cases 369 1031
Source: As in Table 2.1.
Notes: 1. % of the same level of education working as self-employed or employed.
2. The samples exclude primary industry.
What sorts o f jobs are held by the self-employed in Taiwan? My computer analysis of 
the sample data o f the survey of 1991-92 reveals 370 self-employed in non-primary 
industry. 142 out of these 370 (38.4%) hired workers to work for them, and so could be
91
Chapter 2 Social  Mobility
called small employers.270 But most of the non-agricultural self-employed just ran a small 
shop of their own. 116 out of 370 (31%) are wholesale or retail trade owners, 35 (9.5%) 
are street vendors, 19 (5.1%) are taxi-drivers, 18 (4.9%) are restaurants owners. In other 
words, more than 50% of the non-agricultural self-employed are earning their living 
based on their ex ante labour271 which depends on the market situation.
The employers do not have a different mobility path from the person who runs a small 
shop of his own. Most of their first jobs were as employees (71.8% of employers [N=142] 
and 64.3% of the small shopkeepers [N=221] ), but by the time they married the 
percentage who remained employees was reduced to 37.3% and 35.7% respectively, 
while the percentage of self-employed increased from 11.3% to 40.8% and 12.2% to 
32.6% respectively.
To hire workers or not has nothing to do with age, while a clear pattern is that the 
more educated rose through the private sector into circumstances where they are more 
likely to hire people. O f those who have less than six years of education, only 27.3% hire 
labourers, and the figure increases to 32.8% (junior high school), 47.8% (senior high 
school), 53.6% (junior college) and 63.6% (tertiary). This is consistent with the survey 
done in 1996 by the Directorate-General o f Budget, Accounting and Statistics. This 
found that employers are more educated than self-employed workers. Among the 
employers, 38% were educated fewer than nine years, 36% are senior high school 
educated, and 26% received junior college and above education, while the figures for the 
three educational levels of self-employed workers are 44%, 34% and 22% 
respectively.272 The number of workers that the employers hire is 12.3, and the figure of 
the self-employed workers is only 2.8.27j
2/0 Here I use Erik Olin Wright’s definition. See Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State (London: 
New Left Books, 1978), Chapter 2.
271 See Claus Offe, ‘The Political Economy of the Labour Market’, in ‘Disorganized Capitalism- 
Contemporary Transformations o f  Work and Politics ’ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p. 28.
272 Computed from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan (f t i& fö i-
t f ^ ) ,  Zhonghua Minguo Bashiwu nian Taiwan Diqu Renli Ziyuan Diaocha Tongji Nianbao ( 0 fag] 
y \  -fJL £  P i t f f - M,  Yearbook ofManpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area,
ROC, 1996) (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 1997), pp. 164-165, Table 
52.
27j Computed from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Yearbook 
o f Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area, ROC, 1996, p. 171, Table 57.
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Even though the less educated Taiwanese are more likely to become self-employed, 
their occupations centre on low prestige jobs like street vendors, taxi-drivers or small 
shop owners. One possibility is that the less educated do not have sufficient human 
capital to learn new technologies to compete, so their work is mostly dependent on 
subcontracting. Those who were medium educated could not get good employment, or 
be promoted high in an organisation, but they were able to learn new technologies with 
the help of what they learned in high school. I found that those interviewees who 
emphasised competitive production technologies were usually those with vocational 
senior high school credentials or higher, while those who talked about their guawci with 
others were usually less educated. Here it seems that education played a role in 
promoting economic success.
We can make the following points:
1. Occupational distribution has been largely determined by education, and the 
education system in Taiwan functions as a mechanism that reproduces social-status 
inequality.
2. People from different educational levels have different mobility paths. The general 
mobility pattern in Taiwan is: for the less educated to try to get a job in the labour market, 
and when possible, to be self-employed in a marginal, low prestige business; while for the 
higher educated, to get a prestige job as an employee and to stay within that organisation, 
relying upon the hope of promotion.
3. I distinguish employers from the others in the category of self-employed. The 
data show that generally employers are better educated than the petty-bourgeoisie.
4. Mainlanders are more educated than Taiwanese, and they are less likely to be 
self-employed. The ethnic cleavage in occupational distribution is basically the result of 
educational effects and guanxi, and the distinction between these factors was observed in 
2.3.2.
5. Obviously the prevalence of the small and medium-sized enterprises in Taiwan is 
not induced by any ‘cultural mentality’. Different educational levels set the general 
limitations to upward mobility, and for the less educated, one of the means to overcome 
this limitation is to withdraw one’s labour power from the wage market and to open their 
own small business.
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2.5 Structural Constraints on Collective Action
We are interested, among other things, in why the less educated, manual labourers 
adopted the so-called ‘de-class-in-itself strategy instead of trying improve their market 
situation collectively. I will discuss the structural factors which influence the strategies 
that manual labourers in Taiwan adopt.
2.5.1 Education as a kind of ideological control
Education is usually considered as a means to break socio-economic inequality. Yet 
the accepted values regarding upward mobility have direct and indirect social control 
effects. The direct effect is that the examination selection system is widely accepted as 
legitimate without any questioning. People are apt to believe that it is the most fair and 
efficient way to select elites to manage society, without any prejudice against poor 
families, because every student has to answer the same questions.
Such a widely accepted belief that educational opportunity is equally provided 
through such exams, plus the belief that a higher education is important for career 
success,274 produces an indirect effect: those who could not enter higher education are 
deemed failures in a competitive society. This is not only the social image of the less- 
educated, but also their self-image. The social and individual images are congruent 
because the less educated could only find low-prestige jobs, which reinforces the 
negative image of the less-educated. In the survey of 1992, 78% of the interviewees were 
not satisfied with their own educational performance.275 Such a self-image is produced 
within the ethos in which one receives a formal education. In Taiwan the teachers mark 
everything, including ‘morality’, on a hundred percent scale, and those getting higher 
marks are always regarded as more intelligent, hard-working and a model for every 
student. In junior high school, almost every school classifies students into two different 
sections: a front section which is established to ‘whip’ students to pass the senior high 
school examination, and a back section, which is said to accommodate those students
24 The survey shows that 89% of the informants think high education is ‘very important’ and ‘important’ 
for career success. There is no attitude difference between higher educated or less educated. See Qu 
Haiyuan, op. cit., 1992, p. 232.
2 5 See Qu Haiyuan, Taiwan Diqu Shehui Bianqian Jiben Diaocha Jihua (A General Survey o f Social 
Change in Taiwan, 1991) (Taipei: Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1991), p.307.
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who do not want to go on studying.276 According to my computer analysis of the 1992 
national survey data, among those whose highest degree was an academic high school 
degree, 21% had been placed in the ‘back section’, and the figure for vocational senior 
high school was much higher, 32%, while for those who got a university degree, it was 
only 2.0%.277
In sum, education is recognised as a mechanism to distinguish the ‘most capable’ 
people from the ‘incapable’, on the one hand, and to legitimise the existing social 
hierarchy, on the other. One case shows this popular attitude towards the function of 
education. A friend explained to students at a junior college why the percentage of 
Mainlanders attending tertiary education is much higher than Taiwanese. She asked 
students to answer the question in a final examination. Even after they had been told the 
reason by her in class, a lot of students replied: because Mainlanders are more clever than 
Taiwanese.
People without higher educational credentials have to try to find alternatives if they 
seek to be upwardly mobile. Since the education system in Taiwan is not flexible, it is 
almost impossible for someone who is out of the school system to go back again to 
school, so almost no one can achieve upward mobility via this route. For example, one 
interviewee’s daughter observed that her father, fifty-five years old, told her that his first 
aspiration had been to study at university, but under financial stress at that time, he had 
had to give up the expectation. He said that since it was impossible to attain a higher 
education, the alternative way open to him to raise his status was to strive to make money. 
But even if one has such a motivation to discard his or her inferior social and material 
status, why did s/he and others adopt individualistic measures instead of collective action? 
We have to examine the mechanisms which excluded the possibility of collective action.
2.5.2 The State-Controlled Labour Regime
Taiwan was ranked as an authoritarian regime before its democratisation in the mid- 
1980s.278 Under this condition, any collective action, including a labour movement, was
2 6 The back section of a school is called ‘fangniu ban’ (2i4-3& ) which means let cows eat grass by 
themselves without any help. Usually no student in the section is interested in studying because they are 
socially defined as ‘bad, backward and hopeless students’.
2 Calculated from ^ 4 General Survey o f  Social Change in Taiwan, 1992.
278 See Edwin A. Winckler, ‘Elite Political Struggle, 1945-1985’, in Edwin A. Winckler and Susan
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viewed as a threatening force to ‘subvert’ social stability and was kept under surveillance 
and suppressed.279
The methods to control the labour movement in Taiwan had been established in the 
period of fighting against the Chinese Communists, and after the KMT retreated to 
Taiwan the implementation of martial law consolidated the party-state controlled labour 
regime.280 A lot of laws were implemented to control labour, including a Trade Union 
Law, the Labour-Capital Disputes Law, the National Mobilisation Law, the martial law, 
Provisions for Controlling Agriculture, Industry and Commerce in the Emergency 
Period...etc. The most important means was to preempt workers’ collective-dispute 
rights. According to clause six of the Trade Union Law, the industrial labourers over 
twenty years old in an area or factory could organise an industrial or occupational trade 
union, but up to 1988, 85% of Taiwan factories employed fewer than thirty workers, and 
the labourers in these firms were excluded from the right to organise a union.281
Even when labourers were eligible to organise a union, the administrative bureaucracy 
could cooperate with employers to prevent the establishment of an ‘unpopular’ union. In 
one case, the labourers working in a shoe-manufacturing company wanted to organise a 
union, and after they had submitted the application form, the government office in charge 
o f the matter notified the company immediately, and the company organised pro­
company workers to organise a new union. The office forged the date of receipt to 
invalidate the first group because in one company only one union was allowed to be set 
up. Besides this arbitrary administrative power, the law forbade any coalition of local 
level unions. Local level unions needed to be subordinated to a higher level union, which 
was always controlled by the party-state.282
Greenhalgh (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy o f  Taiwan (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 
1988), pp. 151-171.
279 See Wang Jenn-hwan [ ) ,  Fang Xiau-ding ( $ ) ,  ‘Guojia Jiqi, Laogong Zhengce yu
Laogong Yundong’ (g) Z-Q fh  ’ State, Labour Policies and Labour Movement),
Taiwan Shehui Yanjiu Jikan (Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies), pp.9-14.
280 See Xu Zhengguang, Cong Yihua dao Zizhu: Taiwan Laogong Yundong de Jiben Xingge he Oushi
ä  •' ’ From Alienation to Independence: Basic Characters
and Trend o f Taiwan Labour Movement), paper presented at the conference ‘Social Movements’ held in 
Qing Hua University, 1988, p. 4.
281 See Wang Hong-zen (JL £  'f—), Zhanhou Taiwan Siren Duzhan Ziben zhi Fazhan ($&& o'XKfcXTTjLZ
» The Development o f Private Monopoly Capital in Postwar Taiwan), unpublished Master 
thesis, Graduate School of Sociology, National Taiwan University, 1988.
282 See Zheng Lulin ( HP 1% %), Taiwan Laodong Tizhi de Jiexi: Jiegou Lianjie de Guandian (
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Because Taiwan was a one-party state, the state administration was in fact controlled 
by the party, and orders from the party were ranked higher than administrative rules.28 J 
For example, Gaoxiong fishermen submitted an application to organise a union, which 
was ratified by a government office, but the party disagreed, which caused disputes 
between fishing labourers and the government office for several years. So, too, there was 
a KMT party cadre in every large enterprise, located in the personnel office, to supervise 
labour/management relations.284
Through these kinds o f control, trade unions in Taiwan lost any independent power to 
strive for labourers’ welfare. Instead they sometimes became a periphery organisation of 
the party-state to control society. If working conditions became unbearable, or one’s 
income remained low, one could do nothing but leave one’s employment in order to find 
one’s own way.
2.5.3 Social Network Controls
Besides the widely accepted ideology of futuristic orientation, which means the belief 
that one would be successful if s/he works hard /85 society needs more subtle control 
mechanisms to forestall any discontent among the disadvantaged classes. Party-state 
control is obviously a kind of precautionary means to bring social discontent under strict 
surveillance, but another more effective and less cost-consuming means is to mobilise 
social networks to drain off the discontent.
As we have seen, in Taiwan most people seek their jobs through personal networks. 
Under this situation, all labour-capital conflict is easily transformed into ‘personal’ 
relationships that can be mediated by friends, family or relatives. A case is the strike
: ’Analysis o f Taiwan Labour Regime: Structural Articulation Viewpoint),
unpublished Masters thesis. Graduate School of Sociology, National Taiwan University, 1988. Michael 
Hsin-huang Hsiao, ‘The Labor Movement in Taiwan: A Retrospective and Prospective Look’, in Denis 
Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 
1992), p.155.
283 See Joseph Bosco, ‘Taiwan Factions: Guanxi, Patronage, and the State in Local Politics’, Ethnology, vol. 
31, no.2 (1992), p.174.
284 See Xu Zhengguang, op. cit., p. 5.
285 In a survey of 1985, only 9.1% of the informants disagreed with the statement that f  one bears
hardships, s/he will be successful’. 45.5% strongly agreed, 27.2% very strongly agreed and 18.1% agreed 
with the statement. See Zheng Weiyuan L), Gaodu Chengzhang Xia Taiwan Renmin de Jingji
Taidu {The Economic Attitudes o f  Taiwan People Under High Growth) (Taipei: Juliu Tushu Gongsi, 1990), 
p.39, Table 4.1.
97
C ha p te r  2 Social M obil i ty
against the Far Eastern Chemical Enterprise in May 1989. Many workers had got their 
jobs in the company through the help of relatives or friends, and during the strike period, 
some workers had to resist the pressure from their parents and relatives persuading them 
to retreat from joining the strike.286 Another case involved workers who joined an 
independent union and came under a lot of pressure from parents and the friends who had 
introduced them to work in the company: ‘In the process of labour-capital conflict, the 
employer mobilised all social relations surrounding the union leaders to press them to 
stop fighting. Besides their parents, the main pressure came from those friends who had 
introduced them to work here’ 287 Such a social network plays a key role in preventing 
the formation of collective class consciousness; in other words, the social networks 
individualise the workers, and if there is any successful collective action organised by 
labourers, it must go beyond the social network.
If  the conflict escalated into collective action, the local politicians would intervene in 
the conflict. Usually the businesspeople had good relationships with local politicians. 
Local politicians and factions are formed on the basis of social networks, especially in 
rural areas,2o8 and they would be asked to mobilise their social networks to ‘de-mobilise’ 
the involved parties.
In his research on social protests in Taiwan in the 1980s, Wu Jiemin (■gr'fr&C) found 
that local factional politicians (mainly representatives from the city, county, and rural 
market towns) played key early roles vis a vis collective actions. They intervened in the 
collective actions through mediation or on-the-spot consultations. The social conflicts 
were set in the context of patron-clients networks which offered a negotiation ‘pipeline’ 
for the protesters and company, and for the protesters ? the local government. Such a
286 See Xia Linqing (J iffy # -), ‘Zhan Shang Bagong Diyixian-You Xingdong Zhuti de Jiaodu Kan
1989nian Yuanhua 5yue Bagong Kangzheng de Fasheng ji Yingxiang’ % —%.— fh
fa >^.^-1989^-3^1^5^ ’ On the Frontline of a Strike--The Emergence and
Effects of the Strike in Far Eastern Chemical Enterprise in May 1989 from the Perspectives of Acting 
Agent), p. 257. In ‘You Shiwu Quxiang dao Shehui Shijian—Youguan Taiwan Laogong Shenghuo de 
Diaocha Baogao ’ ( & i t f l r f c  f t  Bä a  i f  &  - t  '/£ f t  £  $L #  » From Practical
Orientation to Social Practices—Reports on Taiwan Labourers ’ Life) (Taipei: Zhang Laoshi Chubanshe, 
1993), pp. 241-288.
287 See Xia Linqing, ‘Yige Zizhu Gonghui Kangzheng Licheng de Anli Diaocha Baogao—Jiegouxing
Chongtuyu Geren Xuexi’ ( - 1 0  fi i& #M ±fcr£& lS ’ ACase
Study on the Resistance History of an Independent Union—Structural Conflicts and Individual Learning 
Process), in Ibid.: p. 217.
288 See Bruce J. Jacobs, Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study o f Mazu
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patron-client network could function because the protesters and the company were 
afraid of harassment from the intelligence agency, and they therefore preferred the local 
politicians, whom they were more familiar with, to ‘serve the people’.289 As James C. 
Scott has observed, ‘the effect of machine rule under universal suffrage is to submerge 
growing collective policy demands with immediate payoffs, thereby retarding the 
development o f class-based political interests among the lower strata’.290
From the above analysis, we can understand why workers in Taiwan preferred to 
adopt the strategy o f ‘de-class-in-itself rather than the strategy o f ‘class-for-itself to 
improve their disadvantaged situation. Paid employees comprised 67.5% of the total 
labour force in 1996,291 but almost every collective problem became transformed into an 
individual problem or became smothered through the three mentioned social mechanisms. 
Politically, the state administrative and policing apparatus preempted the emergence of 
any possible collective action. Socially, the social networks, mainly through kin networks 
and local factions, could ‘demobilise’ any collective action.
The ultimate effect was that whenever a labour-capital conflict erupted, one of the 
first resolutions that came to mind was to ‘leave the place’. A survey done in 1992 shows 
that one out o f five workers had changed their job in the past three years, and the average 
frequency was 1.34 times. The less one was educated, the more frequently one changed 
jobs.292 Among the paid employees in the private sector, 4.4% wanted to change their job, 
while the figure for self-employed workers was only 2.06%, and only 1.76% of 
government employee wanted to change their jobs.29j Among the surveyed unemployed 
with work experience, 42% left their job because of dissatisfaction with the previous job,
Township, Taiwan (Canberra: Contemporary China Centre, 1980), pp.78-82.
~89 See Wu Jiemin fk<), Zhengti Zhuanxingqi de Shehui Kangyi—Taiwan 1980Niandai 
t f j f t  itJsL M — a %?1980 '  Social Protests in the Transition o f Regime—Taiwan in the 1980s),
unpublished Masters thesis, Graduate School of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 1990, pp. 
80-82, 130-131, 134-135.
290 See James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (N.J.: Englewood Cliffs, 1972), p. 151.
291 Computed from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Yearbook 
o f Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area, ROC, 1996, pp. 2, 51.
292 Those received primary education changed jobs 1.42 times in the past three years, and the figures for 
junior high school, vocational senior high school, academic senior high school, college and university are 
1.38,1 .37,1 .35,1 .24 and 1.20 respectively. See Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 
Executive Yuan, Zhonghua Minguo Bashiyinian Taiwan Diqu Gongzuo Jingyan Diaocha Baogao ( f  0
’ Report on the Work Experiences Survey in Taiwan Area, 
ROC, 1992) (Taipei: Directorate-General ofBudget, Accounting and Statistics, 1993), pp. 66-67, Table 25.
293 Ibid.: p. 126, Table 38.
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and 70% of these dissatisfied workers were from the private sector.294 When wages or 
working conditions were really unsatisfactory, workers simply retreated from the labour 
market to become self-employed.
2.6 Thesis on ‘the Boss Island’
Is the mobility path of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs in Taiwan unique as 
compared to other countries? We can check this in terms o f two aspects: fathers’ 
socio-economic background and educational attainment. Table 2.16 shows the socio­
economic background of small business owners in three countries.
We notice, firstly, the bulk of small business owners are recruited from the lower- 
middle social strata in all three societies, but the percentage of those from the lower- 
middle class in Taiwan (59.7%) is the highest among the three Secondly, the pattern of 
distribution between Taiwan and Hong Kong is closer than between Taiwan and Britain. 
Thirdly, the occupational distribution of businesspeople’s fathers in Taiwan is almost the 
same as the occupational distribution of the total Taiwanese population (the figure in 
parenthesis). From this comparison, we can consider the question: is small business 
largely a ‘safety net’ for children from the upper classes, or is it largely an upward 
mobility channel for those from lower strata?
The high percentage of small business owners from lower-middle class families in 
Taiwan might reflect a specific economic development stage. The labour force in primary 
industry was reduced from 56.1% in 1952 to 17.0% in 1986. So it is not surprising that 
the occupations of most of the informants’ fathers were in primary industry. The similar 
pattern in Taiwan and Hong Kong support this argument.
More than 50% of the businesspeople’s fathers were farmers and self-employed, and 
only 9.9% (Taiwan) and 12.9% (Hong Kong) were from employer, managerial or 
professional background, but in Britain, the figure from the upper class was 31.7%. In 
Germany, 29.3% of small business owners’ fathers were businesspeople, and 16.1% of 
their mothers were businesswomen.295 In short, the social background of European small
294 Computed from Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Yearbook 
o f Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area, ROC, 1996, p.212, Table 70; p.231, Table 81.
295 See Heinz Klandt, ‘Trends in Small Business Start-up in West Germany’, in Robert Goffee and Richard 
Scase (eds.), Entrepreneurship in Europe — the Social Process (London, New York, Sydney: Croom Helm, 
1987), p. 36, note 9.
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business owners is quite different form Taiwan and Hong Kong. In Europe, a larger 
proportion o f business founders are from business families than would be expected from 
chance, while in Taiwan, the opportunity for children from lower-middle strata is not less 
than for the upper strata, though the children of employers and the self-employed have a 
slightly higher chance to run a business of their own.
Table 2.16 Small Business Owners’ Socio-Economic Background (%)
SEI of father Taiwan
(1991-92)
Britain
(1984)
Hong Kong 
(1987)
Employer 6.4(3.7) 4.8
Manager 2.1(2.0) 29.4 1.6
Professional 1.4(1.3) 2.3 6.5
Self-employed 18.9(12.7) 6.1 36.7
Upper non-manual 2.8(4.9)
Lower non-manual 7.1(7.1) 17.3 16.5
Manual 16.7(16.7) 28.5 8.1
Farmer 35.9(40.2) 19.0
Other 8.5(11.3) 16.4 6.8
N= 281(2377) 214 248
Sources:
1. Taiwan. The General Survey of Social Change in Taiwan, 1991-92, as disaggregated by myself.
2. Britain: David Goss, Small Business and Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), Table 3.1, 
p.52. Original data is from J. Curran and R. Burrows. Enterprise in Britain: A National Profile o f 
Small Business Owners and the Self-Employed (London: Small Business Research Trust, 1988), p.25.
3. Hong Kong: Victor Fung-shuen Sit and Siu-lun Wong, Small and Medium Industries in an Export- 
Oriented Economy: The Case o f  Hong Kong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1989), Table 
7.11, p. 95.
Notes:
1. For classification of different occupations in Taiwan, see appendix 3.
2. Figures in parenthesis in Taiwan show the population distribution of fathers’ occupations when 
informants were fifteen years old.
2. For civil servant in Hong Kong is classified in Other. Merchant (34.7%) and Hawker (2%) in the 
original table are classified into Self-employed.
3. Employer/Manager and Upper/lower non-manual workers in Britain are put in one category in 
original table.
4. This is classified into two categories in the French data: upper middle or upper-class, including top, 
middle management workers, independent workers, medium and large farmers; working class or 
lower middle-class occupation, including clerks, sales and shop assistants, skilled workers, foremen, 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers, agricultural labourers and small farmers. See Nonna Mayer, ibid., 
Table 47, note 6 and appendix.
From Table 2.17, we see that the small and medium-sized enterprises served as an 
avenue of upward social mobility for the less-educated in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China, 
while in Colombia it seems to be a ‘catch net’ for upper-class children. In Taiwan,
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excluding shopkeepers, street vendors and independent professionals, 38.9% of the small 
business owners held a senior high school degree but no higher, much higher than the 
proportion of the population. Ke Zhiming Oft & 38) found that ‘it is impossible to 
promote the less-educated in a bureaucracy, so 82% of the informants believed that to be 
one’s own boss is the best way to be successful’ 296 The situation is the same in China and 
Hong Kong. The percentage of post-secondary degrees among small business owners in 
the three Chinese societies is higher than the population distribution, but not so extreme 
as in Colombia, where 35.1% of the informants are university graduates. In Germany 
(1980), 53.3% of the small business owners had advanced secondary (Abitur) or 
comparable levels of educational attainment (versus 11.3% of the population). A similar 
relationship holds for the figures for post-secondary qualification (66.9% of an external 
control group and 90.6% of the entrepreneurs)297
This is a strong contrast. Though those with only a primary school education in one of 
the Chinese societies had a smaller chance to be one’s own boss, those who acquired a 
secondary degree and cannot enter university are more likely to be upwardly mobile via 
this path. On the contrary, in Germany or Colombia the less one is educated, the 
progressively lower the opportunity to run one’s own business. Obviously to be one’s 
own boss in a Chinese society is like a ‘social ladder’ to climb up, while in Germany, 
Britain and Colombia, it is better viewed as a ‘catch net’ for the downwardly mobile.
Another commonly held thesis is that ‘it is a traditional Chinese ethic to work hard to 
become one’s own boss’. For example, a survey of 1988 in Hong Kong found that 83% 
of the interviewees believed that workers have a chance to become bosses, and 49% in 
Hong Kong think the best mobility path is to ‘start one’s own business’ 298 Why is there 
such a widely held belief? Stevan Harrell suggested that the relevant ‘economic ethic’ of 
Chinese society is the ethic of entrepreneurship, which is defined as the investment of 
one’s resources in a long-term quest to improve the material well-being and security of 
one’s family.299 Such an ethic is future-oriented, as with the small-scale factory workers
296 See Ke Zhiming, op. cit., p. 13.
297 See Heinz Klandt, op. cit., p. 36, note 11.
298 See Wong, Siu-lun, ‘Chinese Enterpreneurs and Business Trust’, in Gary Hamilton (ed.), Business 
Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, 
University of Hong Kong, 1991), p. 19.
299 See Stevan Harrell, ‘Why Do the Chinese Work so Hard?’, Modern China, vol. 11, no. 2 (April, 1985),
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in Taiwan in Richard W. Stites’s description, who worked hard in order not to have to be 
workers forever.300 Chen Jiexuan noted that diligence as a world view would
highly value those who worked hard to become a proprietor. He noted that without 
support from this ideology, those who tried to be upwardly mobile through this route 
would not have access to social prestige, and their profit-pursuit would lack 
legitimacy.301
Yet such ahistorical explanations fail to explain Taiwan’s specific historical context 
and ethnic cleavage. The simple fact that Mainlanders and Taiwanese developed their 
careers within Taiwan in different ways cannot be explained by these cultural 
explanations. If Mainlanders and Taiwanese inherit the same Chinese culture, why have 
the Taiwanese been more likely to hold a desire to be a proprietor? It also fails to explain 
why people with a secondary degree are more likely to become business owners and 
those with a primary degree are more likely to be small shopkeepers or street vendors. It 
also cannot explain why the occupational distribution of males and females is so different.
My explanation is that, given the job structures in Taiwan, the less educated do not 
have any career prospects in a small firm, and on the other hand they are not able to work 
in a big company or a bureaucracy compared with those with high credentials. In addition, 
there has been no effective collective way to improve their market situation in the labour 
market. So their best hope is to apply the skills they learned in the factories in setting up 
their own business. But to run a company, one needs some basic general knowledge, and 
thus those bosses with secondary degrees were considerably more likely to be successful 
than those who were only primary school educated .302
p. 216.
300 See Richard W. Stites, ‘Industrial Work as an Entrepreneurial Strategy’, Modern China, vol. 11, no. 2 
(April, 1985), pp. 227-246.
301 See Chen Jiexuan Xieli Wangluo yu Renji Wangluo—Taiwan Zhongxiao Oiye De Shehui
Jingji Fenxi (t& P f '  ’ Subcontracting and Personal
Networks—social economic analysis o f Taiwan's small and medium-scale enterprises) (Taipei: Lianjing 
Chubanshe, 1994), p.292.
302 We should not forget that the data only shows the existing, or successful in another sense, companies. It 
does not show the failed firms. Those lower-educated might have tried to open their shops, but failed, so 
they had to go back to their original occupation again. Here we do not have data about the failure rate of 
different firms of different social background.
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Table 2.17 Formal Education of Small and Medium-Sized Entrepreneurs (%)
Education Taiwan(A) Hong Kong China Colombia Taiwan (B)
1991-92 1987 1991-92 1978-79 1990
Less than Primary 
School
0(8.9) 4.3(16.1) (22.3) 9.1 5.3
Primary School 18.1(29.9) 27.5(34.2) 19.3(34.6) 20.8 26.3
Junior High School 16.7(16.2) (30.2) 34.2
Senior High School 38.9(26.8) 55.8(43.0) 76.2(11.0) 29.9 29.4
Technical School 13.9(9.7) - - 5.2 3.5
Post Secondary 12.5(8.5) 12.3(6.7) 4.5(1.9) 35.1 1.3
N= 72(2370) 278(—) 3161(—) 77 228
Sources:
1. Taiwan(A):The General Survey of Social Change in Taiwan, 1991-92. Taiwan (B): Ke Zhiming (fä
& ), Taiwan Dushi Xiaoxing Zhizhaoye de Chuangye, Jingying yu Shengchan Zuzhi—yi Wufenpu
Chengyi Zhizaoye wei Anli de Fenxi ( £ ^ M & ] £ ' J % ' f f $
’ The Establishment, Management and Production Organisation o f Small 
Enterprises—Case Studies ofthe Ready-made Clothes Industry in Wufenpu) (Taipei: Sinica Academia, 
1993), p.33.
2. Hong Kong: Victor Fung-shuen Sit and Siu-lun Wong, Small and Medium Industries in an Export- 
Oriented Economy: The Case o f  Hong Kong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1989), Table 8.1, 
p. 99.
3. China: Guojia Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui, Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanliju (National 
Economic System Reform Committee, National Industry and Commerce Administration Bureau), 
Zhongguo Geti, Siying Jingji Diaocha — Jingying, Lirun, Shouru (Economic Survey on Chinese 
Individual, Private Business — Business Administration, Profits and Revenue) (Beijing: Junshi Yiwen 
Chubanshe, 1993), p. 118 & 344, Table 1-1-13 & 5-1-8.
4. Columbia: Mariluz Cortes, Albert Berry and Ashfaq Ishaq, Success in Small and Medium-Scale 
Enterprises—the Evidence from Colombia (Washington: Oxford University Press published for The 
World Bank, 1987), p. 148, Table 4-5.
Notes:
1. Figures in parenthesis show population distribution.
2. The data shown here includes only those small business owners, excluding self-employed or 
professionals who hire workers.
3. The figure on high schools in Colombia includes those who did not complete their high school degree. 
The survey was conducted in metalworking firms only.
To summarise the argument so far, for those from the lower socio-economic classes, 
small and self-employed businesses are more likely to serve as a means to climb up the 
social ladder, even though the opportunity might be more accessible to those from a 
higher socio-economic background. In terms of education, small business owners tend 
not to be highly qualified, and thus it becomes plausible that this represents an alternative 
career path for those without formal ‘credentials’.
2.7 Conclusion
In general, one’s educational opportunities highly correlate with family socio-
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economic background. In Taiwan, as noted, this socio-economic background is also 
related to ethnicity. The Mainlanders tended to be more highly educated than the 
Taiwanese, though the gap has been narrowed. To explain the phenomenon, I traced 
back to the 1950s the fact that the postwar political structure determined occupations 
and the shape of the educational system. Mainlanders were mostly placed in public 
offices or public enterprises, which gave them better economic benefits. Most Taiwanese 
were farmers at that time. Such an occupational difference entailed economic inequality 
between the two groups which in turn affected educational opportunities for their 
children. Such an unequal opportunity structure was reinforced by the government’s 
education policy. Educational institutions were tightly controlled according to economic 
planning, which meant students had to face strict examination selection. The upper 
classes’ economic resources helped their children to pass the examinations, while the 
government heavily subsidised the education of the children of public servants. These 
government policies benefited Mainlanders more than Taiwanese.
Since children from better socio-economic backgrounds obtained better educations, 
they could get better jobs in the labour market. The way the less educated adapted was 
through an effort to scramble out of their class situation, where possible, by ‘becoming 
one’s own boss’, as the best path to upward mobility open to them. Such a strategy was 
structured in Taiwan in a specific historical context and was not predominantly the effect 
o f traditional culture. Two main reasons for a lack o f alternative paths were: the state- 
controlled labour regime forestalled the emergence of a labour movement; and the 
specific social network relations dissipated any possible collective action. Under these 
mechanisms, when the employment situation was unstable, wages low, and working 
hours long, their only chance was to leave wage employment. As Hill Gates has noted, 
capitalism ‘offered a social model of upward mobility based directly on wealth rather 
than on connections with the state through the highly limited channels o f degree- and 
office-holding”.303
Thus, the general mobility pattern in Taiwan for the less educated has been to get a 
wage job first and then to become self-employed when possible. The booming world 
economy in the 1960s gave entrepreneurial blue-collar workers a chance to move out of
303 See Hill Gates, ‘Money for the Gods’, Modern China, vol.13, no.2 (1987), p.261.
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the ‘inferior’ class. But when they decided to jump out o f their original class to be self- 
employed, they have faced social structures constraining their economic activities. In the 
following four chapters I will discuss the specific structures imposed on them, and how 
they manage their business under these constraints. The first step they needed to take was 
to collect capital to establish any new business, so let me start with their initial financing.
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Chapter 3: The SMEs’ Finances
3.1 Initial Capital of SMEs
I have explained in Chapter Two that structural forces, i.e., poor working conditions, 
low education, and political control, push a lot of workers to establish their own 
business. When they decide to do so, there are four ways to raise enough initial capital, 
i.e., (i) to borrow from financial institutions, (ii) to use one’s own savings, (iii) to use 
one’ s social relations to collect capital, and (iv) to borrow from special government 
funds.
Almost no-one raises their initial capital from a bank, as the banking system is like a 
pawn shop, in that it always requires collateral for the loan. The normal practice is that 
the borrower shows documents to prove the value of his or her collateral, and the bank 
will give a loan at 70% to 80?/o of the value. ’04 One interviewee’ s wife said that ‘banks 
are like prostitutes, who only work for rich people: if one does not have money, banks 
will never serve a person’. Another said that ‘unless one’s company is already in good 
financial shape, and you also have personal guanxi with the banks, it’s almost impossible 
to borrow from the banks. Besides, the bank staff always thinks that the more work 
means the more errors, and less work fewer errors iii £
you are not able to borrow from them’. Among my 40 interviewees, not one raised their 
initial capital from the banking system.
One way is to borrow such money from public funds set up by the government. One 
fund is called Loans to Youths to Set Up a New Business’ (it* %-M H  I f  Ik), which 
provides young people without any initial capital with low interest loans to establish their 
new business. Its interest rate is only 70% of the prime interest rate of the Bank of 
Taiwan.305 Though the cost o f interest is very low, there are not a lot of people with 
accounts at the fund. Only one among my forty interviewees said that he had used this 
capital source to finance his initial capital when he set up a new firm.
304 Discussion with an official from a government bank. The normal practice is 60%, and the rest is a 
second mortgage, called Ertai
305 See Yang Yahui and Xiao Xuanyiyi A Study on the Financing o f  Small &
Medium Business ( ^  (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1992), p. 111.
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Instead, most of the businesspeople saved some money, combined with private 
borrowing, to establish their business. According to Taiwan’s civil law, there are three 
types of ownership of a company: wholly-owned, partnership and corporation. Among 
my forty interviewees, twelve companies (30%) were wholly-owned when they were set 
up, and twenty-eight interviewees (70%) adopted a partnership to establish their first 
business.
If these businesspeople use their savings as the sole source of their initial capital, 
their businesses are usually small and easy to set up, as in the case of an informant who 
set up his company with a few thousand US dollars, hired an apprentice, and used a 
machine to produce moulds. Only five informants (12.5%) said that their initial capital 
derived from their own savings without any other source. These were all ‘wholly-owned 
companies’.
In Taiwan the most common way to raise funds is to use one’s existing social 
relations to pull together scattered savings. Seven out of forty (17.5%) informants 
borrowed money to set up their business. No brother or friend runs the company with 
them. Their initial capital source included: their own savings, parents or siblings as well 
as wife’s dowry and rotating credit associations. Interestingly, none of them borrowed 
from friends or relatives outside one’s core family. We will discuss this phenomenon 
after the problems of a partnership are analysed.
The main reason to adopt the form of a partnership to establish one’s first business is 
a shortage of capital. The entry level for setting up a manufacturing company is getting 
higher and higher. Either one has enough social relations to borrow money from one’s 
own networks, or one has to go in with partners. To raise one’s own share may still 
depend upon capital from family members; from friends; and from less closely connected 
social networks, mainly informal rotating credit clubs.
The first source is based upon traditional family values: that one’s family (jiazu, 1M£) 
is communal so that everyone is supposed to contribute to it as a whole. Especially in 
the patriarchal Chinese society, the capital usually flows from females to males, and from 
parents to sons. As Justin D. Niehoff finds in Yingge town, female workers had to send 
their money back to their family, and to help their father or brothers to set up their
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businesses/06 Norma Diamond’s research in the 1970s in Tainan shows that the earnings 
o f unmarried daughters were remitted to parents to supplement the budget of the 
household and to help with the schooling and maintenance of brothers during an 
extended education.307 In Hill Gates’ research, one fifth of the enterprises were set up 
with the help of wives’ dow ries/08 Ka Chih-ming’s research found that in
Wufenpu, when initial capital derived from only one financial source, 83% of the one 
hundred and sixty-six sampled raised their initial capital from self-savings (41%), 
parents’ contributions (20%), and loans from relatives (21%). If they could raise capital 
from more than one financial channel, the most important sources were 1) rotating credit 
associations (39%), 2) own savings (26%) and 3) parents’ contributions (18%). As the 
sample was of small-scale enterprises, the percentage of one’s own savings in the initial 
capital loomed large/09
In my own research, ten percent of the interviewees obtained their initial capital 
partly from their wives’ dowries. The percentage is not as high as Hill Gates’ finding. 
However, another six interviewees (15%) utilised their wives’ networks to gain access 
to initial capital, including rotating credit association, wife’s savings and her family’s 
money. Besides the wife’s contribution, nine out o f the forty informants (22.5%) 
received some money from their parents or siblings.
Other sources of initial capital include borrowing from rotating credit associations or 
from relatives and friends, but it seems that a partnership is far more important than 
other sources, as can be seen in the fact that 70% adopted partnerships to set up their 
first business. It is also interesting to note that among the twenty-eight companies, only 
six of the interviewees (21.4%) borrowed money from their parents, and five out of 
these six were partnerships between brothers. We might say that there is a sharp line 
between core family and others. Parents tend not to lend out money to non-core family 
members, and newly set up companies that are partnerships between friends seem not to
306 See Justin D. Niehoff, The Villager as Industrialist Ideologies of Household Manufacturing in 
Rural Taiwan, Modem China, vol.13, no.3 (July 1987), pp.291-96.
307 See Norma Diamond, Women and Industry: Taiwan, Modern China, vol.5, no.3 (July 1979), p.325.
308 See Hill Gates, Small Fortunes: Class and Society in Taiwan, in Dennis Fred Simon and Michael
Y. M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 1992), p.177. 
j09See Ka, Chih-ming (fä  SJ!), Market, Social Networks, and the Production Organizations of 
Small-Scale Industry in Taiwan—the Garment Industries in Wufenpu ( &M&]M #  '
— (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1993), p.
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be able to borrow money from parents.
Though a partnership is the most common way to start a new business, the ending is 
usually unhappy. A general pattern for a partnership enterprise is: 1) cooperation in the 
form of capital and technical cooperation; 2) disputes, either over profits or distribution 
of losses, and 3) disintegration of the partnership, closing the shop, or one of the 
partners converting it into an individual property.'"10 In the 1992 General Survey of 
Social Change in Taiwan, which I have disaggregated and analysed on computer, only 
12.7% (sixty-five out of five hundred and ten self-employed) are in partnership 
businesses. In my own interview data, though 70% of the enterprises were initially 
partnerships, only eight out of these twenty-eight (28.6%) survived in the form of a 
partnership when I first carried out interviews in 1993, and in 1996, only six of them 
kept the cooperative form. One company had broken up, and another one was closed 
and the owner committed suicide. Half of the eight enterprises are brother-type 
partnerships, and one of them is getting ready to divide the company among the brothers, 
and another has established a new firm for his son. Clearly, the partnership enterprise is 
not the normal type in Taiwan’s business community.
Following are three cases that illustrate typical patterns of a partnership.
Case 1
In 1974, some friends o f an interviewee’s brother co-invested in a company which 
was not very well administered. The interviewee resigned from his job to work for the 
new company, which was bom of a merger o f two tiny companies, and the partners from 
the other company lived in the firm’s premises, which meant that they used the 
company’s electricity and space. An argument ensued, and by the end o f 1974, they 
divided the machinery into two parts and broke up the company.
Case 2
Seven people organised a new company. One shareholder later sold his shares (about
48, Table 2-15.
310 Xie Guoxiong’s finding is similar to mine. See Xie Guoxiong (1#tflli&) , ‘Heishou bian toujia-- 
Taiwan zhizaoye zhong de jieji liudong (M. , Black-hands
Becoming Their Own Bosses: Class Mobility in Taiwan’s Manufacturing Sectors)’, Taiwan Shehui 
Yanjiu Jikan Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies), vol. 2, no.2
(summer 1989), p 38.
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US$20,000) to the interviewee’s wife, because it was not profitable. Still later the 
company continued to make a loss, so the wife borrowed US$40,000 from the 
informant’s sister to solve the company’s financial problems. After the US$40,000 
investment, she and another shareholder became the two major shareholders. Then the 
interviewee came to work for the company. He found that another shareholder always 
took a certain percentage as commission when he put out an order to a company which 
contracted for them. The interviewee thought that he should not take this kind of 
commission, for it increased the company’s costs. They began to have ‘unpleasant 
discussions’, and as a result one night, another shareholder took away all the machines, 
and asked to withdraw all his shares from the company.
Case 3
The interviewee’s father invested with his uncle in producing the core part of a clock 
In the first few years they did not succeed in breaking through technical 
bottlenecks. All the losses were financed through the support of his uncle, who ran a 
very successful restaurant in Taipei. Eventually, the product became much cheaper than 
that o f Seiko, which was the monopoly supplier of this watch component, and they 
gained large profits. But now everyone began to worry about the distribution of profits. 
His uncle said that he had paid most of the costs in these few years, and should get 80% 
of the profits; while his aunt argued that she was the main figure to deal with all financial 
problems, so she should be awarded more. Besides this sort of profit-distribution 
problem, the interviewee’s father was very critical of his uncle’s decision to spend 
US$80,000 to decorate the firm. On the other hand, his uncle was very angry at his 
father’s embezzlement from the company. One day, his uncle and aunt asked his mother 
and father to leave the company, and gave them US$500,000 as compensation. 
Afterwards, they set up a new company to compete with the uncle.
These kinds of partnership histories are very common in my interviews. Even the 
brother-type partnership is not immune from the pattern. As one informant said, ‘After 
the blow, I deeply understand that even relatives want to make money, when he talked 
about how his relatives embezzled money from his father’s company. Another
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interviewee said ‘I hate partnerships. There are always arguments between partners. 
Even when they have profits, they fight over the distribution o f profits.’
So how can we explain the persistence of some partnership enterprises? David Schak 
finds that the persistence of partnerships depends on the size, capitalisation, technology 
and entry barriers. If it takes much effort, skills and capital to form a partnership, it is 
more likely to stay together. If the partners are relatively equal in capital, skills, guanxi 
or other assets, they can easily break apart and go their own ways. Another factor is 
whether there is a clear division of labour and management. If one person runs the 
business and the other(s) profit on their investments, it will probably endure.
The most likely to survive is the partnership between brothers. Among the four 
surviving brother-type companies from 1993, three had a strong leader. Two were led by 
the eldest brother and another directed by their mother. In the remaining company, the 
brothers have a consensus that they do not hire family members on the company payroll. 
If one had hired a family member in the partnership company, it could be interpreted as 
expanding one’s power in the company, and will cause suspicion among the others. The 
informant said that ‘my wife does not come to help in the firm, for the company is 
owned by many brothers, and we ah avoid bringing any family member to work here, 
especially the wife because they might have a different opinion which will definitely 
disturb the running o f the company. So we don’t allow any family member to intervene 
in the company’s affairs’. This strategy is also adopted by another partnership company 
which was composed of friends’ capital.
Another way to maintain a partnership is to co-invest in a company on equal terms. 
If there are profits from a co-invested company, all partners will benefit equally; and if 
the company fails, all will suffer. For example, the business of an informant is to put 
electric wires underground, so he needs cement to make the tubes. Another informant 
owns a construction company, which also needs cement. They co-invested to establish a 
cement-jerking company, which benefits both.
This kind of partnership pattern shows that a profit-oriented firm accommodates 
uneasily to the family ideology. Many brother-type partnerships end up dividing, and 
some have to resort to a dominant family member to put the company together. The 
distrust among family members can cause the break-up of a family firm. If this kind of
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distrust exists in a family firm, we would expect that it is less likely to trust non-family 
members. We have found that none of the wholly-owned companies borrowed from 
friends or relatives when they began their business. The distrust between family members 
and non-family members explains this.
Besides borrowing money from one’s core family or setting up a partnership 
company, another way to collect initial capital is to join a rotating credit group. The 
working o f a rotating credit group is that one of the joining members, called Huitou (it 
s i ,  head o f the rotating credit association) is responsible for collecting a certain amount 
of money from members. If it is a club with US$100 and eleven members, everyone in 
the club can bid to take the money contributed from all members if one needs money. 
Everyone will get a paper to write down their bid, and the one with the lowest amount 
will win the bidding. For example, if one does not need money, s/he can write the 
amount o f 100, which means s/he would like to collect 100 from every one. If one writes 
90, s/he will collect 90 from the other ten people, i.e., US$900 in total. In eleven months, 
everyone can obtain the bidding only once, and after her/his winning of the bidding, s/he 
has to pay the full amount o f US$100. For example, if one secures the rotating credit 
with the price o f US$90 in the second month, s/he will get US$900 in total. The 
following nine months s/he has to pay US$100 every month. If s/he paid 90 in the first 
month, the total amount s/he pays during the eleven months is 90 (first month) plus 900 
(the following nine months), i.e., 990.
The interest rate is usually higher than the official bank rate. Take the example that 
we mentioned above: s/he pays interest of US$90 (990-900), and the interest rate is 
90/900=10% for ten months, and the annual interest rate would be 12%.“’12 The earlier 
one bids for the credit, the higher is the interest rate, as Table 3.1 shows.
311 I am indebted to David Schak’s comments on this issue.
Jl2 The calculation of interest rates is more complicated than shown here. To know the method of 
calculation, see Tu, Jaw-yan ), NICS Kogyoka Ajia wo Yomu (NICS To Understand Asian
Industrialisation) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988), p.122, Table 4-4.
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Table 3.1 Interest Rates in a Standard Rotating Credit Group
unit: %
Period Total amount one gets 
when one wins the bid
One pays when 
one gets the 
bid
Actual amount 
one gets when 
one gets the bid
Interests one 
pays(-) or gets (+)
Interest Rate
(1) (2) (3)=OM2) (4) (5)=(4)/(3)
1 10,000*24=240,000 10,000 230,000 0 0.0
2 10,000*1+8,500*23
=205,500
8,500 197,000 33,000(-) 16.7
3 10,000*2+8,400*22
=204,800
8,400 196,400 32,100(-) 16.4
4 10,000*3+8,200*21
=202,200
8,200 194,000 32,900(-) 16.9
5 10,000*4+8,000*20
=200,200
8,000 192,000 33,100(-) 17.2
6 10,000*5+8,000*19
=202,000
8,000 194,000 29,100(-) 15.0
7 10,000*6+7,700*17 
= 198,600
7,700 190,900 30,200(-) 15.8
8 10,000*7+7,400*17
=195,800
7,400 188,400 30,400(-) 16.1
— — —
24 10,000*24= 240,000 10,000 230,000 90,000(+) 64.3
Source: Tu Jaw-van ( ,0.?, if ), NICS Kogyoka Ajia wo Yomu (NICS To Understand Asian
Industrialisation) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988), p.122, Table 4-4.
A rotating credit group is one of the major ways for businesspeople to collect initial 
and working capital to run a company. What one needs is only one’s social networks and 
then one can kick off a new rotation if one needs capital. Eight out of my forty 
informants (20%) said that they collected initial capital by this method, and most of them 
agreed that this system was very helpful when they started their business. It is popular 
because the relationship between the lenders and borrowers is clear: creditor and debtor, 
no more and no less. The lender does not have to feel ashamed to ask for money back 
plus interest, whereas it is not common to ask for interest among friends if one lends out 
money. So this credit rotation system can be viewed as a kind of mechanism to solve the 
contradiction between the self-interest principle and the renqing principle.
3.2 Working Capital of SMEs
One should distinguish between the ‘initial capital’ for setting up a firm, and the 
‘working capital’ after a firm has successfully been established. In the two phases, 
SMEs have different demands for capital. After running a successful company, one
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would have no problem in getting bank loans to provide working capital. As mentioned, 
the banking system in Taiwan is like a pawn shop, lending money to those whose 
financial situation is good and with minimal risk of default. It is almost impossible for 
SMEs that lack capital to secure any loans from the banks. Many scholars proposed 
that the government should grant SMEs special funds or bear a certain risk for them. 
They said that the biggest problem that SMEs face is insufficient capital. But the SMEs 
do not obtain fewer loans than large companies. SMEs that are run well do not have 
any problem of capital circulation. They have enough capital to reinvest in new projects.
In my sample, only two informants (one operated a motorcycle assembly firm, the 
other a publishing company) complained about the difficulty of securing loans to 
expand production. The other companies do not have problems in getting working 
capital for their production, for either they can discount their letters-of-credit or notes 
receivable at the bank, or mortgage their machinery or land to borrow money.
Since the deregulation o f the financial market, more financial tools have been 
introduced in the markets and made available for the SMEs to diversify their working 
capital. Four financial markets, i.e., the monetary market, the foreign exchange market, 
the capital market and the futures market, are available. For example, a company can 
use treasury bonds as a short-term savings tool when it has extra money, and sell them 
when it is in need of money. Or it can issue commercial paper to collect capital for 
production expansion. While more financial products are available to SMEs, they are 
not yet familiar with these products. In 1996, the use of commercial paper and bank’s 
acceptances comprised only 1.5% of their total liabilities in contrast to 7.6% for big 
firms (see Table 3.2 and 3.3). The method of direct financing from financial markets 
will become more and more important as people become more familiar with them. 
More and more SMEs use the futures market to hedge the risk of exchange rate 
fluctuations. Some informants also said that they plan to issue stocks in the stock 
market to raise capital. The establishment of the OTC (over-the-counter) market gives 
SMEs more opportunities to do this because the OTC market sets lower thresholds for 
companies to participate.
It seems quite contradictory that some scholars believe that SMEs have difficulty in 
getting capital while most o f my informants reported no problems. However, from the 
vantage point of banks, it is not difficult to explain: banks also want to make money,
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and loans are based on risk calculation; if not on profit calculation, on political interest 
calculation. Those SMEs complaining about the banking system are usually not very 
well run companies, and have no support from local politicians. Their risk premium is 
thus too high for a bank to grant them loans. So these SMEs have to resort to the 
private financial market. For well-run companies, the risk is lower, and with mortgaged 
assets, the banks run almost no risk in granting loans.
As a result of financial liberalisation after the mid-1980s, more and more new 
financial tools are available in the financial market which enable private enterprises to 
get capital directly from the market instead of from intermediaries, e.g., issues of 
commercial papers, bonds or securities. Newly established banks are keen to compete 
to gain customers. However, the impact of financial liberalisation on big firms and 
SMEs is not the same, which can be observed from the liability structure viewed by 
enterprise size (See Table 3.2 and 3.3)
Liabilities of a company’s balance sheet can be regarded as external capital 
sources, and the net worth is the company’s internal capital funding. The two tables 
below show that more and more of the capital in big firms derives from internal funding, 
while more and more SMEs have sourced their capital from outside. Almost one out of 
two dollars (47.8% in 1996) in big firms is from the company’s internal funding. It can 
be interpreted that big firms are able to sustain the company’s development through 
their own capital. In contrast to these big firms’ capital structure, the SMEs’ internal 
funding was reduced from 40.7% to 34.0% between 1991 and 1996 due to the decline 
of the owner’s equity, which means that they are more and more dependent on external 
capital sources. When they source their capital from outside, there is no difference 
between big firms and SMEs in terms of borrowing from financial institutions.
Another important external source of capital for private enterprises is ‘trade credit’, 
which accounts for 17% of the big firms’ total liabilities, and 28% of the SMEs’ in 
1996. However, fewer and fewer big firms use this financial tool, while more and more 
SMEs have come to depend on it. This is because SMEs use less formal contractual 
relationships to do business with their counterparts. One exporter told me that ‘we 
don’ t ask those well-known customers to issue letters-of-credit. Sometimes we just 
ask them to pay one third in advance and the rest can be paid one month after the 
goods set shipped. All these practices are based on mutual trust (xinyong)’. It is one of
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the major financial tools by which Taiwan’s SMEs manage their capital.
Table 3.2 Liability Structure of Big Enterprises, 1991-95
unit: %
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
L ia b ilit ie s 5 4 .2 5 6 .3 5 4 .8 5 4 .5 5 3 .3 5 2 .2
Loans from 
FIACD
25.0 25.4 22.8 23.3 22.0 16.4
Loans from 
Enterprises 
and
Households
4.6 3.8 3.6 3.1 3.1 3.2
Commercia 
1 Papers and 
B ank’s 
Acceptance
3.3 3.5 5.7 5.4 6.2 7.6
Trade
Credit
18.0 20.2 18.9 17.6 16.3 17.0
Other
Liabilities
— — — — — 8.0
N e t W o r th 4 5 .8 4 3 .7 4 5 .2 4 5 .5 4 6 .7 4 7 .8
Owner’s
equity
30.0 30.1 28.2 28.7 29.1 —
Retained
Earnings
15.8 13.6 17.0 16.7 17.6 —
T o ta l
L ia b ilit ie s
1 0 0 .0 100 .0 1 00 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0
Source: Zhonghua Minguo Taiwan Diqu Gongminying Oiye Zijin Zhuangkuang Diaocha Jieguo 
Baogao (  £  jfMbßk £ ■ & I ? M M . 48.■£-, Report on Public and
Private Enterprises ’ Capital Conditions in Taiwan District, the Republic o f China) (Taipei: 
Economic Research Department, the Central Bank of China, 1993-1997). Data of 1996 is 
from news released on the 14th of April, 1998 by Central Bank.
Note: Other Liabilities include borrowing from government, overseas borrowing, domestic corporate 
bonds, overseas securities and other reserves.
Buyers ask favours from sellers to delay their payment as long as possible, while 
sellers would like to collect their money as soon as possible so that they can earn 
interest. Normally buyers issue a thirty to ninety days’ post-dated cheque after the 
goods are delivered so that they can reduce their interest burden. Sellers can go to 
banks to discount the cheques and get cash. This kind of business practice was 
enforced by the government’s Bills Law ( ® for those who bounced their cheque 
would be put in jail. (The legal penalties were removed several years ago.) Besides, it 
was very difficult to open a chequing account in a bank.'1" Possessing a chequing
Regarding the difficulty of opening a chequing account, see Shen Yingming ( )  , Dixia
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account represented one’s xinyong, and the acceptance of the post-dated cheque 
became popular because the cheque had already been endorsed by the government and 
banks.
Table 3.3 Liability Structure of SMEs, 1991-95
unit: %
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
L iab ilities 59.3 59.7 60.9 64.3 65.8 66.0
Loans from 
FIACD
21.6 23.1 23.2 25.1 24.8 24.4
Loans from 
Enterprises 
and Households
13.1 13.8 14.9 14.4 15.0 11.0
Commercial 
Papers and Bank’s 
Acceptance
0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.6 1.5
Trade Credit 23.6 22.0 21.8 23.8 25.0 28.3
Other - - - - - 0.8
N et W orth 40 .7 40.3 39.1 35.7 34.2 34.0
Owner’s equity 39.4 37.0 36.3 33.2 32.3 -
Retained Earnings 1.3 3.3 2.8 2.5 1.9 -
T otal L iab ilities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Zhonghua Minguo Taiwan Diqu Gongminying Qiye Zijin Zhuangkuang Diaocha Jieguo 
Baogao (  'ZpR'&YEM  f t  Report on Public and
Private Enterprises Capital Conditions in Taiwan District, the Republic o f China) (Taipei: 
Economic Research Department, the Central Bank of China, 1993-1997). Data of 1996 is 
from news released on the 14th of April, 1998 by Central Bank.
Note: Other Liabilities include borrowing from government, overseas borrowing, domestic corporate 
bonds, overseas securities and other reserves.
The legal system underpinned the cultural practices of xinyong (trust). However, 
when a conflict of interest arises, e.g., when one is not able to pay back the money, the 
trust will give way to self-interest. A popular saying was ‘cost ten, sell eight, default, 
pay back three, and profit five’ (^ -f~  '  $  /V '  #J '  It shows the
dilemma the seller has to face: s/he would like to extend credit {xinyong) to the buyer 
so that s/he can make more money, but s/he also has to worry about the risk of default. 
Intensive personal contacts become one major way for businesspeople to know buyers’ 
xinyong, for the credit rating system is not yet sound in Taiwan. An interviewee who 
runs a Buddhist statue-molding company said that'after the default by my sister, I
Jinrong zhi Yanjiu ’Research on Underground Financial Market) (Taipei: Bureau
of Monetary Affairs, 1996), p.17.
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started to know that I can’t rely on the Bills Law at all. I always thought that having 
the skill would be enough to be a boss. With the protection of the Bills Law, it should
not be a problem to accept a cheque. But now I know that management, the law and
»>
personal contacts are important as well. Xinyong is not an imperative cultural factor 
driving people to keep their word, but must be supported by legal and social factors to 
work.
The SMEs’ ratio of borrowing from households and other enterprises is much 
higher than among big firms. From 1991 to 1995, the ratio increased from 13.1% to 
15.0% in SMEs, but decreased to 11.0% in 1996, while in big companies it declined 
from 4.6% to 3.2% in the same period. This financial instrument is mostly based on 
private relationships, and thus we can conclude that SMEs are much more likely to use 
personal networks to secure capital than are big firms. This personal connection is 
mainly through shareholders’ credits. According to a survey done by the Bank of 
Taiwan, 82% of the loans from households to SMEs come from the SMEs’ own 
shareholders. When the SMEs make profits, they distribute the profit to shareholders 
instead of retaining it as a kind of reinvestment capital. The shareholders obtain their 
the profit, and then lend out the capital to their own compames to gain higher interest 
(i.e., two times higher than the market rate).314 The main reason to borrow from 
shareholders is that if the money did not go into the official financial market, the capital 
owner does not have to pay any tax on the interest s/he earns, and at the same time, 
can use this kind of accounting practice to hide income.
Big firms may borrow from the official financial market, or from the financial 
institutions accepting chequing deposits (FIACD), or issue bonds, securities or stock to 
collect capital, where interest rate is only half that of the formal financial market. 
According to an informant at the Bureau o f Monetary Affairs, it has become a major 
financial tool for big firms in the past five years, accompanying the development of 
Taiwan’s financial markets.
The private borrowings from households and enterprises are usually viewed as 
private financial markets. Because more SMEs borrow money from this private market,
314 See Qiu Zhengxiong and Liu Yiru » $'] ) , Huobi yu Jinrong Shichang guonei
Fazhan yu Guojihua Fazhan ( f t  M  f t  : ^  f t  M M 'ft ’ Domestic and
International Development o f Monetary and Financial Market) (Taipei: Bureau of Monetary Affairs,
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it is often claimed that the SMEs lack capital and thus have to resort to a private 
financial market, which is regarded as a sign of the inefficiency of the financial 
market. However, if we use the shares of loans as an indicator, the SMEs do not 
obtain less loans as a proportion of their sales volume than do the large firms. Up to 
the end of 1995, the SMEs obtained only about 37% of the total loans from the 
commercial banks, and most of this money went to big business. But from Table 3.4, 
we can see that the sales of SMEs in the economy are only around one-third of total 
sales, and the share of loans to them from the financial system is between 37% to 40% 
of total loans. Another indicator is the ratio of their loans from financial institutions, 
which shows no difference between the two groups (see Table 3.2 and 3.3). And the 
third reason to doubt this claim is that the SMEs’ loans from households mostly derives 
from the shareholders’ loans, and there is no sign that this is less efficient than 
borrowing from banks, for the kind of capital flow between borrower and lender is 
direct instead via financial intermediary, which will save certain part of transaction 
cost.316
The Taiwan government has maintained a monthly report of the financial private 
market’s interest rates since the 1950s. This means that it knows quite well that the 
prevailing interest rate is not the market-clearing interest rate; instead, it is distorted. 
This government’s interest rate controls were strongly criticised by Taiwan economists 
for inefficiency, as they do not allocate scarce resources adequately, and do not help
1993), pp.83-84.
315 See Yang, Yahui and Xiao Xuanyiyi A Study on the Financing o f Small &
Medium Business (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1992), pp. 135-141;
Zhou Tiancheng (M %>$*), Taiwan Jinrong Guanzhi yu Jingji Fazhan: Shuangyuanxing Jinrong Tixi 
yu Erfenhua Shichang Jiegou I »
Taiwan’s Financial Regulations and Economic Development: Dual Financial System and 
Dichotomous Market Structures), Taiwan Yinhang Jikan ( £  » Taiwan Bank Quarterly),
1994, vol.45, no.l, pp.222-240; J. D. Shea, Financial Development on Taiwan: A Macro Analysis, 
Conference on the Financial Development o f Japan, Korea and Taiwan (Taipei: Institute of 
Economics, Academia Sinica, 1990); Wu Huilin (^ -.t-# ), Zhengfu Ruhe Xiezhu Zhongxiaoqiye (JSt 
Jtt-fr 1$ Ab f  f '  iF Jf ’ How Can the Government Help Small and Medium-sized Enterprises to
Transform?) (Taipei: unpublished research paper, 1996), p.5, 17; Lin Zhongxiong and Peng Baixian 
( # .# $ £  ’ tJTJ Ü ), Zhongxiao Qiye Jinrong yu Yiban Jinrong zhi Bijiao (17 —
’ Comparison of General Finance and Special Finance to SMEs), in Chen Mingzhang (p£a£j 
*$) (ed.), Taiwan Zhongxiao Qiye Fazhan Lunwenji f  'h& ’SJFM. smXH ’ Essays on Taiwan 
SMEs) (Taipei: Lianjing Chubanshe, 1994), pp. 195-267.
316 See Qiu Zhengxiong and Liu Yiru ( £[$ * S'H&io ) , op. cit., 83-84.
120
Chapter 3 The SMEs' Finances
those enterprises which really need the capital.j17 The system finally was liberalised in 
1989. But why was the ‘inefficient’ financial system kept for over forty years? We 
would argue that this kind of distorted market mechanism was mainly used as a means 
of control, that financial institutions played a supportive role to control economic and 
political resources.
Table 3. 4 Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ Shares o f Loans and Sales
unit: %
Year Shares of Loans Shares of Sales
1988-91 41.49 34.76
1992 39.36 33.66
1993 38.77 33.87
1994 37.19 32.2
Source: Jingjibu » Ministry of Economic Affairs), Zhonghuaminguo Bashisi nian
Zhongxiao Qiye Baipishu ( i* 0  RIM! s\- p 'J ' TPS & jt£_ f f  » White Paper on
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in the Republic o f China, 1995) (Taipei: 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1996), p.58, Table 2-2-4; p.125, Table 4-2-1.
3.3 Loans and Guanxi
In short, in the financial system in Taiwan, the main financial intermediaries were 
controlled by the state, while local financial institutions were controlled by local KMT 
factions. The situation has not changed a lot nowadays, despite the liberalisation. If 
there is no interest rate control, or no political control, the financial institutions will 
allocate the capital according to the feasibility of a. company’s proposed investment and 
rate of returns. However, political power changes the ‘economic rationality principle’ 
and results in the practice of ‘pulling gucmxV.
The policy of controlling interest rates and financial institutions until late 1980s 
inevitably resulted in a shortage of savings and the problem of ‘favouritism’. The banks 
had to use credit rationing when allocating capital, which in turn increased the
31' See Chen Shimeng ( P& j£. ) et al., Jiegou Dangguo Ziben Zhuyi ( I t  & f t  ^  & ’
Disintegrating KMT-State Capitalism) (Taipei: Chengshe Baogao 1, 1991); Jiang Shuojie ( )  , 
‘Taiwan zhi Lilyu Wenti’ the Problem of Interest Rate in Taiwan), in Yu
Zongxian (W ^  f t )  (ed.), Taiwan Huobi yu Jinrong Lunwenji ( £  %  f t  ffiM&M&tmXM) (Taipei: 
Lianjing Chuban Shiye, 1975), pp.305-323; Liu Fuqi (#P$L^), ‘Taiwan you Tonghuo Pengzhang dao 
Jingji Wending de Jinrong Fazhan’ Financial
Development in Taiwan: from Inflation to Stabilisation), in Yu Zongxian (ff- % f t )  (ed.), Ibid.: pp.31-
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opportunities to be corrupt. In a poll of executives by the Far Eastern Economic 
Review on the banking sector in Asia, 20.8% of the executives think that Taiwan’s 
banking sector is to a great extent affected by corruption, and 54.2% think the degree
•  318is to some extent.
What companies asked for was a chequing account and loans. As noted, the use 
of the chequing account was to prove one’s credibility, and the access to loans was for 
working capital and tax evasion, which will be discussed below. In order to obtain 
loans, even the top officers know that banks’ customers had to give presents and to use 
guanxi319
Financial institutions consider three factors in evaluating applications: transaction 
records with the banks (shiji, H ), trustworthiness ( xinyong, i t  ) , and 
relationships (jiaoqing, ).j20 A very profitable company would find it easy to
obtain loans from the banks according to the market principle, for it will be able to pay 
back the money and has a lower risk of default. Big firms will not have any problem 
because their credit rating is much better than small firms. So the three factors are an 
invisible wall for SMEs to gain access to the formal financial market. Utilising guanxi 
becomes necessary for them.
A company has to keep a good transaction record with the banks so that banks 
can rely on its credibility and also profit from the transactions. Companies were asked 
to have a minimum savings balance in the bank in certain periods so that the bank can 
obtain a cheap source of capital. This kind of practice is called cshiji9 ( ) . Not
only does the bank ask for the company to maintain a deposit account, but also needs 
the company to prove that it is a good customer and would never default. This 
criterion is more or less based on a credit evaluation, and it more or less regulates the 
banks’ practices not to ensure these do not ‘derail from the right economic track’. 
However, it seems that jiaoqing’ (SLffr) is most important among the three factors 
due to the specific political environment. As many interviewees mentioned, even if
69.
318 See Far Eastern Economic Review, Asian Executives Poll, 07/Aug/1997, p.33.
319 YinZhongrong ( ,op.cit., 21.
320 See Xiao Shengtie ( iff , Taiwan Minying Gongye Lixi Fudan zhi Fenxi (
M ffj/f, Analysis o f  Private Enterprises’ Interest Burden in Taiwan ), in Yu Zongxian (T  %
$t) (ed.), op. cit., p.335.
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one’s company is very well run, it still needs to know someone in the bank and to keep 
a good relationship with her/him to arrange of loans easily.
A company can approach the financial institutions via local factions. Because most 
of the banks belonged to the state, workers in the banks were civil servants, and the only 
responsibility they bore was to their chief, who in turn had to be responsible to the 
provincial government, which is supervised by the provincial council. This means that 
provincial council representatives can exert pressure on banks to loan to certain people. 
When most provincial representatives belong to one local faction, it is not hard to 
imagine that the flow of loans from the banks mostly went to the local faction’s 
businesses. It is widely assumed that every provincial council representative has the 
privilege o f borrowing a certain amount of money. One businessman whom I 
interviewed said that “one o f the advantages in putting a provincial representative’s 
name on my company’s board of directors is so that we can then borrow money from the 
banks easily” .
For the civil servants in the bank, as long as the loan is legal and there is support 
from the top, even if the risk is high and the bank’s profit is low, they still have to lend 
out the money, or they run the risk of offending their supervisors. In particular, the local 
financial institutions like the farmers associations or credit cooperatives, which are 
mostly controlled by local political factions, are also abused by local politics, and only 
those people with good relationships with local factions can secure loans from these 
institutions.
Businesses lacking the right ‘political connections’ have to follow the market rules, 
i.e., either their credit is good enough to borrow money from the banks, or they are able 
to find an ‘underground way’ to obtain access to the formal financial market; otherwise 
they have to resort to the financial ‘black’ market.
Demand creates its own supply, as Say said. There were a lot of companies that 
needed a chequing account, or money, but did not have good guanxi with the banks, so 
they needed to ask for a financial broker’s help. It was required to have a person to 
‘introduce’ the company to the bank in order to open a chequing account. It is also a
321common practice for a bank to ask for a guarantor if one wants to borrow money. 
This gives an opportunity for those people familiar with banking practices or who have
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good relationships with banks to become brokers and charge a fee for their service. 
Though this kind o f service is illegal, it has existed for over fifty years.022 For example, a 
few staff from one credit union in Taipei raised some money to run a company to help 
companies that needed deposit certificates in order to apply for a new company 
registration. They charged these companies 0.3% interest rate per day (108% per 
annum).020 Regarding the application for a chequing account, there was a market price: 
in 1982, a check account cost NT$20,000 (US$5 00 ). To delete a bad records for 
bouncing a check cost NT$5,000.324
If a company cannot borrow from a financial institution, either by way of the normal 
process or ‘underground’, it has to resort to a private financial market and pays a higher 
interest rate. It can borrow from four sources in the private financial market: specialised 
private moneylenders, relatives or friends, rotating credit associations, and employees of 
the company .025 The latter three ways o f borrowing money are based on personal guanxi. 
However, even the moneylenders like those in Dihua Street (i&Tb#f) loan to those they 
are familiar with in order to minimise risk. Only a few moneylenders can be called 
‘usury shops’. If we add the cost of engaging with bureaucrats in the public banks, and 
the problems of finding guarantors, collateral, and the tedious application process, the 
cost o f borrowing from the private financial market is not so high as it appears.027
From the above discussion, we see that companies need guanxi to borrow either in 
the official or private financial markets. This sort o f guanxi is not necessarily inevitably a 
Chinese trait, but shaped in certain socio-political formations, and exploited as a means 
to achieve certain goals. Some people can utilise political guanxi and gain lower interest- 
rate loans from the organised financial market. People without political backgrounds 
would utilise personal connections to collect capital. However, we cannot say that 
having guanxi is in itself sufficient to ensure one can borrow money. If one does not 
have a good reputation in business (lacking xinyong), s/he will also find it hard to
321 See Shen Yingming, op.cit., p.15.
322 Ib id: p  16.
323 Ibid.: pp. 16-17.
324 Ib id: p. 17.
325 See Xiao Shengtie ( If 1l$£) , op.cit., p.333.
326 See Shen Yingming, op.cit., p. 12; Yang Yahui and Xiao Xuanyiyi op.cit.,
p.221.
32 See Xiao Shengtie ( if  ) , op.cit., pp.333-336.
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borrow. The Tainan Bang (Tainan business group, % fa % ), a loose coalition of 
enterprises, would not lend money to those businesses which lack good xinyong, even if 
it is an enterprise in its own group.328 If guanxi is based on calculated interests, it can be 
imagined that the so-called Chinese guanxi will evaporate when interests conflict.
3.4 SMEs and Tax Evasion
Although most of my informants have enough working capital for production and 
many of them do not need banks loans, many o f them still borrow money from the 
banks. If well-run companies do not need capital from the banks to reinvest, why do 
they take out loans? The main reason is to evade tax.
Tax evasion is widespread among SMEs. One informant said that in 1987, the 
government scrutinised the tax files of ten publishing companies in the Tainan area, and 
‘of course every company was found to be guilty o f tax evasion’. He himself was fined 
about US$20,000. After the ‘tax shock’, he began to borrow money from banks to 
prove that he has difficulty in his finances and needs financial support from banks. He 
told me confidently that ‘if they come to check for tax evasion again, they will never 
find any clue’. Another informant invested in a hotel. A provincial representative and a 
county representative also have shares in the investment. ‘To invite them to join the 
investment will make it easy to get loans from the banks, and the purpose of borrowing 
money is not lack o f capital, but to evade tax’.
How is this done? According to a report of the Taxation Office, the most common 
way is to claim less income than one actually earns in one’s income tax statement; this 
accounted for 58% of the illegal cases found in 1982729 The methods include: the 
owner do not issue sales invoices (22%), do not report general income (15%), do not 
report business income (15%), and do not report commission income (5%). There are 
at least two accounting practices used to evade issuing a sales invoice: first, when the 
company gets cash income, it is put in one’s pocket, and the company reports a higher 
quantity of sales and a lower unit price when it issues invoices; second, to adjust the
328 See Shen Yingming, op.cit., p.12.
329 See Xu Zhimin ( RJ,  Zhongxiao Oiye Jianquan Kuaiji Zhidu yu Fangzhi Taoloushui zhi 
Yanjiu (  i7 ’ Studies on SMEs' Accounting System and 
the Prevention o f Tax Evasion) (Taipei: unpublished Master thesis, Graduate School of Accounting, 
Soochow University, 1986), p.35.
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accounting for short-term borrowings, accounts receivable and deposits received from 
shareholders to hide the sales income.^30 Table 3.3 shows that about 15% of SMEs’ 
liabilities and stockholders’ equity are from private borrowing. This percentage is much 
higher than the big firms’ 3.1%. We also noted that most private borrowing in SMEs is 
through the deposits received from shareholders. This accounting practice explains 
why a lot of SMEs borrow money from the private financial market, i.e., tax evasion. 
For example, if a firm has sales of ten dollars, the company can credit ten dollars cash 
and debit ten dollars in the item of ‘borrowing from shareholders’ so that
there is no transaction of the sales, and in future, the company can borrow ten dollars 
from a bank, and use the money to pay back the shareholders plus interest. When this 
step is reached, the money is successfully laundered.
Another common way to evade tax is to inflate the costs and expenditures so that 
one shows no profit. This comprised 17% of the reported tax evasion cases by the 
Taxation Office in 1982. One common practice in the old days was to buy invoices 
from a ‘paper company’ (rentou gongsi, A  s i  °]) as proof of expenditures, while in
fact there is no transaction at all. It is very easy to set up a company, that some actually 
set up many such companies, then sell invoices to other companies so they can evade 
tax. After one or two years, the paper companies will close, and the person sets up 
another one to continue this activity. In these ways, the company can report a lot of 
costs which in fact it never incurs. For example, a company produces a product at a 
cost of 100, and sells it at the price of 120. In the normal case, it has to pay a profit tax. 
But instead buys phoney invoices to inflate the cost to 140. Thus it has to borrow 20 
from a bank to cover the extra 20 in costs (140 minus 120). In the next year, if the cost 
and price of the product is unchanged, the company would make another 20 profit, 
which would be used to pay back the bank. So in these two years, the company 
accounts would show no profit at all on par value, but in fact have 40 in profits. 
Another way is that private expenditure is debited as company expenditure; and a third 
way is to give shareholders cheques and debit them as business expenditures. All these 
practices can inflate costs and transfer profits to shareholders.
How do they hide their money after they get the cash? The most common way is
330 Ibid.: pp.37-38.
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to put the money in family members’ bank accounts. Another way is to buy bearer 
bonds, then transfer the bonds to family members. One does not have to show any 
identification certificate to cash the bearer bonds, so this method has become popular 
among businesspeople. ^ 2 In recent years, an increasingly popular way is to open an 
account in Switzerland and to launder money through underground financial 
intermediaries, like the jewellery shops on Hengyang street in Taipei. One
informant told me that his family is in Canada, and all his money is remitted from 
Taiwan via Swiss banks to Canada. Another way is to set up a company overseas, and 
make nominal purchases, then transfer the money to the overseas company, though 
there is no real transaction has occurred between the two companies at all.
3.5 The New Banks’ Competition and Dereeulation of Financial Markets
In 1992, the prohibition on setting up new banks was removed and eleven new 
banks were approved. Did this kind of deregulation improve the efficiency o f the 
financial market and undermine the material base of KMT rule? On the one hand, we 
could say that with competition the financial institutions controlled by the government 
will improve their efficiency and abandon those politicised operations that violate 
market principles. However, Taiwan’s polity has been transformed from authoritarian 
to ‘populist authoritarian’, which means ‘the state centralises and uses power in an 
authoritarian way in the name of the common weal to legitimise its rule, but at the 
same time it intends to disregard the formal constitutional framework’.33^  The state 
allows private big companies to conduct highly profitable business, and forms a new
j
coalition with them in the name of the common weal. Before the lifting of martial law, 
this kind of coalition had no legitimacy, for the KMT-controlled government did not 
acquire any legitimacy from the votes. But after 1992, the government is elected, and 
its coalition with big business is legitimised by this democratic voting system.334 The 
new banks are all controlled by big companies (see Table 3.5), and their relationships 
with the government and local factions reinforce political power in the financial system.
331 See Xu Zhimin ( & &  ) , op.cit., p.35.
332 This story is heard from a friend who tried to evade huge taxation from the Taxation Office.
333 See The Editorial Board, ‘A New State or A New Society: On the Present Situation and the Radical
Alternatives’ ( — ) , in Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly
in Social Studies, no 20 (August, 1995), p. 6.
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Table 3.5 The Background of Newly Established Banks (1991)
Name Chairman Main Investor Background
Daan
* *
Lu Runkang Yimei et al.
k h
A ll investors are Taiwan's top 
100 Business Groups
Wantai Xu Shengfa Yulong
?§•!«:
4
Yuandong Xu Youxiang
fäihß-
Yuandong
4 *
5
Yatai
& &
Qiu Jiaxiong Erming investing Co., et. al. Big companies
Zhongxing
t *
Wang Yuyun 
l i t
Huarong 12
Wantong
« Ü
Wu Zunxian Tainan Business Group
a
3
Yushan
Sub
Lin Zhongxiong Faihuo et. al. Big companies
Lianbang Li Jingcun Lianbang Business Group the biggest land 
speculating group in 
Taiwan
Huaxin Lin Lixin KMT et. al. 
* • £ * *
KMT
Baodao
f  %
Chen Chongguang Yimei et. al. Big companies
Fubang Cai Wancai Cathay 2
Zhonghua
t #
Wang Youzeng 
i X f
Liba 20
Huanya
i t S
Xie Rendong Changyi Big Real Estate Co.
Taixin Wu Dongliang Xinguang 6
Source: Yan Jimbao Taiwan Diqu Yinhang Fazhan 40nian (£/%bkHk4tLfr&M. •
The Development o f Banks in Taiwan Area), (Taipei: Zhonghua Zhengxinsuo, 1991), pp.404- 
405.
Notes:
1. The number in the background column means the ranking of the investing business group in 
1985 ranked by Zhonghua Zhengxinsuo.
2. The meaning of big companies is my own judgement based on their fame in Taiwan.
Nominally the Land Bank of Taiwan and the Chiao-tung Bank were privatised in 
1996, as the government sold a portion of its shares on the market so that it holds less 
than fifty percent of the shares. Three commercial banks (Hua-nan, Chang-hwa and the 
First Commercial Banks) were approved to be privatised in September 1997. In the
Ibid.: p. 8. 128
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near future the government will continue to privatise other public banks. Though the 
government’s holdings are under 50%, it will still dominate these banks, and it will be 
able to exert pressure on them to follow its policies/35
These privatised and to-be-privatised banks will still be the most important actors 
in the financial market, but they will have another new role to play by, i.e., to be the 
final guarantor of the other private financial institutions. This means that they have a 
political errand to stabilise the financial system. Whenever an institution faces default, 
especially one of the local faction-controlled credit unions or farmer’s associations, 
these banks will step in to lend it a hand.
This phenomenon was already evident in 1995, when a lot o f local faction- 
controlled credit unions and farmers’ associations ran into trouble, and the public banks 
had to ‘clear all the bad debts’. Obviously the cost is paid by the taxpayers. Though 
most local financial institutions joined the central deposit insurance company after a 
series o f financial crises, the risk premium that the insurance company charges is only 
0.01% of total deposits, the lowest rate in the world. The company can offer such a 
low rate because its main shareholders are the Central Bank and the Ministry of 
Finance (over 99%), and most of its revenue derives from the interest on its equity of 
10 billion Taiwan dollars. The government pays the insurance cost, and local factions 
gain the profits. This sort o f design illustrates what James O ’Connor notes: the basic 
contradiction o f capitalism is the privatisation o f profits and the socialisation of
. 336costs.
Those SMEs which could not borrow money from the old banks'^7 are able to 
borrow money from the new banks to a certain degree, but there are limitations. 
Usually the new banks will supply capital first to their guanxi qiye ( f t h e  
enterprises with which they have guanxi. If, after satisfying the needs of these 
customers, they still have capital to lend, businesspeople who would otherwise have to 
borrow money from the private market get access to loans. Since the end of the bubble 
economy in 1991, savings have been much higher than investment, and the new banks
3j5 Up to now, these privatised public banks are still regarded as state-owned for the people in charge 
of these banks are civil servants and their names are still put in the ‘address book of Executive Yuan 
and its Offices’.
336 See James O’ Connor, The Fiscal Crisis o f  the State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), pp.1-10.
337 ‘New banks’ refers to the banks set up after 1992, and the others are called ‘old banks’.
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have begun to loan out their excess savings to those SMEs which still heavily rely on 
the private market. This is the positive effect of competition. According to financial 
statistics, up to the end of 1997 the share of the new banks’ loans to SMEs was 8.1% 
of total loans from all commercial banks, increased from 5.5% in 1994.^8 One 
interviewed manager in a public bank said that the increase o f loans to SMEs from the 
new banks comes mainly from the marginal customers of the old banks, which do not 
want to lend money to these SMEs because of the high unit cost.
However, by the end o f 1997, the average percentage o f loans to SMEs from 
commercial banks was 31.1%, and only two (Wantong and Baodao Commercial Banks) 
out o f the seventeen newly established banks exceeded this percentage. Most of them 
lent out only 20% of their total loans to SMEs. In other words, most o f the loans of 
these new banks go to big firms. The low share o f loans to SMEs is partly due to the 
high unit cost o f loaning to SMEs, and partly due to the new banks reluctance to join 
the ‘Foundation of Guaranteeing SMEs’ Credit’ which is
guaranteed by a government fund to lend out money to SMEs, according to an official 
at the Bureau of Monetary Affairs whom I interviewed.
Whenever the central bank reduces money supply and tightens the loans, it 
becomes hard for those marginal SMEs to borrow money from the new banks. In 
August 1995, an informant who usually obtains his capital from the private market, to 
which he has to pay 20% to 25% in annual interest rates, was informed by a newly 
established bank that he could borrow at the bank rate, which is never over 15%. But 
the financial crises of the credit unions and the following chain effect on farmers’ 
associations made the new bank unable to give him any new loans, for the central bank 
tightened the money supply in response to the crisis.
Another influence of the new banks relates to the rise of interest rates in the private 
borrowing market. The ratio of the prime interest rate to the private borrowing rate 
was 2.5 in 1990, which increased to 2.8 in 1991, and 3.0 in 1992. After 1992, the ratio
338 Calculated from Jingjibu Zhongxiao Qiyechu (1995), op. cit., p. 129, Table 4-2-2; Statistics Office, 
Bureau of Monetary Affairs, MOF (March 1998), op. cit., pp. 18-22, Table 6.
339 See Finance Bureau, the Ministry of Finance, Jinrong Yewu Tongji Jiyao (i t f i i  tfM  #  ’A 
Summary Report on Financial Statistics) (Taipei: the Ministry of Finance, 1996). Cited from the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, 84 Nian dui Zhongxiao Oiye Fudao Gaikuang Baogao (R
Report on the Assistance Policy to SMEs in 1995) (Taipei: unpublished
paper), p.86, Table 1.
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remained at 3.3 without change040: in other words, the dual market is again restored to 
equilibrium. The establishment of new banks inevitably absorbs some capital in the 
private market, which reduces the supply of funds in the private market. So the ratio of 
prime interest rate and private market interest rate was raised, i.e., the interest rate in 
the private market is relatively high to attract more capital.
A new trend after the financial deregulation is that some land and stock speculators 
have begun to buy a milk cow, i.e., to buy a bank. They buy the shares of some 
financial institutions in the stock market so as control the operation of the bank. They 
then can influence the loan policy, and secure loans from their own bank to finance 
their speculations, especially in 1995, when most of their capital was trapped in 
sluggish land and stock markets. The most well-known such scandal is the case of the 
Overseas Chinese Commercial Bank, which was controlled by Liang Boxun ( ^  #3 
% ) . Before he became the chairman of the board o f the Overseas Chinese 
Commercial Bank, most of his loans were from certain public banks, where he used his 
power (mainly through his connections with the Provincial Governor James Soong, 
Ä3&) to promote certain persons to key posts in the banks. After gaining control of 
the Overseas Chinese Commercial Bank, he loaned his guanxi companies NT$3.5 
billion (US$140 million) from June to the end of November, 1995. Most of the loans 
up to the end of 1995 became bad debts.041 Another case is the Taidong Small and 
Medium Business Bank, which was controlled by You Huaiyin He lent out
money to his several companies, which in turn put the money in his account in a 
commercial bank, which was his ‘money laundry bank’.342 More such potential cases 
could explode if this kind o f ‘privatisation of public interests’ continues.
The contradiction o f ‘privatisation of profits and socialisation o f costs’ is rooted in 
Taiwan’s specific political economy, i.e., the capitalist market and the populist 
authoritarian state. In a capitalist market, a badly-run company will be driven out of the 
market; however, if political force intervenes for political reasons, an uncompetitive
340 Calculated from Taiwan Huobi yu Jinrong Lunwenji ( a  3cS) (Taipei: Lianjing
Chuban Shiye, 1975), p.5, Table 4-2; Zhonghua Minguo Taiwan Diqu Yinhang Jinrong Tongji Yuebao 
( f  I f  IF] £  -jtM.&i t f f j M,  Financial Statistics Monthly, Taiwan District, the Republic o f
China) (Taipei: Economic Research Development, the Central Bank of China), from different years 
publications.
341 See China Times, China Evening Times, 08, 09 January, 1996, p.3.
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company can survive. Local faction-controlled financial institutions provide one 
example. The ruling party knows quite well that local factions are their bases to win 
votes in elections; however, the fall o f any financial institution would cause more harm 
to its rule. At the moment, the ruling party tries to introduce market principles in the 
financial market, and hopes to reform these institutions step by step so that badly run 
credit unions or farmers associations could strengthen their competitiveness in the 
market. For example, it allows credit unions to change to commercial banks if the 
operations are well. By this way, the ruling party can still gain support o f local factions, 
and at the same time prevent any criticism of bad management in the financial 
market.343
3.6 Conclusion
Contrary to most scholars’ argument that SMEs need financial help from the 
government, an SME usually needs help only in its initial stage. Secondly, we found that 
the most common way to collect enough capital to establish a business is to use one’s 
social relations: borrowing from family members and relatives, rotating credit 
associations and dowries, or cooperating with friends to form a partnership enterprise. 
However, this latter type of organisation usually does not last very long due to conflicts, 
including family firms organised by brothers or relatives. We found that a partnership 
company cannot survive long unless it is strongly led by one leader in a family, or mutual 
profit-sharing between partners. This type of business is initiated by personal guanxi, but 
usually ends in conflicts o f  interest. There is, again, always a tension between the profit- 
maximisation principle and the guanxi principle.
In this chapter, we have also examined the flow of working capital to small and 
medium-sized private enterprises. The source of capital consists of two parts, i.e., capital 
from the official financial market and private market. Compared to big companies, the 
capital source of SMEs from retained earnings and direct financing is much lower, while 
from trade credit and enterprises and households, which is regarded as the private 
market, it is much higher. A high percentage of SMEs using trade credit as financial
342 This is heard from a friend working on the case.
343 See Bureau of Monetary Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, The ROC Financial System and Policy
(4% (Taipei: Bureau of Monetary Affairs, 1996), pp.62-63.
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leverage due to the business practices shaped by the legal system (Bills Law). The reason 
why SMEs borrow a lot o f money from enterprises and households is to evade tax. Since 
the share of loans to SMEs is equivalent to their shares of sales, and the percentage of 
total capital from financial institutions in total liabilities is almost the same as big firms, 
and least but not the last, since most private borrowings by SMEs is the item ‘deposits 
received from shareholders’, who want to earn higher interest and evade tax, we 
strongly doubt the claim made by many scholars that SMEs lack capital and so have to 
resort to the private market.
This kind of financial market is a mixed product of historical development, political 
control and market mechanism. It makes it hard for financial institutions to operate 
based on the profit-maximisation principle, and it reinforces the use o f guanxi to get 
loans. Local political figures play a prominent role in mediating between money 
borrowers and money lenders.
Working capital is not a problem for those SMEs that are run well because they 
could use diverse financial tools to get credit: borrowing from shareholders, extension of 
trade credit, discounting their notes receivable or letters o f credit. We found, instead, 
that SMEs want to borrow more money from the financial institutions so that they can 
evade tax. The government has implemented policies to supply more funds to SMEs, but 
obviously it created some space for them to exploit the system to maximise their self- 
interest.
Deregulation leaves more room for big firms to expand their territory into the 
financial markets. SMEs could benefit from deregulation to a certain degree, but those 
SMEs borrowing on the private market could not share the benefits. They even suffer 
from the crowding out effect in the financial market caused by the rising demand for 
capital.
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Chapter 4: Marketing Management
4.0 Introduction
One popular image of the proprietors of Taiwan’s SMEs is that they bring a suitcase, 
go overseas, attend an exhibition or visit customers, and try to persuade foreign buyers to 
put in an order. This image raises interesting questions: why do they go overseas to sell? 
How do they get in touch with the buyers? How do they market their products?
In this chapter, we will discuss where the markets are for SMEs’ products, and why 
a certain kind of market distribution prevails. We will incorporate power relationships into 
our analysis to understand the use of guanxi and personal interactions in pursuit of profits 
in the business community. Different methods to sell products will be probed, and we will 
examine the interaction of social relations and market relations and discuss the function of 
price competition and its possible influence on personal interactions.
Two theories, social embeddedness theory and transaction theory, will be broached 
in my discussion, centring on the concept of guanxi. Social embeddedness theory tries to 
probe the bases of long-term relationships— e.g., mutual trust and guanxi. However, as 
shall be seen, it cannot explain the disintegration of long-term relationships caused by 
market competition. Nor, as shall also be seen, can transaction theory explain adequately 
change and development in a relationship, for the theory is static and ^-historical. First, 
however, in order to put our discussion into context, let us examine how Taiwan’s SMEs 
have fared in the market at a macro -economic level.
4.1 Outlets for SME Products
Figure 4.1 shows the contribution of SMEs to Taiwan’s exports. The first thing to 
note is that the SMEs contribute more to sales in overseas markets than do big firms. 
However, after 1987, the year the New Taiwan Dollar started to appreciate, the SMEs’ 
share began to decline, from 65.5% in 1987 to 50.6% in 1994. In 1996, the top 150 
exporters mainly consisted o f big electronics firms, comprising 32.7% of total exports.344
j44 See Board of Foreign Trade (§1 i -^ W Woguo qian 150da Chukou Maoyishangyu Chukou Diqu, 
Chanpin Fenxi (Analysis o f the Top 150 Exporters by Areas and Products, 4$ $  150 X  & f? 3
i f  a  Mb Ek ' Ä  A  fpfif) (Taipei: Board of Foreign Trade, 1997), unpublished paper. The data is from the
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Yet the SMEs’ share in Taiwan in the export market remains important as compared to 
Japan or Korea, where the top ten Zaibatsu or Chaebol handle more than a quarter of 
national trade.345
Figure 4.1 Share of SMEs and Big Firms in Export Markets, 1982-94
unit: %
T *77*rr4
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&  <S> cS? dSbb &  c #  dS?~3° s5V ^  ^  &  -a
— ♦ — SMEs 
- - -A- - - Big Firms
Source: Jingjibu ($&.#$■■£(* » Ministry of Economic Affairs), Zhonghuaminguo Bashisi nian Zhongxiao 
Qiye Baipishu ( i70 &  1 $ U 9 i * ' h i t Z i  £  ’ White Paper on Small and Medium­
sized Enterprises in the Republic o f  China, 1995) (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1996), 
p.48, Table 2-1-5.
The share of SMEs’ sales is about one third of total sales, so we can use a simple way 
to calculate their share of exports in total sales (see Figure 4.2). In 1987, the overseas 
market absorbed about 77% of the SMEs’ production, and the percentage declined 
gradually to 46% in 1994. The overseas market is not so significant for big firms, 
comprising a quarter to one-fifth o f their total sales. Yet the SMEs’ target market has 
changed notably, i.e., from overseas to domestic markets. Too, the SMEs’ importance in 
the economy is declining, especially in the manufacturing sector, decreasing from 47% in 
1986 to 37% in 1994.346
computerised import-export magnetic tape recording every company’s capital, import and export products, 
value, unit price, destination. The top 150 exporters were selected as the analysis target, which is grouped 
as ‘big firms’, and the other companies are grouped as ‘SMEs’. The definition is different from the 
definition of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, however, it tells something about Taiwan’s export market 
at the enterprise level, which was never analysed before.
345 See ITC, Survey o f  China ’s Foreign Trade—An analysis o f  China ’s export and import data at the 
enterprise level (Geneva: International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO, 1995), p.15.
346 See Jingjibu (£f.i#-£ß * Ministry of Economic Affairs), Zhonghuaminguo Bashisi nian Zhongxiao Qiye
Baipishu ( f  ^  R, - f  z s f -  f  ’ White Paper on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in
the Republic o f  China, 1995) (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1995), p.372, Table 3-1.
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To sum up, the domestic market is dominated by big firms, and the overseas market 
used to be the SMEs’ arena, but gradually they have been overtaken by big firms. The big 
firms’ power in the national economy is getting stronger.
Figure 4.2 The Share of Exports in SMEs’ and Big Firms’ Total Sales, 1987-94 unit: %
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
M SMEs' Share in Total 
Sales
A Share of Export in 
SMEs' sales
— Share of Export in Big 
firms' sales
Source: Jingjibu ’ Ministry of Economic Affairs), Zhonghuaminguo Bashisi nian Zhongxiao Oiye
Baipishu ( p  0  ßi M ^  f  0  P f ' ßt ßf  & ßßüf • White Paper on Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises in the Republic o f China, 1995) (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1996), p.48, 
Table 2-1-5; p.372, Table 3-1; XingzhengyuanZhujichu t f  &  » Directorate-General of
Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan), Zhonghua Minguo Taiwan Diqu Guomin 
Jingji Dongxiang Tongji Jibao ( p  0  R  MU gj f Mbßk & t f ^ M  ’ Quarterly 
National Economic Trends, Taiwan Area, the Republic o f China, 1997), p.3, Table “Expenditures 
on GDP”.
4.1.1 Historical Factors Affecting the Market Structures
Manufacturing and commerce are the two main industries in Taiwan. Their sales 
comprised, respectively, 45.3% and 35.8% of total sales in 1986. By 1994, however, the 
share of manufacturing was reduced to 32.9%, while commerce increased to 3 8.4%.347 In 
short, the relative importance of manufacturing industry is declining, and that of commerce 
is rising.
Though the SMEs have experienced similar economic structural changes in the 
manufacturing industry, their decline is faster. In 1986, the share of manufacturing sales in 
total SMEs’ sales was 53.3%, which was reduced to 37.8% in 1994. For commerce, the 
share declined by only 1%, i.e., 35.4% in 1994 compared to 36.4% in 1986. The share
Ibid: p. 372, Table 3-1.
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commanded by the construction industry gained during the period, from 2.9% to 17.1%, 
thanks to rising land prices after 1988.348
The SMEs’ share of Taiwan’s total commercial sales declined from 41% to 30% in 
this period, as the big firms expanded their operations in commerce. The above figures 
match the general picture outlined above: i.e., the big firms’ influence has strengthened 
both in the domestic and overseas market in the past ten years.
Before the policy of economic ‘internationalisation and liberalisation’ in 1987,349 the 
domestic market was protected, and certain industries benefited a lot from this 
protectionist policy. The development of textile capital in the 1950s is a well-known 
case .350 Most o f the present big business groups, including Yue Long (*§>£!■), Far Eastern 
( Jiaxin Cement ( &  7Jc 7 ü), Pacific ( A - f  - %  #£), Tainan ( £  %  ),
Xinguang (#f 7E), and Tunex ( i .  •$•-£■), accumulated their initial capital in the 1950s with 
the help of an industrial policy to protect ‘infant industry’ .351 It was the same in the 
petrochemical and cement industries: e.g., Formosa Plastics ( £  $g), Huaxia Haiwan (4 | j[  
'# '% ), Qimei Changchun ( -^ 4 0 , Taiwan Cement (£$L ), and Dongnan Cement
( iHifc* ^ ) . 352
The textile industry policy illustrates the protectionist policy which helped the big 
firms to dominate the domestic market. Shanghai textile capital had begun to flee with the 
Nationalist Party before the Communists took over the mainland in 1949. One informant 
relates that the Taiyuan Textile Company ( £  tL), a major company in the Yue Long 
business group, had already utilised US aid funds to ship machinery to Taiwan when the
348 The sudden increase of construction industry in the share of total sales is partly caused by the new 
calculation method by the Ministry of Economic Affairs after 1990. See Ministry of Economic Affairs, op. 
cit., p. 372, note.
349 See Board of Foreign Trade, Foreign Trade Development o f  the Republic o f  China, 1995 (Taipei: Board 
of Foreign Trade, 1996), p.7.
350 See Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, New York/London: M. E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 1986), Chapter 5; Huang Dongzhi ( ^ ^ ^ . ) ,  ‘Taiwan zhi Fangzhi Gongye’
% ’ Taiwan’s Textiles Industry), Taiwan YinhangJikan ( a T^f'J ’ Taiwan Bank Quarterly), vol. 7, 
no. 1, pp. 10-11, 33; Lin Bangchong ( # . #  £ ) ,  ‘Taiwan Mianfangzhi Gongye Fazhan zhi Yanjiu” (&
% ’ Research on Taiwan Textiles Industry), Taiwan Bank Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 2, 
pp. 102-103; Liu Jinqing( <£'] ), Sengo Taiwan Keizai Bunseki (Analysis o f  Post-war Taiwan Economy)
(Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Press, 1975), pp.213-233; Wang Hongzen ( i ^ f -  ) , Zhanhou Taiwan 
Siren Duzhan Ziben zhi Fazhan ’ The Development o f  Private Monopoly
Capital in Post-war Taiwan) (Taipei: unpublished Masters thesis, 1988), pp. 25-33.
351 See Hongzen Wang, Ibid: pp. 25-29.
352 Ibid: pp. 34-47.
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United States still supported the Nationalist government in the civil war. The production 
capacity of the textile sector rapidly expanded after the Nationalist government retreated 
to Taiwan in 1949, and most new companies were from mainland China. Even after the 
amalgamation of native Taiwanese textile capital after 1954 into the Tainan Textile 
Company, the production capacity of thirteen Mainlander firms still comprised over two- 
thirds o f the total textile production as of the end of 1962.353
After the outbreak of the Korean War the United States resumed her military and 
economic aid to the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Cotton was one of the most 
important materials for aiding the Taiwan economy. From 1951 to 1959 the total value of 
US aid cotton was $139 million, about 16% of total economic aid.354 All the raw materials 
were rationed according to every firm's production capacity by the Economic Stabilisation 
Board.
How much benefit could one get for each bundle (470 pounds) o f rationed cotton? 
The official price was NT$4,150, but the black market price was triple that, i.e., 
NT$ 13,000, and the finished product could be sold for up to NT$26,000, meaning that if 
one could get one bundle of rationed cotton, one could earn over two million per month. 
The average income in 1953 was only NT$7,722 per household per year (see Table 4.1). 
The price of farmland was about NT$20,000 per Jia ( ¥  ).355
The big companies not only benefited from the supply of raw materials, they also got 
the lion’s share of US financed loans. One informant complained that the hand-weaving 
firms could not borrow any money from the government at all, let alone get US AID loans: 
‘According to the local reports, most large private companies got help from US AID, but 
only a little reached the hands of smaller private firms’ .356 As Thomas Gold has pointed out, 
‘Although officially anyone could apply for AID allotments, in practice mainlanders had an 
inside track, being familiar with procedures and having friends or relatives in the 
bureaucracy’ .357 Another reason why most of the funds flowed to the large companies was
353 See Shi Minxiong (aM&ifc) and Zhang Wenbo ‘Taiwan de Fangzhi Gongye’
» Taiwan’s Textiles Industry), Industry o f  Free China, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 2-11.
354 Calculated from Liu Jinqing, Ibid., pp.220, 372.
35‘ One j ia  is about one hectare.
356 See Arthur F. Raper, Taiwan zhi Chengshi yu Gongye ( j f  » Urban and Industrial
Taiwan—Crowded and Resourceful) (Taipei: U.S. Mutual Security Mission to China and National Taiwan 
University, 1954), p.49.
357 See Thomas Gold, op. cit., p. 70.
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the Nationalist Party’s policies. Some scholars have argued that the Nationalists preferred 
the development of small and medium-sized enterprises instead o f large corporations 
because they wanted to prevent the emergence of ‘corporate capitalism’ on the one hand, 
and to create an ‘unspoken alliance’ on the other.3:18 But the leading industrial sectors in the 
first half of the 1950s were cement, textiles and plastics, and they were also the key planned 
industries in the Nationalists’ First Four-Year Economic Plan.359 Only big companies had 
sufficient capital to operate in these industries. It is erroneous to say that the Nationalists 
preferred small and medium-sized enterprises from the very beginning. In 1954, a year of 
throat-cut competition and mergers between textile firms, Yin Zhongrong declared at a 
meeting that ‘the government should encourage large firms to expand, to merge small firms. 
It is a natural tendency to perfect industrial development. From small to big, from many to 
few, the government can easily regulate the firms’.360 Another policy maker said that ‘in the 
past few years, the government only paid attention to the development of some key 
industries and ignored the potential contributions of small and medium-sized enterprises 
for economic development’.361
After 1953, the price of clothes and yams dropped under the average weighted price 
and some firms were knocked out of the market.362 To solve the problem of market 
saturation and encourage large firms to export, the government subsidised the big firms 
NT$6 per US dollar of products that they exported.363 This delayed the pace of 
centralisation o f textile capital, but in the economic recession of 1957-58, this occurred 
nonetheless.
358 See Hill Gates, ‘Small Fortunes: Class and Society in Taiwan’, in Dennis Fred Simon and Michael Y. 
M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Inc), pp. 169-185. 
j59 See Zhang Guowei (5k?k&)), Taiwan Jingji Fazhan ( ’ Economic Development in
Taiwan) (Taipei: Zhengzhong Publishing Co., 1967), p. 257, 786-795.
360 See Yin Zhongrong, Wo Dui Taiwan Jingji de Kanfa (& M  o 'My Opinion o f the Taiwan 
Economy) (Taipei: Self-Publishing, 1954), p. 30.
361 See Zhao Jichang (^fg& § ) , Geguo Zhongxiao Qiye Fuzhi Cuoshi yu Women Nuli de Fangxiang (-&-
® 4* 4' 4Mf"3 » SMEs support policies in other countries and what we should
do), p . l l ,  in Zhao Jichang (ed.), Geguo Zhongxiao Qiye Fudao Cuoshi (fEffl SMEs
Support Policies in Other Countries) (Taipei: Guoji Jingji Ziliao Zhongxin, 1965), pp.1-14.
362 See Huang Dongzhi, op. cit., p. 30.
36j See Lin Bangchong, op. cit.
140
Chapter 4 Marketing Management
Table 4.1 Household Income Distribution, 1953
unit: NTS, %
Household
Income
Percentage of 
Household
Cumulative
Percentage
Percentage of 
Total Income
Cumulative
Income
1,600 23 23 3.5 3.5
5,010 37.9 60.9 17.3 20.8
9,000 14.6 75.5 12.2 33.0
13,000 8.1 83.6 10 43.0
18,000 5.5 89.1 9.3 52.3
24,000 3.6 92.7 8.3 60.6
31,000 2.6 95.3 7.7 68.3
42,000 1.9 97.2 7.6 75.9
59,000 1.2 98.4 6.9 82.8
85,000 0.8 99.2 6.5 89.3
120,000 0.5 99.7 5.9 95.2
145,000 0.3 100 4.8 100.0
Source: See Zhang Guowei (5&^. J^), ‘Minguo Sishier Nian Taiwan Geren Suode Fenpei zhi Guji’ E3
’ Estimation ofTaiwan Income Distribution in 1953), in'1 Zhang 
Guowei Jiaoshou Taiwan Jingji Lunwenji’ M ’ Essays on Taiwan
Economy from Professor Zhang Guo-wei) (Taipei: Chinese Cultural College, 1980), pp. 45-85.
From July 1957 to June 1958, about two hundred companies went into bankruptcy. 
It was widely believed that heavy taxes, usury, a reduced supply of credit and a limited 
domestic market were to blame.364 To find an outlet for surplus capital, large firms began to 
dump their products in the domestic market. One informant said that “the large firms’ 
technology was at least ten years more advanced than ours and the quality of their products 
was much better than the small firms so that no small firm could survive if the large firms 
began to have a price war” . The informant’s wife added that during that period, as 
competitive pressures began to squeeze out small firms, she had to carry clothes from their 
own firm to sell in the streets, just like a street peddler. The market share of the large firms 
jumped from 50% to 90%.
The problem that textile capital faced was no longer technology, finance or taxes, but 
the market. Other industries had the same problem. For example, the cement industry had 
to export 18.5% of its total production after 1957 because of over-capacity.365 Since the 
domestic market was saturated, the only outlet for surplus capital was to export. But the
364 See Liu Jinqing, op. cit., p. 250.
36~ See Jiang Jingyi ($?-#—), ‘Taiwan zhi Shuini Gongye’ ( £  #  ’Taiwan’s Cement Industry),
in Bank ofTaiwan (ed.), Taiwan zhi Gongye Lunwen Jijuan 2 ( £  ’ Essays on Taiwan
Industries, no. 2) (Taipei: Bank ofTaiwan, 1958), p. 48.
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foreign exchange rate system ‘punished’ exporting firms. For example, in June 1957, a firm 
that exported US$1 of products could receive in exchange NT$28.99, while the black 
market price for one US dollar was NT$38.58, so whenever one US dollar of goods was 
exported, the firm was denied about 10 yuan of earnings, i.e., one-third of the export 
income.366
Between 1958 and 1963, the government initiated several reforms to correct the 
price distortions so as to create a congenial environment for exports. Starting in 1958 the 
Nationalist government reformed its dual foreign exchange rates system gradually, and 
reached a single exchange rate in September 1963.367 The reform created an environment 
for exports and opened a new era for Taiwan’s economic development.368 It enabled a lot 
of SMEs to prosper in the years of an expanding international economy in the 1960s. In 
1972, the share of the overseas market in SMEs’ sales was 56%.369 The figure increased 
steadily to a peak o f 69% in 1987, and then declined gradually. However, the government 
did not really want to deregulate the market and ease restrictions on imports. It relied 
increasingly on tariffs instead of quotas to protect the domestic market Especially the level 
of protection for most intermediate and capital goods remained high throughout the 1960s 
to 1980s.370 Because the big firms had power over the domestic market, this kind of 
import-restriction policy left the domestic market untouched, and the dual market 
structure was more firmly established, i.e., the big firms dominated the domestic market, 
and the SMEs specialised in the export market.
Different factors facilitated Taiwan exports of all kinds of low-skill products to the 
US: the General Special Preference Customs System, which gives less developed countries 
special customs preferences; increasing domestic consumption stimulated by USA 
government fiscal policy; American multinationals in Asia exporting products back to the 
US for their mother companies (i.e., intra-firm trade increased); the diversified taste of 
American domestic consumption for different levels of goods; and the trade disputes
366 See Samuel P. S. Ho, Economic development o f Taiwan, 1860-1970 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1978), p. 395, Table A66. The table charts the detailed changes in official exchange rates.
367 Ibid: pp. 195-196.
368 See Liu Jinqing, op. cit., p. 247.
369 See MOEA, Zhongxiao Qiye ShichangXingxiao zhi Yanjiu ( f  d' iE S  f  £  ’ Studies on
SMEs’ Marketing Management) (Taipei: MOEA, 1992), p.16, Table 2-8.
370 See Samuel Ho, op. cit., p. 196.
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between Japan and the US opened niches for products that Japan could not export.371
4.1.2 Emerging International Factors Changing the Market Structures in the 1980s
This market structure remained unchanged until the impact of international economic 
forces emerging from the globalisation trend in the 1980s. Before 1986, the trade pattern 
was to import basic components from Japan, assemble products in Taiwan, and then export 
them to the US.372 The expanding exports to the US market enabled Taiwan to accumulate 
huge foreign reserves in the first half of the 1980s (see Figure 4.3), but the value of the 
Taiwan dollar did not change at all, which means that it was undervalued.373
In 1985, the G5 countries agreed to let the US dollar depreciate against other main 
currencies.374 In 1986, the US began to put pressure on Taiwan to appreciate the Taiwan 
dollar in the name of fair trade. The exchange rate was changed from 1:40 to 1:28 in two 
years, which means that the cost calculations based on the old exchange rate increased 
42.8% in terms of the Taiwan dollar. It drove many SMEs out of the market. Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 show that the SMEs no more were a major player in the export market. On the 
other hand, the pressure from the US to open Taiwan’s domestic market and to reduce 
custom tarrifs, plus the increased purchasing power of the New Taiwan Dollar due to the 
depreciation o f the US dollar, led to significantly increased imports, (see Figure 4.3). This 
also made it more difficult for SMEs to compete in the domestic market.
At the same time, the huge accumulated foreign reserves were converted into an 
increased money supply, and with the cost of manufactured products rising on export 
markets, there was no incentive to invest the money in manufacturing industry. Almost all 
of the money flowed into speculative business, i.e., land speculation, the stock market and 
the underground financial market, which produced a bubble economy. Land prices rose 
sky-high. This bubble economy reached a peak in 1990, and afterwards land and stock
371 See Akira Suehiro, Ajia Kougyouka no Dainamizumu (The Dynamics of Asian Industrialisation), in 
Akira Kudo (ed.), Nijisseiki Shihonshyugi II (Twentieth-Centuiy Capitalism II) (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1995), pp. 172-176.
J 2 The trend changes a little after 1986 after the sharp rise of Taiwan dollar, but even though, in 1995, 
export to US market totalled 26.4% of Taiwan’s total export, dropped from 38.2% in 1986. Import from 
Japan keeps unchanged in the past decade, around 30% of total import. See Board of Foreign Trade, op. cit., 
pp. 25, 27, Table 8, 9.
373 See Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1996 (Taipei: 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, 1997), p.187, 150.
374 See Fuji Sougou Kenkyuushyo, Hiyakusuru TouAzia to Nihon—Raibaru ka Patona ka? (The Rising East 
Asia and Japan—Rival or Partner?) (Tokyo: Fuji Sougou Kenkyuushyo, 1994), p.4.
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prices have been sluggish for years.
Figure 4. 3 Export and Import Growth Rates, 1986-96
unit:%
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Source: Board of Foreign Trade, Foreign Trade Development o f the Republic o f China 1996 (Taipei: 
Board of Foreign Trade, 1997), p.9.
To deal with the unprecedented economic situation, SMEs had to adopt new 
measures. One way was to try to find an overseas country with cheap labour and land to 
continue their production. Accompanying the eased tension with China, the shift of 
Taiwanese production bases to Southeast Asia and China has produced the so-called 
‘investment-induced trade effect’. The increased, investment into the two regions has 
greatly changed the trade patterns of Taiwan. Figure 4.4 shows that the US and the 
Japanese markets have gradually been taken over by Hong Kong and ASEAN firms. 
According to research by Taiwan’s Board of Foreign Trade, the relative importance of 
SMEs in ASEAN export market is higher than in the EU and Japan. The share of the top 
one hundred and fifty exporters in the ASEAN and Hong Kong market was 33% and 23% 
respectively in 1996, and the other smaller exporters had 67% and 77% shares, which is 
much higher as compared to their 56% share in the EU, and 61% in Japan.375 This 
‘investment-induced trade’ pattern caused by the capital exports of SMEs also happens in
3,5 See Board of Foreign Trade, Woguo qian 150 da Chukou Maoyishangyu Chukou Diqu, Chanpin Fenxi 
(Analysis o f the Top 150 Exporters by Areas and Products, TkFdwF 150 A. iE & fT 3  iE ' M.
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Japan and Korea, and this ‘convergence’ is the result of globalisation, which helps the 
development o f the larger regional economy.376
Figure 4. 4 Shares of Four Major Exporting Regions in Total Trade
unit:%
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Source: Board of Foreign Trade, Foreign Trade Development o f the Republic o f China 1996 (Taipei: 
Board of Foreign Trade, 1997), pp.22-31.
Note: Currently ASEAN consists of 7 member countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, and Vietnam. The data before 1996 does not include trade data with 
Vietnam.
The transformation o f Taiwan’s political economy produced a brand new milieu for 
SMEs. In the coming sections, I will discuss how businesspeople utilise market principles 
based on price competition and guanxi based on personal contacts to gain orders. We also 
will be concerned with how social relation ships are affected by the market principle. The 
two questions I will discuss first are the types of power relationships which are central to 
guanxi, and how such behaviour could be altered under political and economic change.
4.2 Types of Power Relationships
It is widely believed that the Chinese like to utilise guanxi to promote their business. 
If one possesses eight guanxi networks, and on average have four friends in each guanxi
Ja ff$ f) (Taipei: Board of Foreign Trade, unpublished paper, 1997), p. 2.
3 6 See Klaus Schwab and Claude Smadja, “Power and Policy: the New Economic World Order”, in 
Harvard Business Review, Nov-Dec., pp.40-50.
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network, and if each one o f these friends also has thirty-two friends, then one has 
32*32*32=32,768 direct and indirect contacts within three circles. So it is not a problem of 
finding a type of guanxi to use, but the problem of how to ‘pull and utilise’ (f'J ) it. When 
we talk about pulling and utilising (or more subtly, exploiting) guanxi, it is already implied 
that there is a power relationship in guanxi. Such a power relationship is constructed by 
multiple forces and not absolute, so each of the parties involved in the relationship has to 
adjust him or herself in a dynamic relationship.
Before discussing gwararz-utilisation, let me explain three different types of power 
relationships to clarify what sort of guanxi we are talking about. I will take one case of a 
publishing company to study the possible power relationships.
The books the publishing company produces can be sold through different marketing 
channels. One possible channel is to sell them directly to bookshops. In this situation, the 
relationship between the publishing company and a bookstore is a pure market 
relationship,377 The bookstore places its orders according to consumers’ demand. The 
second marketing channel is aimed at school libraries. In 1994 the Ministry of Education 
subsidised primary and high school libraries 100 million Taiwan dollars to buy ‘good’ 
books selected by the Government Information Office ( BU ) . So the publishing 
companies strove to have their books on the list. Because the Government Information 
Office does not want to displease any publishing company, usually some books of every 
publishing company will be put on the list. So the main focus is in the second round: how to 
get orders from school libraries. Because the school principal holds the power to decide on 
the order, publishing companies have to spend a lot of time with the principals. Publishing 
companies normally have a list of principals’ names, addresses, telephone numbers and 
school budgets. An interviewee told me that he has to go out dining every day with a 
different principal. But such ‘dining-out’ social activity does not guarantee the order. More 
important is a ‘commission’, i.e., the publishing company gives back a certain percentage 
of its sales into the principal’s pocket. The market price of such a commission most often is 
10% .
Another way to sell the books is to go to schools or government offices. Usually the
37 Here I do not mean that a market contractual relationship could exist without any kind of pre-existing 
social relationships. It is more appropriate to say that the two sides bargain irregardless of the existing 
social relations.
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publishing company asks for a place to exhibit its books for a week, and the company’s 
salesman tries to persuade white-collar staff to place their orders, or to give students a 
sheet filled with books titles, which is distributed by teachers in class, and to ask students to 
take these home to ask their parents’ permission to tick off what books they want to buy. 
The next week the students hand the sheet to the teacher, and then the salesman goes to 
collect the sheets from teachers. Because schools are not supposed to be a ‘profit-seeking’ 
area, any kind of commercial activity requires the approval of the principal. In order to 
access this big market, which accounts for 15% of total sales, every publishing company 
has to ‘deal with’ the school principal. Obviously, the relationships between the publishing 
company and the school principal are not pure contractual market relationships, for the 
head is not a consumer nor does the company treat the head as a potential final consumer.
All the three types of guanxi relate to power relationships. In the first situation, the 
power relationship is on an equal basis. A bookshop will not order books from a publisher 
if there is no demand, so the two parties’ relationship depends on a market demand-supply 
situation. I call this kind of relationship a horizontal power relationship. Another case is 
the supply side o f the labour market, where a lot of labourers compete with each other for 
a job offered by an employer. In this case, there is conflict between workers, but there is no 
problem of domination. This situation conforms to neo-classical economics’ pure 
competitive model which views every human relationship as a market relationship.
These kinds of horizontal power relationships are exhibited in the private capitalist 
economy, and its basic rules are exemplified in the three principles o f civil law: freedom of 
contract, individual free will and property rights. Because the market is the only arbitrator, 
and the firm is only one of numerous competitors in the market, so any kind of personal ties 
would not help it to have any advantage against others. The only way for a firm to survive 
in the market is ‘rationalisation’. Basically the bulk of small and medium-sized enterprises 
in Taiwan have to face this kind of power relationship: to compete with each other to win 
orders from the competitive world market. Some scholars like to emphasise how important 
Chinese guanxi is in doing business, but obviously it is not important in this kind of 
horizontal power relationship.
The second kind of guanxi we discussed above is not based on an equal, free 
relationship. This type of relationship could be counted as a kind of market, but not a 
perfect competitive market where every firm is free to enter and to exit. The school
147
Chapter 4 Marketing Management
principal holds the money, and he decides how to ration the money for different books. If 
the principal decided to buy A publishing company’s products instead of B’s, B could do 
very little to counterbalance the principal’s decision. So no wonder the publishers have to 
spend so much time in establishing relationships with a school’s principal. The guanxi is 
based on a patron-client relationship, and I would call this kind o f relationship a vertical 
power relationship. Such relationships can be found in capital-labour, male-female, central 
politician- local politicians relationships.
Under the vertical power relationships, two parties interact on an unequal basis, and 
the weak is dominated by the powerful, so the weak, in order to profit for him/herself, must 
exploit every kind of means to keep good relationships with the powerful. Businesspeople 
are facing those who hold resources. They compete with other book publishers to offer 
better terms to the principal. To gain from the relationships one must show the other party 
that it is profitable for both if they keep up the relationship. How to transform the existing 
‘non-profitable’ guanxi to mutual benefits becomes a very important business activity. 
Businesspeople in Taiwan have to face different structural constraints, so they have to ‘pull 
guanxi' in every kind of business sphere.
Before the democratisation process in the mid-1980s, most corrupt activities were 
covered up to maintain an image of an upright government. At that time, knowing key 
persons had a lot of benefits: firstly, to gain loans from strictly controlled financial 
institutions; secondly, to get access to public purchases; thirdly, to evade tax; and finally to 
get preferential legal interpretations of codes. This kind of vertical power relationship is 
what most scholars would refer to as "guanxi'. But obviously this kind of specific power 
relationship is produced in specific political structures. After the democratisation period, 
such political-business relationships are not as tolerated any longer. By the force of public 
opinion and the opposition parties, a lot of illegal affairs were exposed, which gave 
bureaucrats a clear lesson: they have to do their work more according to the law. An 
interviewee commented on this kind of bureaucratic change: as compared to the 1960s, 
political corruption had lessened. In the 1960s, he had had to spend money on bribes to buy 
a manufacturing firm licence, and now he said he did not have to bribe any longer to obtain 
bureaucratic approvals.
In the third situation, a school principal or the head of an organisation holds the 
power to enter the market. S/he is not the resources’ owner, but only a gatekeeper.
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Institutions occupy the positions to control entry to the market. But on the other hand, we 
can see that there is a norm regulating which institutions are classified as able to compete in 
the market, and which are not. In other words, not every social institution is allowed to 
engage in free market exchange.
There are some specific areas where market principles are not allowed to function. 
Karl Polanyi says that certain mechanisms exist to protect the society from a pure market 
economy, such as public education which is not a ‘natural result’ of the market’s 
functioning .378 Society assigns these kinds of institutions certain roles and functions which 
follow different rules from capitalist calculations. Other institutions like social help 
networks, compulsory military service, or religious institutions are all related to certain 
social value systems which might conflict with capitalist principles. In James O’Connor’s 
terms, it is the contradiction of accumulation and legitimacy. 379 The case of the publishing 
company that wants to sell its products in schools expresses this kind of contradiction: the 
company follows the rules o f the market, i.e., to maximise its profits, under the constraints 
set by social norms. This situation can be seen from the street vendors who appropriate 
public space, like roads, sidewalks and parks, as their own private business space; or 
salesmen of rehabilitation equipment who intrude into hospital wards to sell their products 
without permission from patients or hospitals. There are more controversial issues like 
opening a casino in Penghu, issuing a lottery, setting condom-selling machines on campus, 
or allowing businesspeople to invest in China freely. We can see that certain goals and 
values contradict the profit-maximisation principle, and all these values either adjust to 
market rules or stick to separate rules. This could be named a societal power relationship.
A firm in capitalist society has to face these three kinds of power relationships. To 
maximise its profits is the basic tenet in capitalist society, and a firm has to adjust its role 
under different power relationships. I will discuss below how SMEs access the market 
under the three different power relationships.
4.3 Price Competition in a Competitive World Market
In neo-classical economics, price is the only indicator to match sellers and buyers.
3/8 See Karl Polanyi /tr. by ’ TAe Great Transformation—Origins o f  Our
T im e .( ^ X  : : (Taipei: Yuanliu Chubanshe, 1957/1989), p.289.
J/9 See James O’Connor, The Fiscal Crisis o f  the State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), pp.1-10.
149
Chapter 4 Marketing Management
The dynamic process, according to this theory, is that all firms in the pure competitive 
market will not have ‘excess profits’ over the long term because if there is excess profit, the 
market will attract other firms to join to compete, and this will bring on a price war. If one 
firm, say T, lowers its price, another firm, J, will follow suit, or it will be knocked out o f the 
market. If both of them reduce their price, their profit will be reduced. In the long run, the 
market will restore to an equilibrium where no firm has ‘excess profits’, and every firm will 
only get its ‘normal profit’.
This kind of analysis to a certain degree matches Taiwan’s trade development. If we 
assume that the world market is a pure competitive market, and Taiwan is one of the many 
suppliers in the market, and there are numerous SMEs in the market, we can use the terms 
o f trade^80 to represent the relative price of Taiwan’s exported products. If the index is 
under one hundred, it means that the exported product is relatively cheaper, for the world 
price is one hundred at the moment, and the export price is less than one hundred. The 
lower the index, the cheaper the exported products. During the first half of the 1980s, the 
index was as low as seventy-five, which means that Taiwan’s exported products were 
relatively cheap in the world market. As we noted in the previous section, the New 
Taiwan Dollar was greatly undervalued during this time so the export price remained low, 
and exports increased, especially into the US market.
Another way to strengthen competitiveness is to raise productivity through the 
introduction o f new technology. Rising productivity will enable the firm to reduce the 
product’s price and to embark on a price war. Taiwan’s technology is not so advanced as 
the Japanese, but Taiwanese firms sometimes have their own grass-roots R&D to keep up 
with the Japanese. The firm of one o f my interviewees invented a machine to produce a 
special type of screw. Before the invention, the manufacturing firm had to import such 
machinery from Germany or Japan, which cost at least NT$2 million, and the speed of 
manufacture was two hundred screws per minute. In 1989 the partner of the informant 
invented a machine which cost less than NT$600,000, and it can produce a hundred and 
twenty screws per minute. This machine became very popular among firms that produced
380 Terms of Trade is the relative price index of imported and exported products. We divide the export price 
by the import price to get the index. If the value is more than one, it means that the price of exported 
products is relatively expensive compared to the price of imports.
381 See Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Council 
for Economic Planning and Development, 1997), p.185, Table ll-2a . The 1991 constant price is 100.
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this special type of screw, and after a price war, the Japanese overseas market was taken 
over by the Taiwanese in a short time. The informant said that ‘my secretary received 
NT$3 million (about US$110,000) in 1990 as her bonus’.
However, the Taiwanese believe that ‘if they can make it, I can’, so after two years, 
another company in Taizhong invented a similar machine to produce the same products. 
Competition drove down the price, and when more and more companies devised the 
machines, the production capacity multiplied overnight, and the price also plummeted. 
After the break o f the partnership, the informant tried to find a new product to sell in order 
to avoid the fierce competition, but his partner kept on producing the same product, and 
two years later his partner’s company went bankrupt due to price competition.
Another is the so-called ‘non-price competition’, e.g., the design of a product. 
Intellectual property rights is a new concept to Taiwanese, and before the US pressed the 
Taiwan government to protect American firms’ interests in intellectual property rights, 
almost every company copied the most popular product design, and manufactured the 
same product at a lower price. The owner of a firm that produced pupil’s reference books 
described the situation: in the old days, he copied the popular design of Japanese children’s 
books, and tried to become a leader in the T aiwan children’s book market. However, if one 
of his books was popular in the market, many other publishers would join in to compete 
with a similar books. At that time, there was a time lag before similar products appeared in 
the market, and he could keep one year ahead of other publishers, each time creating a new 
product for the coming year. However, the time lag becomes shorter and shorter, and when 
I interviewed him the time lag had been reduced to only one month.
A survey done in 1984 shows that about half o f the SMEs that exported products 
(2,770 cases) complained that their competitors adopted a ‘cut-throat pricing strategy’.382 
This situation has not changed, according to a macro-survey conducted by the MOEA in 
1995, which also shows that about half of the interviewed firms (4,913 cases) think that the 
major marketing problem they face is ‘cut-throat competition’ from domestic firms. 
Among the firms that hired more than three hundred workers, 37% faced this problem, 
while 50% of the firms that employed fewer than ninety-nine workers believed that their
382 See Board of Foreign Trade, Zhongxiao Oiye Waixiao Daoxiang Chengzhang Diaocha Yanjiu Baogao 
(17 ’ Research on SMEs’ Export Growth) (Taipei: Board ofForeign
Trade, 1984), p.53, Table 4-3.
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• 383major marketing problem is ‘throat-cut competition’. In other words, the smaller the 
firm is, the more competitive their product market is.
According to neo-classical economic theory, to deal with this harsh competition, 
comparies can raise their productivity, either through mechanisation or rationalisation o f 
production or overseas production. If they cannot adjust, they must exit the market. This 
reasoning is based on the assumption that efficiency and therefore the cost of production is 
the only determining factor in the market. However, we would argue that there are two 
non-economic ways to deal with competition, i.e., power manoeuvres and the 
establishment of long-term relationships, which are inextricably linked with the social 
structure. Our main concern here is now, under the specific Taiwan social structure, 
businesspeople sell their product through guanxi, or more precisely, through power 
relationships.
4.4 Economic and Political Power Manoeuvres
Neo-classical economists just notice the competition between suppliers, but they fail 
to see the power relationships in the market. This kind of manoeuvre can result from 
economic or political control.
As observed above, a price war could result from the pure competition between 
supplying firms. But it could also result from manoeuvres on the demand side. For example, 
it is a common business trick to tell one supplier that another supplier would produce it at 
a lower price so that the buyer will bring down the price. An informant said that in 1972 he 
successfully invented a new machine to produce iron tubes. An American importer tried to 
benefit by manipulating suppliers from Taiwan and Japan. He told the Japanese producer 
that Taiwan can produce this product at a lower cost. At the same time the American told 
the Taiwan company that the Japanese would take his order at a lower price. If  he refused 
to accept the order, his firm would not be able to operate, so he had to engage in a price 
war. Through this kind of manipulation, the price war lasted over five years.
At that time he would have liked to cooperate with the Japanese firm to end the price 
war, but the Japanese firm believed that it could outlast him in the war, so it was not until
383 See MOEA, Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu Zhizaoye Jingying Shikuang Yixiang Diaocha Baogao (  i7 
0  R, M a tob (ä #  j f  i t  t°] f t  M  Survey Report on the Business Practices o f
Manufacturing Industry)  (Taipei: MOEA, 1995), pp.36-37, Table 7.
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five years later that the Japanese firm offered to end the war. From then on they made an 
agreement that both would not accept the orders under a certain price, and agreed to a 
division o f labour, i.e., he produced certain kinds of products, and the Japanese produced 
others. Before long the sales price began to rise.
This case shows us a kind of power relationship different from what neo-classical 
economics teaches us. Before J and T’s cooperation, the relationships between A and J, T 
were vertical, and A could use his power to manipulate J and T, while the relationships 
between J and T remained competitive. But after cooperation was achieved, the triangular 
relationship turned into a dual relationship. Through their cooperation, J and T prevented 
any further price war and were able to change the ‘market forces’.
As another example, a major effort by an interviewee’s company has been to get the 
work to make a concrete tunnel for electric-power wire for Taipower ( £  % f t  s] 5
Taiwan Power Co.). There are about twenty companies who are eligible to bid for the 
work from Taipower, so they collaborate with each other throughout the island. Before the 
bidding, all o f the firms had to reach an agreement on the price, and then every local 
company bid for the work in different regions. The firm can keep part of the money to 
cover its costs and a certain portion of the money as its profit, but then the rest of the 
money has to be distributed to other firms equally. These business practices are 
relationships that are perfectly fitted to a market.
Neo-classical economics might say that there would be a free-rider so that this kind 
of collusion would not last long, like the cartel of the OPEC. However, an organisation 
could use different methods to discipline its members. In the case mentioned above, the 
organisation could lobby the government to stop issuing licenses so that no potential 
competitor could enter the market. The second way is to use ‘moral persuasion’, a term 
used by the informant, to prevent the emergence of free-riders. If  it does not work, 
violence could be the last resort.
Normally, the kind of vertical control relationship happens in the product distribution 
channel when one party controls access to a specific market. One informant produced 
ventillation fans, and most of the products reached customers through the wholesale chain 
store, Makro. But quite often Makro sold the product at the price lower than the 
production price to attract customers, which inevitably toppled the price structure 
constructed by different channels. He said that he had no choice but to cut the supply and
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tried to find another channel. An American importer ‘fed’ an informant, i.e., the importer 
gave him a lot of orders, and step by step, the exporter had to rely on the importer’s 
marketing channel. The informant said that after he found that his sales relied more and 
more on the importer, up to 40% of his total sales, he became vigilant, and tried to diversify 
his market. When the importer asked him to reduce the product’s price and he refused, he 
still could survive the hard time while he sought new marketing networks for his products.
Another kind of power manoeuvre relies upon political influence, which is different 
from the economic domination mentioned above. In Taiwan, some public works are given 
to certain companies only. For example, ‘important, national defence related’ public 
construction is still put out to the construction department of the National Veterans 
Association( iH .H 'tO , which is a conglomerate operating all kinds o f business activities.384 
Such a conglomerate becomes an institution to protect the Mainlanders’ economic 
interests, because most veterans are Mainlanders. They are granted the monopoly right to 
operate lots o f commercial activities, and then in turn put out the jobs granted from the 
government to smaller firms, and earn the transfer profits without doing anything. For 
SMEs to get an order from the Association, they are subordinated to the gatekeeper who 
controls access to the market. Unless they change to another market, they have to rely on 
the Association, and to enter into a patron-client relationship.
The Association has a Taipei Service Centre. A retired general, who is a good friend 
of an informant’s father, is in charge of the organisation. At that time, all construction 
work from Taipower was assigned to the Association, so the general occupied a good 
position to control Taipower’s public construction work. Through good guanxi with the 
general, the informant was able to sell cement products to Taipower.
If the government’s policy were not biased to favour retired Mainlander soldiers, the 
National Veterans Association would not have had the power to take this important public 
work; if the informant were not Mainlander, or his father had not known the general, the 
informant would not have had the opportunity to win a contract from Taipower; if the staff 
in Taipower had not been corrupt, they would have reported the collusive behaviour to the
384 Tliis semi-official company was founded by special funds in the late 1950s, and owns 26 different kinds 
of companies. Because it is not public enterprise, it enjoys the independent financial status, and is a main 
financial source for KMT. See Chen Shimeng, Lin Zhongzheng, Chu Jingyi, Zhang Chingxi, Shi Junji and 
Liu Jintian, Jiegou Dangguo Zibenzhuyi—lun Taiwan Guanying Shiye zhi Mingyinghua (.Deconstruct 
Party-State Capitalism—On Privatisation o f  Taiwan Official Enterprises) (Taipei: Chengshe Baogao 1,
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Investigation Bureau. All these kinds o f power manoeuvres are produced in a certain 
social context, and would not be sustained in another social structure. We could say that 
the degree of the transparency of the policy-making process determines the possibility of 
forming a closed shop. If certain kinds of information are not available for most people, it 
will be easy to form a closed relationship. In Taiwan, the prevailing closed social networks 
that can be used to access information and a corrupt government bureaucracy reinforce the 
difficulty to enter a relationship. Power manoeuvres become possible under this social 
structure, and guanxi becomes necessary.
4.5 Long-term Relationships—How to Balance Cost and Benefit
The second way to deal with market competition is to establish long-term 
relationships between buyers and sellers. Obviously any business practice to a certain 
degree should be based on mutual trust, a kind of collective conscience described by Emile 
Dürkheim .385 The world division of labour, or commodity chains, as Geriffe described, 
must be based on some reliable networks.386 This is why many sociologists like to 
emphasise the social bases of economic functions.387
Social networks {guanxi) are the basis of such analyses. Research has that found 
xinyong (credit, reliability or trustworthiness) is very important in doing business. The 
impression also gets imparted that people living within the Chinese cultural context can
1991), p. 67.
385 See Emile Dürkheim/ tr. by _£ j] -ft, De la division du travail social Social Division of
Labour) (Taipei: Shangwu Shudian, 1966).
386 See Gereffi, Gary, Miguel Korzenienicz, Commodity Chains and Footwear Exports. In William G. 
Martin (ed.), Semiperipheral States in the World-Economy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1990), 
pp.45-68.
38 See Wong Siu-lun, ‘Chinese Entrepreneurs and Business Trust’, in Gary G. Hamilton (ed.), Business 
Networks and Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia, (Centre of Asian Studies, University of 
Hong Kong 1991), p. 15; Thomas Menkhoff, Trade Routes, Trust and Trading Networks: Chinese 
Family-Based Trading Firms in Singapore and Their External Economic Dealings, unpublished PhD 
dissertation (1990), Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld; Kao Cheng-Shu, ‘Personal Trust in 
Taiwan Business’, in Gary G. Hamilton (ed.), op. cit., pp. 66-76; Susan Greenhalgh, ‘Networks and Their 
Nodes: Urban Society on Taiwan’, China Quarterly, no.99 (September 1984), pp. 529-552; Chen Jiexuan, 
Xieli Wangluo yu Renji Wangluo—Taiwan Zhongxiao Oiye De Shehui Jingji Fenxi (Subcontracting and 
Personal Networks—social economic analysis o f Taiwan's small and medium-scale enterprises) (Taipei: 
Lianjing Chubanshe, 1994). Chen Jieying, ‘Taiwan Zhongxiao Qiye Lingxihua Ziben Jiegou de Shehui 
Jichu’ (The Social Base of the Fragmented Capital o f Taiwan’s SMEs), Si yu Yan (Thought and Words— 
Journal o f the Humanities and Social Science Quarterly), vol. 30, no.3, pp.59-86; Chen Jieying, ‘Taiwan 
Zhongxiao Qiye Jingyan Quxiang Jishu Leiji Moshi de Shehui Jichu’ (The Social Base of the Accumulated 
Experience in Technology Procurement in Taiwan’s SMEs), in Zai Benrui (J£.£-3&)(ed.), Taiwan Shehui 
yu Jingji Lunji (Collection on Taiwan Society and Economy) (Taipei: Youshi Chubanshe, 1995),
155
Chapter 4 Marketing Management
access another part of the cultural repertoire— Chinese guanxi—  to serve as a guarentee in 
business.388
This ‘cultural approach’ is partially correct. Many informants also emphasised this 
point when they talked about their business practices. In most transactions they do not 
need to sign any formal contract. But we should note that this business practice is not 
based on traditional merits. Both sides must benefit from this long-term relationship, or it 
will not work out.
Some Taiwan scholars try to construct different types o f guanxi to analyse Taiwan 
businesspeople’s behaviour.389 In "flexible production networks", in "social engagement to 
gain orders or to secure a loan", all kinds of business activities are based on “Chinese 
gucmxi networks, which are combined with business practicality and a human touch”
A'fS’). What they define as gucmxi is quite ambiguous, for it includes every kind of 
interaction. If so, we can say that every business has to use its personal contacts to establish 
business relationships, which are combined with calculations o f interest and specific social 
customs. This kind of behaviour is not confined to China or to business, but also applied to 
Japan and the USA, or to political clientelism, where social customs are only 
complementary to pursuits of power.390
4.5.1 Building and Utilizing Social Closure
Karl Polanyi argued that economic life is not organised by a self-regulating market; 
so, too, the labour market in capitalist society is also not regulated by market principles 
only. Social networks, or social closure, play an important role. Following I will discuss the 
formation of social closure and long-term relationships, and more important, I will talk 
about the factors which might cause the disintegration of the social networks or long-term 
relationships. The problem of how to establish and maintain a long-term relationship which 
involves both parties’ interests is more important than the typology of guanxi.
pp.293-322.
388 See literature review in Introduction Chapter.
389 This kind of approach is widely adopted by the researchers at Tunghai University. They set up a research 
centre to study the business behaviour in East Asia. See Kao Chengshu, Chen Jiexuan, Chen Jieying et. al.
390 See Hongzen Wang, ‘Dui Chen Jiexuan xian sheng “Guanxi yu Faling” de yidian Yijian’
■£ & Hfl H  4 “” 6-1— ’ A Brief Comment on Chen Chieh-hsuan's "Personal Connections and 
Legal Rules: A Traditional Dimension in Taiwan Business", Si yu Yan T  ’ Thought and Words— 
Journal o f the Humanities and Social Science Quarterly), 1993, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 247-250.
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Research done by Egan and Mody shows that American buyers prefer long-term, 
stable, and direct relationships with both developed and developing country suppliers.391 
They also report that ‘developing countries’ firms may find it more difficult to enter 
relationships and thereby break into industry networks....they may find they are 
increasingly unable to get their first orders’ .392
The situation they describe applies not only to the newly developing countries, but 
also to a new company which wants access to the market. One’s family could be helpful in 
this. One informant produces components in Tainan, and exports most of his products. He 
has two boys, and he has already begun to plan their careers. Whenever he goes overseas to 
visit his foreign distributors, he takes his two boys with him, and introduces them to the 
distributors’ children. ‘It will become the two kids’ capital, and will be helpful to their 
future business’, he explained.
However, not everyone is lucky enough to have a ‘good family’ or ‘useful’ social 
relations to utilise. Those excluded from a network have to find a way to access the 
network, which is called ‘guanxi-pulling’ (£ l HI # ) .  Nevertheless, one who wants to “pull” 
gucmxi has to be able to offer benefits to the other party, or it is hard for one to cut into a 
guanxi.
In Chapter Two, we have shown that the mobility path for Taiwanese is that one 
works for a while before marries, and after marriage, one tries to open a business of one’s 
own and become a proprietor. The first phase could be called a ‘network building period’, 
which is viewed by Taiwanese as a necessary process. One utilises one’s early working 
experience to know more ‘friends’ for future business. An informant hired a secretary to 
receive foreign guests: ‘After two years, she quit the job, set up her own trading company, 
and took away one of our biggest customers’.
In a broader sense, all networks can be one’s capital. Besides the family ties one can 
utilise, one can also utilise broader social relations. An obvious commercial activity to 
mobilise social relations so as to make money is direct selling. In his research on Taiwan’s 
direct selling, Pei-Chia Lan found that, besides turning to their immediate social relations 
to sell products, more important ways among direct salespersons to make money are to
391 See Mary Lou Egan and Ashoka Mody, ‘Buyer-Seller Links in Export Development’, World 
Development, vol.20, No. 3 (1992), p.325.
392 Ibid: p. 329.
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‘activate their remote networks, create new networks with strangers, and further, 
transform these social networks’.393 One’s immediate social circle is too small to find big 
potential buyers. A salesperson has to expand his social relations hips. Lan found that 
strangers or remote friends are “better” customers than close friends.394
Another kind of social relations that can be utilised is clientelism, which is the kind of 
social closure that limits certain people’s access. Hans Schenk finds that in clientelist 
relationships in India, for instance, only if the lower caste offers the upper caste certain 
benefits can they be included in clientelist relationships.395 The dual political clientelism in 
Taiwan gives certain people power to gain an economic rent, and only those people who 
give support to the patrons could access the network. For example, to find a job in a 
farmers’ association requires help from local politicians, who control the local institutions. 
It will be difficult for anyone who is not in the circle to get a post. Even in central 
government offices, the kinds of posts that do not require qualifications are usually 
occupied by high-ranked officials’ relatives or friends.396 An informant sells kitchen wares, 
whose two main marketing channels are construction sites and retail stores. The formal 
channel has a much higher share of his sales. A legislator, who owns a big construction 
company in Taoyuan, ran in a political campaign in 1992, and the informant had to support 
and help him to win the election in order to gain orders from the legislator’s company. This 
kind o f social closure is more or less based on the concept o f reciprocity. One party gives 
support, either economic or political, and the other party provides economic benefits. It is 
an “interests community” (Interesse Gemeidschaft), where self-interests bind them 
together, much as neo-classical economics assumes.
Big firms usually do not have problems in using guawci to market their products. 
They have a public relations department to promote relationships with all relevant parties, 
and the hig-ranking managers often have good relationships with the most important 
people in the society such as the club of Jinshi ( k £ ) and Oingsong which count
many important people among their members.
393 See Pei-Chia Lan, ‘Disciplinary Capitalism: Networking Power and Emotional Labor in Direct Selling 
unpublished paper presented at North American Taiwan Study Conference Austin (June 1998), p. 13.
394 Ibid: p. 14.
395 See Schenk, Hans, ‘Corruption-What Corruption? Notes on Bribery and Dependency in Urban India’, 
in Peter M. Ward (ed.) Corruption, Development, and Inequality (London: Routledge, 1989) pp. 110-122.
396 No data is available on this point. But one popular joke is that one can offend one’s boss, but never 
offend those low-ranked employees who had attained their positions without passing the state examination,
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Smaller companies have to establish new relationships step by step, and need to use 
competitive offers such as low prices. An informant who processes iron products observes 
that doing business depends onjiaoqing f  ’ friendship, or personal relationships), but 
if one wants to enter a business, s/he has to use price competiton to gain orders. Normally 
the buyer will tell the supplier how much the cost is, and asks the supplier to offer a price 
less than the prevailing price, at the same quality, or the supplier will not place an order. In 
this way, one can establish a business relationship with the other party step by step. The 
research done by Egan and Mody concurs. They note that ‘relationships tend to grow 
incrementally, with their duration and depth more evident ex post than ex ante f 91
Even though social closure is based on mutual trust and reciprocity, the market 
situation still influence the relationships. One informant’s first overseas customer was 
Australian, and their relationship persisted for over ten years. Even after the sharp rise of 
production costs in Taiwan after 1987, his buyer still placed orders with him. For both of 
them, these orders were not at all profitable, but they tried to maintain this relationship so 
far as possible. After 1990, his Australian buyer had to switch his orders to China, and he 
said that both o f them felt relieved. Their relationship in the beginning was based on 
profit-calculation, but later it developed into a relationship of mutual trust and reciprocity 
but under the pressure of prices, even though both o f them tried to keep the relationship 
going, it became hard to maintain it without mutual benefits.
We know that an economic system is linked by different sectors, and if a link of the 
chain breaks, the economy will be dysfunctioning: car manufacturing needs thousands of 
different spare parts, and any problem with the production of components will cause an 
interruption in car-making. The centre-satellite production system organised by a lot of 
firms is a kind of long-term relationship which tries to minimise the instability of 
procurements o f spare parts from the centre firms and o f the quality of components 
supplied by satellite firms.
A case studied by the Taiwan government shows that a close tie between the centre 
and satellite firms has helped this industrial network grow and profit over the past fifteen 
years. Taiwan Liwei ( o ) contracts with about one hundred and fifty satellite firms
to produce machinery. Liwei supplies raw materials, machine modules and technology to
and who are too well connected to offend.
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satellite firms, and the satellite firms assemble the final products. Whenever Liwei devises a 
new model, it will train the satellite firms, and teach them how to use the new technology to 
assemble parts for it. The two sides meet once weekly to discuss the problems in 
production, quality control and information on new technology. Through this kind of 
intensive interaction, they are able to produce internationally competitive machinery.398
Though this subcontracting system is maintained on the basis of mutual trust and 
benefits, if some do not follow the rules, e.g., to keep up the good quality o f their products, 
it will create problems for the centre company. So a subcontracting system will work better 
if there are pecuniary rewards in the system. ‘When a firm subcontracts its products, it will 
find subcontractors with good reputations (it i f )  to do the work’, an informant noted. 
‘It is not a problem to control the quality of put-out products, for the upstream 
subcontractor will check the product produced by the downstream firm. If the quality of 
the downstream firm is not good, the upstream firm would not accept it. If  it had been 
accepted, and could not pass my quality control, the firm would not be able to get the 
money from me, and at the same time would have to pay money to the downstream firm. ’ 
In other words, the company uses a ‘mutual monitoring’ mechanism to guarantee quality, 
which also ensures the functioning of the reciprocal rewards system.
A second way to avoid the dilemma of keeping a good relationship with partner 
businesses is to avoid doing business with close friends or relatives. To use an earlier 
example, the direct salespersons in Taiwan sell more to strangers and remote friends 
because when a salesperson tries to make money from a friend, s/he has to run the risk of 
losing the friends.399 Only strangers or remote friends will not give this kind of social 
pressure on the businessperson.
4.5.2 Disintegration o f Social Closure and Relations
The kind of long-term economic relationship mentioned above is more or less based 
on mutual trust and reciprocity, with the help of economic calculations. This reciprocity is 
not like a clientelist relationship, where power relationships are unequal, yet long-term
397 Ibid: p. 326.
398 See Jingjibu » Ministry of Economic Affairs), Zhonghuaminguo Bashisi nian Zhongxiao Oiye
Baipishu ( i7 4ß ’ White Paper on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in
the Republic o f China, 1996) (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1996), pp.216-219.
399 See Pei-chia Lan, op. cit., p. 14.
1 6 0
Chapter 4 Marketing Management
economic relationships have the same troubles that clientelist relationships face, i.e., how 
to balance assets and liabilities. The cases of partnerships that we discussed in Chapter 
Three suggest that even a long-term established network is fragile. Market relations can 
interfere with one’s social relations, and one has to find a way to accommodate both.
In a capitalist economy, ‘meeting that product’s quality specifications at a 
competitive price and adhering to reliable delivery standards are minimum requirements 
for selling in the market.’400 A firm that cannot meet the minimum requirements will not be 
able to sustain any long-term relationship. No buyer can stand, over the long term, high- 
cost products, as in the case of the Australian buyer. Another informant had run a shoe 
manufacturing company, but the oil crisis in 1973 drove up the cost of PVC raw materials 
by 80%, and he could not bear the high cost. He had to close his firm, even though many 
‘overseas lines’ had cooperated with him for a long time.
Even family-based networks can be unreliable, even though one has full information 
about one's family members. In 1983, four million Taiwan dollars (about US$150,000) that 
an informant had lent to his sister and uncle were in default, and the rest of his savings of 
one million Taiwan dollars was also in default to a friend, "That is because I over-trust 
others", he commented. Another informant organised a club with ten other companies, and 
they have a financial credit network with each other. But one company ran into difficulty in 
1995 and this company could not pay back six million dollars to her (about US$230,000) 
because of an economic recession. They still have business deals, but their relationship has 
been changed into a ‘more pure market relationship’, and since then they have not 
maintained any social functions with each other. The two cases illustrate that one has to 
fulfill one’s social role in a market, and one’s asset, i.e., one’s social network, is also one’s 
liability. Both of the two informants played their social roles (brother and friend), and were 
asked to lend money not following any market principle, i.e., economic calculation, but 
when another party is not able to fulfill their obligation (to pay back the money), their 
social relations could not be sustained.
What if the social closure or long-term relationships break down after the 
intervention o f market forces? In Taiwan, this used to be resolved by social pressure or 
violence, and not through a legal system. But in an increasingly internationalised economy, 
it is harder to use these old means.
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What is critical is how to maintain social networks which are in trouble. Often such 
relationships terminate with no further connections. If so, the question is how to claim back 
one’s money. The 'victims' would like to retrieve their money, but the other side may not 
have sufficient money to pay back the debt, or even if they have, prefer not to pay it back. 
So before making any business commitment, e.g., to loan, to sell or to buy, one has to bear 
the risk and must be prepared for a default. One has to calculate, if the other business fails, 
what sorts of means are available to claim back the money. One way is to go to court and 
ask for legal restitution. But the political system interferes with the judiciary, so even if one 
could have legal restitution, it might take years, which is too high a cost for businesspeople. 
This knowledge contributes to the phenomenon that in Taiwan’s business community, it is 
rare to sign a contract, as mentioned. It shows that there is no trust in the legal system.
Social pressure is used as the second way to claim back a debt. In a modem legal 
system, every legal subject is independent o f each other. But obviously the social 
institutions do not function in that way. In Taiwan, the view persists that members in a 
family belong to one family instead of being many different independent legal subjects. 
Every member is supposed to share duties in common for their family. So one's family is 
usually regarded as one's business guarantor.
Before the amendment o f the Bills Law in 1988 it was a criminal offense if one 
bounced a check, for the state wanted to enforce transactions. Quite often a company's 
legal owner was the wife, and the manager was the husband. The company used the wife's 
personal cheques to do business with other companies. If  this company went broke and 
cheques bounced, the wife would be put in jail instead of the 'real' owner, the husband. One 
female informant recalled that her husband told her that she knew much more about finance 
so that she should be board chairman, and used her name to issue cheques. After they 
separated she suddenly realised why her husband wanted her to be board chairperson.
Why do people accept this kind of cheque which is not the real owner’s? Because 
people believe that a family is a community where everyone is supposed to share 
responsibility. One case is the "European Community Market Building", which was built 
and sold by Huang Jinzhou He failed in his financial investments and fled with
the money to Canada. He owed investors about NT$20 billion (about US$750 million). 
Later he committed suicide in Canada. Creditors asked his family, mainly his sister, to clear
400 See Egan and Mody, op. cit., p. 321. Italics added by author.
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the debts. His sister promised that she would do her best to clear off the debts, though she 
has no legal responsibility at all.401
This kind of social pressure to secure transactions work in a community-based or 
‘relationship’ society, but urbanisation, the prevalent nuclear family system, and the 
internationalisation of capital flows reduces the influence of traditional community 
pressure. Besides, people are better educated and know how to use the law to escape from 
the negative side o f traditional values.
Another means is to use force to take back money. The final resort to the law is of 
course also based on force, i.e., to use state power to implement the law.402 But if the state 
power fails to protect transactions, and social pressure is ineffective, the last method is 
private violence, i.e., to ask a gangster to resolve a dispute.
The influence of criminal elements in Taiwan is widely known. In 1995, the speaker 
of Pindong county council shot dead a businessperson over their business disputes. The 
speaker of Gaoxiong county council was shot to death by a township representative in the 
same county because of business conflicts. According to a report, over 80% of local 
council representatives have criminal records.403 In an unpublished internal official 
document, the Minister of Justice admitted that five wanted gangsters and the wives of 
another two gangsters were elected as county representatives in January 1998.
In previous decades, these gangsters were under strict supervision by the state. But 
after the lifting o f martial law and democratisation, that power no longer prevails. They are 
entitled to campaign for political posts. At the same time, the KMT party tries to cooperate 
with them to keep its power, so the gangsters’ influence has expanded.
A successful gangster often has his own business, mainly in land speculation and 
government project bids.404 He also tries to make money by 'solving disputes' between 
people. This becomes an important way for people to secure their debts. One informant 
said that when he faced a situation where he could not claim back debts owned to him, he 
went to court to claim NT$500,000. The jury recommended he settle out o f court, for if he
401 See Ziyou Shibao (& & ’ Liberty Times), Huang Jinzhou Dajie: Mama Di Jia Jixiaoshi jiu
Yuhai...(^-^$?H A i i .  • » Huang Jinzhou’s eldest sister: Mother was victimised
few hours after she arrived Canada.) 08 January 1996, p.3.
402 See Max Weber, Politik als Beruf (The Profession and Vocation o f  Politics). In Peter Lassman and 
Ronald Speirs (eds.), Weber's Poltical Writings, p .310. He said that every State is founded on force.
403 See Chen Dongsheng, Jinquan Chengshi (Money & Power City) (Taipei: Juliu Chubanshe, 1995), p. 68.
404 See Gongshang Shibao (Commercial Times), Weibiao Huati Zaocheng Huati Weibiao
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sued, in the end he might get only NT$5,000 back. A friend introduced him to a criminal 
investigation police officer to settle the case. The policeman asked a gangster to demand 
the money. The debtor had no money, but had a house valued at NTS 1.7 million. So the 
informant paid 0.9 million to the debtor, and the policeman and gangster also charged 0.3 
million from the debtor, and the informant obtained the house. Another informant took 
back 50% of his NT$60,000 debt with the help of a gangster. But ‘the aftermath never 
ends’, as he described it, ‘for the gangster came back over and over again to ask for money, 
and asked me to find jobs'.
However, social order cannot be built upon violence. In the near future, the resort to 
traditional social pressures will need to be replaced by the establishment of trust in the legal 
system, because it is increasingly unfeasible to resort to the old communal forms any more 
and the ‘rule o f gangsters’ is not a realistic alternative for the business community. After 
the first direct election o f Taiwan’s president in 1996, Lee Teng-hui had tried hard to solve 
the ‘gangster-money’ complex (,W, ^ b y  enforcing implementation of the law. 
Though the KMT’s power derives partially from the support of corrupt local factions, it 
may not survive politically if it keeps a close relationship with them. The KMT has to 
response to popular demands, and in the coming few years, the dilemma—to solicit support 
from local factions or from the people-may dominate the tactical agenda.
4.6 State Regulations and Societal Power
It is possible today to lobby to alter planned regulations. Usually the government has 
to choose between different interests. In the process of enacting National Health Insurance 
( ) , for instance, the government had to resist the pressure from the business
community and implemented the project earlier than planned.405 The policy to prohibit 
business investment in China has also evoked enormous resistence; many important 
business community leaders criticised the policy as ‘reducing Taiwan’s competitiveness in 
the world’.
According to the Statute Governing Relations between the People of Taiwan and the 
Mainland Areas ) , a company investing in China has to report to the
Exclusion topic makes topic exclusive), 05 May 1996, p.22.
405 See Tang Wenhui ( )  , ‘The Political Processes of National Health Insurance 
Initiation in Taiwan’, American Asian Studies (forthcoming, 1998).
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Investment Commission or it will be fined; however, the investments reported to the 
Taiwan government in 1995 are only one third of the amount shown in Chinese 
statistics.406 One informant who invested in a shoe manufacturing company in Fuzhou said 
that he had been to China before the government allowed people to travel there. In 1989, at 
the time of the Tiananmen Massacre, he had been planning to build a factory for the past 
three years. He analysed the situation, and believed that the Chinese government would not 
change its ‘opening’ policy, and that it might now give greater benefits to foreign capital in 
order to attract investment and reduce the negative image from which it suffered. He kept 
to his plan, and built a factory that employs more than five thousand workers. He told me 
proudly that ‘about one third of Nike’s shoes are made by our company’.
This kind o f business activity had an impact on the government’s polciy, and in 
September 1990, the Taiwan government relaxed the law to allow Taiwan business to 
invest in China ‘indirectly’ if the amount is under US$1 million. Businesspeople can touch 
the ‘untouchable’ and push the government into changing policy.
Though businesspeople are able to lobby the government to change its policy, the 
regulations of overseas governments are beyond the control o f Taiwan’s businesspeople. 
Other nations control access to their domestic market, either through tariffs or non-tariff 
barriers, in order to protect domestic industry. So the export-oriented SMEs have to pay 
attention to the international economic milieu, since their business could easily be affected 
by any policy change by foreign governments.
A common industry policy adopted by an overseas government is to restrict the 
import of semi-finished goods so that domestic industry could develop the ability to 
produce industrial components, which have a higher price in the world market. The 
manager of a Taiwanese firm producing umbrellas, which invests in China, said that it 
exports basic components from Taiwan, processes the umbrellas in China, and leaves the 
last processing step, i.e., attaching the handle of the umbrella, to be finished in Taiwan, so 
that they could export the product from China as a semi-finished product and enjoy the tax 
incentive program offered by the Chinese government.
Another informant complained that his marketing channel is controlled by another
406 Taiwan’s statistics show US$1.09 billion, while China’s is US$3.16. See MOEA, Liangan Jingmao 
Guanxi Fazhan zhi Tantao {fo & BUI #  #  M. Z- t-f, Exploration on Economic and Trade 
Development Across the Taiwan Strait) (Taipei: MOEA unpublished paper, 1997), p.14.
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Taiwan company, for business orders from Southeast Asia flow to that company. The 
informant could not export his product to Southeast Asia countries separately because the 
tariff was as high as 30% for semi-finished products, and was taxed at only 10% for 
finished goods. Another company used his products to assemble a finished machine to 
export, so the informant had to depend on that company.
A new issue at the WTO is to discuss the anti-dumping policy adopted by the United 
States.407 It is often regarded as a kind of protectionist policy for American domestic 
industry. One informant benefited a lot from American policy to levy anti-dumping tariffs 
on iron tubing in the peroid from 1979 to 1981, and from 1987 to 1991, for Japanese and 
Brazilian products. Products from the two countries were levied a 50% anti-dumping tax, 
while Taiwan’s tariff was only 6.58%. He said that the market vacuum opened by the tariff 
against Japan was ‘too big to swallow’.
However, the market protection measures of tariff barriers are no longer acceptable 
to the international economic community. A more subtle way to protect ‘national industry’ 
is to use the terms of ‘fair trade’, ‘human rights’ or ‘labour issues’ to bar certain goods 
from certain countries. In the near future, these issues will become major disputes between 
developed and developing countries, and SMEs will have to face a ‘ social charge’ from 
their target market, especially from Western countries.408
4.7 ‘(ruanxi* and Long-Term Relationships
Some scholars emphasise the importance of guanxi networks in the Chinese business 
community, and quite often this social network is regarded a kind of ‘social capital’, as if 
the broader the network, the more capital one owns.409 Gary Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu 
write that in Tiwan ‘The relationships defined by the roles tend to be stable over the long 
run. They are based on reciprocal trust, loyalty and predictability’.410 But their hypothesis
40 See Board of Foreign Trade, WTO Xinjiapo Buzhangji Huiyi Zhanwang (W T  O ipt&M
St, Outlook o f  WTO ’s Ministerial Conference in Singapore) (Taipei: Board of Foreign Trade, unpublished 
paper, 1996).
408 See Hongzen Wang (1997), op. cit., pp. 160-161.
409 See Jane Kaufman Winn, ‘Not by Rule of Law: Mediating State-Society Relations in Taiwan through 
the Underground Economy’, in Murray A. Rubinstein (ed.), The Other Taiwan—1945 to the Present. 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp.204-209; Gary G. Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu, “The 
Institutional Foundations of Chinese Business: The Family Firm in Taiwan,” Comparative Social 
Research, vol. 12, 1990, p. 145.
410 Gary G. Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu, op. cit., p. 145.
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ignores the fact that this specific social closure is formed under a specific Taiwan social 
formation, which can be transformed or destroyed by newly arisen social forces. The price 
competition, the power manoeuvres or the rise of a new party can change the shape of 
social closure. A firm that used a social relationship to gain orders from a public organ has 
to face competition from outsiders, in a democracy or free economy, as in the case o f the 
cement company that sold products to Taipower. Competitors wrote letters to the Ministry 
o f Justice Investigation Bureau to ask for an investigation into its collusive monopoly. 
Accompanying the process of democratisation, the earlier corruption can no longer be 
tolerated, and the interest community comes under great pressure to disintegrate. In 1996, 
strong public opinion regarding corruption in a new airport construction project forced the 
government to take actions to investigate it, and also forced a KMT party-owned 
enterprise to pull out of the bidding.411
Secondly, the broader one’s social network is, the more obligations one has to bear. 
It is like the balance sheet, where assets are always equal to liability plus equity. The 
network will collapse if one could not fulfill her/his duty. A Taiwanese saying is that ‘it is 
more difficult to pay back a renqing debt’ (A 'I'f People instead prefer to use
pecuniary rewards to pay back what they owe.
Regarding the existence of long-term relationships, transaction theory tries to explain 
the contradictions between short-term profit-maximisation (struggles between buyers and 
sellers and between themselves) and long-term personal trust in terms of economic cost. 
This theory argues that every transaction will incur a cost: for example, to acquire credit, 
to know the quality of one's products, to quote prices, etc. All these kinds of costs will be 
marked up into a product's price. But if buyers and sellers have established long-term 
relationships, many costs would be saved and hence reduce the cost and price. Based on 
this incentive, a long-term social network would help to reduce the whole transaction cost. 
This can also be applied to industrial organisation. For example, clothes can be finished in 
a firm, or be put out and finished by many firms. Which organisation of production is used 
depends on the total cost one form or another will incur.
The problem with this theory is that it is tautological and static: tautological, because
411 This situation is like the history Karl Polanyi interpreted, but in the opposite way, that the anti-self- 
regulating market movements were spontaneous in order to protect different groups’ own interests. People 
who are deprived the right to access certain profits would gather together to fight for their interests.
167
Chapter 4 Marketing Management
what exists becomes reasonable to be labelled as a cost reduction; and what does not exist 
is therefore deemed to be comparatively high cost; static, because there is no analysis of 
dynamic processes in this theory.412 When it says that the existing social networks reduce 
transaction costs, it just says the existing social system is the best up to now, but says 
nothing about how it evolved and where it will be going. We would like to know the 
dynamic development of the social institutions, but their reply will be only: when the 
transaction cost is changed, they will be changed. For example, many informants said that 
the subcontracting o f shoe and textile production in Taiwan did not appear until the mid- 
1970s, and before that time, any newly increased orders were met by expanding the 
production scale.413 How do we explain this change? They might say because of the rising 
costs to produce within a firm, the institutions had to change to a subcontracting system. 
But then why do both forms exist at the same time after the 1970s? Since the concept of 
cost is too broad to include everything, we have no idea what are the most important 
factors in evaluating transaction costs.414
Not all relationships are long-term, and not all long-term relationships are close. Step 
by step, a short-term relationship could be changed into a long-term relationship; and too, 
step by step, a long-term relationship can be transformed and destroyed. A relationship is 
dynamic and developmental, and people in the relationship have to balance the assets and 
liabilities. It is not governed by economic calculations only, nor by social relations only, but 
a dynamic result o f the two forces.
So transaction cost theory tells us one side of the story, i.e., that economic links, both 
short-term and long-term, are organised along the principle of minimum cost, but this does 
not tell us what sorts o f social institutions are employed to assign everyone a role to play 
and to provide mechanisms to guarantee the transactions’ security. It is always assumed
412 This is the basic problem of neo-classical economic analysis, which uses comparative equilibrium to 
explain change, and once the world reaches equilibrium, it will never change. So ‘in the long run’, we 
would all reach an equilibrium, where market efficiency would govern our life.
413 Also see the survey done by a Japanese scholar in the first half 1970s on bike-manufacturing, who found
that the subcontracting system was not well developed because of less developed industrial linkages. See 
Take Mizuno OJcff ‘Chusho Kigyo no Shihon Yushitsu—Taiwan ni Okeru Kemikarushyuzu Seizogyo 
no Shirei wo Chuxin to shite’ (+ ' ] '  #  no ^  4-^T ih — & ni Okeru Kemikarushyuzu no
wo ^  to shite, SMEs’ capital export—the case of the chemical shoes industry in Taiwan) (Tokyo: 
Yuhikaku, 1973), p.200.
414 Douglass C. North tries to analyse the evolution o f social institutions by the concept of transaction costs. 
He told us to find out those factors which changed the transaction costs of institutional arrangements. If so, 
we cannot see any important factor in the theory at all. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional
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that the modem legal system is able to do this, but we have argued that other institutions, 
such as social pressure arising from social relations, or gangsters, are much more important 
to provide security to transactions. Besides, transaction theory cannot explain the 
structural changes caused by the profit-pursuing activities, like the lifting of controls on 
Taiwanese investment in China, or the demand to privatise public enterprises.
In contrast with transaction theory, the cultural approach, as in the Taiwanese 
scholars’ explanation of Taiwan’s development, tells another side of the story, but this 
story is also static and ^-historical. The ‘Chinese way’ of marketing is like an ‘orientalist 
concept’, which excludes the common experience of capitalist society, i.e., the market 
forces that can destroy a long-term established social network.415 Both of the theories are 
partially correct, but not wholely.
4.8 Conclusion
Meeting a product’s quality specifications, at a competitive price, and adhering to 
reliable delivery standards are the three minimum requirements for selling in the market. 
Without these, there can be no co-operation or long-term relationship. That is business.
However, one might not be able to sell one’s product in a market even if a company 
can meet the three requirements. Political and economic power manoeuvres, and certain 
forms o f closures can result in a barrier to market entry. These kinds of closures are 
produced in certain social contexts which cannot be reproduced elsewhere. I have explored 
the close cooperation between big firms and the government in the 1950s, which resulted 
in a segregated market: big firms specialised in the domestic market, while SMEs sold their 
products overseas. In the late 1980s, the international political and economic forces 
opened the domestic market, and pushed the big firms to sell more overseas. The relative 
importance of the American and Japanese markets for Taiwanese SMEs was gradually 
replaced by China and ASEAN.
The concept o f ‘embeddedness’ used by some scholars expounds this point.416 Many
Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
415 For Karl Polanyi, the tragedy the industrial revolution brought is not the lowering of living standards, 
but the destruction of the traditional community, a kind of cultural disaster for the working class. See Karl 
Polanyi, op. cit., pp. 271-289.
416 See Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, ‘Introduction to the Sociology of Economic Life’, in 
Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg (eds.), The Sociology o f Economic Life (Boulder, San Francisco, 
Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 1-26.
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Taiwan scholars like to use the concept ‘guanxi ’ to depict this business closure in Taiwan.
I have argued that the prevalent utilisation of guanxi resulted from a specific social milieu, 
and not so much the innate cultural traits of Chinese businesspeople. Pulling guanxi is 
important because it enables businesspeople to make profits. Because the guanxi is based 
on mutual interests, it is dynamic and developmental. Following Polanyi’s analysis of 
capitalist society, I have argued that ‘the economy is directed by market prices and nothing 
but market prices, where human beings behave in such a way as to achieve maximum 
money gains’ .417 The prevailing market forces intervene in social relations, and even though 
there are social closures and long-term relationships, they can disintegrate due to 
differences o f interest. The pursuit o f profits not only influences personal interactions and 
relationships, it also pushes the state to conform to the market trends. When Karl Marx 
wrote that capitalist forces are in some ways progressive, he meant that individuals 
transformed feudal social values when they were driven to pursue individual profits. From 
this viewpoint, we can understand the role o f businesspeople in Taiwan’s democratisation 
process: when there was an interest for them to maintain the system, they collaborated with 
the ruling party; when there are conflicts o f interest, they would break the rules without 
hesitation. A businessperson has to exploit his guanxi to make profits, but at the same time 
s/he is sometimes unconsciously testing and chipping away at the existing social order, as 
with the government’s ‘Go Slowly Toward China’ policy, which often has been challenged 
by the business community.
All transactions must be based on mutual trust to a certain degree, and this kind of 
trust is underpinned by law, or social pressure, or private violence. Traditionally, social 
pressure provided a strong measure of transaction security, but no longer operates so 
effectively in a modem context. Gangsters can alternatively be resorted to, but this 
ultimately becomes dysfunctional to the smooth operations o f any business community. 
We can expect that Taiwanese SMEs will increasingly rely on law courts to adjudicate and 
to guarantee trust, with less resort to social pressure or the threat of violence.
Ibid: p. 10.
170
Chapter 5 Human Resources Management
Chapter 5: Human Resources Management
In a pure capitalist labour market, the relations between capitalists and labourers are 
theoretically similar to two commodities exchanged in the market. Taiwan’s economists 
mainly adopt this viewpoint to interpret Taiwan’s labour market.
At the same time, Chinese enterprises are usually described as ‘family enterprises’, 
for they are usually controlled and managed by a family. This is often praised by scholars 
who see Chinese culture as one of the secrets of Taiwan’s economic success. Pure market 
forces do not function in such a ‘traditional values-laden labour market’. This approach 
does not, however, tell us why there are a lot of failing family enterprises, and why the 
turnover rate of the labour force is so high.
In this chapter I will discuss labour-capital relations, and, contrary to economists, 
will observe how the traditional cultural values, set in specific political and economic 
structures, affect organisational behaviour, which might not follow market principles, i.e., 
other considerations might be placed prior to profit calculations. I will explore the social 
norms, which influence the ways to find a job, and the industrial relations in an enterprise.
I will also discuss the reasons why Taiwan’s family firms want to employ family members 
as their inner circle.
However, the cultural factors are not left intact, and we will see how market forces 
condition the working of traditional values and, moreover, when these factors do not fit 
into a capitalist society, how the enterprise will be changed. I will discuss the consequences 
of hiring an inefficient family member in an enterprise, and the family division caused by 
family discord. I will compare the new types of family division in industrial Taiwanese 
society, which are different from Wong’s model based on agricultural Chinese society. In 
the last part o f the chapter I will explore the new labour market situation after the mid- 
1980s, and try to identify the new ways that the family enterprises adapt to cope with the 
new circumstances.
5.1 The Economic Structure and Family Firms
According to the definition set by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, about 98% of
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Taiwan’s firms in 1995 were SMEs.418 They absorbed about 80% of the total labour 
force.419 However, the data does not show the role of the family firm in the economy. In 
Chapter Three, I mentioned that most of my informants’ companies are wholly-owned (3fj 
It)- The government data confirm that 60% of the SMEs in 1995 were wholly-owned, and 
only 1.3% of the SMEs adopted any form of partnership ( 4 " ^ ) .  28% were limited 
companies ( #  s] ), and 10% were stock-holding companies »J ).420
From the viewpoint o f ownership, we can safely say that at least 60% of the SMEs 
were not so much individually owned but rather were family firms, and that these SMEs 
employed more than 50% of the total labour force. Too, many of the stock-holding 
companies are also family firms. In their research o f Taiwan’s business groups, Hamilton 
and Kao found that sixty-three (66%) out of the ninety-six groups are family firms, and 
thirty-one (32%) also counted as ‘quasi-family firms’, though in a Western legal sense 
these would be considered partnerships.421
This kind o f organisational form has an influence on Taiwan’s economic activities. 
We need to know why Taiwan’s businesses adopt this sort o f organisational form. Is it a 
product o f Chinese culture? Or a kind of organisational form adapted to a specific political 
economy? Let me start with the cultural factors, and then observe how they fit into the 
capitalist economy.
5.2 Working for the Patriarchal Family
In Chapter Two we have shown that running a successful business is an upwardly 
mobile path for those not successful in climbing the educational ladder. Another important 
inspiration derives from family values. Many interviewees said that they had to work day 
and night when they started their business. They felt it their duty to do so, as they had taken 
money belonging to the family, which reduced the security of the whole family. If they 
failed, all o f the family would be seriously affected. Martin King Whyte also found that ‘the
418 The definition has been changed seven times. See Jingjibu ($iL$f~§P » Ministry of Economic Affairs),
Zhonghua minguo Bashisi nian Zhongxiao Qiye Baipishu ’ White
Paper on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in the Republic of China, 1996) (Taipei: Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, 1996), pp.351-354, appendix 1.
419 Ib id: pp. 56-57.
420 Ibid.: p. 71.
421 See Gary G. Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu, ‘The Institutional Foundation of Chinese Business: the 
family firm in Taiwan’, Comparative Social Research, vol. 12 (1990), p. 143.
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continuing strong family obligations make it possible to mobilise individuals very 
successfully for family-based entrepreneurial activities’.422
The data that I computed from 'A General Survey o f Social Change in Taiwan, 
1992\ running all of the data through my computer, shows that 21.5% of the interviewees 
were self-employed, and 6.7% worked for their families (see Table 5.1). If we exclude 
retired people, housewives, and unknown cases, more than one out of three worked for 
their family. Even when we exclude farmers (one hundred and eighty-three cases), about 
27% of the informants worked for their family.
Table 5.1 Working Place Distribution, 1992
unit: %
Category Self-
em ployed
W ork in 
Com pany
W ork in 
Fam ily
U n­
em ployed
R etired H ouse­
w ife
Unknown TO TA L
Frequencies 512 1075 160 79 63 471 17 2377
Percent (1) 21.5 45.2 6.7 3.3 2.7 19.8 0.7 100.0
Percent (2) 28.0 58.9 8.7 4.3 - - -- 100.0
Source: Calculated from “A General Survey o f Social Change in Taiwan, 1992”. The research was 
conducted by the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica under the directorship of Professor 
Kuo-shu Yang and Hei-yuan Chiu.
Notes: Percent (1) includes those people not counted in the labour force statistics, and percent (2) excludes 
these people.
Who works for the family? I have computed from the ‘General Survey5 that sixty- 
seven percent o f them were females and thirty-three percent were males. Among the 
females, 76% of them did not receive any wage, while the figure for males is only 50%. In 
other words, far more females worked as unpaid family workers. The official data shows 
that the percentage of unpaid family workers in the total labour force is declining, down 
from 12.4% in 1978 to 8.4% in 1996, and that the share o f unpaid female family workers 
increased from 62.6% to 74.6% within this group.42^
Another statistic computed from the same database is that among the one hundred 
and forty-five self-employed who hired more than one worker in their business, excluding
422 See Martin K. Whyte, ‘The Chinese Family and Economic Development: Obstacle or Engine?’, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol 45, no. 1, (Jan 1996), p. 17.
423 See Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan ( f r ü tf ö .L t t  $ 2), 
Zhonghua Minguo Bashiwu nian Taiwan Diqu Renli Ziyuan Diaocha Tongji Nianbao ( ft 0
■%- £#AkiQk tf-ft-ftft, Yearbook o f Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area, ROC,
1996) (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 1997), pp.52-53, Table 14.
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farmers, 72% of the employers were males. Adding together the owners and those who 
work for their family, those who answered ‘I take part in important decision making5, 69% 
are males. According to the government’s survey in 1996, 87% of all employers are 
males.424 This confirms the patriarchal image of Taiwan’s family firms, which usually use 
unpaid family females, while the owners and decision makers are mostly males.
Not only are the decision-making posts in the family firms largely occupied by males, 
but capital flows from females to males, and from parents to sons. The wife’s dowry and 
‘private savings’ are used to help the husband’s business, and the wife’s separate
occupation serves as the family’s safety net when the husband fails in business. One of my 
respondents had a wood-processing firm. After a default on a cheque, he was arrested and 
put in jail. His wife had to sell dumplings in the local market in Gaoxiong, and all her 
income was used to pay the debt, the three children's education and the rent. Another 
informant said that his wife encouraged him to set up a company, and if he had failed, she 
still had a stable teaching job at a school, wfiich would have enabled her to support the 
family with three children. Her support made him decide to open a factory of his own.
Though female family workers contribute to the family firm, and they are legally 
entitled to inherit the family property, they are not entitled to inherit according to 
Taiwanese custom. In her research o f gender differences in household resource allocation 
strategies, Holin Lin finds that Taiwanese and Mainlanders’ sons ‘actually got much more 
in the division o f parental property’ other than cash (see Table 5.2).425
Cash is normally given to the daughter as her dowry. A daughter working in the 
company might get a dowry as her reward, but the dowry would soon be channeled into 
her husband’s initial capital if her husband wants to open a business. A company is usually 
taken over by a son, though daughter(s) also work in the family firm. Many male 
informants told me that it is important to have a son. One informant has three daughters, 
one of whom works in a big company, and the other two work in his own company. He said 
that he did not have any incentive to expand the firm, even though there is an expanding 
market, for he does not have a son to inherit the business he has established. Another
424 Ibid: pp. 52-53, Table 14.
425 See Holin Lin » Lin Heling), ‘Gender Culture as Economic Determinant: Household Resource
Allocation Strategies Among Ethnic Groups in Taiwan’, paper presented at Conference on Social 
Stratification and Mobility: Newly Industrializing Economies Compared (Taipei: International 
Sociological Association Research Committee 28, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, 1998), p. 103.
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respondent placed his two sons into the company, and even though they are not competent, 
according to the respondent’s brother, he still wants to leave the factory to the two sons 
after he retires. At the moment, most of the managerial work is done by the two 
daughters-in-law.
Table 5.2 Who Actually Got WTiat in the Division of Parental Property
Colum n pet (percentage in  its ethnic group population)
(Count) Taiwanese Mainlander
D a u g h te r ^  s ) Son( s) D aughters) Son(s)
Land 4 .6 6 2 .9 6 .0 4 1 .0
(4 3 ) (5 8 2 ) (5 ) (3 4 )
House 2 .6 12 .6 6 .0 1 6 .9
(2 4 ) (1 1 7 ) (5 ) (1 4 )
Cash 6 .2 2 .2 9 .6 3 .6
(5 7 ) (2 0 ) (8 ) (3)
Others 1.5 0 .3 6 .0 0
(1 4 ) (3) (5 ) (0 )
Source: See Holin Lin (#.-$^5^- » Lin Heling), ‘Gender Culture as Economic Determinant: 
Household Resource Allocation Strategies Among Ethnic Groups in Taiwan’, paper 
presented at Conference on Social Stratification and Mobility: Newly Industrializing 
Economies Compared (Taipei: International Sociological Association Research 
Committee 28, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, 1998), p. 103, Table 3B.
But working hard for a patriarchal family does not mean that one needs to work for 
one’s own family enterprise. One can also work in a big company and remit money back to 
the family. The question is why a lot of family members do work in a family enterprise. I 
would argue that there are two main reasons: to keep non-family workers from sharing in 
the profits; and to evade tax. To use family members to work in one's company is like 
killing two birds with one stone, i.e., reducing any labour-capital conflict and engaging in 
Taiwan’s most common form of corruption.
5.3 Labour-Capital Relationship in SMEs
On the one hand, an owner of an enterprise prefers to hire more family members or 
relatives, for it is easy to use social relations to de-mobilise the other labourers, as we have 
seen in Chapter Two. But on the other hand, the owner has to run the risk o f hiring an 
inefficient relative. It is almost impossible to fire a relative, for one has to follow the
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traditional norm and be kind to all one's friends and relatives.426 A family firm has to 
balance the cost and benefit o f employing family members and relatives. In this section, I 
will discuss how the SMEs recruit labourers, how they manage them, and what the possible 
outcomes are when conflicts arise.
5.3.1 The Role of Social Relations in Job-Searching
In the 1960s, a lot of the workers were from rural areas, and they had to find their 
first job through personal connections in the urban areas. An informant told me that in the 
1950s, labourers from Beimen mainly went to Gaoxiong and Tainan. He emigrated to 
Gaoxiong, not because there was a job for him, but because he believed that there might 
be a job, and more important, because he had a classmate whom he could rely on to 
provide a free sleeping space. If  there were no such social contact in Gaoxiong, he would 
have gone to Tainan, because Tainan is much nearer to Beimen. A personal network 
based on a common hometown provided the most important social network on which 
migration was premised. Migrants tended to select their residences or occupations on the 
basis of relatives and friends from the same community, as Alexander Chien-chung Yin 
observed of Penghu immigrants in Gaoxiong,427 Ke Zhimin (Ka Chi-ming, j5} of 
Wufenpu ( emigrants in Taipei,428 and Michael Backman o f overseas Chinese in 
Southeast Asia.429 The formation of the immigrant community was based on an 
‘immigration net’, which means one person ‘pulls’ another into the newly established 
community and forms a distinct social network. It serves two economic functions: one is 
to supply a labour force for owners who are from the same community; the other is to 
provide basic social help for newly arrived sojourners.4’0 For workers and bosses, it
426 It is hard to define what is close relatives. Those workers introduced by relatives or friends are not close 
relatives, for they do not belong to the first circle of the boss. Close relatives could be those relatives who 
have direct contact with the boss, and interact more frequently than others.
427 See Alexander Chien-chung Yin, ‘Voluntary Associations and Rural-Urban Migration’, in Emily 
Martin Ahem and Hill Gates (eds.), The Anthropology o f  Taiwanese Society (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1981), p. 327.
428 See Ke Zhimin, Xiaoxing Oiye de Chuangye, Jingying yu Shengchan Zuzhi—yi Wufenpu Chengyi 
Zhizaoye wei Anli de Fenxi (The Establishments, Managements and Production Organisation o f Small 
Enterprises—Cases Study o f Ready-made Clothes Industry in Wufenpu) (Taipei: Sinica Academia, 1993).
429 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia, (Canberra: 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Commonwealth of Australia, 1995), pp. 13-18.
430 It also serves political function. In Gaoxiong, a newly planned industrial city in the 1920s, there are 
three factions which were based on immigration background. One is called ‘Zaidi ’ faction (>£.*&), another
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became an indispensable ‘instrument’ in finding a job or in doing business.
This situation has not changed a lot after 30 years. This can be observed in the survey 
data that I computed on the ways in which people obtained their jobs. Fei Xiaotong’s 
classification of Chinese guanxi is adopted here to distinguish the closeness of the 
relationship with the interviewee, i.e., with the ego (& in Fei’s term.4jl Excluding those 
working in primary industry, and according to closeness, I find that only one-third of the 
people obtained their job through an impersonal channel, e.g., the state exam, an 
employment bureau, a public advertisement, or a company’s formal recruitment. One- 
fourth o f the sample were introduced by non-relatives, e.g., friends, teachers, classmates or 
colleagues, 12% were introduced by family members or relatives to work in a non­
relative’s company, while 30% worked for their family, a relative’s business or were self- 
employed.4’2 A survey done by the government similarly shows that 41% of the SMEs’ 
employees were introduced to work in a company via personal contacts, and 52% were 
recruited by impersonal methods.43’ The statistics imply that social networks in searching 
for a job are important.
According to the yearly survey done by the D irectorate-G eneral o f the Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, 40% of the employed in 1979 obtained their jobs through 
the introduction o f relatives/ friends or teachers. The percentage declined to 34.5% 
in 1996. The way o f finding a job by referring to ads or posters doubled from 11% 
to 22% in the same period.4^ 4 This long-term  data reveals that, even though social 
netw orks are im portant in searching for a job, their relative im portance is declining, 
accompanying the capitalist development o f Taiw an’s economy.
Cross-tabulating how people find jobs with company size in terms o f workers, we 
find that the smaller the business size, the more likely that it hires people introduced by 
family members and relatives. According to my own computations of the 1992 survey,
is ‘Penghu’ (M'M) and the other one is ‘Tainan’ (& &) faction, whose members are mainly from Beimen 
area. Both Penghu and Tainan factions are organised by those immigrants from these two counties.
431 See Fei Xiaotong Xiangtu Zhongguo Xiangtu Chongjian 4* @ 3t?£) (Taipei:
unknown publisher), p. 27.
432 Calculated from “4 General Survey o f Social Change in Taiwan, 1992”, question 56: How do you find 
your present job and your first job? Valid cases are 1,513.
433 See Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Zhonghuaminguo 84 
Nian Zhongxiao Oiye Baipishu ( f  'J'jE M  & & it, White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises) 
(Taipei: MOEA, 1996), p. 97, Table 3-2-8.
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those firms employing less than twenty persons recruited 49% of their labour force from 
among family members or relatives, 28% were introduced by friends or colleagues, and 
23% through impersonal recruitment. The figures for companies employing fewer than one 
hundred workers were 22%, 36% and 42% respectively; while for those employing more 
than five hundred workers, they were 12%, 37% and 51% respectively. The survey done 
by the government in 1997 showed that among firms employing more than three hundred 
workers, 81% of the labourers are recruited by public selection, and only 10% are 
introduced by the workers in the firm. The figures for those firms hiring less than thirty 
workers are 63% and 27% respectively.4j5
In short, social networks play an important role in recruiting the labour force, but 
their importance is declining gradually. The role of social networks is also different 
between SMEs and big firms. The bigger the firm, the less important the social network in 
helping to find a job.436 When a company grows to a certain size, its social network reaches 
a limit, and it has to resort to less personal ways to recruit its labour force.
5.3.2 Social Roles and Self-Interests in Working Place
Different ways of recruiting manpower will influence the capital-labour relationships 
in the company. We have discussed the labour-capital relationships in Chapter Two. For 
SMEs, it is easy to use small group pressures to control labour. In this kind of organisation, 
traditional social relations play a key role to harmonise labour-capital relationships.
To cite an example, three brothers jointly ran an electronic components company, 
and they hired a niece to work as personnel manager. She continuously emphasised the 
importance o f ‘keeping good relationships within a family’ ( ^ J *3 when I asked her
the key to the success of the company. Regarding the turnover rate o f the labour force, she 
said that she was exceptional, for she had worked there over ten years, and ‘eight out of ten 
technicians will leave’, she said with contempt. Her words show that she does not identify
434 See Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, op. cit., pp. 264-265, 
Table 99.
435 See Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan 
Zhonghua Minguo Taiwan Diqu Shiye Renli Guyong Zhuangkuang Diaocha Baogao( f '
fT M f t  ft'2LM  Report on the Employment o f Manpower, Taiwan Area, ROC, 1997)
(Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 1997), p.66, Table 17.
436 Calculated from “A General Survey o f Social Change in Taiwan, 1992 ”, question 56: How did you find 
your present job and your first job? And question 21: how many workers are there in your company? Valid 
cases are 1026.
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herself as an ‘employee’ at all. She has tried her best to fulfil the ‘family member’s role’ in 
the company. That is why she disliked the high turnover rate of the labour force, which 
reduced the possibility of accumulating the skills to operate the company.
The rules set within the organisation might be grounded in pre-existing social norms, 
not rules set by either capitalists or the legal system. One’s identity is multifaceted, and 
one’s identity as an employee is not necessarily dominant. If the labour-capital relationship 
does not dominate the work place and instead other social relationships prevail, the rules 
within the organisation might not follow the capitalist logic. Under this circumstance, 
labourers have to try to maximise their income under the constraint of their social roles.4^ 7 
At another company, the labourers were mostly introduced by friends in the neighborhood 
of the factory, and my informant said that ‘the production efficiency of these old female 
workers is as good as that o f young female workers, for they’re more willing to adjust their 
time to comply with the company’s production schedule, and they are also willing to work 
overtime.’ These old female workers were willing to do so because they were poor and 
needed more money, and they had to keep good ganqing with the boss.
Not everyone follows the social norms set for them, however. Most labourers 
assume the social role of a worker for the short term, but then leave after s/he has learned 
the necessary skill to open his/her own shop. Another interviewee said that 50% of the 
newly recruited workers will leave in the first year, and another 20% in the coming year. As 
seen in Chapter Two, the less educated try to get a job in the labour market, but seek the 
opportunity to become self-employed. Yet this kind of short-term proletarianism makes it 
possible to endure unreasonable pressure from the work place. The research in Wufenpu 
done by Ke Zhiming shows that relatives are more willing to do overtime work, and are 
more flexible in meeting the boss’s requirements, though they also complained about it and 
felt exploited. Richard W. Stites found that ‘workers are aware that surface friendliness 
with the owner is just that’;438 the deeply rooted labour-capital conflict still exists.
From the boss’s perspective, s/he also plays two roles in a profit-seeking organisation, 
those of the capitalist minded business(wo)man, and the kind philanthropist. She or he can 
seek to exploit the social relations to enhance his or her dominance over the workers for 
profit. But the owner does not necessarily behave in a paternalistic way and take care of the
43 This point is consistent with neoclassical economics theory on utility maximisation. 
438See Richard W. Stites, op. cit., 1985, p. 236.
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workers as in the relationship between father and sons.4^ 9 Gordon Redding has argued that 
the management pattern is paternal. But my comparison o f  family and non-family 
enterprises showed that this paternalistic management only exists in the family firm, and 
even there the management pattern is not always paternal. Ambrose Yeo-chi King found 
that Chinese like to hire kinsmen on the grounds that they are reliable, competent and 
responsible.440 But when self-interests conflict, the 'generous' side o f patriarchy gives way 
to self-interest.
I asked owners their opinion o f  the Basic Labour Rights Law. They all complained 
about its 'bias towards the workers'. One extreme case is an interviewee who spent most o f  
the time talking about his experience in joining the Ciji (,%$£) Buddhist sect when I 
interviewed him. He said he used to be an alcoholic, but after conversion to the Ciji 
Buddhist sect, he changed his personality totally and his family life became 'warm and 
happy'. “Religion also changed my attitudes toward workers. I used to think that I spent 
money to hire them, but now I think that they spend their time to work only for a low  
remuneration. Now I treat them as if they are my family members”. But when I asked him 
about the Basic Labour Rights Law, he said that 'this law is copied from Japan. But the 
government did not consider that the Japanese and Chinese national characters are 
different. Japanese will work hard seven days to get seven days’ reward, but Taiwanese 
would ‘steal time’ (be lazy) as much as possible, even if they are paid for seven days.... This 
law is like "raising rats to bite rice bags" 31), encouraging labourers to fight
against their boss.' Self-interest almost always plays a key role in the owner’s decision­
making, and religious belief or ethics has little role to play in this domain.
This finding is consistent with Donald DeGlopper’s observation that the employers 
are not paternalistic, nor are the employees dependent, and that both sides like this kind o f  
relationship.441 Though the boss and workers are linked through social relations in the 
beginning, their later interactions follow the logic o f capitalism, i.e., an impersonal way o f  
interactions would be more effective in realising profits.
439 See Gary Hamilton, and Nicole Woolsey Biggart, ‘Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative 
Analysis of Management and Organisation in the Far East”, American Journal o f Sociology, vol. 94 (1988) 
(Supplement), pp. 52-94.
440 See Ambrose Y. C. King and Ranee P. L. Lee (eds.), Social Life and Development in Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1981).
441 See Donald DeGlopper, ‘Artisan Work and Life in Taiwan\  Modem China, vol. 5, no. 3 (July 1979), p. 
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Family firms which hire family members and relatives or friends also have labour- 
capital conflicts. The most common contradiction involves the promotion of workers. 
Important positions are reserved for family members, and not so close relatives find it 
difficult to get promoted. As in the family firm mentioned above that is controlled by three 
brothers and their relatives, non-family members do not have much opportunity to be 
promoted in the firm, so these workers leave to find their own way.442 When I computed 
the survey data of ‘A General Survey o f Social Change in Taman, 1992’ for the question 
‘What is the outlook for your career?’, the mean score—that is, the optimism regarding 
promotion—of those finding a job by impersonal means is statistically significantly higher 
than those who had used a personal way (excluding the self-employed in the sample).443 
We have found that the bigger the firm, the more likely it is to recruit labourers in an 
impersonal way, so we can say that the career outlook in the big firms is better than for 
those working in relatives’ firms.
Income distribution shows the same pattern. For males, those working for one’s 
family or co-investing with relatives, or self-employed, have higher incomes than those 
whose jobs were introduced by relatives or friends, and the average incomes of those 
finding their jobs through an impersonal way lay between the above two groups.444 This 
indicates that in family firms, family members are paid better than non-family members.
If the career outlook in a small family firm is not good, and if the pay is not as good as 
expected, workers leave and look for another job or they set up their own company. This 
reaction can resolve the contradiction between social relations and market relations: on the 
one hand, both boss and workers can keep the social relations harmonious on the surface; 
on the other hand, labour can shift to keep the market efficient.
5.4 Family Enterprises and Tax Evasion
As noted earlier, one reason to use family members to be managers is to evade tax. 
Almost everyone complains about the government’s inefficiency and corruption. Most of
442 Xie Guoxiong also found the same result in his fieldwork. See Xie Guoxiong, op. cit., p. 34.
443 It is a seven scale question from -3 to 3. The higher the score, the better the outlook for one’s career, and 
the expected mean score is zero after recoding. The mean score of those finding their job in an impersonal 
way is 0.72, while those introduced by family members to work in a non-relative company report an 
average outlook of 0.65, and those introduced by friends score 0.56. p<0.00.
444 Male’s average monthly income of those finding their job in impersonal way is NT$34,567, while those 
introduced by family members to work in non-relative company report NT$30,244, and that by friends is 
NT$29,973. Self-employed reported NT$41,406, and working for one’s family was NT$31,548.
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my informants said that they would pay more tax if the taxes were really used for social 
welfare or public works. But they claim that too much of the taxes go into bureaucrats’ 
pockets: ‘the more we pay, the more they get’. Tax evasion has become epidemic. In 
Chapter Three we have discussed how taxes are evaded in practice. Here we will discuss 
corruption, and the utility o f hiring family members to cope with corruption.
5.4.1 Government Regulations and Bribery Practices
The Chinese saying 'Yamen bazi kai, meiqian biejinlaV  (4§xrUY^ T*\ ’ 
fc.)445 expresses the phenomenon o f pervasive corruption. The situation has changed 
slightly since Taiwan’s democratisation, but according to a Far Eastern Economic Review 
survey in May 1995, Taiwan is still ranked as the most corrupt country among the four 
little tigers 446 In 1993, 45.7% of interviewees agreed that without bribery it is difficult to 
deal with civil servants, while only 26.4% disagreed. When asked about local government 
bureaucrats, 55.5% felt their integrity was suspect, while only 12.9% believed there was 
no problem.447 Unpublished research by the Ministry of Justice in 1997 shows a low degree 
o f popular faith in officials in various government departments. Table 5.3 shows the results 
o f the survey. As it demonstrates, in only one department did most public servants gain 
even the ‘passing’ score of six.
An interviewee, M, said that he was required to reduce the amount o f ash his factory 
produced according to a new environmental law. Bureaucrat A ‘recommended’ to him 
some ‘highly rated’ companies to do the work. He quoted X company, one of the good 
rated company, which asked for US$32,000, while another ‘non-rated’ Y company 
charged only US$20,000. Naturally, he gave the work to company Y. After construction, 
the new equipment failed to pass inspection. M asked Y why he failed to pass the 
subsequent inspection, and Y in turn rang A to know what the problems were. It turned 
out that A wanted a ‘commission’ of US$6,000 for this work. M was very angry, and 
asked A to come to his factory to take the ‘commission’. Though M recorded what they 
talked about when A came to take the money, he did not go to court because he ‘did not 
have time to deal with these things’. He said that he later listed this expenditure as a ‘cost 
in socialising’. Afterwards he found that X company was run by a local politician’s relative,
445 It means that a government office welcomes everyone, but don’t come here without bringing any money.
446 See Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 May 1995.
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and many factories asked these ‘good-rated’ companies to do the environmental 
protection work to prevent harassment from the bureaucracy. If the people in charge of the 
environmental protection inspection are thus corrupt, given that they were the only ones to 
get a passing score of 6 (Table 5.3), we can imagine the corruption of the public servants in 
other departments.
Table 5.3 Subjective Impression of the Integrity of Public Servants
Mean Score
Local Representative ( S&lT 4.1
Representatives at Central Government Level( 4* ^  E ift) 4.3
Civil Servants in Charge of Urban Planning ( i t i f  A f | ) 4.7
Civil Servants in Charge of Customs Inspection A  M) 4.8
Minister ( - M M  ) 5.1
Police ( &%■) 5.1
Judge, Prosecutor ) 5.4
Civil Servants ( ) 5.5
Civil Servants in Charge of Taxation ( ) 5.5
Civil Servants in Charge of Environmental Inspection AM ) 6.0
Source: Ministry of Justice, Taiwan Diqu Minzhong dui Zhengfu Lianzheng Zhuguan 
Zhibiao—Minyi Diaocha Baogaoshu (
j  TiM M-cTilt, Report of the Subjective Index on Government 's Integrity in
Taiwan) (Taipei: the Ministry of Justice, 1997), pp.63-69.
Note: Interviewee was asked to mark a score ranging from 0 to 10 to evaluate the officials’ 
integrity. 0 means not upright at all, and 10 means 100% upright. In Taiwan, 6 is the 
passing score, a score of less than six indicates failure.
Even where bureaucrats are not corrupt, it still takes a long time to process an 
application. For most industries, especially the construction industry, time is money, and 
approval of an application one day earlier means saving one day’s interest on invested 
capital. For example, because land is extremely expensive in Taiwan, after purchasing a 
site a construction company will want to start as soon as possible. But the application 
procedure may vary from one month to three months, depending on bureaucrats’ ‘free­
will’448. If the construction licence is approved one month earlier than normal, the 
company can save a huge amount, enough to pay the ‘socialising cost’ incurred from 
dealing with bureaucrats. The head of one very big construction company in Taiwan 
complained at a conference that because o f bureaucratic harassment ‘min bu liao sheng’
44' See Qu Haiyuan ( | l  >&#), op. cit., pp. 232-233.
448 In Chinese, this term also connotes the meaning of ‘arbitrary’.
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’ people cannot survive any more). To deal with ‘bureaucratic work’, her 
company organised a team and spent a lot of time in establishing connections with 
bureaucrats. What the company wants is to speed up the bureaucratic approval process. 
When ‘a case’ is processed the head of the company would arrange to meet bureaucrats to 
express his gratitude for the help. Big companies can organise a work-team to specialise in 
this work, but small and medium-sized enterprises have to resort to their guanxi with a 
local faction.
The two cases mentioned above lie within the legal framework, and bureaucrats 
cannot be charged as corrupt if they simply ‘recommend’ that businesspeople do 
something, or give a hand to companies to speed up applications. Yet every sphere that 
involves government intervention gives bureaucrats a chance for corruption. When one 
starts a business, one has to face different regulations for environmental pollution 
prevention, labour health and safety protection etc. To run a profitable business in Taiwan, 
one has to run the risk of corruption, as most informants who are businesspeople told me. 
The following cases are all illegal ways in which businesspeople deal with bureaucrats.
To set up a company one has to comply with a lot of government regulations. 
Generally speaking, it is difficult for small enterprises to meet these regulations, so these 
businesspeople have to take ‘detours’ to get the required licences. To send a ‘red 
envelope’ (bribe) is the easiest way. The above mentioned Ministry of Justice survey 
shows that 22% of the interviewees or their relatives had given a red envelope to civil 
servants with power to decide on a matter of importance to them.449 One of my informants 
had planned to operate a factory in the 1960s to produce motorcycle components, but he 
did not have enough capital to buy land to construct the factory, so he set it up in his own 
house. But according to the law, one cannot set up a factory in a residential area, so he 
could not get the licence. Through the help o f a Gaoxiong City Councilor, he bribed a 
bureaucrat ‘several tens of thousands’ of Taiwan dollars to get the licence, by signing a 
debt-credit contract to pretend that he owed the bureaucrat money. Several months after 
he had bribed the bureaucrat, the bureaucrat was reported for bribery, but ‘luckily’ the 
investigation skipped his own bribery.
449 See Ministiy of Justice, Taiwan Diqu Minzhong dui Zhengfu Lianzheng Zhuguan Zhibiao—Minyi 
Diaocha Baogaoshu ( r £ ' f ö i & I ä j  Report o f the
Subjective Index on Government’s Integrity in Taiwan) (Taipei: the Ministry of Justice, 1997), p.37.
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The police are responsible for household registration, so they are aware o f every 
household’s situation. If one uses one’s house as a factory, s/he is supposed to ‘express 
her/his gratitude’ for the ‘hard-working’ policemen three times a year, at Chinese New  
Year, Dragon Boat Festival and Mid Autumn Festival (September). When these festivals 
approach, police will patrol their area to remind small shop-owners or street vendors that 
it is time to express their gratitude. There is a market price for this expression o f gratitude, 
depending on the area and businesses. For example, the Zhongshan District (17 Jj d .) of 
Taipei charges more than the Muzha District And if a policeman is assigned to
Taoyuan county, which is famous for its illegal sex industry, this assignment could be 
regarded as a kind o f promotion, though s/he is at the same rank and gets the same wage. 
If a businessman dares forget to express his gratitude, police will visit his shop or company 
daily to check whether the standard o f equipment is in accord with the regulations. Street 
vendors are illegal, as are shops which occupy sidewalk space. It is also illegal to put an 
appended attic on one’s roof without permission from the City or County Construction 
Department. If a policeman wants to harass a company, it is very easy to find an 
irregularity. This also applies to taxation officers. One informant complained that ‘the 
taxation officers came to check our accounting in February, and after three months, they 
came again. I can’t stand it any more. Whenever a head o f the taxation office is changed, 
they come to check the accounting. Their intention is obvious, they just want a red 
envelope’.
Most businesspeople dare not offend the police or stir up trouble for them. The most 
common means for small shop-keepers and street vendors to protect their interests is to 
ask a city or county councillor or a provincial representative to support them to maintain 
their business without crack-downs, as well as to pay money to the police to be rid o f their 
daily harassment450
Factories have to satisfy even more government regulations, especially regarding 
industrial safety and environmental protection. However, there are only a few inspectors 
to check the thousands o f factories every year. Such an inspection easily becomes a 
formality. The normal procedure is: inspectors inform the factory what day they will come,
450 The famous Zhou Rensen A ^ )ca se  shows the widespread corruption of Taiwan’s police. The 
Bureau of Investigation found several accounting books listing many famous political figures, including
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so that the company can better ‘prepare’ for the inspection. To do so, the company is 
cleaned up, raw materials or finished products are removed from the fire exits, and illegal 
foreign guest workers are hidden away. When the inspectors come, usually they just chat 
with the boss. After one or two hours, they go out to have a sumptuous meal, and the boss 
gives each ‘small gifts’ to express his gratitude for their hard work.
Businesspeople also have to deal with taxation. One expressed to me the opinion that 
if you want to know the Taiwan economic miracle, go to study taxation law. Another 
claimed to me that Taiwan’s GNP is two thirds under-estimated because Taiwanese report 
only one third of their income. From their statements, it is not hard to imagine how 
widespread tax evasion is in Taiwan.
The two main ways to avoid being audited are to give the taxation officers red 
envelopes or to allow them to hold a share o f equity in one’s company. To give a red 
envelope is usually mediated by accountants, whose main task is to save money for the 
business. To allow officers to ‘join one’s investment’ depends on how much profits a 
company can make and how strong-willed the officers are who want to put money in the 
company.
5.4.2 The Inner Circle and Tax Evasion
In Chapter Three I discussed how taxes are evaded. It is an open secret that 
companies keep three sets of account books. One set, recording the ‘real’ business 
operations and revenues, is for internal use. Only top managers o f the inner circle are 
allowed access to this set. Another set is to how to the taxation officials, and it usually 
shows a deficit or little profits. The third is used to secure loans from banks, and it shows 
high profits. One informant noted that ‘Taiwanese have a talent for tax evasion’. If the cost 
of bribery is lower than the gains from tax evasion, why not bribe. However, since tax 
evasion is not legal, it is always confidential, and only certain people can gain access to the 
real accounting book. To use family members can prevent the exposure of illegal matters.
If a family enterprise is small and labour-intensive, e.g., a subcontracting firm or one 
of the tiny clothing manufacturing firms in Wufenpu, the profits are mainly from the family 
members’ own labour, and what they get is a 'normal profit in the competitive market'. The
policemen. SeeBiDiaoyu (41 <73fr), ‘ZhouRensenRenmaiDapuguang’ (M AJ9IlA & £  » Exposure 
of Zhou Rensen’s Social Relations), Caixun ( MfM)  , no. 171 (1996), pp.212-220.
186
Chapter 5 Human Resources Management
Taxation Office usually does not pay much attention to this kind of business, though it 
might have a higher income than that of wage labourers. For example, an informant opened 
a Chinese medicine shop, and on average his family can earn A$ 10,000 a month. But two 
persons have to work from 5:00 a.m. till 12:00 p.m., which means their hourly wage is 25% 
higher than a wage worker.451 Every year they are taxed only a few thousand Taiwan 
dollars.452
But companies bigger than micro-enterprises have to be careful, for the Taxation 
Office often keeps an eye on them, and usually it is easier to check their capital flow. They 
hire more workers, and usually the work place is separated from their home, unlike 
micro-enterprises. However, one informant said that if one pays tax as the laws regulate, 
no company in Taiwan will be profitable.
Civil servants in the Taxation Office are counted as one of the four evils.45,5 One of 
my respondents privately related that the Taxation Office fined him a few million US 
dollars for tax evasion in January 1995, and up to now the case was not yet been 'solved', 
for the officials hinted to him that 'everyone more or less evades tax and we know how to 
deal with it'. He has talked many times with the persons who are in charge of the case, and 
has asked his provincial representative to help to 'bargain' how much legal and illegal 
money he should pay. This corrupt situation is well known, and even the head of Formosa 
Plastic, the largest manufacturing enterprise in Taiwan, criticised that ‘if there is one 
company evading tax, we can say confidently that all companies in the industry evade taxes, 
for the accounting principles make it impossible for one company to evade tax without the 
cooperation of upstream or downstream companies.... Everyone knows that tax evasion is 
pervasive and has lasted for a long time. So obviously many of the staff in the Taxation 
Office collude with companies to make money’.454
In September 1997, the Investigation Bureau prosecuted a group, consisting of civil 
servants at the Taipei Taxation Office, for cooperating with accountants to help more than
451 Their hourly wage is A$5,000/(17*30)=A$10, and a wage worker’s is A $ l,500/(8*25)=AS7.5. The 
average wage in manufacturing industry is NT$30,720 in 1994, and NT$33,765 in 1996.
452 About a few hundred Australian dollars. Exchange rate of one Australian dollar is about twenty Taiwan 
dollar. The average wage in manufacturing industry is NT$30,720 in 1994, and NT$33,765 in 1996.
453 The four evils are judges, police, secret agents and Taxation Office servants. See Twu Jaw-yann (>£B3  
%), NJCS—Kougyouka Ajia wo Yomu (NICS—Reading Industrialised Asia) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988), p. 
127.
454 See Wang Yongqing (3.7% f i t ) ’ Wang Yongqing Bamai Taiwan (Wang Yongqing Checks Taiwan ’s
Disease, (Taipei: Taiwan Daily News, 0 1997), p. 75.
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1,600 firms to evade tax over the past decade.455 The reporter commented that 
‘businesspeople might not want to hide their income, but the probability of meeting a clean 
officer at the Taxation Office is too low, so they have to protect themselves by way of 
bribery’.456
The companies have to keep secret of their tax evasion and bribery, and family 
members are trusted to keep the secrets. In big firms, there is an inner circle to manage the 
company’s finance, and to ward off the government’s investigation, and to work closely 
with the civil servants from the Taxation Office.457 In SMEs, the family members comprise 
the inner circle. I have found that the females, either wife or daughter or aunt or 
daughter-in-law, usually take care o f financial matters in the SMEs. In Taiwan, it is a 
stereotype that women are more capable in managing money than men, and normally a 
company’s accounting is controlled by a female. She has to hide income and to collaborate 
with accountants to fake financial statements.
5.5 Contradictions Between Strong Social Ties and Inefficient Management
As noted, to evade taxes and to keep the profits in the family vis a vis employees’ 
demands for higher wages, companies tend to use family members as managers in an inner 
circle. Expanding the concept of familial ties, Hamilton and Kao write that the Chinese 
family enterprise should be understood ‘in terms of trust-bearing personal relationships 
that can be used to generate economic and control networks within and beyond the 
group’.458 One hypothesis developed by them from their re-definition is that ‘guanxi 
relationships, in turn, constitute one’s personal networks that allow one to mobilize 
resources and manpower within and among firms. In a general sense, the larger and more 
cohesive a person’s network, the more powerful that person is considered to be’.459 
However, this kind of conclusion neglects the basic principle underlying the function o f a 
network, i.e., the reciprocity principle; and secondly, ‘such an embededness of economic 
activity in social relationships should not be seen as capable of producing its own sources
42:1 See China Evening Times, Liwenxin An Douchu Shuiwuquan Heimu ( •  
The Case of  Liwenxin Reveals the Black Box o f Taxation Office) (30/09/1997), p. 4.
456 Ibid.: pA.
45 See Gary G. Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu (1993), op. cit., p. 146.
458 Ibid.: p. 148.
459 Ibid.: p. 146.
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of allocative efficiency’ .460
5.5.1 Reciprocity and Social Networks
Karl Polanyi argues that there are three different principles that organise our 
economic life, reciprocity, redistribution and householding (oeconomia). The Chinese 
guanxi network is based on the principle o f reciprocity. The basic tenet is that when one 
takes, one gives back in return. The Taiwanese saying ‘Chiren Yijin, Huanren Baliang’ 
(at  A —■ Jf ’ 3JI —eat one jin461 from others, give back eight Hang in return) shows 
the burden of receiving favours. In the old days, when it was not easy to find a job in the 
manufacturing industry, if one was introduced to work in a factory by an acquaintance or 
relatives, it means that the introduced obtained a favour from the boss, and s/he was 
supposed to pay back the favour. The best way to pay this back was to perform well in the 
firm. However, as earlier noted, this sort o f ‘giving a favour to workers’ is declining, with 
more and more people finding their jobs through impersonal ways. Since the workers may 
not have any special obligation to the boss, the relationship between them and the boss 
becomes based more on pure market principles.
If one wants to broaden one’s network, one has to spend more, which might be 
beyond one’s means if the network is too large. Even if the network is small, one faces the 
renqing dilemma. In Taiwan, it is popular to ask some powerful persons such as legislators 
or high ranking government officials to write or speak to the decision-maker in a 
bureaucracy. The decision-maker has to decide whether s/he should give a hand or not. If 
the introduced person’s qualification is sub-standard, or the guanxi between the 
recommender and the decision-maker is not close, the introduced case will be filed. If  the 
powerful person owns a company, it might be easy to put these people in the company 
because s/he can decide it. If  so, the company has to face the dilemma, i.e., to conform to 
social ties or to market efficiency. If the powerful person has to ask other people’s favour, 
s/he has to consider how to pay back the renqing in future, in other words, s/he will 
become a renqing debtor. So when one has a broad social network, one will have higher 
renqing pressure, which is liability against one’s assets. If the cost of renqing becomes too 
high, one will not be able to maintain such a broad network. So a personal network is
460 Ibid.: p. 148.
461 Jin and liang are the weight measurement in Taiwan. One jin  equals 600grams, or equals 16 hang.
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basically sustained by one’s ability to give.
When one is no longer able to give, e.g., when one leaves the key position which 
provides one with power, the network will soon shrink. One company owner was a 
legislator, and was involved in a business with several others. But after he lost office, many 
o f the partners pulled out, and the Taxation Office started to check his accounting. He 
asked one o f his partners, who held a high-ranking government post, to help, but the 
‘friend’ did not respond. The Chinese saying ‘renqing is as thin as a paper’ (A.f f  
Renqing bo ru zhi) describes this experience. One’s social network is artificial, and a broad 
network can be very fragile if the network is built upon the position one occupies.
5.5.2 Familial Ties vs. Company Profits
A second problem with Hamilton and Kao’s hypothesis is that a family firm is still an 
enterprise, which has to conform to market forces to make a profit. If  it has an inner circle, 
these people must be competent to make profits for the firm. Yet employing family 
members to work at managerial positions might not be based on their competence or 
productivity but on familial ties. A problem will arise if members of the inner circle are 
incompetent or are not devoted to the company.
It is quite common, as noted, for the boss’s wife or daughter to do the company’s 
accounts even if she knows nothing about keeping books at the beginning. Learning by 
doing is a common pattern, and she may go to an after-school institute to learn the basic 
skills. The boss’s brothers or sons are in charge of sales or production, and their acquisition 
o f the necessary skills is on-line training — training through working.
However, not every family member is good at business or willing to look after the 
family firm. An extreme case of this dilemma is a boss who is the eldest son, and had a 
strong traditional conviction that he would bear all the family responsibilities. When he was 
young he sacrificed for his family regardless of the cost and helped all of his brothers to 
'stand up in society proudly' He established a firm which, step by step,
employed his brothers. In his company, all family members have equal rights but unequal 
obligations. Before dividing living costs among fangs (Hokkien, A ° t)  in 1992
all family members could take as much money as they wanted from the pooled funds earned 
from the family enterprise, 'like a small communist society', he said. For example, his two 
children both went to national universities, where the tuition fees are only one-fourth o f
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those private universities. His brothers have more children and all went to private 
universities. Though he had to do most of the work, he got much less money from the pool. 
He has great authority in the family, but it means that his brothers could be lazy and leave 
the work to him. He complained that they did not even know how to write an invoice after 
working for twenty years in the company. He had invested in another company and 
assigned a brother to manage it, but because of the brother’s incompetence this investment 
failed, and his brother returned to his old job. My interviewee concluded that 'the defect of 
a traditional family enterprise is that everyone is the boss, but no one is the specialist. 
Everyone has opinions, but no one does their fair share. Our traditional culture emphasises 
ethics and morality, but if we follow its doctrines, we will not survive’.
This is an extreme case. Family enterprises operating Tike a communist society’ are 
not a common phenomenon in Taiwan, but it shows the dilemma a family enterprise can 
face, the contradictions between market principles (efficiency) and family values (xiaoti, #  
j$ , fraternal solidarity). On one hand, traditional values require a family to take care of all 
family members, and on the other, the market principles require that an enterprise treats 
everyone in terms of their competence. If a family enterprise uses family members to evade 
taxes and to keep outsiders from sharing in the profits, it also runs the risk of family discord 
and production inefficiency. As the family expands and more family members are 
incorporated into the family enterprise, it is more and more difficult to handle these 
problems.
One interviewee’s company operated very well in the 1970s and at the beginning of 
the 1980s; however, the marketing channel was controlled by a wholesaler in Taipei, so the 
owner had thought to set up a distribution company with his brother, who taught at a 
teachers’ college. His brother took NT$3 million from him in the early 1980s, but used it 
for other purposes. The news spread quickly in the business community, and produced a 
domino effect. The NT$40 million he had borrowed in the private financial market was 
withdrawn by creditors, and ‘the company almost collapsed’.
5.5.3 Fen-jia as a Mechanism to Resolve Contradictions
If a firm is run by the family, it will eventually experience the family cycle, and a 
decision to split the family. There are two different views on the causes of family division. 
In his research on agrarian Chinese society, Maurice Freedman concluded that the ability of
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the father to exercise authority is the key element that ties the whole family together.462 
However, for Myron Cohen and Arthur Wolf, ‘the fate of a family is decided by all o f the 
adult men individually and rationally in search of economic advantage’.46' Margery Wolf 
uses the concept of ‘uterine family’ to explain the break of the solidarity expected of 
brothers in Chinese society due to the different economic calculations in the family 
composed of different uterine families.464 Sung Lung-sheng has argued that the distinction 
between inherited property and acquired property is relevant to family division, and ‘the 
principle governing the division of acquired property leaves more room for 
disagreement’ .465 Chen Xiangshui ( F^#z]c) also noted that conflicts in the interests of 
brothers resulted in the family division.466 Shunichi Horie (ig ) 467 and Siu-lun Wong
('^T^SfmO468 developed models for the Chinese family cycle, and fen-jia (splitting family 
property) happens in the ‘extended type F in Horie’s model, or the ‘segmented phase’ in 
Wong’s model. Both o f them agree that differences of interest among fangs are the main 
reason for fen-jia.
The contrary findings of Maurice Freedman as against other scholars express the two 
social forces we use here, i.e., the social and market relations which course through the 
family unit. On the one hand, filial and solidarity relationships are moral norms for a family. 
Thus, the hiring of family members to work in the family enterprise is supposed to be the 
decent and proper thing to do. On the other hand, the pursuit o f individual interests can 
become the seed of family discord. Division in the traditional family is a mechanism to 
solve the contradictions arising from the family enterprise.
In the studies mentioned above, all but Wong focuses on agricultural society. In
462 See Maurice Freedman, Chinese Lineage and Society (London: Athlone Press, 1971).
463 Cited from Arthur P. Wolf, ‘Domestic Organization’, in Emily Martin Ahem and Hill Gates (eds.), The 
Anthropology o f Taiwanese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), p.343.
464 See Margery Wolf, Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972).
465 See Lung-sheng Sung, ‘Property and Family Division’, in Emily Martin Ahem and Hill Gates (eds.), 
The Anthropology o f Taiwanese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), p.377.
466 See Chen Xiangshui (P&#zk), ‘Fenji, Jicheng yu Shuangqin de Fengyang: Yige Nantaiwan Nongcun
de Gean Family Division, Inheritance
and Parents' Supporting System: A Case Study in Southern Taiwan Rural Village), p. 95. OinghuaXuebao
’ Tsing Hua Journal o f  Chinese Studies), new series XXTV(1994), no.l, pp. 85-125.
467 See Horie Shunichi ($S — ), ‘Taiwan Kanzoku no “Kazoku”~jia ideorogi to jia shyutan’ ( £
/H ^ n o  r j  --^ ideorogi to ^ # 8 ]  » Family of Taiwan Chinese: jia-ideology and jia-group), 
Minzokugaku Kenkyu ’ Research on Ethnology), vol. 46 (1981), no.3, pp.299-314.
468 See Wong Siu-lun, ‘The Chinese Family Firm: a Model’, British Journal o f Sociology, vol. 36 (1985), 
no.l, pp. 58-72.
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capitalism, land is one o f the three major production factors and is a kind of capital, so 
Wong applied the concept o f fen-jia to capitalist enterprises, which have capital such as 
machinery, land and manufacturing equipment. I will extend some of these scholars’ 
arguments to industrialised Taiwan, where the capitalist family enterprise cannot avoid 
cultural influence. However, some of their arguments are not applicable to fen-jia in the 
1990s due to the changed social milieu and occupational and structural changes.
If a family firm follows the rules of capitalism, i.e., the goal of maximising profits for 
the enterprise, it will not face the renqing dilemma, and an incompetent family member 
would be fired. However, the different brothers in the family all are shareholders, and all 
the shareholders are at the same time the managers. In non-family firms, managers are 
replaceable if they do not perform well. In the family firm, ownership and management are 
mixed, and no one can ask the family managers to leave, for they are also shareholders. 
Unless the family firm is managed by non-family members, the ownership among brothers 
will need to be divided. The first method makes a company no longer a true family 
enterprise, and it becomes a profit-oriented company without any family ingredient, even if 
the family members still own large shares of the firm. The second involves fen-jia. As 
Burton Pasternak noted, the shape of Chinese family patterns is mainly determined by 
external forces.469 The end o f a family firm depends on the two forces acting on the family 
enterprise if there are family disagreements or conflicts.
Many scholars believe that fen-jia is the main reason why there are so few big 
businesses in Chinese society, for any lump-sum wealth will be divided. This ignores the 
fact that capitalist business enterprises are newly arisen and that most small and medium­
sized enterprises started up in business just a few decades ago and have not yet experienced 
the problem of fen-jia. Moreover, this ignores the existence o f big business groups in 
Taiwan. Wong Siu-lun’s model suggests that in the end the Chinese family firm will either 
disintegrate or will revert to the centralised phase in which the family firm is controlled by 
one family member. It is almost impossible for a big firm to emerge in his model that is run 
as a family business group.
469 See Burton Pasternak, ‘Economics and Ecology’, in Emily Martin Ahem and Hill Gates (eds.), The 
Anthropology o f  Taiwanese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1981), pp. 151-183.
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5.5.4 Types o fFen-jia
We have to distinguish between three types offen-jia. the first is the traditional type, 
i.e., to divide family property, mainly land, to sons equally, and its equivalent in modem 
society, to divide a house or a family enterprise. The case o f ‘the small communist society’ 
discussed above is typical o f this type offen-jia. A company was originally set up by an 
informant and his father, and then gradually his brothers joined the company. Before his 
father died, the family was organised on the basis of paternal authority, as Freedman 
portrays. However, after his father’s death my informant inherited his father’s authority 
and was able to prevent the family firm from splintering. His authority did not depend on 
culture but on his devotion to the family. He had finished only junior high school and spent 
the remainder of his youth working with his father. His brothers were all able to finish 
senior high school or college thanks to his financial support. However, because the family 
firm was a sort o f ‘acquired property’, his brothers had the right to ask for family division. 
If so, the family enterprise would be fragmented; if not, a lot of quarrels could arise if the 
brothers had different ideas or if there were conflicts over profit-sharing. For my informant, 
the problem was that the land and the house they occupied were registered in the names of 
his brothers, so if he decided to fen-jia he would be penniless. So he has to delay family 
division, at least until he could buy a house of his own for his nuclear family. Then, he said, 
he will divide the property as soon as possible. The Xinguang ($r I t )  and Guoji ( H 1^ -) 
business groups are two famous cases in Taiwan. In August 1995, the third son of the 
Guoji business group sued his brothers for embezzling equity from one of their companies. 
But the unspoken reason was a quarrel over the distribution of the property left by their 
father.470
Wong claimed that the eldest son normally inherits the position of chief executive 
position of a family firm, but the other brothers might not acquiesce to his authority, which 
would cause domestic tensions. The younger brothers could either acquire skills different 
from the elder brother and occupy different managerial positions, or ask for new ventures 
that they can run using their individual management.471 The family firm of this type is more 
or less like a partnership company. However, it is also possible that a family enterprise is
470 See Zhongyang Ribao (Central News Daily, overseas edition), 06, 07, September, 1995, p.3. This kind 
of family division will result in the division of property, but different brothers use the same ‘brand name’ 
like Xinguang. It resembles Japanese Keiretsu after the World War II.
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inherited by one son, while other sons get an equal value in money. In this case, the 
enterprise would continue operating without the dilemmas described above. If no son 
would like to take over the business of the father, there will also be no problem of fraternal 
squabbling. A number of informants complained that their sons do not wish to inherit the 
company they have set up, and all they can do is ‘wait and see’. One informant had worked 
for a landlord in Gaoxiong, who had vast holdings in commercial fish ponds. ‘After the 
father died’, he said, ‘no son wanted to run his business. They have their own occupations 
such as doctor, legislator, scholar, so they don’t want to be a businessman.’
In Taiwan’s expanding economy, with different occupations available to the younger 
generation, an arrangement can be made for one son to inherit the company, while other 
sons go out to work. In this case, the so-called fen-jia is only the division o f money, and it 
does not affect the running o f the company at all. For example, an informant asked his 
eldest son to inherit his steel company, while the second son, a doctor, got the money to 
run a hospital, and the third, a university lecturer, got money to buy a flat. Property, in 
terms of money, is equally divided among brothers, but in such cases does not result in the 
disintegration of a family firm. Social relations are preserved, and market relations are left 
untouched, avoiding family discord.472 This type of fen-jia  is new, and as Taiwanese 
society continues to industrialise, and more and more job opportunities in secondary and 
tertiary industries become available to family members, this type of family-firm division will 
be more prominent.
There is another way to prevent the family division disputes. It is common for the 
father to invest in different industries for different sons so that they have equal property 
inheritance, which prevents any argument over family division. One interviewee, whose 
firm produces cans to store chemical materials, opened another company to import and 
process iron. The first firm will be passed to his eldest son, and the second to the second 
son. In 1992 he was establishing a third firm, which involves a co-investment from the first 
two sons, but this third firm will belong to the third son. In other words, the property of the 
father is equally divided among sons through inter-investment by the three sons.
This type of family division occurred in the second phase, i.e., the centralised phase
471 See Wong Siu-lun, op. cit., p. 66.
472 This type offen-jia is more or less like the Japanese division of a family, i.e., only the eldest son inherits 
the family business, and all other sons find other jobs by themselves.
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of paternal control, in Wong Siu-lun’s model, and not in the third, segmented phase. This 
sort offen-jia has developed in a capitalist business environment, and does not occur in the 
Chinese agricultural society. It is a combination o f capitalist profit calculation and the 
family life cycle. Both principles, i.e., profit maximisation and harmonious familial relations, 
are preserved in this manner of family division.
In capitalism, capital always seeks the most profitable outlets, and when a family 
enterprise is well run and has earned money, the owner does not leave the money idle. S/he 
can either expand production or invest in another business. A survey done by the 
government in 1995 shows that about 70% of the surveyed 5,954 companies in 
manufacturing industry have no intention to diversify their investment into a different 
business. The four main reasons for not taking a diversification strategy are labour 
shortages (12.7%), insufficient profitability (12.6%), difficulty in securing loans (11.1%) 
and cut-throat market competition (10.8%).47j Among those who have diversified, half 
(49.3%) replied that the saturation of their main product market is the main reason to 
diversify their investment.474 In my own interviews, most of the new investments of my 
informants are based on their social networks from which they get the information about 
new market opportunities. These are not necessarily in the same industry in which they are 
working. If there is a good prospect of profits, they will put the money into it. Hamilton 
and Kao call this ‘opportunistic diversification investment’, for ‘the investment pattern 
leads to an unusually wide spread of product lines within groups, and results in business 
groups being largely composed of a series of medium-sized firms’.475 We have emphasised 
that a family firm is still an enterprise in a capitalist society, and when a firm has profits, its 
main product may be in the mature phase in the product life cycle and it has to make hay 
while the sun shines. Investment diversification is one strategy to expand its market. In 
Taiwan, the significance o f this sort of investment diversification has a specific cultural 
meaning, for it not only follows the market principle, but also preserves the tradition of 
family division. One informant owns a construction company. In 1989 he bought a grit­
mining company. One son is in charge of the construction company, and the other is in
473 See Ministry of Economic Affairs (&L^ -Sß), Zhizaoye Duojiaohua ji Guojihua Diaocha Baogao (M &
M ß  ß! Reports on the Diversification and Internationalisation o f Manufacturing
Industry) (Taipei: MOEA, 1995), pp. 156-159, Table A-ll-2.
474 Ibid. : p. 92, Table A-7-1.
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charge of the new one. Though he is the real boss of the two companies, the two sons 
operate their respective companies, and needless to say will inherit their own company 
when fen-jia  takes place. Through this from of investment, the informant avoided the 
worst o f the construction recession in the construction industry in the 1990s, profiting 
from the new company.476
This kind of family division accommodates market principles and social relations 
nicely. It can avoid family disputes caused either by different management styles of the 
brothers in a company, or by uneven shares of company profits. It also conforms to market 
principles that every individual firm is responsible for its own profits. If a brother or a 
family member is not competent, it will affect only the relevant company and will not 
adversely affect the other.
In this case, it is quite easy to become a business group which consists of different 
firms run by the same family members. Business groups in Taiwan are usually of this type. 
It does not conform to the Wong model in which a family firm will be either fragmented or 
centralised. It is fragmented if we observe it from the transfer of ownership of several firms 
to different sons. However, from the perspective of the father entrepreneur, it is centralised. 
If  all brothers work together, it forms a business group, and will not necessarily lead to any 
one phase in Wong’s model.
As seen, we ought not reach the conclusion that a family firm cannot expand in scale 
to become a business group. There are three other factors inhibiting the growth of a family 
enterprise: firstly, market forces will exclude those enterprises which are not competitive. 
A lot of new firms open every year and a lot of others fold. In 1991, the average five-year 
survival rate of all enterprises was 68.8%, and the survival rate in the industrial sector was 
73.6%.477 In 1994, 55,700 companies were newly set up, amid 18,501 closures.478 Though 
not all o f the failures were newly established firms, the new firms have had to face a market
4/5 See Gary G. Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu, ‘The Institutional Foundation of Chinese Business: the 
family firm in Taiwan’ (1990), p. 144.
4 6 He said that there are three subsidies of the new company to issue invoices and ‘evade tax’.
4/ See Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Zhonghuaminguo 84 
Nian Zhongxiao Oiye Baipishu ( i * & &  # ,  White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises) 
(Taipei: MOEA, 1996), p. 64.
478 Ibid.: p. 61. According to Cheng Zhengcang, in the 1980s, on average 381 new manufacturing firms 
entered the market, and 244 firms exited the market. See Chen Zhengcang, Taiwan Zhizao Changshang 
Jiaru yu Tuichu zhi Yanjiu ( £  ?? ’ Firm Entry and Exit in Taiwan
Manufacturing Industries), Shehui Kexue Luncong * Forum on Social Sciences), p.229.
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shared with old firms and are less likely to succeed. The survey done in 1995 shows that 
44% of the existing SMEs have operated their business less than five years, while the figure 
for big enterprises is 32%. One out of five SMEs operated their business less than two 
years.479 This means that only about half of the existing enterprises survive more than five 
years, and if a firm wants to grow big, it has to face harsh market competition. Chen 
Zhengcang ( fc J L 'jt) found that the more competitive the market is, the higher the entry 
and closure probability.480
Secondly, as seen, family firms try to evade tax and turn to using family members to 
keep its financial secrets. Using family members can also prevent the labour-capital 
conflicts that afflict capitalist production. We have explained the dilemma the family 
enterprises face here, for if the family members (inner circle) are not competent, they 
would be expelled from the market.
Thirdly, even if a firm is very successful, it has to face the traditional problem of 
fen-jia. Businesspeople without a son, or in which no son is willing to take over their 
business, will not expand their business. For businesspeople with sons but only one 
enterprise, it is quite possible that the quarrels between brothers would fragment a business. 
Only those people with many enterprises to distribute equally to sons, or with one son 
inheriting the enterprise(s), could expand their scale of production and organise a business 
group.
5.6 The New Market and Employment Situations
After the mid-1980s, labour shortages became a common topic among enterprise 
owners. The younger generation is not willing to work in manufacturing and insist on high 
pay and good working conditions. Figure 5.1 shows the employment structural change 
after 1980. The secondary sector reached its highest employment share in 1987, and then 
declined gradually, overtaken by the tertiary sector in 1988.
4 9 See Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, op. cit., p. 72, Table 2- 
2- 8.
480 See Cheng Zhengcang, op. cit., p. 230.
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Figure 5. 1 Structure of Employees by Industry
unit: %
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Industry
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Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical 
Data Book (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
1997), p. 20.
After the lifting of martial law in 1987, workers could organise unions and could 
strike, but because most firms are family firms, it was difficult to take collective action. In 
smaller firms, it is easy for the boss to use social relations to prevent collective action and 
consciousness. When I computed the survey data of 6 A General Survey o f Social Change 
in Taiwan, 1992\ which asked ‘do you agree to take collective action to strike’, I found 
that the bigger the firm, the more likely that the respondent would agree. The difference 
between groups is statistically significant at the level of 5%.481
Labour shortages became a problem in the late 1980s, and many firms today 
complain that they cannot find enough workers. In a survey conducted in 1997, 23% of the 
manufacturing firms said that they faced the problem of labour shortages, varying directly 
with firm size. Among those hiring more than three hundred workers, 54% face this 
problem, compared to only 18% of those employing less than thirty workers.482 Manual 
labourers (45%) and semi-skilled labourers (26%) are the most in demand. The workers 
needed by the firms hiring more than three hundred workers comprise 46% of the total
481 It is a four scale question, i.e., strongly agree, agree, disagree and strongly disagree. Firm size is grouped 
into ‘no employees’ ‘less than twenty employees’ ‘fewer than one hundred employees’, ‘fewer than 500 
employees’ and ‘more than 500 employees’. The mean score of the five groups is 3 .06,2.99,2.95,2.86, and 
2.89 respectively.
482 See Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Report on the 
Employment o f Manpower, Taiwan Area, ROC, 1997, p. 2, Table 1.
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labourers required, while only 3% for those employing less than thirty workers.48j
Some firms have sensed the change in the business environment and have begun to 
adopt methods conforming to market forces and to rationalise their human resources 
management. A survey done by the government revealed that the four main ways for SMEs 
to cope with labour-force shortages are: raising wages (26%), rationalisation of 
production (24%), reducing the scale of production or utilising a putting-out system (16%), 
and employing foreign workers (13%).484
Some o f my interviewed companies said that they would move production lines 
overseas. With increasing land costs and the rising value of the New Taiwan Dollar, 
investment in Southeast Asia and China is one way to reduce production costs. I will 
discuss this topic in the next chapter.
Using the putting-out system can reduce costs. An interviewee who runs a textile 
firm said that he was happy to put out all the processes of his work because it resolves 
labour problems. He enjoys it when petty sub-contractors owning one machine bring 
presents in visiting him and ask him to give them work to do. He also says that he is no 
longer harassed by workers. Many informants said that the putting-out system did not 
emerge until the mid-1970s when there was no longer a cheap labour force. As Ke Zhiming 
has pointed out, the putting-out system became popular after the mid-1980s when it 
became harder to find any relatives or friends to work in the small-scale enterprises.485
However, the putting-out system is based on a specific industry structure, i.e., one 
with an easily divisible production process, in which it is easy to set up a small firm and in 
which big firms are willing to put out certain parts of the production process.486 The 
production process of traditional industries like textiles, electrical machinery and 
mechanical appliances are divisible. An informant who produces machinery to manufacture 
plastic milk bottles said that after he got an order, he designed the module, and then put out 
different parts of the machine to different single-task factories. Each single-task factory 
hands its finished products to him, and he then assembles the different parts in his factory 
and ships the assembled to the customer.
Besides the factor of divisibility, the putting-out system is also confined to the
483 Ibid.: pp. 32-39, Table 6.
484 See Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, op. cit., p. 99, Table 3-2-10.
485 See Ke Zhiming, op. cit., p. 45.
486 See Xie Guoxiong, op. cit., p. 31.
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difficulty of setting up a firm to produce a part o f a product. If the cost o f establishing a 
sub-contracting factory is high, it is unlikely that such a system will be set up. In Taiwan, no 
one cared about environmental costs before the mid-1980s, taxes were low, and workers 
were relatively cheap, so the determining factor was capital. One informant had a wool­
spinning factory. He said that only a part of the whole production process could be put out, 
and the last stage o f weaving wool products like combing wool is hard to put out due to the 
expensive machinery, that is not affordable by a small firm.
Using the putting-out system, a company can save different kinds of costs if the 
product quality is acceptable. It can save labour costs, which includes wages and social 
security expenses. It also saves the cost of the stock of raw materials and inventory. An 
informant got orders from customers, and then ordered raw steel from upstream 
companies, mainly China Steel, and transported the steel to a factory owned by others. 
After the factory finished cutting the steel according to orders, the products were carried to 
customers directly. He said proudly that T do not need any capital to set up a capital- 
intensive factory. Though the profit is less, e.g., you earn only two dollars per ton 
compared to three if it is cut by your own factory, it is still profitable, and I save a lot of 
troubles by not running a factory.
Toyota’s JIT  (just in time) production prevails in Taiwanese industry, as in the 
manufacture of computers.487 A new type of production is BTO (buy to order), which 
means that a big firm will not put in an order until a customer places one. Thus, the cost of 
inventory can be transferred to the subcontractors. JIT  and BTO methods of management, 
and the putting-out system, transfers the cost to subcontractors and reduces the burdens o f 
larger firms.
The putting-out system is usually based on the availability of a marginal labour force, 
or in Marx’s term, a reserve army. This system mobilises housewives and children, students, 
retired people, and even prisoners in jail.488 Because this marginal labour force does not 
work under the same roof, there are no obvious labour-capital confrontations, and
487 See Pan Meiling and Zhang Weian Tanxing Shengchan yu Xieli Wangluo (9M±
Flexible Production and Cooperative Networks) (Taizhong: Tunghai University, 1997), 
unpublished manuscript, pp. 7-10.
488 See Xie Guoxiong (G. S. Shieh, ‘Yinxing Gongchang: Taiwan de Waibaodian yu Jiating
Daigong’ H  fe. f t  X . , Invisible Factory: Subcontracting Points and
Homeworkers in Taiwan), Taiwan Shehui YanjiuJikan ( Tai wan:  A Radical Quarterly 
in Social Studies), no. 13 (1992), pp. 142-147.
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complaints about the Basic Labour Rights Law will not emerge. However, the marginal 
labour force is not only used in putting-out, but also in some big firms in order to reduce 
labour costs.
One owner uses older workers to deal with his labour shortages. All of the workers in 
his firm are Obasan (a Japanese term used in Taiwan, meaning women aged over forty), 
whom he described as 'not operating machines as swiftly as the young workers, but docile 
and willing to work overtime when it is urgent to turn out a batch of products'.
A popular recent method is to hire ‘guest workers’.489 Taiwan had only 3,000 foreign 
workers in 1991, but this increased to 292,000 in 1996.490 63% of the guest workers work 
in manufacturing industry. The textile and electronics industries absorbed another 26% of 
them.491 According to regulations, the employer cannot pay a guest worker less than the 
minimum wage set by the government. In 1993, the minimum monthly wage was 
NT$14,000 per month (about US$550). Guest workers are usually paid the minimum 
wage, which is about 50% of the average wage received by native workers in 
manufacturing.492 However, about six months o f the wage of the guest workers goes to 
their government and brokers, and so they do not receive any money in the first few months. 
Thus, when they arrive in Taiwan, they always ask the employer to give them more work to 
do. This enables the employer to operate the machines more efficiently as no machine will 
be idle if the machines work twenty-four hours a day. An interviewee praised the Thai 
guest workers as ‘easy to use’ ). ‘Because they have to pay back the money they 
borrowed in their home country, they have to work hard to earn more money. They hope 
to work overtime every day, and if possible, sixteen hours a day so as to earn NT$3 0,000 a 
month’.
Not every company is eligible to import foreign workers. One informant was not able 
to employ guest workers. He found a rule set by the government that a ‘newly set-up 
company is allowed to import workers’, so he closed his old firm, applied to establish a
489 See M. G. Quibria, ‘Labour Migration and Labour Market Integration in Asia’, The World Economy, 
vol. 20, no.l (1997), pp. 21-42.
490 See Jingjibu »Ministry of Economic Affairs), Zhonghua minguo Bashiliu nian Zhongxiao Qiye
Baipishu » White Paper on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in
the Republic of China, 1997) (Taipei: Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1996), pp.3-11, 3-12.
491 Ibid.: pp. 3-12.
492 See Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taiwan Statistical Data Book (Taipei: Council 
for Economic Planning and Development, 1997), p. 22.
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new one, and at the same time applied to import foreign workers. “Most workers in my 
factory are guest workers”, he said. “They work very hard, and can work day and night. 
Even though our languages are different, I show them how to operate the machines, and 
then they know how to do it. My machines can be operated twenty-four hours a day to 
meet the demand from customers. This reduces my capital expenditure.”
However, the economic recession beginning in 1995 drove up the unemployment 
rate, and many native workers demanded that guest workers be prohibited, for the labour 
tasks like construction and lower skilled work, which used to be taken by aboriginal people 
or retired veterans, are gradually being taken by foreign workers. The shutdown of many 
big factories makes the issue hotter. But from the perspective of the boss, since guest 
workers are ‘easy to use’, the government should not prohibit their use. These labour- 
capital conflicts in the domestic economy are being transformed into conflicts between 
different groups of workers. Accompanying the globalisation of the economy, labour 
migration problems have emerged.
The third way is to rationalise production, i.e., to use more capital and machinery to 
replace labour, or to 'democratise' the work place. An interviewee rationalised his 
production lines after 1990 and spent a lot of time discussing with his staff how to raise 
efficiency and minimise the wastage of production materials, or to arrange the production 
flow more efficiently. In 1992, he found that labour costs increased from 11% to 40%, and 
he began to further rationalise labour costs. He did not purchase more capital goods to 
automate production, but tried to find out where his labour force was redundant and 
sought to cut high labour costs. Another informant changed his personnel management 
from 1988. He asked his workers their opinions about how to pay wages, and the wage 
was changed from an hourly wage to piece wages. Whenever he gets an order, he will let 
everyone know how much money he will get from the job, and then discusses how to 
distribute the profits between the owner and workers. The criterion for the distribution is 
based on the 'piece wage', i.e., how much time the workers need to manufacture the 
product, and he then would convert that time to a wage. He said that the monthly wage of 
the workers increased from NT$30,000 to 80,000 (about US$3,000) and at the same time 
he saved a lot in supervisory management costs.
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5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explained how traditional values operate in family enterprises. 
Obviously cultural theory could explain the development of Chinese business, but cultural 
theory does not pay any attention to markets and political forces and thus fails to explain 
the failure o f a lot of family enterprises. We cannot deny the importance of traditional 
values, but we have to put them within the context of specific social structures, which 
might hinder or facilitate the functioning of these values. In Taiwan, corrupt political and 
economic structures encourage the use o f family members as an inner circle in the family 
enterprise. But the imperative o f market forces will drive these family enterprises out of the 
market if they are not efficient enough to compete with others.
Family values are important in the operation o f family firms. Traditional values filial 
help to tie together the different interests among family members, but the market principle 
disintegrates the cohesion. So-called renqing is not only an asset of a family enterprise, but 
also a liability, and the more the renqing, the more one becomes liable to become indebted 
others. Personal networks are not always assets to one’s balance sheet.
Fen-jia is one way to the circumvent incompetence of family members and to resolve 
disputes among them. Fen-jia, however, might result in the fragmentation of a family firm. 
But as I have noted, what is more common today in Taiwanese society is that the father 
sets up more than one small firm and distributes them equally to different sons. Too, the 
development o f the Taiwanese economy offers more opportunities for the younger 
generation to seek new occupations and they do not need to rely on the family firm. This 
will reduce the tendency of a family firm to splinter if only one son inherits the property 
while others accept monetary compensation. When a father entrepreneur 
‘opportunistically’ diversifies his investment and sets up firms for more than one son, there 
will be the possibility of forming a business group, which is outside the predictions of 
Wong’s model. In other works, the cultural constraint offen-jia generates a unique type of 
economic organisation -  the existence of numerous SMEs and business groups at the same 
time.
Because o f Taiwan’s labour shortages since the late 1980s, companies have had to 
change their ways of managing human resources. One way is to rationalise production lines, 
and employ less workers. A second method is to utilise a putting-out system and transfer 
the costs to smaller firms. A third way is the hire foreign workers. Lastly, many SME
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owners have sought to production lines overseas, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter.
205
C hapter 6 S M E s’ O verseas Investm en t
Chapter 6: SMEs’ Overseas Investment
I have written at length about the social structures affecting business practices in 
Taiwan. In this chapter, I will discuss the business practices o f Taiwan’s SMEs abroad. 
The social structures they face abroad are different from what they encounter in Taiwan, 
and some of their business practices shift in line with this. Comparing these differences in 
their business practices can illuminate how much ‘Chinese business practices’ are affected 
by culture, and how much they are situated within a specific social setting. I will discuss 
financial management, marketing management and human resources management in the 
alienated social milieu. Among other things, it will be seen that their human resources 
management is much more authoritarian overseas than in Taiwan, which refutes the myth 
of Chinese ‘paternalistic’ management.
6.1 The Trend to Invest Overseas
The sharp appreciation of the Taiwan dollar in the mid-1980s was one o f the major 
reasons to shift production lines overseas. According to a 1991 survey conducted by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, what also pushed companies to make such investments was 
not only the exchange rate, but also rising labour costs and land costs (55%, 40% and 
39%); and the three main attractions overseas were cheap labour costs, a developing 
overseas market and a desire to sell products from within the local market (67%, 54%, 
30% out of five hundred and seventy-four firms sampled).4Sb After 1991, the reasons to 
invest overseas changed slightly. Utilising cheap labour remains important, but not as 
significant as before. For those firms investing between 1987 and 1991, 67% singled out 
cheap labour as the main reason to invest overseas, a percentage that declined to 55% for 
firms investing after 1995. The potential local market and an effort to produce locally for 
Taiwan’s buyers gained weight after 1995. (See Table 6.1)
493 See Jingjibu Tongjichu * Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo Taiwandiqu
Zhizaoye Touzi Yixiang Diaocha Baogao ( f*0 &IH ’ Report on
Manufacturing Industry's Investment Purposes in Taiwan, ROC) (Taipei: Economic Ministry, 1992/ 
April), pp. 9-10.
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Table 6.1 Reasons to Invest Overseas
Unit: %
Firm Size by 
Employee
L oca l
M a rk et
P o ten tia l
R eq u est
from
O verseas
B u y ers
F ollow
T a iw a n ’s
B u yers
G lo b a ­
lisa tion
C h ea p
L a b o u r
D om estic
In v estm en t
M ilieu
D eteriora ted
>300 59.8 25.4 14.8 44.9 55.5 26.3
> 100 50.0 23.4 14.1 34.8 56.5 30.4
<99 46.9 24.4 22.3 19.6 67.4 36.0
Year o f Overseas Investment
Before 1986 65.6 16.4 14.8 27.8 62.3 24.6
1987-91 44.7 26.0 15.7 26.7 67.3 34.8
1992-94 48.9 24.8 20.6 24.5 64.5 37.0
After 1995 56.8 22.7 27.3 29.6 55.0 23.6
Investment by Area
China 48.8 22.1 24.5 19.4 72.1 38.2
Hong Kong 58.8 41.2 27.5 52.9 31.4 15.7
USA 70.4 38.9 8.3 43.5 22.2 10.2
Malaysia 43.3 34.3 7.5 43.3 53.7 26.9
Singapore 66.7 33.3 11.1 50.0 27.8 11.1
Thailand 40.6 14.5 14.5 33.3 69.6 36.2
Indonesia 47.4 15.8 7.9 13.2 79.0 34.2
Philippines 22771 22.7 “ Ö U 40.9 81.8 500
Vietnam 24.4 15.6 11.1 26.7 64.4 40.0
Average 49.6 24.5 19.8 26.3 63.7 33.5
Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu * Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu
ZhizaoyeDuiwai TouziShikuangDiaochaBaogao, Bashiwu Nian ( i 70 -R M  o S M
th flt — 'V -£■ » Survey on Overseas Investment o f the Manufacturing
Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1996) (Taipei: MOEA, 1997), pp. 70-73, Table 4.
Note: The question is multiple choice, so the sum of the percents is over 100.
Table 6.2 shows the amounts Taiwanese companies invested overseas in a range of 
Asian countries. This overseas investment increased sharply after 1986. Before 1990, most 
overseas investment poured into Southeast Asia, but after the easing of political tensions 
between Taiwan and China and the development of China’s economy, huge amounts of 
Taiwanese capital flowed into China starting in 1991. Up to the end of 1997 China 
absorbed about half o f the Taiwanese capital invested overseas. In 1997, however, only 
about 21% of this capital flowed into China. This was a result of the Taiwan government’s
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‘Go Slow Toward China’ (*&,;% H & )494 policy, which was intended to counterbalance 
China’s military exercises from July 1995 to March 1996.
Table 6.2 Areas and Annual Amount of Overseas Investment (1986-1997)
unit: million US$
Year 1959-
1987
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Thailand 885.0 859.9 892.2 782.7 538.5 289.9
Malaysia 151.2 306.1 799.7 2,347.8 1,326.2 574.7
Philippines 16.9 109.9 148.7 140.7 12.0 9.1
Indonesia 2,400.6 913.0 513.2 618.3 1,057.3 563.3
Singapore 465.3 6.4 5.2 47.6 12.5 8.8
Vietnam — — 1.0 228.2 498.1 538.8
China — — — — 2,710.0 5,543.0
Subtotal 3,919.0 2,195.3 2,360.0 4,165.3 6,199.2 7,527.8
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Subtotal
Thailand 215.0 477.5 1,803.9 2,785.8 *405.9 9,441.2
Malaysia 331.2 1,122.8 567.8 310.3 480.4 8,318.2
Philippines 5.4 267.8 13.6 7.4 13.1 744.5
Indonesia 127.5 2,487.6 567.4 534.6 3,414.9 13,284.2
Singapore 69.5 100.7 31.6 165.0 230.3 1,142.9
Vietnam 398.5 495.8 1,216.9 530.0 241.0 4,301.9
China 9,965.0 5,395.0 5,777.0 5,141.0 *1320.7 35,851.7
Subtotal 11,116.0 10,347.8 9,992.6 9,637.8 6,150.7 73,307.7
Source: Originally from Thailand BOI, Malaysia MID A, the Philippines BOI, Indonesia BKPM, 
Vietnam SCCI, Investment Commission, MOEA. Cited from Touzi Yewuchu (■& W 
Investment Department), Woguo zai Dongxie Geguo Touzi Tongji Jianxi (£% $'£ f t  Jß-S-M 
B rief Analysis on Taiwan’s Investment in ASEAN) (Taipei: Investment 
Department, unpublished paper, 1998).
Note: means the figure was collected in November, 1997, rather than at year end.
6.1.1 Who Invests Overseas?
In a survey conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1996, 47% out of the 
surveyed large enterprises (over three hundred employees) had already invested overseas,
494 This policy was addressed by President Lee Teng-hui in a public speech on 14 September 1996 to limit 
Taiwan’s economic exchanges with China because of China’s political intention to ‘utilise’ Taishang to 
force Taiwan government to make concessions to China. See Mainland Affairs Commission (!*£ #-#■), 
Kuayue Lishi de Honggou—Liangan Jiaoliu Shinian de Huiguyu Qianzhan f t  X.
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while only 29% of the firms employing less than three hundred but more than one hundred 
workers had done so. The figure fell to 25% for firms employing less than a hundred 
workers.495 The percentage of SMEs investing overseas is obviously quite high. 
Electronics (25%), plastics products (11%), metallic products (9%) and textiles (5%) are 
the four main industries to invest overseas.496
A Ministry of Economic Affairs survey in 1991 found that most labour-intensive 
industries, especially those firms which had invested in China, reduced or stopped their 
domestic production, while heavy industries either maintained or expanded their 
production scale. This means that SMEs that were not internationally competitive found 
they had to move their production lines abroad, while for big firms the overseas investment 
is a business strategy to adjust and expand their global production. This kind of SME 
overseas investment is much like Japanese overseas direct investments before the mid- 
1980s, which aimed at securing a local market or for re-export to the US market.497 This is 
different from a multinational company, which sets its marketing strategy and components 
production according to different regions’ economic situation. For example, a Japanese 
multinational company has invested in Malaysia to produce VCRs, but its components 
derive from one hundred and seventeen firms producing in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Australia.498 The survey of 1996 shows that the three main reasons for big 
firms that employ over three hundred workers to invest overseas are to enter the local 
market (60%), cheap labour (56%) and globalising their business (45%). For SMEs 
employing less than a hundred workers, finding cheap labour (67%) is more important. 
However, entering the local market is another important reason (47%), as is a new trend to 
follow Taiwan’s buyers by going overseas to invest (22%).
/m. ’ Crossing Historical Cleavage—Past and Future o f Exchanges Across Taiwan
Strait) (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Commission, 1997), p. 419.
495 See Jingjibu Tongjichu &  » Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu
Zhizaoye Duojiaohua ji Guojihua Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian ( p  0R13J a fötäläM Pk S £  IbDF
M] fL48.it, Reports on the Diversification and Internationalisation o f Manufacturing Industry)
(Taipei: MOEA, 1995), p. 40, Table 5-1.
496 See Jingjibu Tongjichu ’ Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu
Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian ( p  0
ft>%j PI f t  48 t r —'V -f~3L ’ Survey on Overseas Investment o f the Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan,
ROC, 1996) (Taipei: MOEA, 1997), p. 46-49, Table 2-4.
497 See Akira Suehiro, Ajia Kougyouka no Dainamizumu (The Dynamics o f Asian Industrialisation), in 
Akira Kudo (ed.), Nijisseiki Shihonshyugi II (Twentieth-Century Capitalism II) (Tokyo: University of 
Tokyo Press, 1995), p.180.
498 Ibid.: p. 181.
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6.1.2 Where to Import Material to Produce?
The data shows that in 1994 about three-quarters of the Taiwanese firms imported 
the bulk o f their product’s materials from Taiwan,499 while the percentage in Japan for 
investments in less developed countries in 1990 was 79.1%.500 From this investment 
pattern, we can see that overseas investments do not necessarily have much backward 
linkages to the local economy. This might result in an enclave economy, as dependency 
theory would predict. But as time passes, will these overseas firms buy more materials and 
intermediary goods from the local economy, if the local economy can produce the same 
quality products? The survey of MOEA shows that the longer a company is established in 
a local economy, the more likely that it purchases components from that local economy.501 
Table 6.3 similarly shows that the earlier a firm invested overseas, the more likely that it 
uses components or semi-finished goods from local enterprises, and the less dependent it 
became on Taiwan’s sources. For Japanese companies, only 53.5% will import the basic 
materials from Japan after five years, while 35.7% will buy theirs from local non-Japanese 
companies.502 In the history of Taiwan’s economic development, there is a similar so-called 
‘technology spill-over effect’, as in the cases o f TV productionJ0J and sewing machines,504 
also called a ‘trade substitution effect’. This means that the expansion of the host country's 
industry will eventually remove the necessity to import intermediary goods from the parent 
country. If overseas affiliates can produce the same quality products as in Taiwan with 
lower cost, Taiwan will increase imports from the overseas affiliates, which will induce a 
‘reverse import effect’, and reduce the surplus gap between the investing country and the 
host country.505 The shrinking trade surplus with ASEAN in these years can be viewed as 
the result o f this ‘trade substitution effect’ and ‘reverse import effect’, especially with
499 See Zhang Yingzhe and Zhang Longhong, op. cit., p. 69.
500 See Economic Planning Bureau, op. cit., 134, Table 1-12.
501 See MOEA, op. cit., 1995, p. 19.
502 See Economic Planning Bureau, op. cit., 134.
503 See Suehiro Akira, op. cit., pp. 173-175.
304 See Schive Chi ( ifJ^r), “Technology Transfer Through Direct Foreign Investment: A Case Study of 
Taiwan Singer”. Proceedings o f the Academy o f International Business: Asian -Pacific Dimensions o f 
International Business, 1979 (Dec.).
505 See Lin Caimei ‘Duoguoji Qiye Jishu Yizhuan yu Woguo Chanye Guoji Shuiping Fengong’
( £  IS IS JL #  HU ’ Technology Transfer of MNE and the International
Horizontal Division of Labour of ROC’s Industry) (Taipei: Chinese Culture University, 1995), pp. 7-8.
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Malaysia.506
Table 6.3 Source of Components and Semi-Products for Overseas Affiliates
unit:%
Firm Size by 
Employees
From
Taiwan
From Local 
Taishang
From Local 
Enterprise
From Other 
Country
>300 50.5 12.8 22.0 15.2
> 100 52.9 14.6 19.2 13.3
< 99 51.0 21.0 21.3 6.7
Year of Overseas Investment
Before 1986 40.3 12.8 28.9 18.0
1987-91 51.1 18.2 21.6 9.1
1992-94 49.5 20.1 21.7 8.7
After 1995 59.4 ~TtüI 15.7 7.9
Average 51.1 19.7 21.1 9.1
Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu &  » Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo
Taiwan Diqu Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian ( t7 
a f t  it it}it 4& # ■ — ff » Survey on Overseas
Investment o f the Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1996) (Taipei: MOEA, 
1997), pp. 97-98,
6.1.3 The Economic Effect o f Overseas Investment
The trend to invest overseas helped to create a booming trade between Taiwan and 
other East Asian countries. It is the so-called ‘investment-induced trade effect’. Companies 
moving their production out o f Taiwan could either dispose of their machinery in Taiwan 
or ship it overseas to produce the same products. Since to use the machinery to produce in 
Taiwan is no longer profitable, it is usually not sold in Taiwan but shipped overseas. This is 
one reason why Taiwanese companies’ sales to ASEAN countries and Hong Kong 
(including China) increased steadily. Its major export products centred on electrical 
machinery and mechanical appliances, which comprised 51.5% and 34.6% of total trade in 
the two regions in 1996.507 Table 4.3 shows that Taiwan’s exports to ASEAN countries 
increased from 10% of total exports to 13.3% between 1992 and 1997, while imports
506 Board of Foreign Trade, MOEA (#iL$T§p |§j Fg- % 3i th), Guoji Maoyi Oingshi Fenxi (WU&ff 3  
#  ’Analysis o f International Economy) (Taipei: Board of Foreign Trade, MOEA, Jan 1998).
507 See Board of Foreign Trade, Foreign Trade Development o f the Republic o f China, 1996 (Taipei: Board 
of Foreign Trade, 1997), p.26, 30.
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increased from 8.4% to 11.6%. Exports to Hong Kong and China increased more 
significantly, from 18.9% to 23.5% in the same period, but imports remained insignificant 
because of Taiwan’s restrictions on imports from China.
For those Taiwanese firms investing in ASEAN countries, the percentage of 
imported machinery is 89.7%. 72.1% of this imported machinery comes from Taiwan.508 
84% of the SMEs and 85% of the big businesses shipped their machines from Taiwan.509 
This situation is the same for Japanese companies that invested in less developed countries. 
According to a survey done by the Japan Economic Planning Bureau in 1990, 62.9% 
imported their own company’s machines when they started their overseas firm, and 27.6% 
bought the machines from other Japanese companies located in Japan. In total, over 90% 
used Japan-made machines to produce in less developed countries.510
However, this increasing interdependent trade relationship makes Taiwan vulnerable 
to the Asian financial crisis that commenced in 1997.1 will leave this issue to the end of this 
chapter.
6.2 Starting a New Business Overseas
6.2.1 The Overseas Chinese Community and Taiwanese Overseas Investment
One advantage for Taishang (Taiwanese businesspeople investing overseas, % ]§)) to 
invest in East and Southeast Asia is that there are a lot of overseas Chinese (Huaqiao, 4£ 
f i % ) ,  who can play the role o f middleman to channel capital. Their situation is similar to 
those Japanese SMEs which tried to invest overseas in the late 1960s, and found Taiwan 
was the most convenient place for them because many of the older Taiwanese are fluent in 
Japanese.
Malaysia is a good case. One informant’s father came to Taiwan after 1949, and his 
family keeps in touch with their relatives scattered in Asia. One of his cousins is Malaysian
508 The survey is done in 1994 by MOEA. See MOEA, Woguo Duiwai Touzi dui Dongnanya GuojiaJingji
ji  Shehui Yingxiang zhi Shizheng Yanjiu (Zhaiyao Baogao) (4% MHtj-th&WMA. & JSt $  # #
—Mdc ’A Summary Report o f Taiwan’s Overseas Investment and its Socio-Economic 
Impact on Local Society in ASEAN) (Taipei: MOEA, 1995), p. 17.
509 See Zhang Yingzhe and Zhang Longhong, op. cit., p.69, Table 2.
510 See Keizai Kikakuchou Chouseikyoku, Nihon to Sekai wo Kaeru Kaigai Chokusetsu Toushi (Economic 
Planning Bureau, Overseas Investment that changes Japan and the World) (Tokyo: Ookurashou Printing 
Bureau, 1990), p.132, Table 1-8.
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Chinese, and with his help he set up his firm in Penang, and his cousin became the manager 
o f the factory. In 1997 he set up another new firm with the help of another cousin in China. 
Many informants said that language is one o f the major problems they face, and overseas 
Chinese become good candidates to bridge the gap between two languages.
Because these small and medium-sized investors have no command of other 
languages, China has become the most popular place to invest. The benefit is that they can 
handle everything by themselves without middlemen. From the building of the factory to 
labour management, they are able to communicate with the local people. An informant 
investing in Malaysia and China compared the labour management in the two countries. Tn 
Malaysia, language and culture are two major problems. Malaysian workers complain to 
the Ministry o f Labour Affairs whenever there is a dispute. In China, I can communicate 
with them in Mandarin, and explain everything when they have questions. So in two 
months, the production line can be equipped with a labour force and ready for production.’ 
The language problem also affects the decision of where to locate the factory. In 
Guangdong, Taishang firms cluster in Dongguan (22%) and Shenzhen (25%),511 while in 
Malaysia, they cluster in Penang (40%) and Klang Valley near Kuala Lumpur (32%).512 
They choose these locations to facilitate doing business with the many other Taishang in 
these areas, and they can expect local personnel to have learned Chinese.
For those places where Chinese is not the official language, overseas Chinese who 
speak Mandarin or Hokkien become the intermediators.51'" The most popular 
intermediators are overseas Chinese who studied in Taiwan and went back to their host 
country to work. Up to 1996, there were more than eight-two thousand overseas Chinese 
students from Southeast Asia who had graduated from Taiwan’s universities, and up till 
1997, more than one hundred thirty-five thousand overseas Chinese students who had
511 The data is calculated from 1991 up to November 1996 according to Taiwan government’s released 
data, which is different from China’s statistics. See Jinjibu Touzi Shenyi Weiyuanhui
ft Investment Commission, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo Huaqiao j i  Waiguoren Touzi, Dui Dalu 
Jianjie Touzi Tongji Yuebao ( P  £  & I%] £1 Tt ’ M A  t f ß j  & ) (Taipei:
Investment Commission, MOEA, Nov. 1996), p.55.
512 See Gong Yijun Guaguo Touzi yu Taiwan Guanlian: Taishang zai Malaixiya de Yixie
Guancha : Cross-Border Investment and Linkage
with Taiwan: Some Observations on Taishang in Malaysia) (Taipei: Sinica Academia, unpublished 
conference paper, 1997), p. 12.
513 In Taiwan’s university campus, there are more and more ads on the wall to find overseas students to 
teach local language. Usually these students are offered jobs before they graduate.
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studied in Taiwan.514 They become the reserve army for the Taishangs ’ investment in the 
area. One company’s executive manager said that these overseas Chinese students were 
very helpful to his investment in Penang when he came in 1987. They introduced 
government officials and relevant managers o f the industry to him, which enabled him to 
evaluate the investment environment quickly. In another firm, the executive manager, 
general manager and purchasing managers are all Malaysian Chinese with diplomas from 
Taiwan. In Malaysia, the Association o f Taiwan-Graduated Students has become the most 
important consulting organisation for Taishang,515
6.2.2 The Host Countries’ Policies and Types of Ownership
In Chapter Three, we found that in Taiwan the most common means to start a new 
business is through a partnership, which gradually evolves into a wholly-owned company. 
A survey done by the Ministry o f Economic Affairs in 1996 shows that the most common 
type o f ownership among those investing overseas is wholly-owned (61%)516 (See Table 
6.4). However, once abroad, the proportion of partnerships is much higher than in Taiwan. 
In Taiwan, only 12.7% enterprises adopt the partnership format, while among those 
companies investing overseas, the percentage reaches 67% in some regions. In the same 
survey done in 1995 with the same question, but using ‘single choice’ instead of multiple 
choice, the percentage of joint ventures among 1,680 firms is 45%, which is still higher 
than 12.7%.517
The different ownership forms adopted by Taishang are based upon profit 
calculations that are affected by the host government’s policies. In his research on the 
Canadian-Chinese business community, Peter S. Li found that partnership was the most 
common form before the Second World War due to a lack o f labour and capital in the
514 See Jiaoyubu Tongjichu (It IF £ß &Ltf &  » Statistics Section, the Ministry of Education Affairs), Huiguo 
Shengxue Qiaosheng Renshu Tongji ( A M M  i f  ’ Statistics on Overseas Chinese Students 
Studying in Taiwan) (Taipei: the Ministry of Education Affairs, 1998), p.73.
M5 See Gong Yijun, Cross-Border Investment and Linkage with Taiwan: Some Observations on Taishang 
in Malaysia, p. 12.
516 The data does not tell us whether it is  the present ownership type, or it is the type when one 
invested overseas The question it asks in the questionnaire is “Regarding to overseas investment, what is 
the type your company adopts?“ (#  s] M  if Ü ) . The question is ambiguous, for it can
not refer to the past and the present type in Chinese. However, according to the explanation of the business 
organisation in page nine, I will assume that it asks the present ownership type.
51' See Statistics Section, MOEA, Reports on the Diversification and Internationalisation o f  
Manufacturing Industry, p. 240, Table B-13.
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community. When Chinese family members were allowed to immigrate to Canada after the 
Second World War, labour force shortages no longer posed a problem, and the ‘ethnic 
partnership system’ gradually disappeared.518
Table 6.4 Types o f Ownership in Host Countries
unit . %
F irm  S ize  
by
E m p lo y ee
Wholly-
Owned
Joint Venture 
with Taiwan co.
Joint 
Venture 
with 
overseas 
Taiwan co.
Joint 
Venture 
with local 
co.
Joint 
Venture 
with host 
government
Joint 
Venture 
with foreign 
co.
Other Total
Number
> 3 0 0 64.4 12.7 4.7 29.7 10.2 17.8 4.7 236
> 100 58.7 11.4 8.2 27.7 10.3 14.1 6.5 184
< 9 9 60.8 16.7 7.6 21.5 9.8 8.2 1.7 892
Y ea r  o f  O verseas In v estm en t
Before 1986 60.7 11.5 13.1 32.8 8.2 14.8 4.9 61
1987-91 65.0 14.5 5.7 26.3 9.7 11.5 3.2 434
1992-94 59.0 15.2 7.0 23.0 10.9 9.2 2.7 597
After 1995 59.6 17.7 8.6 19.1 8.2 12.3 2.3 220
Investm ent by A rea
China 63.7 15.4 5.2 20.0 12.6 10.0 2.2 849
Hong Kong 60.8 9.8 13.7 29.4 5.9 7.8 3.9 51
USA 71.3 17.6 11.1 22.2 1.9 14.8 5.6 108
Malaysia 47.8 25.4 10.5 31.3 4.5 11.9 3.0 67
Singapore 44.4 5.6 5.6 50.0 0 38.9 0 18
Thailand 52.2 10.1 14.5 42.0 5.8 10.1 0 69
Indonesia 34.2 13.2 13.2 44.7 5.3 2.6 10.5 38
Philippines 54.6 0 0 31.8 0 9.1 13.6 22
ASEAN 5 36.1 10.7 8.2 29.6 3.2 8.9 3.2 280
Vietnam 48.9 24.4 4.4 17.8 13.3 15.6 2.2 45
A v era g e 61.1 15.2 7.2 23 .9 9.9 10.8 2.9 1312
Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu > Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu
Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian ( f  lä MM
M  f t  f t  ’ Survey on Overseas Investment o f the Manufacturing
Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1996) (Taipei: MOEA, 1997), pp. 76-77, Table 4.
Note: The question is multiple choice, so the sum of the percent is over 100.
318 See Peter S. Li, ‘Chinese Investment and Business in Canada: Ethnic Entrepreneurship Reconsidered’,
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The host country usually designs very good packages to attract foreign capital. 
However, it also wants to gain from the policy, e.g., for the foreign-owned company to 
export its products to earn foreign exchange, or to encourage co-operation between local 
and foreign firms so as to access new technology from foreign companies. If there are 
restrictions on the establishment of wholly-foreigner-owned firms, foreign investments are 
more inclined to take a joint venture format. Foreign investors will calculate the costs and 
benefits so as to take advantage of the offers o f the host country.
The Chinese government encourages joint ventures. The local authorities always ask 
foreign investors to agree to provide a large sum of investment capital, though the realised 
capital is often less than what has been promised. Up to the end o f 1996, the negotiated 
capital o f Taiwan’s investments was US$34.5 billion, but the investment capital actually 
was recorded as only reaching US$14.9 billion, 43% of the negotiated capital.519 Besides, 
the products of a wholly-foreigner-owned company can be sold only to a certain degree in 
China’s domestic market, so this also encourages foreign capital to enter into a joint 
venture with local enterprises. Malaysia has similar restrictions. As one informant said, ‘so 
far as I know, most Taiwanese firms investing in China are joint venture companies. That is 
because the businesspeople are not familiar with the local social milieu, so they are afraid of 
putting all their money there. Besides, the products of wholly-foreigner-owned company 
have to be exported. So they prefer to take the joint venture form to reduce the risk on the 
one hand, and to be able to sell the products in the domestic market on the other hand.’ In 
Malaysia, the government regulates that there must be at least two local shareholders in a 
foreign invested company. A common way to evade the regulations is to ask local Chinese 
to find two Alibabas520 who contribute one Malaysia dollar to be a shareholder, but the real 
business is controlled by the Taiwan investor. In the Philippines, the local people should 
have at least 60% of the shares, but an informant found an Alibaba via his friend. Different 
government polices produce different outcomes.
The distribution of ownership types differ from country to country. Among the 1,312 
surveyed firms, 849 (65%) had invested in China and 45 (3.4%) in Vietnam. There two
Pacific Affairs, vol. 66, no. 2, p. 225.
519 See Mainland Affairs Commission » Crossing Historical Cleavage-Past and Future o f Exchanges 
Across Taiwan Strait (1997), p. 372, Table 7-1.
520 This means Malays whose names are put on the board by overseas investors but who do not have any real 
power.
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countries have ‘socialist economies’, and most business activities to a are still under 
government control.521 Joint ventures with local governments provide one way to escape 
bureaucratic harassment — and enables a foreign company to benefit from the newly 
established relationship. One businessman runs a wholesale centre in Guangdong, which 
distributes goods to other provinces in China by railway. However, railways in different 
provinces are managed by different provincial bureaux. Other provincial railway bureaux 
might not take care of the goods, and might leave them at the provincial railway station for 
a long time. So this businessman co-operates in a venture with the army, and whenever he 
ships the commodity by railway, he puts a label ‘Military Use’ on it, which enables the 
shipped goods to be transported quickly.522 12.6% of the Taiwanese businesspeople who 
have invested in China and 13.3% of those who invest in Vietnam establish joint ventures in 
with the host government, which is much higher than the percentage o f joint ventures in 
any o f the other five ASEAN countries (3.2%) or the USA (1.85%) (see Table 6.4).
6.2.3 Wholly-Owned Companies and Tax Evasion
If  a company is not targeting the other country’s domestic market, or the host 
government restricts the sale of products in the domestic market, or controls the foreign 
exchange, it usually takes the form of a wholly-owned firm abroad. In a country controlling 
foreign exchange, it will be easier for the parent company to manage all the finances. One 
company has an affiliate in Malaysia. The affiliate’s orders and financial transactions 
clearances are made in Taiwan. The parent company remits money to the affiliate every 
month to pay wages and to meet the other costs o f business operations, but the money to 
pay for the imported goods and the money received from exported goods is cleared in 
Taipei instead of in Kuala Lumpur. In this way, the company can prevent the problem of 
foreign exchange controls. More important, I believe, is to evade tax, which often takes the 
form of ‘price transfers’.
Taiwan data show that only 39% of the firms’ overseas operations made any profits,
521 See Mainland Affairs Commission (&■#--$“), ‘Zhonggong Guoqi Gaige zhi Youli ji Buli Tiaojian’ ( +
Situations of the Reform of Chinese Public Enterprises), Dalu Gongzuo 
Jianbao (A  i t  Briefing on the Work on Mainland China), Executive Yuan Meeting, no. 2561, p. 
3-16.
522 See Mainland Affairs Commission (1^  Taishangfu Dalu Touzi Shibai Anli zhi Yanjiu ( 
A F k £ t j t f i t % £ R e s e a r c h  on the Failed Taiwan Businesspeople in Mainland China) (Taipei: 
Mainland Affairs Commission, 1992), p. 182.
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and 30% reported a loss, while the rest reportedly broke even, according to the survey of 
1996. The earlier a company set up overseas, the more profits it made. 50% of those firms 
going overseas after 1995 reported a loss, and only 21% showed a profit. Big firms 
employing more than three hundred workers profited more (51% out of 217 firms) than 
SMEs employing less than three hundred (about 37% out of 1,033 firms).52j We can doubt 
that the firms were telling the government the truth. Though it is possible that high initial 
costs would not provide immediate returns, another possibility is tax evasion.
In the case above, after the parent company receives an order in Taiwan, it puts this 
order to the Malaysian affiliate to produce it. Say that the money it gets for the order is 
$200, and the raw materials cost $100, the wage cost is $20, and business operations cost 
$10, it will profit by $70. However, the affiliate company can inflate the cost o f raw 
materials to $165, and the rest of the cost ($30), i.e., wage costs plus business operations 
costs remain the same, so in total the cost to produce the product becomes $195, and the 
profit in Malaysia is reduced to $5. Another way to keep the profit in Taiwan is to put out 
the order at the price of $135, which will leave the Malaysian affiliate with a $5 profit. 
Because the booking is made ‘within a company between different firms’, it is easy to 
control the shift of profits between different places, depending on the tax rate charged by 
different governments.
In a similar sense, a Taiwan company selling to Taiwan companies in the host country 
would adopt wholly-owned ownership to control its financial management. An informant 
says that the transactions incurring credits and debits between Taishang in Dongguan ( ^  
^,), China, are cleared in Hong Kong instead of in Dongguan. For example, A company 
sells products to B company, and B gives A a cheque, which will be cleared in Hong Kong.
The rule of ‘lailiao jiagong’ » import materials to process) imposes a
certain tax rate for the company, and then the company is free to sell its products in the 
domestic market. The tax rate depends on the arbitrary judgement o f the officer. After 
receiving the tax, the government will not charge any business tax. So it is important to tell 
the government that there is no profit in producing the products so that the government 
will not tax too much. The company can inflate the cost o f imported raw materials, or 
deflate the selling price to another company. To work out such a system depends on co-
523 See Statistics Section, MOEA, Survey on Overseas Investment o f the Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan,
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operation between Taishang. So the system is like a conglomerate owning different firms, 
which transfer the products within the company, though in fact they have independent 
accounting. The transactions between these firms can be cleared overseas so that the 
profits cannot be checked by the government, and it can be remitted to Taiwan freely 
without government controls.
A company executive discussed with me a tax difference between Taiwan and 
Malaysia: that in Taiwan, one has to pay a 0.6% business income tax every year, no matter 
whether one has profits or not, while in Malaysia, if one does not have any profit, one does 
not have to pay any tax. So in Taiwan, after paying the 0.6% tax, one can ‘enjoy’ the rest of 
one’s profits. But in Malaysia, if one never has a profit, one cannot buy goods, or the 
government would trace where your money derives from. I asked him: if you never show a 
profit in Malaysia, what can you do with your money? He replied that he will not buy 
anything there, so it should not be a problem. In other words, he will report no profit in 
Malaysia, and bring all the profits back to Taiwan via an ‘underground way’.
6.3 Capital Sources for Overseas Investment
In Taiwan, as shown in Chapter Three, when one starts a new business, the most 
common way to raise initial capital is to use one’s existing social relations to pull together 
scattered savings. This kind o f capital-raising method is not common for SMEs investing 
overseas. If  these SMEs have not already accumulated enough capital in Taiwan, they are 
not able to borrow money for this purpose from local financial institutions. In China there 
are some financial institutions like rotatiing credit clubs similar to Taiwan’s, but most 
Taiwan businesspeople lack social contacts there, and it is almost impossible for them to 
collect initial capital like in Taiwan for their new investment.524
Taiwan companies remit cash to the host country to build up a firm; or sell their 
Taiwan machinery to the newly established firm as a part o f the new investment; or grant 
their company’s copyright to the affiliate or transfer technology, and use this as a part of 
their share. The different ways of capital-raising are shown in Table 6.5.
ROC, 1996, pp. 169-170, Table 17-2.
524 See Fan Jinming (&$$ afl), ‘Dalu Minjian Zijin Rongtong Qudao yu Taishang Yinying Celyue’ ( A $ e 
R, TU % a W 0  ’ Private Financial Channels in China and the Strategies Taishang
can adopt), Taiyan Liangan Qianzhan Tansuo ( Expl ore the Future across Taiwan 
Strait) (Taipei: Taiwan Research Institute, no. 7 (1998), pp. 33-46.
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Table 6.5 Capital Sources for Overseas Investment
unit: %
Firm  Size by  
Em ployees
Cash M achinery Supply o f  Raw 
M aterials, Semi- or 
Finished Products
Granting 
Patents or 
Technical 
Transfers
Other Total
Number
>300 93.2 47.9 24.6 10.2 1.7 236
> 100 89.7 57.6 32.6 9.8 0.0 184
< 99 73.9 67.3 45.3 9.2 0.9 892
Y ear o f O verseas Investm ent
Before 1986 88.5 63.9 45.9 16.4 0.0 61
1987-91 80.0 62.9 40.3 9.9 1.4 434
1992-94 75.4 64.0 40.5 8.5 0.5 597
After 1995 87.7 56.8 35.0 9.1 1.4 220
Investm ent by A rea
C h in a 7 3 .9 7 3 .0 4 5 .0 9 .2 0 .5 84 9
Hong Kong 92.2 41.2 19.6 3.9 2.0 51
USA 91.7 26.9 27.8 7.4 0.0 108
Malaysia 91.0 47.8 28.4 11.9 0.0 67
Singapore 83.3 22.2 27.8 ~ 2 2 2 l 0.0 18
Thailand 89.9 40.6 33.3 11.6 ~ 4 A 69
Indonesia 92.1 71.1 31.6 7.9 0.0 38
Philippines 81.8 59.1 54.6 9.1 9.1 22
Vietnam 88.9 68.9 33.3 6.7 0.0 45
A v e r a g e 7 9 .6 6 2 .4 3 9 .8 9 .5 0 .9 1312
Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu » Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo Taiwan Diqu
Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian ( i* Jjßßi M o  i%bht Qk 
thfJt j f  #■— ’ Survey on Overseas Investment o f the Manufacturing
Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1996) (Taipei: MOEA, 1997), pp. 79-80, Table 5.
Note: The question is multiple choice, so the sum of the percent is over 100.
Remittance of cash from Taiwan is the most common way to collect capital to 
establish an overseas company. Table 6.5 (above) shows that the smaller a firm, the less 
likely is it to remit cash, and the more likely to sell machinery in the host country as part of 
the new firm’s build-up of capital overseas. For those investing in China, 73% of the 
surveyed firms used machinery as a part o f the initial capital for the new venture, which is 
higher than with any other country. The percent remitting cash to build a new factory in 
China is only 73.9%, the lowest percent among the countries invested in.
This phenomenon has to do with the political policies and institutions o f the host 
country. If  the political structure of the host country is not stable, or corrupt, the investor 
would like to have returns from his investment as soon as possible, especially for small- and
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medium-sized enterprises. An informant said that ‘I never think of the problem of who will 
inherit my property in China. What concerns me is how quick I can make a profit and take 
back my investment money. The amount o f the initial investment should be got back in 
three years, and the sooner the better’.
One easy way to lower their exposed investment is to sell the used machinery to the 
host country, or to use it as a part of a joint venture’s investment capital. The machinery 
shipped overseas is usually overvalued so that the Taiwanese sellers could ‘earn two 
hands’: the first hand is the real value of the machine, which is counted as a part o f their 
investment capital; and the second hand is the overvalued portion which takes the place of 
capital in the joint venture, and which ensures a Taiwan SME would not lose a lot of 
money even if the overseas firm fails to make profits.525 For example, an informant co­
invested with a Chinese counterpart in a firm to produce poly-plastic utensils. He owned 
40% of the NT$1.3 million shares, i.e., 0.52 million. But he sold his machines at a value o f 
one million, so he took back 0.48 million from his Chinese partner. In this way, he ensures 
that he gets back the full value of his machines, and at the same time secures returns in the 
future from the Chinese market. According to a survey on foreign investment conducted in 
1994 by the Chinese government, the price o f ‘investment in kind’ is 20% overvalued.526
To be successful in this kind of deal depends on imperfect local information about the 
market price for the used machinery and corrupt political structures. In China and Vietnam, 
the local governments and their public enterprises were the only potential partners with 
foreign investors to establish joint-venture firms. The generous investment package 
designed for foreign capital provides the bureaucrats with incentives to work with overseas 
capital. However, the sale to such joint-ventures of machinery at inflated prices will 
become transparent in future if the market information flow is freer, and it will be more 
difficult for Taishang to use the same tricks to take back their money.
525 Ibid: p. 30.
526 See Jingjianhui Jingyanchu » Research Department, Council of Economic Planning),
Dalu Waizi Zhengce zhi Yartbian ji qi dui Taishang de Yingxing
$  • The Evolution o f Chinese Foreign Investment Policy and its Influence on Taishang) (Taipei: Council 
of Economic Planning, 1997), pp.2-12.
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Table 6.6 Markets for Overseas Taiwan Companies
u n it: %
F irm  S ize by  
E m p lo y ees
Taiwan Local Market Other Area Total Number
>300 12.1 43.0 44.9 213
> 100 9.9 46.7 43.4 171
< 99 10.2 43.2 46.7 842
Y ea r  o f  O verseas n vestm en t
Before 1986 13.3 47.0 39.7 60
1987-91 8.7 40.0 51.3 425
1992-94 9.6 46.1 44.3 576
After 1995 16.9 43.1 40.0 165
In v estm en t by A rea
China 9.9 40.2 49.9 794
Hong Kong ~ T 6 40.1 52.4 49
USA 9.7 66.9 23.5 103
Malaysia 6.6 45.5 ~~47y 65
Singapore 5.8 44~9^ ~ 4 9 J 17
Thailand 10.2 50.1 39.8 62
Indonesia 18.8 48.7 32.6 32
Philippines 22.3 29.4 48.4 19
Vietnam 27.2 28.5 44.3 42
A v era g e 10.5 43 .6 45.9 1226
Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu »Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo
Taiwan Diqu Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian
’ Survey on
Overseas Investment o f the Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1996) 
(Taipei: MOEA, 1997), pp. 145-146, Table 12-2.
Regarding working capital, a survey done in 1993 shows that 56% of Taishang in 
China obtained their working capital from their Taiwan parent company, 16% of them 
borrowed money from China’s banks, and 11% acquired it from their Chinese counterpart 
partners.527 In Chapter Three I have argued that borrowing from the banks is a strategy to 
evade tax. This kind of practice seems not to work in China. The main reason is that these 
companies are foreigner-owned, and the profits they make in China will be remitted to the 
parent companies. Since the practice o f ‘price transfer’ mentioned above provides another
52 See Investment Commission, MOEA If ft "tO, Taishangyu Waishangzai Dalu Touzi
Jingyan zhi Diaocha Yanjiu — yi Zhizaoye Weili ( a f t  A fä lx  W
P] ’ A Comparative Study o f Foreign Investment in Mainland China, Take the Example o f 
Manufacturing Industry) (Taipei: Investment Commission, MOEA, 1994), p.175, Table 7-41.
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means to transfer profits to the mother country, and at the same time to escape the control 
o f foreign exchange, there is no need to borrow from banks in China. In addition, the 
corrupt procedures to remit money overseas in China make foreign companies more likely 
to use the ‘price transfer’ strategy to be rid of hassles,528 which will reduce the Taishang’s 
demand for working capital from banks in China
Table 6.6 (above) shows the market for the products o f overseas Taiwan business. 
There is no significant difference between different firm sizes for the product outlets. 11% 
of the firms re-export their products to Taiwan, while 44% of them sell their products in 
the local market, and 46% sell their products in areas other than Taiwan and the host 
country. This market distribution seems not to change as time passes. A survey done by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1995 asked the firms two questions: where was the market 
for their products when they began to operate their overseas production; where is the 
market for their present products. The difference between the two periods is not significant 
at all.529
6.4 Markets for Overseas Products
6.4.1 Exports o f Overseas Produced Products : the Role o f Parent Firms
Table 6.7 shows the marketing channels for overseas production. The Taiwanese 
parent company plays an important role in selling the products produced overseas, and the 
smaller the firm, the more important the role it plays. The importance of the parent firm in 
Taiwan depends on the marketing strategy adopted by the Taiwanese company, and the 
marketing ability of the host country to the world market.
If the overseas affiliate is only a production base, which is co-ordinated by the parent 
firm to produce components for other affiliates, or aims at exporting to a third country like 
the USA, its marketing channel is more likely to be controlled by the parent firm. One 
interviewed company produces children’s books for its American buyer, and it produces 
semi-finished products in Taiwan, exports these to China, processes them there, and then
528 Ibid.: pp. 178-179.
529 In the first year of operation, 12.6% re-exported products to Taiwan, 10.2% sold in the hosting country, 
and 47% exported to third countries. The figures in 1995 are 11.3%, 40.5% and 48.2% respectively. See 
Statistics Section, MOEA, Reports on the Diversification and Internationalisation o f  Manufacturing 
Industry, Ibid. : pp. 194, 195, Table B-8, B-9.
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re-exports them to the USA. The order is firmly controlled by the parent company in 
Taiwan, and the overseas affiliate is only a production base. Most of the Taichung 
umbrella-producing firms moved to China after 1987. They export the parts, assemble the 
umbrellas in China, and re-export the semi-finished products to Taiwan. Only the last piece 
o f the umbrella is finished in Taiwan. Big firms like ACER, which produces computer 
motherboards in Subic Bay, the Philippines, and exports these to Taiwan to assemble, 
relocate production bases in different overseas affiliates to take advantage of different 
countries’ comparative advantage.
Table 6.7 Marketing Channels for Overseas Production
unit: %
F irm  S ize by  
E m p loyees
Parent 
Company 
in Taiwan
Overseas
Affiliate
Other 
Company 
in Taiwan
Company in
Host
Country
Company in a 
Third Country
>300 47.9 64.4 3.0 18.6 8.5
> 100 50.5 64.7 5.4 21.7 5.4
< 99 54.8 55.4 13.3 19.3 10.8
Y ea r  o f  O verseas In v estm en t
Before 1986 50.8 73.8 1.6 19.7 0.0
1987-91 55.3 59.2 9.0 16.1 1.4
1992-94 51.8 54.9 14.1 22.5 0.5
After 1995 52.3 61.4 5.5 18.2 1.4
In v estm en t b y  A rea
China 59.1 52.4 13.1 17.8 10.0
Hong Kong 43.1 70.6 5.9 19.6 17.7
USA 28.7 80.6 4.6 25.9 6.5
Malaysia 49.3 73.1 4.5 17.9 7.5
Singapore 16.7 72.2 0.0 50.0 22.2
Thailand 43.5 73.9 2.9 23.2 2.9
Indonesia 42.1 63.2 13.2 21.1 7.9
Philippines 63.6 59.1 9.1 9.1 13.6
Vietnam 68.7 40.0 8.9 15.6 4.4
A v era g e 53.0 58.3 10.4 19.5 9.6
Source: Jingjibu Tongjichu » Statistics Section, MOEA), Zhonghuaminguo
Taiwan Diqu Zhizaoye Duiwai Touzi Shikuang Diaocha Baogao, Bashiwu Nian ( f  
0  & &  £  i f t ä  Hk 7? P!& &  -fr—w  -f~£. 0  > Survey on Overseas
Investment o f the Manufacturing Industry in Taiwan, ROC, 1996) (Taipei: MOEA, 
1997), pp. 148-149, Table 13.
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In less developed countries like China, Vietnam or the Philippines, the parent 
company in Taiwan plays a key role to channel the products to other overseas markets 
because of the limited marketing experience of the host country. Research by Egan and 
Mody shows that a new trend for NIE firms is to source inexpensive footwear in LDCs for 
US buyers as production costs rise in the home countries, but the buyer-seller links are not 
changed. Another type of intermediation occurs when the US buyer seeks an equity 
partnership.530 The NIE firm provides on-site training and other management, while the US 
side supplies assured orders. This trend is enforced by non-tariff barrier policies 
implemented by Western countries, e.g., quota restrictions, regulation of origin of 
production, and countervailing duty taxes.
The established buyer-seller links are not easy to enter for the LDC companies. One 
interviewed American-Taiwanese importer said that his Christmas gifts are imported from 
China, which is mainly sourced through Taiwanese companies with which he has co­
operated for a long time. A Taiwan partner was producing ceramic products, but moved to 
China to produce because of rising labour costs and the improved quality of the Chinese 
ceramic industry. However, the Taiwan partner keeps the core part of the product design 
and technology innovation in Taiwan, while production is left to the overseas affiliate. In 
this buyer-seller link, the Taiwan company plays a pivotal role to channel the products from 
China to the USA, and other LDC companies cannot easily access the link. We noted in 
Chapter Five that ‘price, quality and delivery’ are three key elements in doing business. 
Long-term co-operation with the Taiwan company gives the foreign buyer the minimum 
guarantee that the co-operating party is reliable in these three respects. One complaint 
often heard from Taishang is that ‘a Chinese firm has no idea of quality’. One Taishang, 
who had imported raw material from Taiwan to produce plastic-related products, tried to 
source the raw material in China to reduce transportation costs. He ordered the raw 
material from one Chinese enterprise, which was able to provide quality materials and to
530 See Mary Lou Egan and Ashoka Mody, ‘Buyer-Seller Links in Export Development’, World 
Development, vol.20, No. 3 (1992), p.324.
531 See Board of Foreign Trade, MOEA (&£$HP Woguo Jiaru Shjie Maoyi Zuzhi Cankao
Ziliao—Gongyepian 5 3  —-21 Reference to the Application to
Accession to WTO—Industry Sector 5) (Taipei: Board of Foreign Trade, MOEA, 1996), pp. 11-13. This 
situation is similar to Japanese SMEs which expanded their overseas investment after the 1980s due to 
wage rises at home and protectionist measures abroad. See United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, Small and Medium-sized Transnational Corporations, (New York: United Nations, 1993), 
p.56.
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deliver on time. However, when the Chinese enterprise could not supply enough raw 
material for all o f its customers, it cut its supply to this Taishang. The Taishang had to 
compensate his American buyer.532
The buyer-seller’s link is not static, and a survey finds that more and more exporting 
channels are taken over by overseas affiliates. 46% of the surveyed firms in 1993 said that 
their export marketing is controlled by the Taiwan parent firm. This had dropped from 
54% in 1992. 42% of the firms in 1993 replied that the export marketing was controlled by 
the co-invested firm in China, which had increased from 29% in 1992.53^  Table 6.7 also 
shows the same tendency: the longer the overseas affiliate is established, the more likely is 
the affiliate to control the marketing channel. When these Asian countries are able to 
establish business networks abroad, the orders received by Taiwan will be replaced. This is 
one reason why the Taiwan government insists on the policy of ‘Go Slowly Toward China’ 
proposed by President Lee Teng-hui.5
6.4.2 Overseas Produced Products Sold in the Host Country
If the finished products are sold on the domestic market, it is more likely to utilise its 
overseas affiliates to sell the products locally. 58% of the surveyed firms replied that their 
products are sold by their overseas affiliates’ marketing networks (see Table 6.7).
In Dongguan, most Taishang only trade with Taishang. One informant said that he 
only does business with other Taishang because he does not trust Chinese companies. ‘The 
cost o f doing business with Taishang is high, but it is higher to do business with Chinese 
companies’, he said. He sells electronic components to another big Taishang, and gets a 
four-month post-dated cheque. If he sells to a Chinese company, he asks for cash—for he 
does not trust them.
In Taiwan, a subcontracting system is prevalent, and whenever a company needs to
53_ See Mainland Affairs Commission, Research on the Failed Taiwan Businesspeople in Mainland China, 
op. cit., 56-57.
5:0 See Investment Commission, MOEA if ft it) , Taishangyu Waishangzai Dalu Touzi
Jingyan zhi Diaocha Yanjiu —yi Zhizaoye Weili, di Ernian WfL&ffT—
’A Comparative Study o f Foreign Investment in Mainland China—Take the 
Example o f Manufacturing Industry, the Second Year) (Taipei: Investment Commission, MOEA, 1995), 
p. 159, Table 6-27.
534 See Lin Yujun and Chen Tianzhi Taishang dui Dalu touzi zhi Xinqushi yu Jiuweiji
( a A  ’ New Trend and Old Crisis o f Taiwan ’s Investment in Mainland
China) (Taipei: unpublished conference paper, 1997).
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buy raw materials or components to assemble, normally it has no difficulty in finding a 
source. In China, however, the integration of upstream and downstream industries is not 
yet established, so it is frequently a problem for a Taishang to find adequate sources of 
supply. The situation these Taishang face is similar to Japanese investment in Taiwan in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. The Japanese investors complained that there was no 
integrated industrial structure to supply all the necessary parts for assembly in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.5^ 5 SMEs from Taiwan in China have the same complaint. Because 
there is no established subcontracting system in China, and no reliable delivery and quality, 
it reinforces the co-operation between Taishang in the same region, such as Shenzhen or 
Dongguan, to form a tight co-operative industrial structure. Another way to resolve this 
problem of sourcing input materials or processing semi-finished goods is to expand the 
firm size and to include all o f the different parts of the work in the same factory, whereas in 
Taiwan it would be finished by many single-task factories. For example, one informant 
noted that connecting electrical cable for manufacturing is normally done by a different 
firm in Taiwan, but in China, the Taishang employs skilled labourers in the factory to do 
the work. The main reason is that labour costs are very cheap in China compared to the 
putting-out charge of other companies. ‘A firm employing fifty workers in Taiwan can 
employ five hundred workers in China because of low wages, so more of what the firm 
needs is produced in the factory rather than purchased from other companies.’
The impact of the close co-operation between Taishang overseas is that many 
upstream firms of a certain industry close their factories in Taiwan and move overseas to 
produce. A core firm established in one overseas place will inevitably pull many satellite 
firms to go overseas with it. If  a satellite firm goes overseas to invest with its core firm, its 
products produced overseas are sold to its core firm there. As Table 6.2 shows, one out of 
four firms went overseas with their Taiwan buyer, i.e., the core firm, after 1995. One 
informant producing electronic components said that his company will go to China if his 
core firm decides to set up a new firm there. Another one producing screws explained the 
rationality o f Lee Teng-hui’s ‘Go Slowly’ policy. He said that Chunyu ( )  Steel 
company is the core firm in the production system. It produces machines to sell to satellite 
firms to produce screws to meet its order from overseas. The government policy at the
See Chapter Four.
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moment is to forbid investments worth over NT$50 million (about US$1.7 million) to 
invest in China. If Chunyu decides to invest in China, which is highly possible, all o f the 
satellite firms will go to establish firms with Chunyu. This will inevitably reduce Taiwan’s 
domestic production, and employment there. He believes that the trend is irreversible, and 
he notes that in the near future China will be able to establish its own integrated production 
system just like Taiwan’s.
6.4.3 Guanxi and Channels
Table 6.6 shows that 44% of the firms sell their overseas products in the host 
countries. Many companies, as noted earlier, establish joint ventures with local companies 
to sell those products. This has two advantages: firstly, it matches the regulations set by the 
host country to encourage national industrial development; secondly, it can utilise the local 
social system to promote its sales in the host country. For example, an informant has a joint 
venture with a Chinese partner to produce polythene utensils in Guizhou. He has a 40% 
stake in the company, and 60% of the products can be sold in the domestic market. The 
marketing problem is left to his Chinese counterpart, for he has no idea of the domestic 
market. According to a survey done in 1993, three out of four firms left their marketing 
activities to be managed by the joint venture company instead o f by the Taiwan parent 
firm.536
For example, there are two channels in the Chinese food market to reach consumers: 
a multi-layer wholesale channel, including an exclusive wholesale agency and
other smaller wholesalers and a retailing system, including department
stores, supermarkets and individual shops.5^ 7 Taishang have to co-operate with Chinese 
businesspeople to establish their own channels to compete with the existing channels, 
mainly controlled by Chinese public enterprises. The Taishang did not know about the 
marketing channel very well when they entered the market, and had to resort to local 
people’s help, mainly high ranking persons in the public enterprises who are familiar with
536 See Investment Commission, MOEA »A Comparative Study o f Foreign Investment in Mainland 
China—Take the Example o f Manufacturing Industry, the Second Year (1995), p.156, Table 6-25.
53 See Zhang Huiwen X ), ‘Dalu Taishang Xingxiao Moshi zhi Yanjiu’ (A fe  a 
% ’ Research on Taishang"s Marketing Patterns in Mainland China), Taiyan Siangan Qianzhan Tansuo 
( Explore the Future across the Taiwan Strait) (Taipei: Taiwan Research Institute, £
no. 7 (1998), p. 58.
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the traditional channels, wholesalers and retailers.5^ 8 Another way to have a share in the 
China market is to grant certain rights to a local company which is familiar with the local 
market. One publishing company grants its copyright to different companies in different 
provinces, and they collect cash from the royalty the Chinese firms pay. Many of these 
companies are in the so-called ‘track two’ marketing channel {% — which is 
different from the traditional channel controlled by public publishing companies like 
Xinhua (#f 4£) or Sanlian (_=L|$).
We often hear that guanxi is so important in Chinese society that one is not able to 
sell products without guanxi. From my interviews, this claim is quite true. One informant 
said that China is like the Taiwan government in the 1960s, and the way he deals with 
Chinese officials is the same as how he dealt with the Nationalist government: to bribe the 
key local bureaucracy in charge of the Taiwan compatriot’s investment. However, I would 
argue that it is the institutional structures which enable some persons to exploit the system 
so that guanxi becomes dominant in social life, and not that cultural factors dominate 
people’s behaviour.
Information circulation is strictly controlled in China. Since the Communist Party 
controls this in local areas, party officials are often the persons with whom Taishang want 
to co-operate. ‘There are piles of regulations on foreign investment, but no one really 
knows what the policy is’, one informant complained. Because the right to interpret legal 
codes is held by the Party officials and the bureaucrats, to keep a good relationship with 
them becomes necessary. He said that his partner is a local official, and through his 
interpretation of the legal codes, the required export quota, 40% of his products, has been 
removed, and all of his products can be sold in the domestic market.
Research done by Zhang Huiwen shows that the five most successful
Taiwanese food companies in China all established their good connections with local 
politicians539. Interviewees who invested in China argued in favour o f the same strategies. 
One informant invested in China with the help of his cousin to set up a firm in his cousin’s 
local county in Guangdong. The cousin is the head o f a public enterprise, who has
good guanxi with the local party secretary (#!& ). There was a large mound at the site
538 Ibid.: p. 60 .
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where he planned to build the factory, and it would have cost him a lot of money to level it. 
He bribed the secretary, and the secretary then ordered the villagers to remove the mound 
without paying any money.
Another case is that of a Chinese partner whose brother is vice party secretary of a 
city. The Chinese partner has a one-third stake in the company. The land belongs to the 
local government, but is used by the cadres to make profits for themselves. The informant 
is happy to work with them, for he does not have to worry about finding land to build his 
factory, and nor have to worry about harassment from the local bureaucracy, mainly from 
the Taxation Office, Public Security or the Party. Any hassles are left to his Chinese partner 
to deal with. Both parties benefit from the co-operation.
Guanxi is so important in China that everyone has to ‘buy’ it in terms of pecuniary 
calculations. For example, an informant paid the local secretary to find some construction 
companies to build a factory. The newly built factory will be able to pass the regulations 
even it is not fully equipped. The Taishang saves a lot of money; and ‘The party secretary 
is very rich. If China’s anti-corruption policy is implemented strictly there, he will be 
sentenced to death’. It is the institutional structure which enables him to exploit this guanxi 
to make money. No power counterbalances the local politicians in China, and they are 
utilising the economic reform opportunities to pursue their own interests.
Because there are no predictable rules for doing business in China, guanxi becomes 
epidemic. Because guanxi is dynamic, no-one can guarantee that the long-term 
relationship will last. If one side is not honest in this mutual guanxi, it is easy to go broke. 
One informant’s friend had a joint venture in China. In the beginning, the company ran very 
well, and made money. Then the Chinese partners asked to expand the scale of production 
to meet market demand. The Taiwan partner was reluctant to do so, for he wanted to take 
back his initial investment as soon as possible. He nonetheless felt under pressure to put 
money into the new expansion. But the Chinese partners kept on demanding that he 
increase the capital, and in the end the Taiwanese side was unable to meet the requests, 
found himself shunted aside in terms of any returns from his investment, and finally 
abandoned all his shares in the company.
Another Taishang had a joint venture in China to produce sports shoes. There were
■39 See Zhang Huiwen * Research on Taishang’s Marketing Patterns in Mainland China (1998), pp. 60-
61.
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a lot o f problems from the beginning, e.g., loose quality control, and no professionals to 
manage the newly established factory. After he surmounted the problems the company 
began to generate profits, and two production lines were fully utilised to meet the 
increasing orders. When the supply was not enough to meet the demand, he planned to set 
up another new wholly-owned factory to avoid the problems he had faced before. 
However, when the Chinese partners knew o f this plan, they thought their interests were 
infringed, and started to boycott him. The export license was normally handled by the 
Chinese partners, and they started to slow down the export application processing. The 
orders for raw materials were made by the Chinese partners, and they began to restrict the 
supply of raw materials so that the company was not able to deliver the products in time.540 
From the perspective of the Chinese side, this Taishang's behaviour had been ‘dishonest’, 
for he did not put the company’s interest over his own. From the Taishang's  perspective, 
the bad experience of the past has made him hesitate to enter into a joint venture again.
The utilisation o f guanxi in China will be transformed in the near future, especially 
when China gains admission to the World Trade Organisation. Some scholars would argue 
that embeddedness is important for business practices, but in the face of a more open 
market power, particularistic rules will be less important. The studies of Zhang Huiwen 
show that increasing numbers o f Taishang are adopting a strategy to reach customers that 
less and less relies on traditional gucmxi practices to sell products.541 Price and quality 
competition is a common way to win a market share, but in the Chinese domestic market, 
throat-cut price competition is not a good strategy for Taishang to compete with long- 
established Chinese products. They often instead need to set a higher price to put their 
products in the ‘high quality’ level. The market in China is so big that every company can 
target a segmented market, and the high-price domain is a good path to cut into the market 
in a way that distinguishes Taishang products from Chinese. The successful Dingxin (T l 
#r) business group and the President (M,—) business group have adopted this strategy, 
and skilfully avoid overlapping the same price range as local Chinese food manufacturing 
companies. With modem marketing skills, the new entrants can win market share in the 
competition without totally resorting to traditional guanxi.
540 See Mainland Affairs Commission, Research on the Failed Taiwan Businesspeople in Mainland China 
(1992), pp. 19-21.
541 See Zhang Huiwen, Research on Taishang's Marketing Patterns in Mainland China (1998).
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6.5 Human Resources Management
As noted, rising labour costs in Taiwan provide a major reason why SMEs move 
production lines overseas. In 1993 when I interviewed businesspeople, they all complained 
about the labour shortages and the difficulties in managing workers. One informant said 
that ‘nowadays it is the workers’ day. However, when economic recession comes, it will 
again be our days.’ They do not have to wait until a recession year in China and Southeast 
Asia. They already have the upper hand in dictating to workers there.
6.5.1 Labour Sources
China and the Southeast Asian countries, except for Malaysia, are relatively labour 
abundant, so it is no problem for them to recruit low-skilled workers locally. As one 
interviewee investing in China said: whenever I put a red paper on the billboard, hundreds 
of people come to ask for the job.
According to a survey by the Investment Commission, more than half of the 
Taishang recruit a labour force publicly, while more than 35% of the labour force are 
introduced by Chinese partners, and about 14% are introduced by the company’s 
employees.542
Most managers are from Taiwan. They have difficulty in recruiting skilled labourers 
from the local area. One informant said that it is easy to find a worker with an elementary 
school education, but very difficult to get a worker with a senior high school background. 
He said that most university graduates go to Shenzhen, and in Dongguan it is not at all easy 
to employ skilled labourers even if you offer a higher wage. One reason is that the units 
(danwei, JfM&) with skilled workers do not release the workers.543 In Southeast Asia, as 
noted, the graduates who attended school in Taiwan have become the most popular group 
for Taishang to turn to in order to resolve management and language problems. In China, 
a Taishang tries to train skilled labour using local senior workers, or dispatches Taiwanese 
managers to serve as instructors. However, more than 40% of the surveyed Taishang 
complained that they spent a lot of money to give training, and then the trainees leave to
542 See Investment Commission, MOEA (1995) »A Comparative Study o f Foreign Investment in Mainland 
China: The Example o f Manufacturing Industry (Second Year), op. cit., p. 161.
543 Ibid.: p. 165.
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find another better job.544
Besides the capable workers and managers, Taishang have to take in some 
‘unproductive’ workers or managers because of renqing pressures in the local society. I 
will leave this issue to section 6.5.3.
6.5.2 Authoritarian Management Style
In this region of a labour surplus, management becomes more authoritarian, if not 
dictatorial. It is often heard that foreigner-owned factories abuse workers, especially in the 
factories owned by firms from Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In 1995, a fire killed more 
than hundred workers in Thailand because the Hong Kong company had locked the exit 
doors to prevent the workers from slipping out of the factory during work.
Militarised management is not rare. Anita Chan found that some Taiwanese and 
Korean owners have a kind of authoritarian management pattern ‘reminiscent of the 19th- 
century Industrial Revolution.545 In a Taishang factory, a huge sign that hangs over an 
elevated walkway reads: loitering underneath, Y100 penalty.546
One informant, who had owned a shoe-making company in Taichung, moved his 
production line to Shenzhen. He told me with pride that they organised the company like a 
military unit. All of the workers are organised into a ‘sjkmT (jH), several ^  compose a 
piA.+ooh(#), and three pLdfocnj are organised into aco^pw^it.)- All workers are required 
to be accommodated in a dormitory established by the company, which is similar to a 
military camp. In the morning, all the workers get up at six o’clock. Breakfast ins from 
6:30 to 7:00. After breakfast, they have to listen to a speech from managers. They work 
from eight to five, with an hour break for lunch. After work, most of the workers do 
overtime work, normally from six to ten o ’clock. The workers are mostly from other 
provinces. They want to make more money, and have nowhere to go, so they are willing to 
work overtime. If not, they still have to stay in the dorm. When they want to leave the 
factory camp, they have to get permission from the senior manager. Another interviewee 
said that they require workers to work nine hours a day, six days a week, though the legal 
working days are five days a week. One owner with a shoe factory in China jested that ‘we
544 Ibid.: p. 170.
545 See Anita Chan, ‘The Emerging Patterns of Industrial Relations in China and the Rise of Two New 
Labor Movements’, China Information, vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring 1995), p.48.
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have already recovered Mainland China A f^ ), for every Chinese worker has to sing 
Taiwan’s military song every day’.547
This kind of management style cannot be said to be ‘paternalistic’ in any way. The 
manner of management used by Taishang overseas illustrates again what is argued in 
Chapter Five, that when self-interest is at stake, the 'generous' side of paternalism gives 
way to self-interest. The workers in the Taishangs ’ factories are not family members, nor 
relatives, nor compatriots, so there is no incentive to be generous or paternalistic. A 
profit-oriented capitalist logic prevails.
6.5.3 Effective Management and Unproductive Guanxi
In the overseas affiliates, the Taiwanese businesspeople do not have the problem of 
employing relatives, for they have to hire a local labour force. So they are able to avoid the 
conflict between hiring inefficient relatives and pursuing higher profits. However, they 
sometimes face instead the problem of hiring redundant workers who are not economically 
productive but who have politically important relatives. In China, as one informant 
complained, even though his company is wholly-owned the local government also assigns 
an ‘official representative in the firm’ which is a waste of money for the
company. Wherever he goes, the representative follows him, which makes him feel like he 
is under surveillance.
So far the representative has not intervened, but if there are many managers from the 
Chinese counterpart in a joint venture, or if political activities are assigned by the 
Communist Party, it will cause efficiency problems. The Party regulates that a firm 
employing more than three hundred workers has to organise a party branch, and the 
workers have to take part in all assigned political activities. This kind of political regulation 
causes a lot of trouble for labour management through interruptions of normal 
production.548
More often than not, the Chinese cadres assigned to high-ranking positions in the
546 Ibid.: p. 49.
54/ This song is ‘Jiutiao Haohan zai Yiban’ (5U & # — A ^u^dof nine good guys), which has no 
anti-communism text.
548 See Wei Lizhi ‘Cong Zhonggong Qiye Guanli Tizhi tan Fudalu Touzi Taishang Gongchang
zhi Guanli’ * Taishang's Manangement in
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firm do nothing. One Taishang with a joint venture in China complained, for example, that 
Chinese cadres were paid a lot of money but have no function in the factory at all. What is 
worse, according to interviewees, in factories where they did have functions they did not 
take responsibility for the tasks to which they were assigned, which caused interruption of 
the production lines. They did not supervise the Chinese workers, and when a machine 
broke or there were quality defects, they did not pay any attention. The Taishang have had 
to negotiate with their Chinese counterpart to hire more Taiwanese managers to replace 
such Chinese cadres .549
If Taishang have to employ Chinese cadres to tackle unexpected problems, they 
prefer sometimes to pay them periodically in the name o f ‘consultants’ (Guwen, &M P^). As 
consultants, they do not have to come to the company every day. Or they pay these cadres 
every time that a case is resolved with their help. This kind of gwazm-utilisation is flexible, 
based on pecuniary calculations.550 When a Taishang refuses to accept those workers 
recommended by Chinese cadres, one common trick used by the Taishang is to ‘open the 
position’, and ask for high qualifications, e.g., to ask if the employee is able to speak 
English. Taishangs use such tactics to prevent local Chinese officials from putting their 
own relatives into the factory.5^
Another way to evade this dilemma is to endure the situation in the short term, and to 
try to earn back their investment as soon as possible. Taishangs running small and 
medium-sized enterprises have no intention to stay overseas for good, and their investment 
plan is always short-term. One informant said that he never thinks of what will happen after 
five years. One reason for this kind of thinking is market competition from local firms. An 
interviewee explained why he wants to take back all his investment capital in two to three 
years: ‘The Mainlanders are very clever. They’re able to make any kind of machine, if they 
get the opportunity to have a look at the machines. They are able to copy our machines and 
produce similar products to compete with us. So in the long run, we will not be able to win
China—Perspectivefrom the Communist China’s Enterprise Institutions), Xiangjiao Gongye ($ L 0 jl 
#  > Rubber Industry) (Taipei), vol.17 (October, 1993), no. 10, p.5
549 See Mainland Affairs Commission, Research on the Failed Taiwan Businesspeople in Mainland China 
(1992), p. 20.
550 See Wei Lizhi, Taishang"s Manangement in China—Perspectivefrom the Communist China’s 
Enterprise Institutions (1993), p.5.
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out in the same product market. I have to grasp my market niche, and make my money as 
soon as possible before the Mainlanders come into competition with us. ’
This kind of short-term investment strategy, plus the newly emerged labour shortage 
problem in Malaysia, enticed many Taishang to move again to another locale with cheaper 
labour. In Malaysia, as an alternative many Taishang have hired guest labour from 
Indonesia and Bangladesh, whom they pay less than Malays. However, more often they 
move the production lines to other countries to find cheaper labour. The head of the 
Malaysia Taishang Club, which consists of three hundred and thirty members, said that 
about twenty to thirty percent of the Taishang have left Malaysia. The Malaysian Minister 
of Human Resources complained that thirty-one Taiwan firms closed their factories and 
owed workers back pay.552 In contrast, China and Vietnam have been able to offer cheap 
labour to the Taishang on good terms, and there is no sign showing that the investment in 
China is decelerating.
6.6 The Asian Financial Crisis and Taishang
The Asian financial crisis that started in May 1997 in Thailand and swiftly spread to 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Korea, has had an impact on Taishang whose products are sold in 
the host countries and export. According to their product outlets and raw material sources, 
we can distinguish four groups: those that utilise local raw materials and produce for 
export; those that import raw materials and export their products; those that utilise local 
raw materials and sell in the domestic market; and those that import raw materials and sell 
in the domestic market.
The first group benefits the most from this crisis. The kind o f ‘price transfer’ business 
practice that was earlier mentioned provides a way to ward off the impact of the financial 
crisis coursing through Southeast Asia. One Taishang said that his company profited 
100% during the crisis period. It exports computer components all over the world, and the
551 See Ding Zhida ( T  & i t ) ,  ‘ Taishang zai Dalu Qiye Laodong Renshi Guanli de Fangfa’ ( o f
' Taishang s Human Resources Management in China), Zhonghua Zhanlyue 
Xuekan ( f  »Journal o f Chinese Tactics) (Taipei, Sep. 1996), p.207.
552 See Gong Yijun, Cross-Border Investment and Linkages with Taiwan: Some Observations on Taishang 
in Malaysia, p. 12.
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export price is quoted in US dollars.55' The second category of firms also make money, 
though less than the first group.
The financial turmoil has had an adverse impact on those Taishang who produce for 
the local market. If they buy raw materials in the host country, and sell in the domestic 
market, normally they have to pay for the raw materials in cash, but get a post-dated 
cheque after the sale. During the crisis, the bouncing of cheques is so frequent that they 
report great difficulties in doing business. If the Taishang imports raw materials, and sells 
in the domestic market, it will face currency exchange losses and defaults.534 Table 6.6 
shows that about half of the Taishang sell their products in local markets in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Thailand, the three countries most adversely affected by the financial crisis. 
Their situation could be said to be precarious.
The dramatic devaluation of the local currencies caused many East Asian countries to 
reform their financial institutions. For example, the Thai government has closed fifty-eight 
financial companies, and fifty-six companies were sold by the government’s Asset 
Management Corporation in February 1998. If the Taishang borrowed money from these 
banks, they will have problems in finding other capital sources. Even if they borrow money 
from the 'good’ banks, the high interest rate makes the loan overly expensive. In a trip to 
Southeast Asia organised by the Council for Economic Planning and Development in 
January 1998 to understand the difficulties faced by local Taishang, most of the complaints 
heard involved the problems of acquiring working capital from local banks.555 Taiwan’s 
Central Bank has deposited US$20 million in every overseas Taiwan bank to support more 
loans to Taishang, and the Ministry o f Finance also has tripled to US$100 million (NT$3 
billion) the capital o f the ‘Overseas Chinese Credit Foundation’, which was set up to help 
overseas Chinese to borrow money from local banks overseas.556 The effect of these 
polices is not yet known, but if economic growth is negative in the region, e.g., if the
553 See Liberty Times ( ij & Dongnanya Taishang Lizhengshangyou Zhanxian Renxing (Jt a
/j-ff-JLifc ’ Taishang in Southeast Asia Strives to Work Better, Showing Their Strength), 2
Feb. 1998, p. 15.
554 See Board of Foreign Trade, Taiguo Jingmao Oingshi j i  Jinrong Weiji zhi Fenxi i f  #
Analysis o f Economic, Trade and Financial Crisis in Thailand) (Taipei: unpublished 
paper, 1998), p. 12.
55' Council for Economic Planning and Development, Dongnanya Touzi Maoyi Kaochatuan Kaocha 
Baogao ( f t  ’ Report on the Visit to Southeast Asia) (Taipei: Council for
Economic Planning and Development, unpublished paper, 26 Jan. 1998), p. 9.
556 Ibid.: p. 10.
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economic growth rate in Thailand is -3.5%, Indonesia 0%, Malaysia 2.5%,557 these 
Taishang will have difficulty selling their products in the host countries, a problem of 
markets rather than working capital.
6.7 Conclusion
In the era o f globalisation, Taiwan’s SMEs follow the capitalist logic and relocate 
their production, mainly within East Asia. Domestic factors such as labour shortages, the 
abrupt appreciation of the Taiwan dollar, and more restrictive environmental regulations, 
plus inducements such as overseas governments’ preferential investment policies and low 
labour costs, explain the new ventures overseas.
As in Taiwan in the 1960s, to find ‘influential partners’ abroad is indispensable if one 
needs to secure approvals from overseas officials. These ‘influential’ partners include 
retired bureaucrats, leaders o f the local Chinese community, local businesspeople, or, in 
China and Vietnam, local governments. But not every partner is co-operative and reliable. 
Conflicts often arise and relationships break down.
It is more to find joint ventures overseas so as to exploit the host country’s 
investment laws. As in Taiwan, tax evasion is also common among the Taishang. However, 
the way taxes are evaded is different than in Taiwan. More methods are available, with 
‘price transfers’ the main strategy.
The original buyer-seller’s link between the Taishang and overseas buyers remains 
unchanged except that the products are no longer produced in Taiwan. The Western 
buyers are still used to putting in orders to Taishang to source their goods. Unless the host 
countries can develop their own competitive industry, the marketing channels in these 
countries are still controlled by foreigners. Accompanying the localisation of the Taishang 
in the host countries, the overseas affiliates play a more and more important role in 
marketing. The build-up o f an integrated industrial structure overseas makes overseas 
Taishang transactions with local Taishang more frequent, which will reinforce the 
connections between them, but at the same time also raises the productive skills o f the host 
countries.
Overseas management of labour is different than in Taiwan because the Taishang are
Ibid.: p. 17, Table 2.
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not socially embedded in the foreign milieu. Their management o f labour is more 
authoritarian. The local managers employed by the overseas affiliates are not necessarily 
efficient in management, and the firm faces the renqing dilemma of Chinese officials trying 
to implant relatives in the company. As observed, some Taishang have found ways to 
prevent this difficulty by demanding high qualifications for the positions or by paying them 
as consultants on a ‘piece wage’ instead of a monthly wage. Overall, the Taiwan SMEs in 
China endure short-term frustrations in order to make a £juick return rather than invest for 
the long term.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
7.1 Summary of Findings
This thesis discusses the life histories, mobility strategies, and business practices of 
small and medium-sized businesspeople, set specifically within Taiwan’s history of the 
past fifty years.
Chapter One discussed the genesis of the modern-day small businesspeople, starting 
with the immediate aftermath of World War II and the retreat of the Kuomintang from 
the Mainland in the late 1940s.
The class structure in the 1950s was a result o f market and political forces, which 
created an ‘ethnicised class structure’. The Mainlanders were placed in the public sector. 
In an age of high unemployment, to obtain a job in the public sector meant that one’s 
livelihood was guaranteed. At that time life chances were not only determined by one’s 
market situation, but also by the intervening political forces.
Set in this class structure, who was more likely to become a proprietor, i.e., what was 
the picture of economic mobility after the 1950s? I have explored different factors which 
might affect the possibility o f mobility. Education as a kind of human capital was the 
most important factor in occupational achievement. But it was an individual factor 
embedded in a social formation. In Taiwan, the occupational distribution was largely 
determined by education, and we find that the education system in Taiwan functions 
mainly as a mechanism to reproduce social-status inequality. The government strictly 
controlled the expansion of education based on economic planning. The ratio of students 
in academic and vocational high schools reversed from 7:3 to 3:7 in twenty years. 
Children from a better socio-economic background had a better chance to go to the 
academic schools and later on to university. The Mainlanders were better educated than 
Taiwanese in the past half century, because of their parents’ higher education, good 
occupations and the state’s subsidies.
Chapter Two has sought to explain why people from different educational levels have 
had different mobility paths. The general mobility pattern in Taiwan is for the less 
educated to endeavour to get a job in the labour market, and when possible later on, to be
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self-employed; while for the higher educated, the strategy was to get a prestige salaried 
job. Because Mainlanders were more highly educated on average than Taiwanese, they 
were less likely to be self-employed. The ethnic cleavage in occupational distribution is 
basically the result o f educational effects, as I have demonstrated through my statistical 
analysis o f the raw data of the 1992 Taiwan’s Social Chang Survey. As the educational 
gap narrows, the ethnic cleavage in occupations disappears.
The prevalence of small and medium-sized enterprises in Taiwan is induced by the 
history of occupational constraints. Different educational levels set the general limitation 
to upward mobility, and for the less educated one of the means they can use to overcome 
this limitation is to withdraw his/her labour power from the wage market.
We are interested in why these less educated, often manual labourers adopt a so-called 
Cde-class-in-itself strategy instead of trying improve their market situation collectively? 
Three structural factors have constrained the possibility o f collective actions of a ‘class 
for itself nature: education within Taiwan as a kind of ideological control; the party-state 
controlled labour regime, and social network controls. Education legitimised the ideology 
that the higher one is educated, the more one deserved a good job in government and in 
other large organisations. People without high educational credentials have had to find 
alternative mechanisms to be upwardly mobile. They could not organise to protect their 
collective interests because the Nationalists controlled every kind of social activities to 
prevent anyone who might destabilise their rule. A more subtle control mechanism, at a 
lower level, involved social network controls, which employ traditional ways to keep 
people in line. To get a job in Taiwan, one is usually introduced by an acquaintance, 
which makes it harder to unite in any collective way. The proprietor can mobilise one’s 
social network to demobilise one’s collective action.
Set in the context of Taiwan’s political regime and the international economy, I 
examined business practices in Taiwan. Contrary to the arguments o f many scholars who 
believe the Chinese way of running a business is unique, I tried to explain the historical- 
social structures behind these practices, and to ‘de-mythologise’ ‘orientalist’ discourses 
regarding Taiwan’s business community. The following four chapters were devoted to 
discussions of a small- and medium-sized enterprise’s internal management, including 
financial, marketing, human resources management, and the new overseas investment
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ventures.
In Chapter Three, I have described Taiwan’s financial system. I found that the 
working capital sources of SMEs derived from internal retained earnings, and external 
trade credit, household sector and other enterprises. The legal system affects business 
practices which induces SMEs prefer to use trade credit as financial leverage. One reason 
why SMEs borrow a lot of money from other enterprise and households is to evade tax. 
Since the share of loans to SMEs is equivalent to their shares o f sales, and the percentage 
of total capital sources from financial institutions in total liabilities is almost the same as 
big firms, and since a lot o f private borrowing by SMEs comprises ‘deposits received 
from shareholders’ who want to earn higher interest and evade tax, the usually claimed 
hypothesis that such SMEs lack working capital and therefore have to resort to the 
private market should be put in doubt.
Taiwan’s financial market is a mixed product of historical development, political 
control and market mechanisms. The KMT confiscated Japanese banks after the Second 
World War and made them a means to maintain political and economic control. The 
government also co-operated with local factions and granted them the privilege to run 
local financial institutions. This kind o f financial control reinforces the use of guanxi to 
get loans from the financial institutions, which gives local political figures a prominent 
role in mediating between borrowers and lenders.
Under these structural constraints, I have argued that, firstly, to distinguish the two 
stages of the SMEs’ development clarifies whether the SMEs need capital urgently. An 
SME normally needs help only in its initial stage, contrary to most scholars’ argument 
that established SMEs need financial help from the government. I also found that the 
most common way to collect enough capital to initiate a business is to use one’s social 
relations. Co-operating with friends or relatives to form a partnership enterprise is a 
common means to start up a new business. Funding is secured from family members, 
relatives, rotating credit associations and dowries. However, partnerships usually do not 
last very long, unless strongly led by the dominant member of a family. This type of 
business is often initiated by personal guanxi, but ends in conflict between differing 
interests.
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Often, SMEs that have already been established want to borrow more money from 
financial institutions so that they can evade tax, which has nothing to do with lack of 
working capital. The government has implemented policies to supply more funds to 
SMEs, but the SMEs exploit the system to maximise their self-interest.
In Chapter Four, I discuss the marketing strategies adopted by Taiwan’s SMEs. 
The minimum requirements to sell a product is to meet quality specifications at a 
competitive price and to adhere to reliable delivery standards. There will be no co­
operation or long-term relationship if these requirements are not satisfied. However, 
these are only minimum requirements. There are barriers to market entry that make it 
hard for those outsiders to enter a market. I have noted the close co-operation between 
big firms and the government in the 1950s, which resulted in a segregated market: big 
firms specialised in the domestic market, while SMEs sold their products overseas. In the 
late 1980s, the pressures from the United States forced the government to open the 
domestic market, and indirectly pushed the big firms to sell more overseas. 
Accompanying the rise o f East Asian economic power, Taiwan’s original export markets 
for SMEs, the USA and Japan, have been gradually replaced by China and ASEAN.
I have also argued that the prevalent utilisation of guanxi results from specific 
social milieux, and is not an innate cultural trait of Chinese businesspeople. The goal of 
pulling guanxi is to make profits for the businesspeople. Guanxi is dynamic, based on 
mutual interests. I agree with Polanyi’s analysis and argue that Taiwan’s economy ‘is 
directed by market prices and nothing but market prices, where human beings behave in 
such a way as to achieve maximum money gains’. The social closures and long-term 
relationships can disintegrate due to differences of interest.
I also probed the role of businesspeople in Taiwan’s democratisation process: when 
there was an interest for them to maintain the system, they collaborated with the ruling 
party; when there are conflicts of interests, they would break the rules without hesitation, 
as with the government’s ‘Go Slow Toward China’ policy, which is often challenged by 
the business community. A businessperson exploits his guanxi to make profits, and he or 
she is sometimes unconsciously tests and chips away at the existing social order.
All transactions must be based on mutual trust to a certain degree, and this kind of
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trust is underpinned by law, or social pressure, or private violence. In Taiwan, traditional 
social pressure provided security in transactions, but it does not necessarily work in 
modem times.
In Chapter Five, I explained how traditional values operate in Taiwan’s family 
enterprises. One of the values is the patriarchal organisation of a family firm, where 
females are less well paid and placed in less important posts. Another example is how 
guanxi (connections) is utilised by people to find their jobs. A small enterprise is more 
likely to hire workers through guanxi than a big firm, which more frequently recruits 
workers in impersonal ways. However, the long-term data reveals that the relative 
importance of getting a job through guanxi is declining in line with social structural 
change.
Because more workers are hired through guanxi in SMEs, the labour-capital 
relationships there are more often based on personal relationships than in big firms, and it 
is easier to demobilise workers by using group pressure in SMEs. However, the tension 
between employers and workers still exists, and one way to avoid direct confrontation is 
to leave the working place. This explains why the turnover rate in Taiwan’s labour 
market is so high, which is often praised by Taiwan’s economists as ‘flexible’.
In SMEs, family members often compose an inner circle, and control the managerial 
positions. One of their functions is to evade tax and to prevent any revelations of tax 
evasion practices. Though traditional filial values help to tie together the different 
interests among family members, the market principle and differences in self-interest 
normally eventually disintegrate the cohesion. A typical problem in a family enterprise is 
that incompetent family members hold responsible positions. This runs the risk of the 
enterprise being managed. But when the firm dismisses the incompetent family member, it 
runs into the problem of family discord.
Fen-jia is one resolution to the dilemma facing families. Three types offen-jia have 
been distinguished. One o f these will inevitably result in the fragmentation o f a family firm, 
which is often cited as the reason why Chinese enterprises are small. However, a more 
common type of fen-jia  today in Taiwanese society is that the father sets up more than 
one small firm, and distributes them equally to different sons. Alternatively, since more 
occupations are available to the younger generation accompanying Taiwan’s economic
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development, not all of one’s sons need rely on the family firm. In some cases, only one 
son inherits the property while others accept monetary compensation. When a father 
entrepreneur diversifies his investment and sets up firms for more than one son, there will 
be the possibility forming a business group. In other words, the cultural constraint of 
fen-jia  generates a unique type o f economic organisation--the existence of numerous 
SMEs and business groups at the same time.
In Chapter Six I discussed the overseas activities of Taiwanese businesspeople after 
the mid-1980s, when domestic factors such as labour shortages, the abrupt appreciation 
of the Taiwan dollar, and more restrictive environmental regulations pushed them to look 
outward, accompanying the international trend toward globalisation. My main concern in 
this chapter is to compare the business practices of businesspeople at home and abroad.
Taishang easily transplanted overseas their past experience in Taiwan. To find 
‘influential partners’ in Taiwan in the 1960s, including retired bureaucrats, leaders of the 
local Chinese community, or local businesspeople, was sometimes indispensable if one 
needed to secure approvals from local politicians. However, we should not view this kind 
o f guanxi as permanent, for not every partner is co-operative and reliable. When there is 
internal conflict, the relationship will break down.
Compared to the common form of wholly-owned SMEs in Taiwan, once 
successfully established, it is more common to find joint ventures overseas, for joint 
ventures can benefit from the host country’s investment laws. As in Taiwan, tax evasion 
is also common among the Taishang. There are more methods available, with ‘price 
transfer’ the main strategy.
The original buyer-seller’s link between Taishang and overseas buyers remains 
unchanged except that the products are no longer produced in Taiwan. Unless the host 
countries can develop their own competitive industry, the marketing channels in these 
countries are still controlled by foreigners. The Western buyers are still used to putting 
orders to Taishang to source their goods. The overseas affiliates play a more and more 
important role in marketing accompanying the localisation of the Taishang in the host 
countries. Too, the build-up o f an integrated industrial structure overseas makes overseas 
Taishang transactions with local Taishang more frequent, which will strengthen the 
connections between them, and also raise the productive skills o f the host countries.
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Because the Taishang are not socially embedded in the foreign milieu, overseas 
management of labour is different from Taiwan’s. Their management o f workers is more 
authoritarian.
7.2 Theoretical Reconsiderations
In this section, I will elaborate the Polanyian approach that I have used in my thesis, 
then discuss the three main theories on Taiwan's economic development: i.e., neo­
classical economics, the 'governed' market, and the Chinese cultural approach.558
Karl Polanyi wrote that the establishment o f a self-regulating market economy needs 
violent intervention by the government: i.e., laissez faire is the result o f artificial 
government interventions, and the limitations on laissez faire emerged naturally.559 
Polanyi's reasoning is that order and law are indispensable for the establishment of a 
market economy. Without the enforcement o f law securing the safety of transactions, the 
'freedom of contract' as the basic tenet of civil codes would not be able to operate. Even 
the most conservative economists such as Milton Friedman could not deny this point.560 
It is more striking to say that the emergence of state regulations is a natural result of a 
market economy. Polanyi refuted the Marxist explanation of state regulations as 
functional to capitalist development, and he also denied neo-classical economics’ 'false 
saying' that regulations help to inhibit development of a market economy. He argued that 
a feature o f our modem times is to protect society from any harmful effects resulting 
from a self-regulating market economy.561 This meant that ultimately the socialist 
movements or peasant movements o f the 19th century were not conspiracies arising from 
political ideologies, but were only a natural reaction against the imperatives o f market 
forces that drove an increasing proportion of the populace to take part in an increasingly 
capitalist market, selling labour or products.
558 No one up to now has used a Marxist approach to explain Taiwan’s development of a business 
community, so I will skip this paradigm, which is often criticised by the Polanyian tradition.
359 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation—Origins o f  Our Time. (Chinese,Jubian: Dangdai 
Zhengzhi, Jingji de Oiyuan, & f t  tr. by Huang, Shumin, Shi, Jiayin and Liao,
Wensheng, ’ X  1k ir  ’ (Taipei: Yuanliu Chubanshe, 1989), p.240.
560 See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1962).
561 See Karl Polanyi, op. cit., p. 155.
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This viewpoint is also shared by Karl Marx. It is well known that Marx, following 
Hegel's tradition, used the 'dialectical method' to write his Das Kapital'. Though his 
method is deductive, from the basic unit o f capitalist society, i.e., commodity, to the 
demise o f capitalism, his main concern is the social tensions arising from the 
commodification of social relations produced by capitalist development. In the last 
section of the first chapter of Das Kapital, Marx discussed at length 'the nature of 
commodification fetishism and its secrets'. Only in capitalist society does a human being's 
social life adopt the form of exchange, which seals the real social relations o f private 
labour. Marx said that the social relations of producers to labour appear as the social 
relations of objects which stand outside themselves.56j The market economy is the 
dominant form of our economic life, but it is full of conflicts and antagonisms springing 
from the law of the market.564
Bearing in mind such analyses of capitalist society, I endeavoured to expound the 
basic social tensions existing in Taiwan society by examining the case o f the development 
o f small and medium-sized enterprises. On the one hand, the market forces even non­
economic organisations to conform to its rules, i.e., minimum cost, maximum profit. On 
the other hand, if a society is organised solely by market principles, it will not be able to 
function. Social norms are also important in our daily life, including business life. As Karl 
Polanyi observed, we have to acknowledge that power and values are a part of the 
reality, 565 which it is necessary to incorporate into the analysis o f a society and an 
economy. If this is so, it becomes evident that any approach adopting a one-sided theory 
will be inadequate; we need to see both sides: i.e., the contradictions between market 
relations and social relations.
562 See Karl Marx, Marx-Engels Werke, Band 23 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1971), p. 87.
563 Ibid. : p. 86.
364 An und hier sich handelt es sich nicht um den hoeheren oder niedrigen Entwicklungsgrad der 
gesellschaftlichen Antagonismen, welche aus den Naturgesetzen der kapitalistischen Produktion 
entspringen. See Karl Marx, op. eit., p. 12.
565 See Karl Polanyi, op. cit., p. 390.
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7.2.1. The Fictitious Self-Regulating Market
Karl Polanyi noted that state regulations are natural results of a market economy, and 
Taiwan government’s control of the economy provides illustrations of this story. The 
uneven distribution of occupations in the public and private sector of the two major 
ethnic groups in the 1950s illustrated the influence of political power in affecting a 
society's occupational structures. Moreover, the labour force was not totally 
proletarianised, i.e., did not become a commodity, after Taiwan’s economic take-off. The 
workers could flow back to the rural area, where the farm family still could support 
family members when they became unemployed in the urban area. This situation is 
different from English workers’ situation at the beginning of the 19th century, when they 
were expelled from their lands and displaced by sheep. The third production factor, 
capital, was always controlled by the government. As we have seen, there were two 
financial systems in one country, i.e., the regulated financial market and an unregulated 
financial market. There was no 'free capital market' at all.
The organisation of production was also shaped by social values and culture, which is 
not what the transaction cost theory depicts: that they are organised by economic 
principles. Though family enterprises are very common in the world, different societies 
have different ways to operate the enterprises according to different socio-political 
contexts. Family enterprises have to take on a traditional responsibility to take care of 
family members on the one hand, and have to conform to market forces to make money 
on the other. These two different principles produce a lot of organisational tensions, as 
we have observed in Chapter Five.
To the extent that production factors and organisations are regulated in terms of 
political power and social values, there will be no free market economy in the sense 
claimed by neo-classical economics. Neo-classical economics tries to explain the 
development o f Taiwan’s economy in terms of'getting prices right' and in the assumption 
that the magic of the market would steer every economic agent’s behaviour toward the 
optimum, i.e., economic success. For example, Samuel P. S. Ho claims that the Taiwan 
experience once again confirms that administrative controls and other forms of
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interference with the market can seriously distort the economy,566 and Jiang Shuojie (H  
has argued that correct interest rates and a correct exchange rate policy in the 
1950s made the Taiwan economy efficient, producing good economic results.567 1 would 
submit that they were just using the ideology of neo-classical economics to interpret 
Taiwan's development. They believe that any factor hampering the market’s functioning 
should be removed to build up ‘an efficient market’. But as we have seen, political power 
and social values played an important role in the economy; it is a false hypothesis that 
Taiwan was a free market economy and that this led to its economic success.
One possible criticism of this approach is that if there were no intervention from the 
government and tradition, the economy would be better off than it is. This approach is 
widely accepted in the 'new economic history approach' which uses econometrics to 
calculate what the economy would be if there were no factor A.568 This school be can 
traced back to the 'old economics tradition' o f Friedrick Hayek, William G. Sumner, 
Herbert Spencer and Ludwig von Mises, who believed that without interventions, the 
market would solve all problems. As Karl Polanyi observed, 'this is their last excuse'.569 
Because these ‘economic liberals’ could not find any evidence to explain why there have 
always been interventions since the establishment of the market economy, they attribute 
this to the hypothesis of an ‘anti-market conspiracy'. Trade unions, monopolisers, 
politicians, farmers and environmentalists are all villains who unite together to oppose the 
functioning o f market forces.
When we review Taiwan's postwar history, we discover immediately that this 
hypothesis has no empirical support. One piece of evidence is the education policy which 
we discussed in Chapter Two. If the government had followed a laissez faire  policy, it 
would not have regulated the development of private schools. Most economists agreed at
566 See Samuel P. S. Ho, Economic Development o f  Taiwan, 1860-1970 (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1978), pp. 248-251.
567 See Jiang Shuojie # ) ,  ‘Taiwan Jingji Fazhan de Qishi’ ( a  ’ ‘The
Implications of Taiwan Economic Development’), in Ma Kai ( .ijS/l) (ed.), Taiwan Jingji Yanjiu 
Luncong—di yi ji, Jingji Fazhan yu Zhengce ( o ’Essays on
the Economy o f Taiwan, vol. 1, Economic Development and Policy) (Taipei: Zhonghua Jingji Yanjiuyuan, 
1991) p.22.
568 See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (tr. by
#  ’ M g  ' (Taipei: Shibao Chubanshe, 1994).
249
C hapter 7 C o n c lu s io n s
the time that it was beneficial to regulate the education market according to the needs of 
national development. They forecast that Taiwan needed more skilled labour after its 
economic take-off, and they recommended to restrict the development of academic 
schools, and to expand vocational education. Therefore the ratio of academic school 
students to vocational students could be reversed from 7:3 to 3:7 in twenty years. This 
kind of regulation has not been criticised by Taiwan's economists at all; instead, they all 
praise the high quality of Taiwan's human resources and the success of Taiwan's 
education. They also asked to set up a Fair Trade Committee to regulate monopoly 
business. In other words, the problem lay not in regulation or intervention, but in 
economic theory. They could behave like interventionists to advocate regulations, all the 
while that the economists preached the virtues of a fictitious self-regulating market, but 
not laissez faire 511
7.2.2 The Orientalistic Discourse
Sociologists and anthropologists sometimes seek to dismiss the function o f the 
market in modem society. They emphasise the primacy of cultural values and traditional 
social institutions, but forget that the development of a market system will inevitably 
bring about changes in society, and social institutions can be subordinated to the market
572economy.
One of the traditions emphasises the importance of cultural values in business 
organisational behaviour. This genre of research and analysis endorses some widely 
accepted hypotheses:
• i t  is the Chinese mentality which drives the Chinese to want to be proprietors.
569 See Karl Polanyi, op .cit., 244.
s 0 See Hou Jiming ( ) , ‘Jiegou Xuepai, Xingudian Xuepai yu Taiwan Gongye Shengji’ ( i # ^ ^
o » ‘Structuralism, Neoclassical Economics and Upgrade of Taiwan’s
Industry’), in Ma Kai (ed.)., Ibid.: p. 32; Wu Hui-lin, ‘Taiwan de Laodong Shichang yu Jingji Fazhan’ 
( ‘Taiwan’s Labour Market and Economic Development’), in Ma Kai ( %  ) (ed.), Ibid.: pp. 83-113.
571 See Karl Polanyi, op. cit., p. 250.
572 Ib id : p. 154.
573 See Richard W Stites, ‘Industrial Work as an Entrepreneurial Strategy’, Modern China, vol. 11, no.2 
(April 1985), p. 238; Chen Jiexuan, Xieli Wangluo yu Renji Wangluo—Taiwan Zhongxiao Oiye De 
Shehui Jingji Fenxi (Subcontracting and Personal Networks—social economic analysis o f Taiwan 's small 
and medium-scale enterprises) (Taipei: Lianjing Chubanshe, 1994), p.292; Wong, Siu-lun, ‘Business
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• th e  equal partition of family property to each son makes it difficult for a family firm 
to grow large after the first generation .574
• th e  economic unit in Chinese business is not the individual but the extended 
household.575
•  ‘familial solidarity’ constitutes the core of the Chinese family enterprise. Because 
they are able to pull the outside world into their networks, the family firms work well.576
•kinship networks are also networks o f trust.577
%Guanxi tends to be stable over the long term based on reciprocal trust, loyalty and 
predictability. 578
• th e  Chinese management pattern is paternalistic.
• th e  Confucian ethic encourages a willingness to devote oneself to vigorously 
pursuing the family’s material interests over both the short and long term .580
This cultural approach is just a variant of the ‘Orientalistic discourse' which 
objectifies Chinese society and gazes at it from the eyes o f Western culture. Its adherents 
try to discover the factors underlying ‘Chinese' society which have not altered in the past 
thousand years. Marx has made the criticism of political economists that in their analysis 
there is history before the emergence o f capitalism, but no more after the emergence of 
capitalism. This criticism can also be applied to this cultural approach: there is history in 
different countries, but no history in a particular individual country. In their analysis, 
political and market forces seem never to have an effect on organisational behaviour. But 
as we have argued, political and economic power have influenced the ethnic distribution
networks, cultural values and the state in Hong Kong and Singapore’, in Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown 
(ed.),Chinese Business Enterprise in Asia (London, New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 136-153.
574 See Gary G. Hamilton and Nicole Woolsey Biggart, ‘Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative 
Analysis of Management and Organisation in the Far East’, American Journal o f Sociology, vol. 94 
(1988) (Supplement), pp. 52-94.
575 See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia 
(Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995b), p.126.
576 See Wong, Siu-lun, 1995, op. cit., p. 139.
5 See Thomas Menkhoff, Trade Routes, Trust and Trading Networks: Chinese Family-Based Trading 
Firms in Singapore and Their External Economic Dealings, unpublished Ph.D dissertation (1990), 
Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld.
578 See Gary G Hamilton and Kao Cheng-shu, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
5/9 See Gordon S. Redding, The Spirit o f Chinese Capitalism, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990), p.215. 
580 See Tu Wei-Ming, Confucian Ethics Today—The Singapore Challenge, (Singapore:Curriculum 
Department Institute of Singapore, Federal Publications, 1984), pp.75-76.
251
C hapter 7 C o n c lu s io n s
in occupations, which made different ethnic groups expenence different mobility patterns, 
and rendered the Taiwanese group more likely to become proprietors (Chapters One and 
Two); economic development influences the method o f family division, and there is no 
reason to believe that a family firm cannot grow large (Chapter Five); the economic unit 
in Chinese business is not necessarily the extended household and it is nor necessarily 
efficiency, instead, a lot of internal conflicts bedevil the family enterprise (Chapter Five); 
guanxi is not always stable, and when there are conflicting interests, it is highly possible 
that quanxi relationships will disintegrate, as we have seen with the buyer-seller’s link in 
Chapter Four; Taiwanese (Chinese) management is not paternalistic at all in their 
overseas factories (Chapter Six); and the conflicting interests among family members 
make a family firm hard to maintain. All the cases that I have discussed above show that 
social relations are not easily maintained if they contradict market principles.
7.2.3 A 'Governed' Market without a Market
Another approach in the sociological tradition puts emphasis on political forces in 
shaping occupational structures and industrial organisations. It is mainly propounded by 
scholars o f political economy. Their hypotheses include:
•Taiwanese, versus Mainlanders, held a comparative advantage in the small business 
world, where networks, familiarity and trust are required.581
• th e  KMT state tried to create an ‘unspoken alliance' with the petty bourgeoisie, the 
result being that the state left small business alone without interference.582
•an y  explanation of Taiwan's growth amidst stability must start with the Nationalist 
party-state, which effectively led sustained economic development.58j
581 See Marshall Johnson, ‘Classification, Power, and Markets: Waning of the Ethnic Division of Labour’, 
in Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. M. Kau (eds.) Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (Armonk, M. 
E. Sharpe, Inc, 1992), p. 81.
582 See Hill Gates, ‘Small Fortunes: Class and Society in Taiwan”, in Denis Fred Simon and Michael Y. 
M. Kau (eds.) Taiwan: Beyond the Economic Miracle (Armonk, M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1992), p. 178; See 
Susan Greenhalgh, ‘de-Oreintalizing the Chinese Family Firm’, American Ethnologist, vol. 21, no. 4 
(1994), pp.766-767; Alice Amsden, , ‘Big Business and Urban Congestion in Taiwan: the Orgins of 
Small Enterprise and Regionally Decentralized Industry’, World Development, vol. 19, no. 9 (Sept. 1991),
p.1122, 1126.
~83 See Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk, New York/London: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1986), p. 122.
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•local factions could reap great benefits if they maintained good connections with the
, 584government.
Their analysis is close to reality, but they ignore two important aspects: the social 
institutions and market forces, which might resist any intervention of political power and 
therefore will weaken any policy intentions from above. In Chapter Two we have argued 
that the open economy in the 1960s offered the less educated, mainly Taiwanese whose 
family background was not as good as the Mainlanders another path to be upwardly 
mobile. This ethnic economic division had nothing to do with primordial ethnicity, but 
was constructed upon political power. Yet at the same time, the numerous small and 
medium enterprises are the result of economic development instead of a policy result, as 
Donald DeGlopper has argued.585 Nor had the Nationalist state the intention to create an 
'unspoken alliance' with small and medium-sized enterprises, as we have shown in 
Chapter One that most financial assistance in the 1950s went to big business because of 
its close alliance with the KMT regime.
All the same, the government's means of control created a space for people to exploit 
the regulations. The underground economy was the symbiotic product of government 
regulations. In the study of the ‘entrustment program’ in Chapter Four, we also saw that 
businesspeople exploited it to make huge profits from the government's cotton rationing. 
So, too, SMEs benefited from the regulated financial system to evade tax (Chapter 
Three). But this does not mean that one could exploit and profit from the regulations 
indefinitely. Market forces will constrain such exploitation, just as the saturation o f the 
domestic textile market after 1954 drove many SMEs to dump their products at a loss. 
While intervention occurred in the market, the market could not be totally controlled.
This ‘governed market’ school of scholarship often ignores the widespread 
corruption, tax evasion, embezzlements and bribery in Taiwan's business and government
384 See Chen Mingtong, Ouyuxing Lianhe Duzhan Jingji, Difang Paixi yu Shengyiyuan Xuanju: Yixiang 
shengyiyuan houxuanren beijing ziliao de fenxi (Regional Oligopoly, Local Factions and Provincial 
Assembly Elections: an analysis o f the background o f candidates), unpublished paper, 1989:12; Chen 
Dong-sheng, Jin Ouan Chengshi—Difang Paixi, Caituan yu Taibei Duhui Fazhan de Shehuixue Fenxi 
(Money+Power City—A Sociological Analysis o f  Local Factions, Zaibatsu and Taipei Metropolitan 
Development) (Taipei: Juliu Chubanshe, 1995).
585 See Donald R. DeGlopper, ‘Artisan Work and Life in Taiwan’, Modern China, vol. 5, no. 3 (July 
1979), p. 286.
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relationships. In Chapter Three and Four, we showed that to deal with the government 
bureaucracy it is necessary for a company to engage in such practices. The market is 
'governed', but it has not thereby necessarily become more efficient. These activities are 
part of an 'unseen' market which could destroy any policy intentions claimed by the 
government.
7.2.4 The Paradox between the Market and Society
We ought not idealise the market’s magic power, nor the strong state’s capacity, nor 
traditional cultural values. These factors’ influence is not linear, nor possess any 
‘mechanical causality’. We rather see the relationships between these factors as 
dialectical, showing the paradox of how different social forces as these work on 
individuals and organisations.
Many scholars have explored the basic contradiction underlying capitalist society, i.e., 
accumulation and legitimacy. Karl Polanyi used this concept to explain the rise o f 
fascism, and the meaning of freedom in modem society.586 James O’Connor argued that 
the fiscal crisis of the welfare state could not be resolved because the state has to spend 
money to support economic development on the one hand, and to provide welfare to save 
labourers from pauperisation on the other. The state could not raise taxes to pay for its 
expenditures, for this will discourage capital investment. In other words, the capitalist 
society’s method is ‘to socialise cost, but to privatise profits’.587 Jurgen Habermas used 
the same concepts to analyse the dilemma o f the modem capitalist state.588
But up to now it seems no one in Taiwan has tried to analyse the dilemma of certain 
social institutions or organisations in the interstices between market forces and social 
values, or more precisely, the institutional changes in the process of economic 
development. If the dissertation has any theoretical contribution, it would be here. 
Throughout the thesis, I tried to discover what contradictory effects a given policy or set 
o f social institutions would produce in Taiwan. The ethnicised class structure in the 
1950s helped the next generation o f Mainlanders pursue white collar jobs, but they also
~86 See Karl Polanyi, op. cit., pp. 383-392.
58 See James O’Connor, op. cit., pp. 5-10.
588 See Jurgen Habermas/ tr. by Thomas McCarthy, Legitimation Crisis (Legitimationsprobleme im 
Spaetkapitalismus) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).
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lost the chance to pursue economic opportunities in the 1960s, when the world economy 
offered a congenial business environment. The economic development promotion policies 
reduced companies’ production costs, but at the same time supplied those firms with 
tools to ‘make money from the state’, as with the financial aid to SMEs or the export tax 
rebate.589 Workers in Taiwan acquired their jobs through social networks, which in turn 
also became a tool for the capitalists to deal with the labour movement, and produced a 
high turnover rate of workers. And we have seen how the family firm tries to take care of 
its family members, but how this could result in employing inefficient members, which in 
turn reduces its competitiveness in the market, and produces conflicts within the family. 
Broad social networks help one’s business, but at the same time require one to fulfil 
responsibilities to the network, which become a business cost.
In the Introduction, I cited Duerrenmatt’s words: paradox reveals the truth. There are 
no linear relationships in human affairs; only from contradictions can we see the basic 
problems of a society. Taiwan’s experience in the past illustrates how people adjust 
themselves to the impact of different powerful forces. No single force could generate this 
great transformation. Accompanying the conflicts and economic development, people 
have learned how to deal with different situations wrought by an admixture of political, 
social and economic forces. By solving the contradictions arising from the structures they 
created, they are writing their own history, and generating further paradoxes. As Karl 
Polanyi noted, though it deprives us of our freedom, we have to face social reality, and 
accept it without complaining, and if so, it will give us the courage and strength to fight 
against injustice and limitations. These limitations give us the insight: we lose old 
freedoms, which are just illusions (by this, Polanyi means the freedom of contract 
proposed by liberalism), and the new freedom we obtain is real.590
589 The import tax would be given back if a company used the imported goods to produce goods and 
export it. Quite often they imported materials and sold it in domestic market. At the same time, they 
exported rubbish, but claimed that they had used the materials and exported it, so that they could claim 
back the import tax. In business community, it is called ‘profit two hands’— profit from domestic sale, 
and from export tax rebate. Many Taiwanese companies use the same strategies when they invest in 
China nowadays.
590 Karl Polanyi, op. cit., p. 392.
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Appendix 1 Background of Interviewees
Date of 
B irth
Education F a th e r’s O ccupation Siblings C hildren Company W orkers
1938 College Tailor 2 2M, IF Construction Put-out
1936 Primary Fisherman 7 IM , 5F Construction Put-out
1949 College Boss of a Factory 4 Fertiliser 20-30
1952 Primary Farmer 8 Auto Parts 7
1949 Primary Peddler 7 3M Printing 2
1946 Senior Vocational 
High School
Died at eight years old/ 
brought up by his brother
? IM, 4F Machinery 12
1942 Junior High School Driver 7 2M, IF Plastic Tube 15
1949 College Boss of a Small Shop 8 2F, 5F Printing 30-40
1941 Primary Tailor 8 IM, 4F Kitchen
Wares
16
1928 Primary Short-term Worker 5 3M, IF Construction Put-out
1940 College Commerce 3 2M Metal Parts 200
1938 Senior High 
School
Doctor of Chinese 
Medicine
6 2M, IF Publication 15-20
1930 Senior Vocational 
High School
Worker in a Newspaper 
Co.
? 2M, IF Toys, Phones 250
1933 Primary ? ? 2M, IF Shoes 200-220
1949 Senior High 
School
Short-term WTorker 8 3F Publication 30
193? University ? ? 3F Auto Parts 80
1963 Junior High School ? 10 2M Machinery 20
1939 College Landlord ? IM , 2F Plastics 50-60
1951 Primary Landlord 9 ? Kitchen
Wares
30-40
1954 Senior Vocational 
High School
Secretary to a M anager of 
a Public Textile 
Enterprise
4 2F Electronics 70
1947 Junior High School Died/ Brought up by 
Grandmother
• 0 IM , 2F Machinery 30
1941 Junior Vocational 
High School
Farmer 7 2M, 2F Textile 50-60
1952 Senior Vocational 
High School
M anager of a Trading Co. 3 3M, IF Electronics 25
1939 Primary Boss of a Factory 4 1M, IF Fertiliser 5
1952 University Civil Servant 2F Motorcycle 150
1950 Junior Vocational 
High School
Boss of a Rice Factory 5 IM, 2F Machinery 50
1933 Senior Vocational 
High School
Businessman 7 2M, IF Carton 35
1952 University Civil Servant ? 2M Construction 50
1951 College Farmer 4 1M Cement 200
1945 Primary Tenant Farmer 3 2M, IF Metal
Moulding
15
1944 Primary Fisherman 8 IM, 2F Machinery 160
1930 Primary Farmer 3M, 2F Steel
Processing
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1943 Senior Vocational 
High School
Fisherman 4 IM , 3F Textile 17
1921 Primary Farmer 6 IM , 4F Furniture 0
1935 Primary Boss of a Factory 5 3M Iron Products 5
1949 Primary Landlord 7 2M, IF Food 120
1955 Senior High 
School
Farmer ? 2M Electronics 65
1939 Senior High 
School
? ? IM, 3F Trading co. 5
1956 Senior Vocational 
High School
Farmer 10 1M, IF Cans 35
1953 University Civil Servant 5 2M Trading co. 6
1951 University Farmer ? 2M Electronics 60
1948 University Teacher ? 2M, IF Electronics 15
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Appendix 2 Data Analysis
Table 1.8 and 1.9 are made from ‘A General Survey of Social Change in Taiwan”591 
of 1989-90 and 1991-92. Each time they had two different questionnaires. In the two 
questionnaires of 1989-90 and the first questionnaire of 1991-92 it asks informants two 
questions: what was your father’s occupation when you were eighteen years old (fifteen 
years old in 1991-92)? What was your first occupation? In the second questionnaire it 
asks only father’s occupation when the informant was fifteen years old. To get the 
occupation structures in the 1950s, I select those informants bom between 1931 and 
1942 for the survey of 1989-90 and that between 1935 and 1946 to be my samples. When 
they were 18 or 15 years old, they were in the 1950s and we can pool their fathers’ and 
their occupations as analysing data. In total I got 2,545 samples from these pooling. 
Because the old generation engaged more in primary industry, and young generation 
shifted to secondary or tertiary industry, so the pooling can show the occupation 
structures of these two generations. One problem is that the second questionnaire of 
1991-92 do not include the question ‘what was your first occupation’, so the samples of 
old generation will be higher. I compare the percentage of the samples distributed in the 
different industries with official statistics in 1952 and 1955, and find the tertiary labour 
force in my samples is higher than official data. If we consider the official data did not 
include soldiers in the labour force statistics until 1968, we can say that the percentage of 
tertiary industry should be higher in the official data. In 1956 the number of soldiers were 
about 270,000, and the total labour force excluding soldiers were 3,231,000 (1955).592 If 
we include soldiers in the data, the percentage of tertiary industry in total labour force 
was about 36% which is higher than that of my samples. Another way to check the 
sample is to deduct the soldiers from the samples and calculate the percentage of tertiary 
industry which is 30%, very close to the official data which is 28.4% in 1955. So basically 
the data is not so biased.
Another problem is that not all informants’ first jobs was found in the 1950s. Some
591 The data analysed in the paper were collected by the research project, ‘A General Survey of Social 
Change in Taiwan” funded through grant from National Science Council, Republic of China (NSA-73- 
0301-H001-18). The research project was conducted by Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica under 
the directorship of Professor Kuo-shu Yang and Hei-yuan Chiu, the view expressed herein are the 
author’s own.
592 See Li Dong-ming, A Study on Social Increase o f  Population in Taiwan (Taiwan: Taiwan Population 
Studies Centre, Taiwan Provincial Department of Health, 1968), pp.61. Gupu Xiaoxiong (ed.), Taiwan de 
Gongyehua: Guoji Jiagong Jidi de Xingcheng (Taiwan Industrialisation: the Formation of 
International Processing Base) (translated from Japanese by Lei Hui-ying) (Taipei: Renjian Chubanshe, 
1992), pp.246, appendix table 5.
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had the job before 1950 and some after 1960. So here I have to make an assumption that 
it is randomly distributed so that the expectation of the first working year is in the 1950s.
One more problem is that Mainlanders in the samples were under-represented. 
Mainlander was about 12% of total Taiwan population, but in my sample, it is only 6.1%. 
Though it is under-represented, but it will not affect the inference for analysing their 
occupation distribution as one-specific group.
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